Leibniz's Law - The identity of Indiscernibles (Discussed and Debated)
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 1 พ.ย. 2022
- Join George and John as they discuss and debate different philosophical ideas, today they will be looking into Leibniz's Law.
Leibniz's Law claims that if X and Y share the exact same properties they are identical, and so they are the same entity. As such no two distinct entities can share the exact same properties. This seems like a common sense principle however with a little philosophical investigation we notice some problems. Watch as George and John discuss further.
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Get the Philosophy Vibe paperback anthology book set, available worldwide on Amazon:
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Canada: www.amazon.ca/dp/B092H5MGF9
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My boy on the left went off 🤣🤣. Thank you, guys, for the excellent content.
You're welcome. Thanks for watching :)
The counter argument of the functionality of haecciaties concerning the ice sculpture wow you have outdone yourselves
I like how one person is being a skeptic while the another is teaching the law. It really does make me understand the law better, love your content, Jesus bless.
this law is usefull to show in philosophy of mind that mental states (e.g; qualia and intentionality) cannot be reduced to physical things, since we can point out properties that are distinct.
You make a great point. I was recently reading about the very same, but found the topic (Theories of Mind) very difficult. So hard to follow in some of the textbooks. But thanks, you seem to have clarified it for me in a sentence.
I don't understand. Can't it be that mental states have intrinsic properties that are identical? The two balls have the same intrinsic properties and they are physical things.
@@CjqNslXUcM they occupy different places in space and were created at different time
@@daviddivad777 Those are extrinsic properties. The two balls also don't share these extrinsic properties, yet they are physical things.
@@CjqNslXUcM the law applies to all properties
What a fascinating topic. These debates are really interesting. Pls keep them coming.
I for the life of me do not understand why your videos donˋt get more views. Anyway, great content as always.
Thank you!
I really like this channel because the questions and give and take care ones that I am actually thinking but can't put into words yet.
Thank you!
Yea another upload. Love your content keep it up!!
Thank you!
The "personal identity" objection raised at 5:45 reminds me of the quote that goes something like "one can never cross the same river twice". I paraphrased the quote and I don't remember who it is attributed to but it seems to me the same general concept. In a sense I suppose it could be said that we are not identical to ourselves from moment to moment since at the microscopic level our bodies undergo constant change - however, this seems to me to be a very pedantic and therefore meaningless point of view, at least when considering shorter time frames where the subject in question doesn't change much. Fascinating discussion though.
The topic of Personal Identity is a fascinating one. I don’t no the proper name of the argument, but it argued something along the following: that you are the same person if you could remember who you were in the past (say, ‘time 2’ - t2), assuming you are in t1 now, and that you in the past (t2) could remember who you were further back (t3), and so on. You are the ‘same person’ if you can do this!
If you can’t remember what you did or thought or ate for lunch two years ago, so long as a ‘previous’ you (t3, t4, t5, etc) can/could remember, then you are all connected and the ‘same person’.
I’m sure I haven’t got the reasoning exactly right, but it was something like that. I’m sure there are also many arguments against such a theory.
Heraclitus, Fragments. you can not step in the same river
Have you guys ever thought about covering Spinoza? I know his work in Ethics is most popular, but his ideas on divine law and sacredness in the Theological-Political Treatise are super interesting too. Or maybe something about natural knowledge/natural law and the two lights of knowledge (Reason and philosophy for intellectual truths and imagination and the mind's predisposition toward morality for moral truths)?
Best!
Thank you for the recommendation, we will look into this.
This entire concept falls apart in face of the Uncertainty Principle.
Great debate👍
Thank you
great!
interesting dialogue wow
Pls do come up vth russell incomplete symbol role in his discription
keep it up!
:)
could you help me explaining the Liberation Praxis, through a video on it
in a video form
Haecceity is seems like nonsense, but I don't think personal identity is a good objection in the first place. Of course you are a different person than you were in the past, even though people refer to you as the same person in continuity.
the two balls are not identical when we consider atoms, or the bacteria living in them they only appear identical
if i have two A's in my hands are they identical ?
Apparently I'm not getting this last point against 'hexeity' or suchness. There are no possible worlds in which my 'suchness' would be totally different (or different in any way whatever ) where my identity would still remain the same. To me it's a nonsensical counter claim. Could someone offer an example to support this claim that the identity of a person or a non living thing remaining intact in a possible world while it is having different intrinsic suchness ?
It does not have a different intrinsic suchness tho, that is the point.
9:00 reply to objection -- but bro, why would you apply a concept meant for animate objects to inanimate objects? you yourself know that animate objects and inanimate objects tend to differ from each other.
But still, the logical objections can be made clear if one delves into the following discussions- # origination or generation of entities/objects and their termination in Leibniz's outlook,
# Morphology or transformation of objects
# Identity of an object as it exists by itself and the process of identifying the same object by a different observer/object.
^^Clarify the above points and the discussion will become crystal clear.
Nothing can be identical because you need to be in the exact same space within space to have identical properties
So do you think my body now is not identical to my body before typing this since my position in space has been continuously altered throughout?
@@Rspknlikeab0ssxdleibniz would say that all future predicates are already included in the complete concept of all substances. So things may seem like they are changing from our limited perspective but if you had complete knowledge of all substance you would see future changes as internal properties which are included in the complete concepts of beings. A true statement is true regardless of the time in which it is said.
@@nimrod4996 I don't really care what Leibniz said in this situation, I'm asking a question given the original cimmenter's assertion
@@Rspknlikeab0ssxd but Leibniz happen to be correct, and you happen to be wrong.
@@nimrod4996 You don't seem to be understanding. I asserted no proposition nor nothing which one would be right or wrong for stating, I was asking for the opinion of original poster. For the record, I never said that Leibniz is wrong, and that's surely compatible with everything I've said
Solution: Nominalism
A bit boring, says my class