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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 22 มิ.ย. 2024
- 👉Original Video: • Bernard Montgomery: Th...
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My father was a British Army captain who fought with the Americans in the Battle of the Bulge in late 1944 (and got a Bronze Star from your lot!) and later was in Montgomery's army that liberated Denmark (he was also a spectator at the Nurenburg trials). In 1995 the Danish government invited my Dad and others back to celebrate 50 years since the liberation. He told me that a teenage Dane came up to him in the streets of Copenhagen just to thank him for what he did. He liked that. And he lived to be 97. Died in 2015.
In mitigation, Montgomery devised 'Market Garden' but direct overall control of it was taken out of Montgomery's hands. One of the main reasons Montgomery was liked so much by his troops was that due to his WW1 experiences, he didn't waste lives tike some of his predecessors and one other particular American glory hunter!
Absolutely correct. Browning and Montgomery devised the original all-British (and Polish) airborne operation COMET, and after Montgomery cancelled COMET due to the presence of the II.SS-Panzerkorps near Arnhem also devised the outline for provisional operation SIXTEEN by adding the two American airborne divisions, approved by Eisenhower, and then handed over to the American USAAF officers in charge of 1st Allied Airborne Army and the US Troop Carrier Command for the final plan named MARKET. This plan was out of Browning's control and Montgomery did not intervene in order to avoid another row with American commanders, but obviously that still means he can get blamed by Hollywood.
I was recently on Bowmore, a village on the island of Islay in Scotland. In the church there is a memorial tablet to the young men of the village who were killed in WW1. There are 48 names on it. The corresponding tablet for WW2 has just 6 names. That’s because Montgomery was careful with their lives.
My Grandad was a recipient of the Distinguished Conduct Medal, Field Marshall Montgomery's signature was on his recommendation letter.
You will notice that his beret has two cap badges. The only soldier to do so. The cap was a tank regiment beret that was presented to him, even though he never served in them and he left the badge on. The other is his his General Officers badge. He also used to wear an Australian army slouch hat that had been presented to him. Just another thing about him was he didn't give a toss about dress regulations.
Two things win wars - Logistics and the pragmatic use of those logistics.
My dad was his driver and bodyguard when Monty was visiting his area in North Africa and Palestine
Hey Connor. They were all men of their time faced with an unimaginable situation. Hindsight and perspective are wonderful things. 😻🙏❤️
Patton was a glory hunter who usually turned up AFTER the event and claimed glory as the ranking Genral
My maternal grandfather fought under Monty. He thought him a tactical genius and saviour of the Eighth Army.
Montgomery understood the art of war far better than most of his peers alas he never mastered the art of delivering his message to those peers in a manner not destined to upset/annoy them. He made his own bad headlines far too often but rarely was it justified as a result of his ability to win a battle usually only ever justified or administered as a reasult of his personality flaws and professional envy.
Connor, you are quite a deep thinker, and. made some very perceptive comments about why some countries become powerful and the danger of becoming complacent.
What's quite funny is that the Montgomery Family came from France, possibly with William the Conqueror. There remain in the south of Normandy two villages which were part of the Montgomery stronghold, Sainte-Foi-de-Montgomery and possibly Saint-germain-de-Montgomery, the mount Gomery would have been a small hill where minerals were extracted gum (pine sap). Moreover, not very far from there in the small town of Vimoutier a German Tiger Panzer V, would have been destroyed on his birthday and would have been given to him as a gift (this is probably a legend) nevertheless this Panzer Tiger is still in roadside exposure.
I always understood that Montgomery's family came from Ireland.
@@valeriedavidson2785 Between 1066 and 1944 they had time to move around and then the families grew, one branch could settle in Ireland, another in Scotland or the USA and perhaps until the end of the 100 years war part of the family retained its stronghold in Normandy?
@@valeriedavidson2785 - the origin of the name is French, Montgomery's father came from Donegal where he was a Church of Ireland minister. His mother's name was Farrar, which is middle English.
@@CROM-on1bz That was a very long time ago. The Norman's were Scandanavians if you want to be pedantic
@@valeriedavidson2785 No, if I want to be really pedantic or downright boring, I would say that the Scandinavians are mostly Indo-European and come from a region that would be present-day Ukraine. That’s being really pedantic.😉
No you never said anything wrong you said everything right I enjoyed watching the video thank you
24:15 - Eisenhower did not "decide" to take command of the land forces from Montgomery - it was always planned that Montgomery would be Land Forces commander only for the invasion and set piece battle of Normandy, the conclusion of which was marked by the liberation of Paris, which happened two weeks earlier than the predicted D+90. In fact on D+90, 4 September, Antwerp was liberated. By this time, they would have three Army Groups in France after landing in Normandy with just two armies. Sorry, but Simon Whistler's videos are characterised by very shallow research - inevitable when you consider how many topics he covers - he's obviously not an expert on any of them.
24:24 - Montgomery was right about Eisenhower being remote, he was still on the Cotentin peninsula in Normandy until moving to Versailles west of Paris just before MARKET GARDEN, while Montgomery had his Tactical HQ beyond Brussels by September.
26:38 - Montgomery did not admit MARKET GARDEN was a mistake - he said he made a mistake in thinking the Canadian 1st Army would be able to clear the Scheldt estuary on their own while he was going for the Ruhr with British 2nd Army. Whistler is hopeless.
Montgomery wrote after the war - 'In my - prejudiced - view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN’s unrepentant advocate.' (Montgomry Memoirs, 1959).
For Eisenhower's part, he felt he had to set the record straight in 1974:
'Eisenhower was similarly unapologetic when he declared after the publication of Cornelius Ryan's best-selling account, A Bridge Too Far, “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” ' (Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015)
27:50 - I think the victory celebrations in Paris sound more like an American celebration than a French one. I think Eisenhower should have left De Gaulle to have his moment with his own people in Paris. I have no idea if that was Montgomery's reason for not going, but it would probably be mine. I would rather wait until we really had something to celebrate in Berlin.
29:48 - "portraying himself as the man who rode in and saved the day" - but it's okay when the Americans do that? Seems that Simon doesn't get the irony either.
Could not agree more - Whistler (whom I have enjoyed listening to on other subjects/offerings has just jumped on the "Ignore the facts to fit in with US PR bullshit" bandwagon. It's far too easily forgotten (especially by those whose only source of reference is Cornelius Ryan) that if Gavin had captured the bridge at Nijmegen which was his purpose for being there in the first place then the armour could have made the last 8 miles almost certainly within the parameter set for such and in time to prevent the loss of so many British and Polish paras) I cannot help but think if the positions had been reversed and it was the Briitsh airborn div's responsibility to take the Nijmegen bridge and it was US paratroopers waiting for armoured relief at Arnhem and the British commander did everything but attack the bridge then that British commander would never have commanded men again. What happened to Gavin. Having said that Browning should also have been cashiered as he gave the green light to what Gavin was doing - which was chasing non existent panzers around the heights above the valley. Market Garden but for Gavin could have seen the allies across the Rhine with a bridgehead ready to charge into the Ruhr valley if required and to have cut the Germans off in Holland by making it to the sea to the north. This would have left Hamburg and the approaches to Denmark wide open and still with a force large enough to make a race for Berlin (maybe) Of all the reasons the op could and did go wrong only one was insurmountable once it was made and that was the bridge at Nijmegen - all the other problems had been overcome to some degree. Hindisight eh!?
@@Scaleyback317 - thank you. Have to say I don't trust Simon Whistler at all - he's a professional TH-camr and not an expert on any of the topics he covers, and this is exposed if he does a topic you're already familiar with in detail. Some people swear by him, but it's like reading Cornelius Ryan (both are politically biased) and thinking you now have a detailed knowledge of MARKET GARDEN. Ryan was an Irish newspaper journalist who stopped digging when he got his 'story', and he seemed to be interested in blaming the British officers involved in the operation and protected the American ones from any criticism by leaving out anything negative about their involvement.
Ryan does not explain that Browning and Montgomery devised the original Arnhem airborne operation called COMET, which was an all-British affair involving the 1st Airborne Division landing at Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave, with only the attached Polish Brigade and an American Troop Carrier Group as the non-British elements involved. COMET was delayed from 8-10 September by weather and then cancelled by Montgomery at 0200 hours on 10 September when he received reports II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the Arnhem target area and realised COMET was not strong enough to deal with them. He and Browning then met to draw up an outline proposal called operation SIXTEEN (COMET had originally been FIFTEEN) by adding the two American airborne divisions and Montgomery presented this to Eisenhower at a scheduled meeting the same day to get his approval. Having the Americans take Eindhoven, Grave and Nijmegen, would enable the British and Polish airborne, with their considerable anti-tank gun resources (the US units had more field artillery) to concentrate at Arnhem to counter the armoured threat.
The outline was then taken by Browning back to 1st Allied Airborne Army in England for detailed planning, and this is where the Americans took control and started making compromises to protect their own air assets at the expense of the airborne troops' requirements. USAAF Generals Brereton (1st AAA commander) and Williams (US IX Troop Carrier Command) deleted the double airlift on D-Day and removed Browning's proposed dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges. These were key elements of Browning's COMET concept and he had warned Dempsey (British 2nd Army) that COMET should not go ahead without the glider assaults to put troops directly onto the key bridge objectives, so they were carried over into the SIXTEEN outline.
Browning could not object to these elements of his plan being removed because he had already threatened to resign over a previous Brereton operation called LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges) having too short notice to print and distribute maps, and couldn't do so again. Brereton had planned to accept Browning's resignation as his deputy in 1st AAA and replace him with Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. Fortunately for all concerned, LINNET II was cancelled, so Browning withdrew his letter and both men agreed to forget the incident, but Browning now knew he had no power to influence the air plan for Brereton's final MARKET operation. The only thing he could do was make a last-minute change to advance the transport of his Corps HQ to Groesbeek from the 2nd airlift (now on D+1) to the first, delaying some anti-tank assets going to Arnhem. He is accused of going on an ego-trip for this, but he was clearly concerned with the Nijmegen mission and wanted to be there for the critical first 24 hours.
Gavin's interview with Cornelius Ryan revealed quite a bit that was not in Ryan's book, for example:
'The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.'
(Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 - James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
- So Browning was trying to replace the glider coup de main by having Gavin drop a battalion there instead, but Gavin decided against it, and Browning could not make it an order - military discipline did not cross national boundaries and many people forget this. But Gavin did want to seize the bridge as an objective on D-Day, and this part of the interview is in A Bridge Too Far, but without the criticism of Colonel Lindquist [my square brackets]:
'Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight.
He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.”
Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.'
- This is backed up by more recent literature by American historian John C. McManus in September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012):
'As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” '
- There follows an excellent analysis of why the bridge and the ridge were both important, but the bridge was the more perishable asset and had to be a priority even if the ridge is taken first, then McManus continues:
'General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance.
At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote.
Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." '
Cont...
@@Scaleyback317 - cont...
- Phil Nordyke is an historian of the 82nd Airborne and has written three regimental histories I do recommend. His combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012) is very revealing not only for what went wrong at Nijmegen, but the whole backstory of Lindquist's poor performance in Normandy is essential to understand the 'why' of it. He also has another witness to the divisional briefing and what transpired on the ground at Groesbeek:
Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation."
Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
- So this should answer your question what happened to Gavin - he was working under constraints imposed by Brereton - he would not alter the air plan for Gavin any more than he would for Browning - and he was concerned with his experience of a scattered drop in Sicily and about the intelligence reports of German armour in the Reichswald.
On the latter point about the Reichswald, I have made a recent discovery that explains it. In the Cornelius Ryan Collection, box 101, folder 9, page 48 - Gavin writes to Cornelius Ryan a covering letter in 1966 to enclose some papers written by Dutch researcher Colonel T.A. Boeree (I have his book written with Cornelius Bauer called The Battle of Arnhem, 1966 and originally in Dutch as De Slag By Arnhem, 1963), and Gavin had suddenly realised something significant:
November 18, 1966
Dear Connie:
Here's a paper which I received quite a long time ago from T. A. Boeree. On page 4a it gives the route of march of the Hohenstaufen Division to positions north of Arnhem. One of its stops was at Nijmegen and, according to the intelligence we had, in the Reichswald.
As I believe I told you, when I talked to you about Operation Market at one time, the British originally planned to parachute into Nijmegen and they were working with Bestebreurtje on their planning when I was called to Brereton's headquarters on September 10 and given the mission for the 82nd. Immediately following that meeting, I went over to the British headquarters. Their intelligence was that there were very heavy German armored forces in the Reichswald and they had been preparing to deal with them in their plans. It seems obvious, now, that the intelligence coming from the Dutch underground was based on armored forces intransit to north of Arnhem. I don't think that Boeree's paper will contribute much to an understanding of the outcome of Market, but I thought that you should have it in your papers.
With best regards,
[signed] James M. Gavin
- So his concern about the Reichswald influenced his decision to assign his least aggressive and experienced 508th Regiment to the Nijmegen mission, while his best 504th Regiment secured the supply line at Grave and his other experienced unit the 505th secured Groesbeek and faced the Reichswald. Arguably the best battalion in the division was Ben Vandervoort's (John Wayne in The Longest Day, 1962) 2nd Battalion 505th, and once they had cleared the northern half of Groesbeek and taken Hill 81.8 above the town, became division reserve near the Division CP in case of trouble.
I think some of Gavin's mistakes are now understandable, but he still made some critical mistakes in ignoring Browning's advice, which I think has now come out of the post-Cornelius Ryan narrative in much better shape - he won his DSO (just missing out on a VC) as a young Lieutenant handling several companies that had lost their officers in the 1917 battle of Cambrai, when Gavin was just 10 years old. He did everything he could to ensure the success of operation MARKET, but was frankly frustrated by American officers at every level.
@@davemac1197 Thank you for a well thought out and detailled explanation. There is food for thought there especially as I have never accepted the US version of events - I dated many years ago a girl whose father was one of the glider pilots. He rarely spoke of his acitons/experiences but he did stick to the phrase don't believe a single word those who have a living to make from adhering to the US centric version of events. They messed it all up at Nijmegen and it was easy for them to blame everyone else except an American for what went wrong.
Years later I was to walk that 8 mile road and have repeated it since. I spoke with local Dutchmen who were directly and indirectly involved and one thing came through from so many of them was that if the Americans had attacked the bridge it would have been taken as there was only a couple of dozen defenders on or near it. One point blank told me - they have blamed Montgomery and the British for the loss but it was the Americans who f----- up the planning and the operation. Those words stuck with me. I recognized the film as entertainment value with only a nod toward accuracy and realized it was an excuse to pin the blame on someone else.
I have always considered it was firstly Gavin who was to blame as he was the commander on the spot and secondly Browining as he could and probably should have reined Gavin in - you have caused me to doubt that and at some point I will have to revisit the issue and do more research taking the sources you have offered up into account. If only there were more time eh!?
Thank you once again.
@@Scaleyback317 - thank you for the kind words. I usually get a different reaction from the "ra-ra go 82nd!" brigade across the Atlantic, although I did get a response from a current or recently serving veteran of that division who told me that nothing has changed and the division is still engaged in covering its own "ass" today.
My contention today is that Gavin is not alone in being at fault, and that superior and junior officers in his own chain of command were complicit - as usual a tragedy is not one man's fault but a perfect storm of many in a chain of bad decisions. Browning, on the other hand, I think can be exhonerated from most if not all criticisms levelled at him, and most of the evidence is freely available:
The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied operational command in northwest Europe, 1944 (Roger Cirillo PhD Thesis, 2001 Cranfield University, College of Defence Technology, Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis). Roger Cirillo is an American military historian, but as you can see he obtained his PhD in the UK at Cranfield studying command and control aspects of MARKET GARDEN. I'm indebted to him for the background on operation LINNET II in particular, which shows how Browning was sidelined politically by Brereton within 1st Allied Airborne Army. The thesis is a free pdf download from the university and you can easily find it with a web search on Roger Cirillo Market Garden.
On the subject of free pdf downloads, another one that I think very much supports Browning and rebutts his Corps Intelligence Officer Major Brian Urquhart, who was the only source in 1967 for Cornelius Ryan's telling of the aerial photo story showing German armour near Arnhem. Search for Arnhem The Air Reconnaissance Story Royal Air Force, and it should be on the MoD RAF site, but now seems to only have a 2016 first edition copy on the Dutch Vrienden Airborne Museum - but it's the same booklet. The revised edition is 2019, if you can find it - maybe the MoD site is down or has removed it?
Browning had already passed away in 1965 and could not defend his decision to dismiss the photo, and the photo itself could not be located - the reason being apparently that the RAF had donated all their aerials of the Netherlands to the Dutch government to help with reconstruction and land use surveys. The collection only emerged in 2014 when the Dutch digitised their archives and put them online. The RAF's Air Historical Branch identified the likely frame (No.4015, 12 SEP 44, 541 Sqn) - I have a poster-sized copy hanging over my PC as I type this and concur with Browning's alleged first impression it's a wonderful view of the Dutch countryside. It's nothing like the oblique shot used in the Hollywood film and the RAF study explains why it would not be an oblique - they were used for point locations if you know where your target is, like bridges and barracks, not searching expanses of woodland for hidden tanks. The image appears to confirm obsolete Mark III and older Mark IV (with short 7.5cm gun) tanks, which rule out a 1944 panzer division as the likely owner. The real owner can now be identified, its location on 17 September is known, as is the fact they were shot up by aircraft and made little impact on the landings, ironically in the US divisional areas many miles from Arnhem.
I have investigated the Airborne Corps HQ establishment, and a Major would be a GSO II (General Staff Officer grade 2) and would normally be the assistant Intel Officer to a GSO I (Lieutenant Colonel). Many of the key positions in Browning's Corps HQ were unfilled and Brian Urquhart was probably out of his depth. I have the Corps report on MARKET GARDEN, which has the Corps glider loading manifest, and I can't see a GSO I (I), and the note on the GSO II (I) for Glider 4 states "owing to an accident flew in late" - so this refers to Brian Urquhart being sent on 'medical leave', and I believe he rejoined the HQ at Nijmegen on 22 September. After the war, Brian Urquhart was a civil servant who helped establish the United Nations organisation and served as Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs - a euphemism for peacekeeping operations. I only wish Browning had still been alive in 1967 and I'm sure would have robustly defended his position, at least in Ryan's interview notes, even if like so much other material he omitted it from the book.
Other references are books you would have to buy, but I think these alone are very interesting. I hope you enjoy them.
Re antibiotics. The development of these from a lab curiosity to a product which could be mass produced was done by a Brit working for Oxford University, called Norman Heatley. There may be a video somewhere about on YT re this guy; essentially millions (including me) owe their lives to his work.
Oxford wanted to patent his work; guesstimated worth £100 million in c. 1943. Normal refused. "This is my gift to humanity".
"The National Army Museum conducted a poll in 2011 to determine Britain’s greatest general. Montgomery’s name was not among the finalists."
Bernard Law Montgomery - Military History - Oxford page
Yes. Mainly I suspect because few have done any real research leaving the decision making to be done by Hollywood and films/Books which will sell in the US rather than the more limited market of the UK. Accuracy matters not a jot - writers have forgone the opportunity to be factual in order to write and promote what will sell to an American audience. Shameful for sure but there you go - that's humans for you.
A few points, sorry if it's too long-
The real lesson of ww1 was don't treat a defeated enemy too harshly. Hitler came to power on a wave of German resentment. Had we treated them fairer and rebuilt their country peacefully instead of blaming them for everything, ww2 would probably have been a short affair.
Hitler did try to get oil from Russia, but so much more. Russia was enormous with a gigantic army, one way or another, he knew he had to fight them, it was inevitable. Also, the longer he took, the more prepared Russia was, it was now or never for the Germans.
Finally, the main difference between patton and monty was nationality. They both tried to prove their country was best instead of working together.
Hope that helped
A lot of geniuses are detested by their colleagues and loved by the people they work to protect. Montgomery never did anything that would waste lives unnecessarily. He believed in risking as few lives as possible for the greatest outcome possible. He wasn’t popular but leadership in war isn’t a popularity contest. If you’re too worried about being liked by everyone then you’re the wrong person for the job and mistakes will be made. He oversaw a lot of battlefield plans but had the ultimate control taken away from him, mostly because he wasn’t liked and didn’t work well with others - geniuses and left- field thinkers often don’t. People try to put him on the autism spectrum today but there’s no direct historical evidence to support this. We’re too willing to pigeonhole people today and put them in neat little boxes. It’s possible he was simply a very intelligent man who didn’t like what he saw as foolish interference from those who weren’t of a military background. The point is we’ll never know. Yes he appears to have some autistic-like personality traits, but then so do a lot of people, it doesn’t mean that he was. He didn’t play by the rules or play well with others, especially those above him who were far away from the action. ‘Hollywood History’ (and I mean this not simply as an US thing), while praising the victors in every battle, is just as happy, if not more so, to tear them down for any mistakes that were made. Did Montgomery make errors in judgment ? Yes. Did he waste lives unnecessarily ? No.
I went to buy his house in Camberley next to the RMA Sandhurst. It needed a lot of work and was quite close to the A30. I would have liked to have bought it but at the time I needed something with no work needed.
Tasmania to Melbourne is about 650kms. Tasmania to New Zealand is about 6,500 kms.
Australia has had Aboriginals for more than 45,000 years, possibly as long as 60,000 years.
New Zealand’s native peoples are the Maori people, one of the wider Polynesian peoples of the Pacific region.
The "old men" who start wars were more often than not once "young men" who fought in wars. Hitler and Churchill were both soldiers who saw active service as young men. Montgomery had led a bayonet charge in WW1 where is was shot in the chest! It is a trite saying that actually means nothing. Germany going to Russia was not just about oil - Mein Kamp spelled it out, and Greater Germany need "living space" to grow - and that was always in the East. Poland was East and he might have deluded himself that France and Britain might not have declared war and let him go for it. Market Garden has many other issues - and its main goal was to cut off the German 15th Army and open the port of Antwerp. Logistics alone made the broad front impossible. Britain and American supply lines were separate and the British one was in slight better shape. If the Arnhem plan had happened when it was planned it would have probably worked - but the 6 month delay was fatal. Even then, if he Nijmegen bridge had been taken on the first day, it might well have worked.
10:35
You mean, inequality is food for war.
You never said a thing wrong I enjoyed watching your video goodnight
Montgomery was both right and wrong. Market Garden had been appallingly planned by Brereton and his team. Had the bridge at Nijmegen been in allied hands the XXX Corps armour could have crossed and made the last 8 miles into Arnhem in time to prevent the disaster. XXX Corps tanks made it to Nijmegen with the time parameters and then had to wait until the bridge (which was all but undefended when the paratroopers under Gavin landed there had been ignored and Gavin did everything except what he was dropped into Holland to do which was take the bridge at both ends) By the time he got round to it there was a strongly defended bridge!
Montgomery should have prioritized the Scheldt whcih could have trapped a large German force and possibly opened up Antwerp for logistics. A big error.
Patton was not fit to lace Montgomery's boots on the battlefield - what he had was a superb PR machine and a hungry audience in the US wanting to hear the PR stuff. Hard facts were secondary. Patton for all he was supposed to have acheived actually acheived very little and hindered quite a lot.
Montgomery was a difficult man add to that Patton was a difficult man and Eisenhower must have been a saint to tolerate the pair of them. The US had far better generals than Patton but it was Patton who knew how to catch the eye and the imagination. Montgomery could do neither of those things all he could do was put people's backs up. Yet his men loved him.
My only issue here is the Scheldt question. It made strategic sense to go for the Rhine crossing as soon as possible, before the Germans strengthened their new river and canal defence lines being formed in the Netherlands during September, while the Scheldt estuary was already part of Hitler's fortified Atlantic Wall defences. German units were reinforcing the Albert canal - the first defence line being formed - from the western (Antwerp) end towards the east. Montgomery's characteristic solution, recognising that a short envelopment north of Antwerp would be a tough fight, was a wider envelopment with MARKET GARDEN going north to the Zuider Zee (Ijsselmeer) coast, cutting off not just the German 15.Armee west of Antwerp, but also a majority of the WBN (German occupation forces Netherlands) west of the corrider.
Even Eisenhower, a logistician who wanted Antwerp opened to support his broad front advance into Germany, saw the sense in going for the Rhine first, while the Germans were still recovering from their withdrawal from Normandy, so after Cornelius Ryan's misleading book was published in 1974 he felt he had to set the record straight with a public statement:
Eisenhower was similarly unapologetic when he declared after the publication of Cornelius Ryan's best-selling account, A Bridge Too Far, “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” (Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015)
The all other operations included opening Antwerp. Montgomery had also been exploring options for 1st Canadian Army to clear the Schedlt while he was going to the Rhine with British 2nd Army, and in fact the Canadians were repositioning themselves around Antwerp while MARKET GARDEN was in progress in preparation for their own attacks. Montgomery had requested an airborne operation (INFATUATE) on Walcheren around 4 September when the planning for COMET was underway to support 2nd Army's advance to Grave-Nijmegen-Arnhem. COMET was the original Arnhem airborne operation involving only I British Airborne Corps units (including 1st Airborne Division and the attached Polish brigade) until cancelled and replaced with the upgraded MARKET. The operation for Walcheren would necessarily involve the available American units of Ridgway's XVIII Airborne Corps (82nd and 101st Divisions) and Brereton rejected the request on the grounds the island was too well defended and possibly feared his own airmen would misdrop American paratroopers into the North Sea and drown them. It has also been suggested he had a political objection to assisting Montgomery with exclusively American lives, whatever the reason, he thought it was suicidal and the operation came to nothing.
Operation INFATUATE was not revisited until after MARKET GARDEN in November, and was assisted by an amphibious landings instead of airborne, but the original idea was an airborne landing in September. It would be wrong to suggest Montgomery was ignoring the Scheldt and Antwerp, but he later admitted he was mistaken in thinking the Canadians would be able to clear it on their own without assistance.
The lesson is
don’t give the Germans an inch
How can he mention monty and not mention his double
There was comparatively little oil in the Soviet Union. Most of the oil fields outside of the US were in British mandated Iraq, and the Arabian peninsula. Remember also that Germany paid only a tiny fraction of the reparations after the Great War. Both Germany and Japan were effectively nationalist dictatorships.
When the Western Allies split up their portions of Germany in 1945, it turned out that the Americans got the scenery, the French got the wine, and the British got the ruins.
Hi Connor, now have a look at Montgomerys brother-in-law, Major General Sir Percy Hobart. "The Real Tank Genius of WW2" by the Fat Electrician.
He could also look at General Slim, one of the greatest and most underrated generals.
Hi Connor , unfortunately there are no original Aborigines in Tasmania the NICE 😤🥺😔Colonists wiped them out either by disease , killed , or forced them to leave Tasmania , 3% they now live mainly on mainland Australia they were Nomads and made makeshift homes to go to the next place to live ,they looked after the land and respecting it for when they returned they lived on the land to feed themselves Hunting berries etc themselves 👏👌 Whereas in NZ the Māori population is 18% and are of Polynesian decent and built dwelling structures farmed hunted and again looked after the land and respected it hope that answered your question ,I live in Australia by the way 🤷♀️
The reason you keep backtracking on everything you previously said is because you don't pay attention. Listen more actively and wait (most of the important information is contained in the latter part of sentences) to gather your thoughts.
Simon talks too fast. He needs to slow down.
He also needs to not murder the French language, Caen and bocage and Dutch, Nijmegen.
He also needs to not murder the French language, Caen and bocage and Dutch, Nijmegen.
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