As rafilosofo pointed out in earlier comment, it would certainly seem that the metanarrative idea is itself a proposed metanarrative. I don't know anything about Lyotard or postmodernism, but this would seem to pretty well parallel the idea that we operate with a hierarchy of theories. For example, we have narrow , explicit theories (a scientific theory of Covid, e.g.); and we have broad tacit theories (I am not just a brain in a vat). I guess I don't see how the assumption of metanarrative advances what I will call the "theory of theories" approach.
Thank your explaining metanarrative in such simple words. I used to believe the metanarrative that I can't understand videos by English speakers and would watch videos by our native speakers😎
Assuming that the metanarrative idea is itself a metanarrative, one might - tongue in cheek - characterize Lyotard's position thusly: "Keeping in mind that I may be wrong, I just wish to take this opportunity to point out that the previously prevailing hierarchy of theories, in which we always allow for the probability that any theory may be wrong, may itself be wrong."
.. which implies that we don't have to allow for wrong theories. If that is the case, modernism is more right than it ever pretended to be and post-modernism is completely dead and buried. It's a ridiculous statement, since that rule of the scientific method has proven its value for centuries. From a pragmatic view, there is no reason at all to throw it out - or even doubt it. To me it's another proof of the inherent inconsistency of post-modern philosophy.
And why we couldn't call the postmodernism a metanarrative? (yes, this would be the opposite of what they say, but call in that way as critics) Since Lyotard write about it, we can think that this view is a worldview to understand the experience of theories and narratives.
I had thought about that. I'm not sure. I guess the idea that our experiences can be explained in many different ways and can have different meaning could be a way of interpreting experiences, but i'm not sure.
I think you're absolutely right. Postmodernists may deny it, but they have a metanarrative, and I call that metanarrative "incommensurablism", because its central thesis is that no opinions of any sort can be compared or measured against each other to see which is more or less correct than the other. And what they call "Modernism" is not just the opposite of that (commensurablism, the view that opinions of any sort can be compared or measured against each other to see which is more or less correct than the other), but a sort of parody thereof, which parody *does* collapse upon itself and end up entailing incommensurablism. If you take "objective" to mean whatever is *beyond any* mere appearances (rather than just *according with all* appearances), and you take being "skeptical" to mean rejecting everything we *don't* have solid reasons to *accept* (rather than just rejecting anything we *do* have solid reasons to *reject* ), you end up forced to conclude on the first hand that there is nothing but anybody's word to go on for anything objective and so all opinions thereupon are beyond question (dogmatism), and on the second hand that there couldn't possibly be grounds upon which to justify any opinion about such so none of them are correct either (relativism). In other words "objectivism" as in transcendentalism entails dogmatism, and "skepticism" as in justificationism entails relativism, and such dogmatic relativism is exactly what constitutes incommensurablism, i.e. "Postmodernism". Furthermore their relativism is anti-objective and their dogmatism is anti-skeptical, so their respective conclusions each undermine the other premise, and they conclude that "objective" and "skeptical" premises they started from, which they dub "Modernism", are self-defeating. But that line of argument says nothing against mere "objectivism" as in (non-transcendent) universalism, or "skepticism" as in (non-justificationist) criticism, which they simply ignore, and *those* together constitute the real opposite of their position, commensurablism. Those together do still entail a subset of their subjectivist and fideistic conclusions too, however: criticism demands phenomenalism (anti-transcendentalism), and universalism demands what I call "liberalism" (anti-justificationism). So even on a commensurablist account, everyone is free to think what they like "on faith" and agree to disagree... but, only until someone shows some critical reason why one opinion is worse than another. Which still can only be done by appeal to "subjective" appearances... but, only appearances that appear that way to everyone, universally.
According to the annotation on a recent issue of Existential Comics (#392, A Postmodern Villain), 'postmodern theorists thought "postmodernism" was bad. They weren't advocating for it!' and Lyotard in particular (who is the titular "Postmodern Villain" in that comic) 'saw a broad movement in the culture where the majority of the intellectuals and the population at large no longer believed in "grand metanarratives".' This seems to conflict with the presentation here that seems to say that postmodernists like Lyotard were *advocating* for an incredulity to metanarratives, rather than just noting that there in fact does (or did at their time) exist in society such an incredulity already.
As I note in the first video in this series, there is a distinction between framing postmodernism as an ethical hypothesis (postmodernism should be true), and framing postmodernism as a metaphysical hypothesis (postmodernism is true, even if it is bad). Lyotard is doing the second: noting, and lamenting the loss of epistemic coherence that comes with metanarratives, but he is saying that this postmodern condition does exist even so. The fallacy that Existential Comics is highlighting is that people often think Lyotard is making the ethical claim (that postmodernism is good), when he is in fact making the metaphysical claim (that postmodernism is true).
@@CarneadesOfCyrene I’m not sure if it’s just a terminological issue, but to my ear saying “postmodernism is true” as a “metaphysical” claim sounds like the same thing as advocating an incredulity to metanarraratives. Saying “postmodernism is good” would be something beyond that, sure, but there is also something less than that: saying “lots of people are incredulous toward metanarratives”, or “postmodernism is popular right now”, without yourself saying even that it is metaphysically true that there is no independent way to adjudicate between metanarratives. The comic seems to suggest that Lyotard et al say only that (what we now call) postmodernism is popular, not that its claims (that there is no independent way to adjudicate between metanarratives) are true, just that they are widely believed.
It seems weird to me that definition. I had a different notion that the metanarrative is "meta" because is a narrative about narratives. In this way of thinking i would see this way of understanding particular experiences as a narrative and the view about narratives as the metanarrative. So the classical macanics would not be a metanarrative, but the metanarrative would be the broader modern thinking that this science is a part. I think I associate this maybe with the Foucault's concept of episteme. This make any sense? 🤣 Or I'm talking bullshit? I did not read Lyotard hahaha
No I definitely have to agree. The way "metanarrative" is defined here seems rather.. Pretentious and obsolete. Like you implied; the given examples for politics or sociology seem more simple like narratives that contextualise individual experiences. That's it. Calling this level of analysis or comprehension or perspective "meta" is a bit off. Whereas, for example, comparing multiple narratives for one and the same experience seems more fitting for such a term as "metanarrative".
To think that no metanarrative is better or worse than any other metanarrative is simply to give up on even trying to improve one's worldview. It's a relativism that gives free reign to all dogmatism, and a dogmatism that cloaks itself in the armor of relativism. It's a way for someone to say "you can't criticize me! there's no such thing as right or wrong! so I get to call myself right and you wrong and you don't get to question that!" That's importantly different from the much more sensible "of course I think that I'm right and that if you disagree you're wrong -- I wouldn't think something I thought was wrong -- but I'm open to the possibility that I might be missing something, if you can show me what it is, and I don't expect you to change your mind until I show you what I think you're missing". Liberty of thought, agreeing to disagree until reason is shown to prefer one view over another, is not the same thing as dogmatic immunity to all questioning.
I'd like to see a response to this comment from the creator. I'm not all that well-versed in pomo (if I was, why would I be watching this video?) and that was my immediate reaction too. Hopefully the upcoming video on truth clears up some of my confusion about the epistemology at play here -- even SEP is pretty damn vague, sadly. I worry that this video may have missed the essence of most postmodern thinkers.
I suppose there is some wiggle room left in the description of postmodern views of metanarratives in the video to judge things on other qualities - for instance, you can still evaluate a work of art on your response to it or what it represents, etc. even if there is clearly no objectively correct method of creating art. I'm absolutely not sure of this but it seems to be plausible (and anyway, I'm struggling from the outset of writing this comment since I'm talking about a nigh-on undefineable movement with wildly individual viewpoints - Baudrillard and Foucault are *obviously* a contrast). Oh yeah, I also always understood PMs as being *extremely skeptical* of metanarratives rather than outright rejecting them, which only leaves the truths you find in them on shaky ground rather than no ground at all.
Last thing: where is the relativism? The way I am reading the resources I have available to me is that PM is first and foremost a period or loosely defined intellectual school. It seems to me to be a little bit of a broad brush to characterize them as simply "relavists", even ignoring the below concerns with their actual views. Furthermore, I think it is a misunderstanding to say there's no possibility of truth/everything is relative in PM. While I am, as indicated above, somewhat naïve on the subject, it's clear to me that Derrida criticizes other authors (Rousseau, Levi-Strauss, etc) and that he does believe in some notion of truth. He's just attacking the preconceived notions that led those authors to find their truth (i.e. logocentrism - a metanarrative, or so I'd think). I may be wrong, and would be happen to be proven so. This is just my interpretation of the video and background knowledge.
@@joelmiles3041 This probably relates to the question I posed for Carneades in another comment to this video, about whether "postmodern" theorists are actually *advocating* for a postmodern approach, or just *observing* that society has leaned toward one. I've recently heard elsewhere that it's the latter, but this video and most other sources I've seen before suggest it is the former, and I don't know enough about the original texts myself to decide. But it makes a lot more sense if these theorists are just pointing out "we as a society have stopped agreeing on any single meta-narrative", rather than saying "no meta-narrative is objectively better or worse than any other".
Could you do a video about YOU , what you believe , your ethics , ur kind of atheism , a video about you ? . I'm sure all of us would enjoy it so much . i really do appreciate ur works bro Peace
Great question. I am a philosophical skeptic, specifically an indirect Pyrrhonian skeptic. I have an old series on the view if you are interested: th-cam.com/play/PLz0n_SjOttTcyjg1s7mrBZSW-QKTSVLrB.html
I only agree with postmodernism in the study of history. Since the metanarratives there are changing constantly (obviously due to the fragmentary nature of history)
Seems to me that postmodern thinking is a big metanarrative in itself. A way of contextualising the whole world by saying it can't necessarily be contextualised. Is this wrong?
Quick question: Is it ever proven if metanarratives are finite or infinite? I would think that a narrative can't be objectively right _only_ if there are an infinite amount of metanarratives because with a finite amount you should be able to keep distilling metanarratives inside metanarratives until you reach the "root-metanarratives" whereas an infinite amount of metanarratives you would find another metanarrative until infinity. Or, could something be said about a metanarrative being objectively false if the metanarratives used are recursive? Maybe it could be proven that petitio principii metanarratives can be called objectively false? Great video, many thoughts, looking forward to the rest of this series. PS: I assume that N, M, and P are finite, and therefore the number of sentences that we could use to construct a metanarrative.
Interesting question. Generally most consider there to be a finite number of metanarratives, at least that we are considering at any given time. The question is whether any of them are correct. The postmodernist thinks there is no right metanarrative to explain reality. To understand this take the example of an "ok" sign. The modernist might claim that there is an objective meaning to such a sign, while the postmodernist will say that its meaning is dependent on the metanarrative, and no metanarrative is more right than any other (or if you are a post-structuralist, the only reason we think one metanarrative is better than another is because of historic power dynamics). The problem is not that there are an infinite number of interpretations of an "ok" sign, but rather that those interpretations disagree (some say it means "ok", some say it means the number 3, some say it is a white supremacist gesture), and, according to the postmodernist there is no way to show which one is the "right" interpretation. There is no meta-meta-narrative to pick out what is true. For the postmodernist, philosophy (which would generally fill such a role) has lost its place as the truth telling discipline (not that the postmodernists want this to be the case, they are simply observing that it is). So the problem is not an infinite regress of metanarratives, but rather a set of branches that never reach an ultimate arbiter.
Just wanted to make a mathematical point: even with an infinite set you could get to one "root-metanarattive". Imagine that you have a tree with two branches, one finite and one infinite. The tree has infinite leaves but if you find a way to reject in block the entire branch then you're left with a finite branch.
Postmodernism is the rejection of metanarratives. That said, one might claim that postmodernism itself is a metanarrative (and therefore self-defeating). I am sympathetic to this position as it is a similar argument from the perspective of Pyrrhonians against Academic skeptics, and we will cover this objection later in the series.
Richard Rorty would disagree and say you're putting a metanarrative into the postmodernist's mouth (see "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism"). I don't think any good postmodernist would say that all viewpoints are valid. A more accurate summary of postmodern thinking, from my understanding, is that our viewpoints are shaped by the communities we find ourselves in. It's about epistemology rather than metaphysics.
I doubt anyone (apart from the lady in the joke about Versailles) believes that there is "one right language", so you must be misrepresenting modernism at least to some degree.
I loved the way you saying everything it's just a metamarrive we invent to explain why we we work I. 3 jobs sleep 4 hours per night and we can't make enough for the month, it's all metanarrative. Lol
So where does this wholesale rejection of metanarratives -- which in and of itself could also be regarded as a metanarrative -- take us? Exactly. Nowhere. Post-modernism seems to be the ideology of negative Nancy's. All they do is complain and criticize. They never come with their own ideas or ways to make things better. It's pretty much baked into the ideology. Hell, how can one even realistically live without any form of metanarratives? Because we determine value based on overarching structures. If we were to let that go, we'd all be valuing everything equally and we'd just be doing whatever we felt like in that exact moment. So the only conclusion I can come to, is that this is not a constructive way of thinking. In fact, it's exactly the opposite; it's destructive. And even if we were to accept this as a way to break down bad structures and bad metanarratives, after which we replace them with better ones, I'd still say it's useless. Because realistically you'd have to have an alternative before you start breaking things down. And if you have an alternative, why not argue from that perspective? So besides it being only destructive, it also seems to be just a political and/or rhetoric tool. It's a political tool of destruction.
There is a very important thing to understand about postmodernism that I covered in the first video in the series: it is a metaphysical not an ethical thesis. Postmodernists are NOT saying "wouldn't it be great if we got rid of metanarratives and couldn't ground any statements in objective truth anymore?" they are saying "Hey, I just checked and there is no way to ground metanarratives in objective truth, that sucks, but that's the way things are." Just because something is unappealing does not make it wrong. If the earth was about to be hit by a giant meteorite, it is clearly fallacious to respond "all these people talking about meteorites are just negative Nancies, we don't need to do anything" or "how could a meteorite be about to hit the earth, if it did we wouldn't be able to live our lives any more?" Simply because a viewpoint is destructive or unappealing does not make it incorrect. If postmodernism is the case, then there is no right metanarrative, assuming that there is a positive viewpoint is begging the question against postmodernism. You might be happier believing that you are immortal, but that does not mean that you are. With that said, there are some legitimate claims that you raise that we will press against post modernism (e.g. isn't postmodernism itself a metanarrative of sorts).
@Carneades.org It's fine as a subject to think about -- and it might even have some niche value here and there. That is however not how it's used in modern day society. And what I'm saying is that the way this is used, is just plain bad. Moreover, this has most certainly turned into an ideology for some. All they do is whine and criticize. So as I mention above, the practical use is very limited or even negative -- even more so if you don't give people an alternative. And that is, if alternatives are even possible under this way of thinking to begin with. I feel this issue is very similar to the free will and responsibility issue. You can argue people have no free will and thus no responsibility all day -- and that might even be true. If we were to act that out in society however, that would mean the end of society. Free will and responsibility however also have implications for the individual, making those topics a bit more relevant to think about. ---- I also just can't step over the fact that you can't defend the rejection of metanarratives by using metanarratives. Because beside this viewpoint being a metanarrative in and of itself, the the existence of a shared and objective truth is also a metanarrative. If you wholesale reject metanarratives, you have to argue from personal truths. So everything is basically an opinion from that perspective. Don't really know how you would argue anything from there, but I would presume the usefulness of something becomes paramount, not its 'truth' value. So you can't argue this point from the viewpoint of it being metaphysical, or simply an observation of some 'truth'. Those things do not exist under this framework.
@@hjge1012 "I feel this issue is very similar to the free will and responsibility issue. You can argue people have no free will and thus no responsibility all day -- and that might even be true. If we were to act that out in society however, that would mean the end of society." No. There is no free will and responsibility is an overrated social construct. That doesn't mean you stop throwing miscreants in cages. If a person is too dangerous to be left in free reign for any reason, restrict them and then treat them as much as they can so that they are less dangerous. It's not that hard to see. This idea of free will and moral responsibility being needed to organize is a myth that has been perpetuated for reasons of the history of our religions and cultures.
In terms of understanding the world, some metanarratuves are superior; often greatly superior. A metanarrative of logic is going to be way more useful than a metanarrative of absurdism. A metanarrative of economics is going to be way more useful than a metanarrative of marxism. Postmodernists are always like, "we are going to come at this from a marxist perspective" - which is absurd because Marx was wrong. Just because no system of reasoning is perfect is no excuse to use false dogmas.
While I agree completely about some metanarratives being better than others, it sounds like you don’t know what Absurdism is if you think it’s anti-logic, or what economics is if you don’t think Marxism is a form of it.
@@Pfhorrest logic is the study of valid rules of inference. Absurdists dont believe in valid rules of inference or any meaning for that matter. Economics is a social science where mathematical models are tested against statistical observation. It has shown time and time again that capitalism is our best tool for fighting poverty. It has shown time and time again that Marx was wrong. Still commies hold onto their socialist dogma and postmodernism is the excuse they use for their science denial.
@@InventiveHarvest Like I thought, you don't understand either of them. Absurdism isn't about inference or anything like that at all. It's about how to handle "the Absurd", which means the conflict between the human craving for "meaning" as in cosmic significance, and the apparent lack thereof in the universe, advocating neither hopeless despair nor irrational blind faith, but just owning up to the situation and carrying on anyway. I don't care to argue with you about whether or not Marx's economic predictions or solutions are or aren't wrong in one sense or another, but by your own stated definition of economics, Marxism is an economic theory, whether or not it's a correct one. I should let @Carneades.org himself school you on how Marxists and Postmodernists generally hate each other, because Marxism (right or wrong) is thoroughly Modernist and deeply vested in a metanarrative, which Postmodernists categorically reject.
@@InventiveHarvest Gonna need some reliable citations on that, since as far as I can find the Frankfurt school were Marxists but not postmodernists, and Foucault was debatably postmodernist but decidedly anti-Marxist.
I am unconvinced that it is a term that succeeds in referring to anything real, or anything importantly different from postmodernism, at least philosophically (perhaps aesthetically this is different). Not to say people don't talk about it, just that it has not taken the form of a clear philosophical position from my understanding. That said if it does exist, it is relatively recent, so there is little scholarship on it.
Funnily enough I was just wondering what metanarratives were, so this came out at the perfect time.
Same. What a coincidence lol
Great! Glad to help. :)
What is the current metanarrativ concerning russia and the west?
Thank you for this vid. What a great help for my report!🥳
As rafilosofo pointed out in earlier comment, it would certainly seem that the metanarrative idea is itself a proposed metanarrative. I don't know anything about Lyotard or postmodernism, but this would seem to pretty well parallel the idea that we operate with a hierarchy of theories. For example, we have narrow , explicit theories (a scientific theory of Covid, e.g.); and we have broad tacit theories (I am not just a brain in a vat). I guess I don't see how the assumption of metanarrative advances what I will call the "theory of theories" approach.
Thank your explaining metanarrative in such simple words.
I used to believe the metanarrative that I can't understand videos by English speakers and would watch videos by our native speakers😎
Assuming that the metanarrative idea is itself a metanarrative, one might - tongue in cheek - characterize Lyotard's position thusly: "Keeping in mind that I may be wrong, I just wish to take this opportunity to point out that the previously prevailing hierarchy of theories, in which we always allow for the probability that any theory may be wrong, may itself be wrong."
.. which implies that we don't have to allow for wrong theories. If that is the case, modernism is more right than it ever pretended to be and post-modernism is completely dead and buried. It's a ridiculous statement, since that rule of the scientific method has proven its value for centuries. From a pragmatic view, there is no reason at all to throw it out - or even doubt it. To me it's another proof of the inherent inconsistency of post-modern philosophy.
And why we couldn't call the postmodernism a metanarrative? (yes, this would be the opposite of what they say, but call in that way as critics)
Since Lyotard write about it, we can think that this view is a worldview to understand the experience of theories and narratives.
I had thought about that. I'm not sure. I guess the idea that our experiences can be explained in many different ways and can have different meaning could be a way of interpreting experiences, but i'm not sure.
I think you're absolutely right. Postmodernists may deny it, but they have a metanarrative, and I call that metanarrative "incommensurablism", because its central thesis is that no opinions of any sort can be compared or measured against each other to see which is more or less correct than the other.
And what they call "Modernism" is not just the opposite of that (commensurablism, the view that opinions of any sort can be compared or measured against each other to see which is more or less correct than the other), but a sort of parody thereof, which parody *does* collapse upon itself and end up entailing incommensurablism.
If you take "objective" to mean whatever is *beyond any* mere appearances (rather than just *according with all* appearances), and you take being "skeptical" to mean rejecting everything we *don't* have solid reasons to *accept* (rather than just rejecting anything we *do* have solid reasons to *reject* ), you end up forced to conclude on the first hand that there is nothing but anybody's word to go on for anything objective and so all opinions thereupon are beyond question (dogmatism), and on the second hand that there couldn't possibly be grounds upon which to justify any opinion about such so none of them are correct either (relativism).
In other words "objectivism" as in transcendentalism entails dogmatism, and "skepticism" as in justificationism entails relativism, and such dogmatic relativism is exactly what constitutes incommensurablism, i.e. "Postmodernism". Furthermore their relativism is anti-objective and their dogmatism is anti-skeptical, so their respective conclusions each undermine the other premise, and they conclude that "objective" and "skeptical" premises they started from, which they dub "Modernism", are self-defeating.
But that line of argument says nothing against mere "objectivism" as in (non-transcendent) universalism, or "skepticism" as in (non-justificationist) criticism, which they simply ignore, and *those* together constitute the real opposite of their position, commensurablism. Those together do still entail a subset of their subjectivist and fideistic conclusions too, however: criticism demands phenomenalism (anti-transcendentalism), and universalism demands what I call "liberalism" (anti-justificationism).
So even on a commensurablist account, everyone is free to think what they like "on faith" and agree to disagree... but, only until someone shows some critical reason why one opinion is worse than another. Which still can only be done by appeal to "subjective" appearances... but, only appearances that appear that way to everyone, universally.
@@Pfhorrest I agree it is incommensurabilism in some way. Poor Kuhn, He didn't want nothing of this BS
@@user-js2dr9gv1u i'm not sure saying there's no objective truth is a way of explaining many of our experiences with a single concept
Ultimately, I think that is postmodernism's biggest flaw and hole. Its own premise undermines its premise.
According to the annotation on a recent issue of Existential Comics (#392, A Postmodern Villain), 'postmodern theorists thought "postmodernism" was bad. They weren't advocating for it!' and Lyotard in particular (who is the titular "Postmodern Villain" in that comic) 'saw a broad movement in the culture where the majority of the intellectuals and the population at large no longer believed in "grand metanarratives".' This seems to conflict with the presentation here that seems to say that postmodernists like Lyotard were *advocating* for an incredulity to metanarratives, rather than just noting that there in fact does (or did at their time) exist in society such an incredulity already.
As I note in the first video in this series, there is a distinction between framing postmodernism as an ethical hypothesis (postmodernism should be true), and framing postmodernism as a metaphysical hypothesis (postmodernism is true, even if it is bad). Lyotard is doing the second: noting, and lamenting the loss of epistemic coherence that comes with metanarratives, but he is saying that this postmodern condition does exist even so. The fallacy that Existential Comics is highlighting is that people often think Lyotard is making the ethical claim (that postmodernism is good), when he is in fact making the metaphysical claim (that postmodernism is true).
@@CarneadesOfCyrene I’m not sure if it’s just a terminological issue, but to my ear saying “postmodernism is true” as a “metaphysical” claim sounds like the same thing as advocating an incredulity to metanarraratives. Saying “postmodernism is good” would be something beyond that, sure, but there is also something less than that: saying “lots of people are incredulous toward metanarratives”, or “postmodernism is popular right now”, without yourself saying even that it is metaphysically true that there is no independent way to adjudicate between metanarratives. The comic seems to suggest that Lyotard et al say only that (what we now call) postmodernism is popular, not that its claims (that there is no independent way to adjudicate between metanarratives) are true, just that they are widely believed.
Meta narratives are valid but unpersuasive, if that makes sense @@Pfhorrest
It seems weird to me that definition. I had a different notion that the metanarrative is "meta" because is a narrative about narratives. In this way of thinking i would see this way of understanding particular experiences as a narrative and the view about narratives as the metanarrative. So the classical macanics would not be a metanarrative, but the metanarrative would be the broader modern thinking that this science is a part. I think I associate this maybe with the Foucault's concept of episteme.
This make any sense? 🤣
Or I'm talking bullshit? I did not read Lyotard hahaha
No I definitely have to agree. The way "metanarrative" is defined here seems rather.. Pretentious and obsolete. Like you implied; the given examples for politics or sociology seem more simple like narratives that contextualise individual experiences. That's it. Calling this level of analysis or comprehension or perspective "meta" is a bit off. Whereas, for example, comparing multiple narratives for one and the same experience seems more fitting for such a term as "metanarrative".
Great explanation and a great video! Libertarianism mentioned also adds some points (imo)
Thanks! Libertarianism is a clear metanarrative, and arguably a clearer one than conservatism these days...
To think that no metanarrative is better or worse than any other metanarrative is simply to give up on even trying to improve one's worldview. It's a relativism that gives free reign to all dogmatism, and a dogmatism that cloaks itself in the armor of relativism. It's a way for someone to say "you can't criticize me! there's no such thing as right or wrong! so I get to call myself right and you wrong and you don't get to question that!" That's importantly different from the much more sensible "of course I think that I'm right and that if you disagree you're wrong -- I wouldn't think something I thought was wrong -- but I'm open to the possibility that I might be missing something, if you can show me what it is, and I don't expect you to change your mind until I show you what I think you're missing". Liberty of thought, agreeing to disagree until reason is shown to prefer one view over another, is not the same thing as dogmatic immunity to all questioning.
I'd like to see a response to this comment from the creator. I'm not all that well-versed in pomo (if I was, why would I be watching this video?) and that was my immediate reaction too. Hopefully the upcoming video on truth clears up some of my confusion about the epistemology at play here -- even SEP is pretty damn vague, sadly. I worry that this video may have missed the essence of most postmodern thinkers.
I suppose there is some wiggle room left in the description of postmodern views of metanarratives in the video to judge things on other qualities - for instance, you can still evaluate a work of art on your response to it or what it represents, etc. even if there is clearly no objectively correct method of creating art. I'm absolutely not sure of this but it seems to be plausible (and anyway, I'm struggling from the outset of writing this comment since I'm talking about a nigh-on undefineable movement with wildly individual viewpoints - Baudrillard and Foucault are *obviously* a contrast).
Oh yeah, I also always understood PMs as being *extremely skeptical* of metanarratives rather than outright rejecting them, which only leaves the truths you find in them on shaky ground rather than no ground at all.
Last thing: where is the relativism?
The way I am reading the resources I have available to me is that PM is first and foremost a period or loosely defined intellectual school. It seems to me to be a little bit of a broad brush to characterize them as simply "relavists", even ignoring the below concerns with their actual views.
Furthermore, I think it is a misunderstanding to say there's no possibility of truth/everything is relative in PM. While I am, as indicated above, somewhat naïve on the subject, it's clear to me that Derrida criticizes other authors (Rousseau, Levi-Strauss, etc) and that he does believe in some notion of truth. He's just attacking the preconceived notions that led those authors to find their truth (i.e. logocentrism - a metanarrative, or so I'd think).
I may be wrong, and would be happen to be proven so. This is just my interpretation of the video and background knowledge.
@@joelmiles3041 This probably relates to the question I posed for Carneades in another comment to this video, about whether "postmodern" theorists are actually *advocating* for a postmodern approach, or just *observing* that society has leaned toward one. I've recently heard elsewhere that it's the latter, but this video and most other sources I've seen before suggest it is the former, and I don't know enough about the original texts myself to decide. But it makes a lot more sense if these theorists are just pointing out "we as a society have stopped agreeing on any single meta-narrative", rather than saying "no meta-narrative is objectively better or worse than any other".
Can you please give me a paragraph of 5 lines about metanarrative by Jean-François Lyotard
Great content
Could you do a video about YOU , what you believe , your ethics , ur kind of atheism , a video about you ? . I'm sure all of us would enjoy it so much . i really do appreciate ur works bro Peace
Great question. I am a philosophical skeptic, specifically an indirect Pyrrhonian skeptic. I have an old series on the view if you are interested: th-cam.com/play/PLz0n_SjOttTcyjg1s7mrBZSW-QKTSVLrB.html
The source volume is too low.
Postmodernism is post-ideological. Hence the importance of thinkers like Slavoj Žižek!
I only agree with postmodernism in the study of history. Since the metanarratives there are changing constantly (obviously due to the fragmentary nature of history)
Seems to me that postmodern thinking is a big metanarrative in itself. A way of contextualising the whole world by saying it can't necessarily be contextualised. Is this wrong?
That is a common criticism of postmodernism. We will look at that and other arguments throughout the series.
How about a postmodernist meta-narrative?
Quick question: Is it ever proven if metanarratives are finite or infinite? I would think that a narrative can't be objectively right _only_ if there are an infinite amount of metanarratives because with a finite amount you should be able to keep distilling metanarratives inside metanarratives until you reach the "root-metanarratives" whereas an infinite amount of metanarratives you would find another metanarrative until infinity.
Or, could something be said about a metanarrative being objectively false if the metanarratives used are recursive? Maybe it could be proven that petitio principii metanarratives can be called objectively false?
Great video, many thoughts, looking forward to the rest of this series.
PS:
I assume that N, M, and P are finite, and therefore the number of sentences that we could use to construct a metanarrative.
Interesting question. Generally most consider there to be a finite number of metanarratives, at least that we are considering at any given time. The question is whether any of them are correct. The postmodernist thinks there is no right metanarrative to explain reality. To understand this take the example of an "ok" sign. The modernist might claim that there is an objective meaning to such a sign, while the postmodernist will say that its meaning is dependent on the metanarrative, and no metanarrative is more right than any other (or if you are a post-structuralist, the only reason we think one metanarrative is better than another is because of historic power dynamics). The problem is not that there are an infinite number of interpretations of an "ok" sign, but rather that those interpretations disagree (some say it means "ok", some say it means the number 3, some say it is a white supremacist gesture), and, according to the postmodernist there is no way to show which one is the "right" interpretation. There is no meta-meta-narrative to pick out what is true. For the postmodernist, philosophy (which would generally fill such a role) has lost its place as the truth telling discipline (not that the postmodernists want this to be the case, they are simply observing that it is). So the problem is not an infinite regress of metanarratives, but rather a set of branches that never reach an ultimate arbiter.
Just wanted to make a mathematical point: even with an infinite set you could get to one "root-metanarattive". Imagine that you have a tree with two branches, one finite and one infinite. The tree has infinite leaves but if you find a way to reject in block the entire branch then you're left with a finite branch.
Since people can cover about seven levels of abstraction and meta-narratives only consist within the human experience, they must be finite.
Doesn't postmodernism have metanarratives of their own?
Postmodernism is the rejection of metanarratives. That said, one might claim that postmodernism itself is a metanarrative (and therefore self-defeating). I am sympathetic to this position as it is a similar argument from the perspective of Pyrrhonians against Academic skeptics, and we will cover this objection later in the series.
Postmodernism: All viewpoints are valid.
Including the viewpoint that all viewpoints aren't valid?
@@MatthewShute Yes! At last, you have grokked the true wisdom of postmodernism!
Valid but in varying levels of truth.
@@MTMRPG All are "equally" true.
Richard Rorty would disagree and say you're putting a metanarrative into the postmodernist's mouth (see "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism"). I don't think any good postmodernist would say that all viewpoints are valid. A more accurate summary of postmodern thinking, from my understanding, is that our viewpoints are shaped by the communities we find ourselves in. It's about epistemology rather than metaphysics.
Why meta? Is neither beyond narrative nor narrative about narrative. It's big narrative, so it should be called macronarrative.
I doubt anyone (apart from the lady in the joke about Versailles) believes that there is "one right language", so you must be misrepresenting modernism at least to some degree.
Namaste and love from India. I hope that peace and love prevail in the world!🙏🇮🇳
I loved the way you saying everything it's just a metamarrive we invent to explain why we we work I. 3 jobs sleep 4 hours per night and we can't make enough for the month, it's all metanarrative. Lol
What an accent 😓
So where does this wholesale rejection of metanarratives -- which in and of itself could also be regarded as a metanarrative -- take us? Exactly. Nowhere. Post-modernism seems to be the ideology of negative Nancy's. All they do is complain and criticize. They never come with their own ideas or ways to make things better. It's pretty much baked into the ideology.
Hell, how can one even realistically live without any form of metanarratives? Because we determine value based on overarching structures. If we were to let that go, we'd all be valuing everything equally and we'd just be doing whatever we felt like in that exact moment. So the only conclusion I can come to, is that this is not a constructive way of thinking. In fact, it's exactly the opposite; it's destructive.
And even if we were to accept this as a way to break down bad structures and bad metanarratives, after which we replace them with better ones, I'd still say it's useless. Because realistically you'd have to have an alternative before you start breaking things down. And if you have an alternative, why not argue from that perspective?
So besides it being only destructive, it also seems to be just a political and/or rhetoric tool. It's a political tool of destruction.
There is a very important thing to understand about postmodernism that I covered in the first video in the series: it is a metaphysical not an ethical thesis. Postmodernists are NOT saying "wouldn't it be great if we got rid of metanarratives and couldn't ground any statements in objective truth anymore?" they are saying "Hey, I just checked and there is no way to ground metanarratives in objective truth, that sucks, but that's the way things are." Just because something is unappealing does not make it wrong. If the earth was about to be hit by a giant meteorite, it is clearly fallacious to respond "all these people talking about meteorites are just negative Nancies, we don't need to do anything" or "how could a meteorite be about to hit the earth, if it did we wouldn't be able to live our lives any more?" Simply because a viewpoint is destructive or unappealing does not make it incorrect. If postmodernism is the case, then there is no right metanarrative, assuming that there is a positive viewpoint is begging the question against postmodernism. You might be happier believing that you are immortal, but that does not mean that you are.
With that said, there are some legitimate claims that you raise that we will press against post modernism (e.g. isn't postmodernism itself a metanarrative of sorts).
@Carneades.org
It's fine as a subject to think about -- and it might even have some niche value here and there. That is however not how it's used in modern day society. And what I'm saying is that the way this is used, is just plain bad. Moreover, this has most certainly turned into an ideology for some. All they do is whine and criticize.
So as I mention above, the practical use is very limited or even negative -- even more so if you don't give people an alternative. And that is, if alternatives are even possible under this way of thinking to begin with.
I feel this issue is very similar to the free will and responsibility issue. You can argue people have no free will and thus no responsibility all day -- and that might even be true. If we were to act that out in society however, that would mean the end of society.
Free will and responsibility however also have implications for the individual, making those topics a bit more relevant to think about.
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I also just can't step over the fact that you can't defend the rejection of metanarratives by using metanarratives. Because beside this viewpoint being a metanarrative in and of itself, the the existence of a shared and objective truth is also a metanarrative. If you wholesale reject metanarratives, you have to argue from personal truths. So everything is basically an opinion from that perspective.
Don't really know how you would argue anything from there, but I would presume the usefulness of something becomes paramount, not its 'truth' value.
So you can't argue this point from the viewpoint of it being metaphysical, or simply an observation of some 'truth'. Those things do not exist under this framework.
@@hjge1012 "I feel this issue is very similar to the free will and responsibility issue. You can argue people have no free will and thus no responsibility all day -- and that might even be true. If we were to act that out in society however, that would mean the end of society." No. There is no free will and responsibility is an overrated social construct. That doesn't mean you stop throwing miscreants in cages. If a person is too dangerous to be left in free reign for any reason, restrict them and then treat them as much as they can so that they are less dangerous. It's not that hard to see. This idea of free will and moral responsibility being needed to organize is a myth that has been perpetuated for reasons of the history of our religions and cultures.
In terms of understanding the world, some metanarratuves are superior; often greatly superior. A metanarrative of logic is going to be way more useful than a metanarrative of absurdism. A metanarrative of economics is going to be way more useful than a metanarrative of marxism. Postmodernists are always like, "we are going to come at this from a marxist perspective" - which is absurd because Marx was wrong. Just because no system of reasoning is perfect is no excuse to use false dogmas.
While I agree completely about some metanarratives being better than others, it sounds like you don’t know what Absurdism is if you think it’s anti-logic, or what economics is if you don’t think Marxism is a form of it.
@@Pfhorrest logic is the study of valid rules of inference. Absurdists dont believe in valid rules of inference or any meaning for that matter. Economics is a social science where mathematical models are tested against statistical observation. It has shown time and time again that capitalism is our best tool for fighting poverty. It has shown time and time again that Marx was wrong. Still commies hold onto their socialist dogma and postmodernism is the excuse they use for their science denial.
@@InventiveHarvest Like I thought, you don't understand either of them.
Absurdism isn't about inference or anything like that at all. It's about how to handle "the Absurd", which means the conflict between the human craving for "meaning" as in cosmic significance, and the apparent lack thereof in the universe, advocating neither hopeless despair nor irrational blind faith, but just owning up to the situation and carrying on anyway.
I don't care to argue with you about whether or not Marx's economic predictions or solutions are or aren't wrong in one sense or another, but by your own stated definition of economics, Marxism is an economic theory, whether or not it's a correct one.
I should let @Carneades.org himself school you on how Marxists and Postmodernists generally hate each other, because Marxism (right or wrong) is thoroughly Modernist and deeply vested in a metanarrative, which Postmodernists categorically reject.
@@Pfhorrestthere are many postmodernist marxists. Examples include the frankfurt school and foucault.
@@InventiveHarvest Gonna need some reliable citations on that, since as far as I can find the Frankfurt school were Marxists but not postmodernists, and Foucault was debatably postmodernist but decidedly anti-Marxist.
METAMODERNISM WTF IS THAT
I am unconvinced that it is a term that succeeds in referring to anything real, or anything importantly different from postmodernism, at least philosophically (perhaps aesthetically this is different). Not to say people don't talk about it, just that it has not taken the form of a clear philosophical position from my understanding. That said if it does exist, it is relatively recent, so there is little scholarship on it.
If postmodernism is level 5, metamodernism would be level 6. It's supposed to be the thing that comes after post-modernism.