Normative Ethical Theory - Tom Beauchamp (1994)

Tom L. Beauchamp (Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Georgetown University) gives an introductory lecture on normative ethics as part of a course on bioethics or medical ethics at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics in 1994 at Georgetown University.
00:00 Talk
56:35 Q&A
#philosophy #ethics #moralphilosophy

[@esoxlucius7519]

These guys are mind bending geniuses.

[@tonicalloway7227]

Ooooh.. ethical theory..

[@user-ug2yz6vb7p]

Very good. Yet, on the topic of the "universal morality" by principles, breaking the law is necessary sometimes, so I have difficulty with one of his minor principles. Also, paying someone to perform morally when morality is not the focus in their "free" time, is an absurdity in my opinion anyway. Habit forms the daimon. I appreciated his thoughts here, anyway. Certainly you he sounds morally fit but the reality is people are entering the medical field a lot of the time with money and other vulgar things as the motivation without even understanding their own motivation...hence that word daimon.

[@aurorajones78]

We should always do Good which is to act according to one’s knowledge and desires with the intent to preserve and create the human species of which you are a part.
We should always avoid doing Evil which is to act according to one’s knowledge and desires with the intent to stagnate and destroy the human species of which you are a part.
This is not the same as utilitarian theory. I find that this equation solves all of the moral conundrums that are left unsolved by modern moral theory to date. Including the trolley problem.

[@CambrianAnomalocaris]

So, If someone performed an action that immediately lead to the extinction of the species, this could still be a Good action under your view?

[@MrLcowles]

@@CambrianAnomalocarisDid you read his comment? What you've written doesn't make sense if you did.

[@CambrianAnomalocaris]

@@MrLcowles I may be mistaken, but I just gave what seems to be the simple counterexample to this kind of view. A similar example re:destroying the world in the video is put up against Kant’s position.
If agent X performs an act Y according to X’s knowledge and desires with the intent to preserve and create the human species of which X is a part then this is a Good action by the definition given.
This makes whether or not Y is Good contingent on X’s knowledge, desires and intent at the time of Y-ing. Not whether Y-ing will actually be a net benefit to the human species.
If Y has the unforeseen consequence of eliminating the human species immediately for whatever reason, but X was in the proper state that was specified by the definition (so X would not have believed that Y-ing would have lead to immediate extinction of the species), then an action Y that lead to the immediate extinction of the human species could still be Good because X when Y-ing was properly acting according to their knowledge and desires and the intention to preserve and create the human species of which X is a part.
So on the view specified, “doing Good” could include actions that lead to the near immediate extinction of the human species.

[@MrLcowles]

@@CambrianAnomalocarisBut if X's knowledge always precedes his actions then I don't get your point. Either in his knowledge he tried to either destroy the world or not. Destroying the world can't be a good action by definition.

[@CambrianAnomalocaris]

@@MrLcowles Under the definition given the action could fall under the definition of doing Good as long as X doesn’t think of the action in any sense under the description of destroying the world and has no reason to think the action would destroy the world. X could be nonculpably ignorant of this one specific consequence of Y.
X could have knowledge that doing action Y has some consequence that ceteris paribus would help the human species to flourish, and does Y for that reason. And I stipulated that X also does not know there are additional [perhaps very unlikely consequences] that would almost immediately create an extinction event, otherwise X would not be in the specified mental state.
The provided definition of “doing good” has to include cases where subjectively X was acting in accordance with the definition provided but the objective consequences are disastrous in spite of X’s intentions.
Edit: The key point is that X was not trying to lead the species to extinction and within X’s knowledge set, Y seems like it would be helpful to the flourishing of the human species.
Why should an individuals particular knowledge + desire + intent to help the species be taken as the meaning of “doing good” instead of whether or not one actually helps the species?

[@martinburrows6844]

Lip smacking