This makes so much sense. Regarding the treatment of criminals if we don't have the free will necessary for moral responsibility- I think Schoemans analogy with the sick that is quarantined is very good. He says that just as we have the right to quarantine carriers of serious diseases to protect people, we have the right to "quarantine" or detain criminals to protect people. But we must focus on rehabilitation 100 % and treat the criminals in the best way possible so as to make them better people.
But rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of free will and self-control. If we tell the criminal offender that, due to causal determinism, he had no control over his past behavior, then we must also tell him that, again due to causal determinism, he will have no control over his future behavior. That makes rehabilitation impossible.
@@marvinedwards737 his consciousness has no control, but your brain can still control you, that's why a person can change even without free will, that person will just be determined to chance and be rehabilitated.
@@marco_mate5181 First, your brain does not control you, it IS you. Second, causation never causes anything and determinism never determines anything. Causation is a concept used to describe the interaction of objects and forces as they bring about events. Place a bowling ball on a slope and gravity will cause it to roll downhill. Place a squirrel on that same slope and his biological drives will cause him to go uphill, downhill, or any other direction where he hopes to find his next acorn. Place a human being on a slope and he'll chop down trees to build a house, find a mate and form a family, join with other families to form a nation. Note that there are three distinct causal mechanisms: physical (inanimate objects and gravity), biological (living organisms), and rational (intelligent species). Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
@@marvinedwards737 @Marvin Edwards 1) "you" is the consciousness of the brain. 2) your brain controls you, it creates the colors you see, the feelings you have and the thoughts you hear inside your head. And your subconscious controls your behavior. 3) what you call free will is not the religious libertarian free will, which means "the ability to do otherwise", but is the soft-determinism free will, which in fact exists. Every being is free to act according to their needs and desires, and if they are constrained by external forces, then their are not experiencing freedom. For instance you are free to buy a movie or not, but wheter you'll do it or not is not up to "you", it will be determined through unconscious processes that will either create the feeling or wanting it or not. You can make choices free from externtal constraints, but never free from the determined unconscious reactions in your brain.
@@marco_mate5181 I'm pretty sure my conscious mind will be involved in any significant decision. Perhaps not in "choices" from the Libet experiments, like squeezing my hand or pressing a button at "random" intervals. But, if my unconscious mind decided to rob a bank, I'm pretty sure I'd be aware of it in time to alter that choice. Both Michael Gazzaniga ("Who's in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain") and Michael Graziano ("Consciousness and the Social Brain") assert that it is not one or the other, but both. The brain does organize sensory data into a model of reality, and uses that model to imagine possibilities, estimate how one option versus another will play out, and choose what the body as a whole will do. That choice, that we make for ourselves, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence, is called "free will", because it is literally a freely chosen "I will". My determinism is neither "soft" nor "hard". I presume a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, in which the meaningful and relevant causes of my choice are located within me. My choice is reliably caused by my own purposes and reasons, my own thoughts and feelings, my own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, my own beliefs and values...All of these things are part of who and what I am. And what they choose, I have chosen. There is no dualism as you keep suggesting.
10:30 - That isn't asymmetrical.. because the contrast is wrong. People often contrast praise with blame.. But that should be praise and "criticise". And the opposite of blame would be like.. "credit".. I always had this weird mismatch in my thoughts where "blame" is not reasonable.. but "praise" was reasonable and useful, as long as we know that there's no true "deserve" concept in play. But with this fix-up, it is now consistent. Edit: Aside from that nitpick.. awesome video. Completely agree. We lose actual responsibility, but we retain accountability and duty. So the whole thing doesn't just get thrown out the window. We retain the necessary aspects, whilst throwing out the illogical Libertarian Free Will and "deserve" aspect.
@@dfsdfsdfsfdsf-x7s - Do you mean "reward"? I think the opposite of that would be "punish"... Blame and credit = moral responsibility Praise and condemn - behaviour modifiers Punish and reward = consequences for actions (also with built-in behaviour modifying) Something like that.
@@Siberius- I was trying to come up with something that would be roughly symmetrical to blame, but I don't think that blame and credit/reward would be good. I think that credit and discredit = moral responsibility (moral attribution) the rest are just not the same in nature. This could be due to human psychology (we are hardwired to pay attention to the negatives more than the positives). Contrast "condemning a behaviour" and "praising a behaviour".
@@dfsdfsdfsfdsf-x7s - I think blame and credit are pretty good for that... "You did the thing in question, and so you get the blame/credit". "Discredit" doesn't appear to be the antonym to "credit". There actually is a better opposite word than "condemn" for "praise", but it was a weird word that isn't very used, and I forget what it was.
I think the asymmetric view is correct. A dog doesn't need free will to deserve praise. Why the difference? It's because the praise makes the dog happy. It can be unfair to us not to give us what makes us happy but that doesn't usually work the other way around. When I say that, lack of free will still makes a difference. It still makes sense for the rewarded and praised to share in their good fortune with those less fortunate, which would make for a much fairer and happier society and world.
Derk Pereboom advocates in favor of a hard determinist position (or, more precisely, a hard incompatibilist position) but acknowledges that there is a point to holding children accountable for their actions by praising or blaming them. He argues that although children wouldn't thereby get what they deserve (since they were causally determined to to whatever they did and hence it's not their fault), our attitudes of praising and blaming them can be "forward looking" and enable them to learn and to become better persons. Therefore we should praise and blame children for their own sake. Pereboom's position seems inconsistent since it tacitly presupposes that the adults who praise and blame children aren't themselves causally predetermined to do so. But if all human beings, children and adults alike, are part of the same causally predetermined physical world, and no genuine options are open to us either, then it is pointless to try to make children act better in the future than they would otherwise do. Before we make any decision to praise or blame children, all of their future actions (as well as ours) already are determined, according to Pereboom's own hard determinist stance. We should just sit back and watch them cross roads without warning them about incoming traffic. Whatever will happen was doomed to happen and we would be just as blameless for having failed to warn them as they themselves are.
There is no scope for independent choice, since the Universe in which we live is deterministic. All our choices, however deliberate they may seem, are dependent on factors which we have no control over. Since, no one has control over everything, no one can claim to have control over his/her “apparently deliberate” choices. But, at the same time, it is also true that social norms, moral standards of a particular society and the degree of strict implementation of those norms and standards by that society, are more likely than not to participate as one of the many factors, that “determine” choices of an individual belonging that society. This, however, doesn’t liberate the society from its deterministic fate, because the society is only a tiny subset of the entirely deterministic Universe. The norms / moral standards of the society as well as the degree of strict implementation of those norms / moral standards are also determined by factors which are beyond the control of the society.
It is so exciting to believe there is no free will. Think of implications for forgiveness of others and for ourselves. Extinguish regret, blame, and revenge and focus on knowledge as the supreme molder of morality in people. Our sole purpose would be to expose everyone as early as possible to the knowledge of being a good person and let the clock unwind.
Have yer cake and eat it too! We don't have control because of determinism, ah, but we do have "enough" control to make decisions. So, no free will because we don't have control, but we choose....Can't have both... His example: children. Please! Adults are not children and we expect morally competence with adults and we don't with children so that example is silly. No blame because of determinism but enough control to make decisions. Circle man....
Yes but often they are inappropriate. So for instance the idea of the deserving poor is usually inappropriate. So things do change if we reject moral responsibility and it is for the better.
If more people realise free will doesn't exist.. then those causal events will lead to treating prisoners better. We're not doomed to do the same things forever, just because there's no free will. Or were you saying we shouldn't "blame" people who treat prisoners terrible with the retributive concept? in that case I would agree.
Ben Libet has said that you cannot draw conclusions about free will from his work. Pereboom knows this so why say that Libet claims you can't?. When using examples of "control" he brings as an example: children. Again, he knows that we don't consider children morally responsible. Bad example. If you agree with his underlying principles, ie, no free will and "forward looking" as opposed to "blame based" responses to an agent's action, you must also assume/accept that the agent is morally receptable, that is, capable and willing, to respond to moral instruction. I sincerely doubt this in the vast majority of cases. Finally, he suggests that neuroscience today is heavily leaning toward no free will. Have a look at the book: Free, by Alfred Mele who suggests that this is not the case.
If we tell someone that, due to causal determinism, they had no control over their past behavior, then, to be consistent, we must also tell them that they will have no control over their future behavior. Rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of ones control of their own choices and actions. Free will skeptics believe that disposing of free will is a magic bullet that will reform our system of justice. But this is an illogical fantasy. If determinism excuses the thief who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who cuts off his hand.
Responsibility is assigned to the most meaningful and relevant causes of the action. To be meaningful, a cause must efficiently explain why the action happened. To be relevant, a cause must be something we can actually do something about. (A) If the cause of the action was someone pointing a gun at the victim and saying, "Fill this bag with all the money in the cash drawer", then correcting our victim's behavior (handing over someone else's money to the robber) is a simple matter of removing the threat, because the threat was the meaningful and relevant cause of her action. (B) But fixing the robber's deliberate choice to commit armed robbery will require changing the way he thinks about such actions in the future, because his deliberate choosing was the meaningful and relevant cause. (C) If the cause of the action was mental illness (the cashier decides to hand out money to everyone who comes in the store) then we treat the mental illness, because it was the meaningful and relevant cause. Obviously, there is nothing we can do about the Big Bang, so it is irrelevant. Obviously, there is nothing we can do about Causal Necessity, so it is irrelevant. And it is only the delusion that causal necessity has its own agenda and predetermined that the robber would hold up the bank that would make anyone dream up the notion that the robber's deliberate choice is not the responsible cause of the robbery.
I think the incompatibilist position is incoherent. If everything is physically and therefore causally determined then blame and praise are also causally determined. They would have a non-physical reason for rejecting blame and praise.
Daniel A Collins Indeed. But what then, practically speaking, is the difference between compatibilism and incompatibilism? For me incompatibilism offers nothing extra, except the flaw that it might excuse an immoral kind of fatalism.
Daniel A Collins I presume you understand the dilemma: "I'm going to do this immoral act because I've figured out how to avoid the moral consequences - and I should feel no shame because my wanting to do it and my doing it are both deterministically ordained." This is the kind of conundrum we all face during our moral development. How do we develop past that without the sense that we could do otherwise i.e. compatibilism?
+Daniel A Collins Perhaps I should say a bit more. But first, the lack of freedom seems to me totally theoretical if it arises only as a concept (scientific determinism.) It would become practical if it translated into actions - but as I've said I don't see how those actions would be different than for compatibilists, EXCEPT for the increased susceptibility to immoral choices which may result when one of the inputs to the decision-making process ("could I do otherwise"?) is philosophically undermined. The same criticism is applied to religious philosophies that believe in fate or immutable destiny - they don't develop because they assume they can't. So, whether or not it is determined, the sense of a "choice to do otherwise" is important - and it seems to me this is all that compatibilism concedes vs incompatibilism. And for good reason?
+Daniel A Collins Sorry if this is dragging ;-) I'm talking about about future choices, not past choices, and I'm saying the inputs to the choice should not be constrained by any sense of inevitability. At the extremes of moral choice, some people ruthlessly pursue what they want (because deterministic social darwinism) while others concede to things they don't want, because they feel pretty much the same way but from a negative POV. I feel the misapplication of determinism encourages these extremes.
We have a bit of free will as we have a bit of consciousness. Much of what's going on is unconscious but we don't know that, it's in the unknown. For criminality treatment has to exist for unconscious parts of behavior. Many making small mistakes don't know why, it is unknown to them. Others may be fully aware so it is a dilemma.
You are talking about consciousness as if exists outside the realm of our physical world. We have no reason to believe that consciousness comes from something otherworldly, just because we don't know how our brains architecture creates this concept of "consciousness" doesn't mean that any theory is plausible and we can, to the best of our knowledge as a scientific community, rule out the possibility of it coming from outside our universe or not being a consequence of all other laws of nature. As the laws of nature seem to be causal, one thing is always caused by another, our brains chemical reactions seem to be caused by the ones before, there is no reason to think consciousness is any different. Yes we don't know exactly what it is, but we can pretty much say for sure that free will doesn't exist as our brains are just a part of the universe that follow the same laws, if it wasn't this way, It would be one of the biggest scientific discoveries ever.
Determinism requires moral responsibility. You, your body, your actions and your mind (and even a your soul if you cling to such an idea) are just different ways of referring to the same thing. The state you were in, your history and the environment all play a role in explaining your actions and should be considered. Free will is a vague and confusing term that doesn't help in understanding. Do we have it or not? It doesn't matter.
So how is moral responsibility required by determinism? Determinism just states that all events are determined by previous causes, therefore ones choices are also determined by past causes, making them in a way inevitable (excluding randomness which we don't control either). If we don't control the outcomes of our actions ( or our want to control them in a specific way) why would we be morally responsible for them?
@@illiniry My compatibilism views free will as a deterministic event, because choosing is a deterministic operation. My choice is reliably caused by my own purposes and reasons, my own thoughts and feelings, my own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, to suit interests that exist within me. So, I am the meaningful and relevant prior cause of my choice. And no prior cause of me can participate in my deliberation without first becoming an integral part of who and what I am. As long as "that which is me" is the same as "that which is doing the choosing", then my choice is my own. And we call this "free will", as long as my choice was free of coercion and undue influence (which is the ordinary meaning of the term).
@@marvinedwards737 Thank you kindly, I still have trouble understanding that position though. If you are the product of genes and life experience and all of your choices stem from that, then how can they be free? You didn't choose all the prior causes that became a part of you. There is no choice that is free of external influence. Whatever causes your decisions is what causes them, if your choices were free then you'd be in a different universe where cause and effect don't apply. I don't see how free choice can exist deterministically, doesn't that imply that you could do otherwise if you rewind time to when you make any decision?
@@illiniry Oddly enough, "I could have done otherwise" is always true whenever a choosing event occurs in the causal chain. Determinism can only claim that "I would not have done otherwise". Given the same me, in the same circumstance, with the same issue to decide, I "would" always make the same choice. If my reasons were good the first time, and nothing has changed, then my reasons "will" lead to the same result every time. But we need to avoid confusing what "will" happen with what "can" happen. If something "will" happen, then it will happen. But if something "can" happen it may happen or it may never happen. And if something "could have happened" then that logically implies that it definitely did not happen. And that's quite different from what we mean when we say something "will" happen. At the beginning of every choosing event, two things are true by logical necessity (they are required for the operation to proceed): (1) there must be at least two real possibilities to choose from (e.g., A and B) and (2) it must be true that I "can" choose either one (e.g., "I can choose A" is true and "I can choose B" is also true). At the end of a choosing operation we will have the single inevitable thing that I "will" do, plus the thing that I "could" have done, but didn't. So, determinism may truthfully assert that "I would not have done otherwise" but it cannot truthfully assert that "I could not have done otherwise". About the prior causes. No prior cause of me can participate in my choosing process without first becoming an integral part of who and what I am. Free will is when "that which is making the decision" is identical to "that which is me". My genes are me. My prior life experiences are me. My beliefs and values are me. My thoughts and feelings are me. These are not external entities making my choices for me. They "that which is me". So, whatever "they" decide, "I" have decided. To put them in one corner of the room and put me in another corner, and then claim that they are external forces controlling me, requires a dualist notion of reality. You see, one of those two corners is empty.
@@marvinedwards737 Interesting, thank you, I'll have to read this a few times to fully grasp. You might find this forum up your alley despite the name, there are lots of compatibilists and interesting threads: facebook.com/groups/204367762908859
Seems like a contradiction 1. we aren't praise/blame worthy because we do not have control due to determinism. 2. we have the control to affect other people's lives and change their behavior even though determinism is true.
We don't live in a deterministic universe. Atoms and molecules are dead objects and don't determine anything. The word "determined" is an intuition pump that sets the mind ablaze with notions of imaginary chains if causation that are nothing more than mental constructs. Assigning causation is always a subjective exercise, in other words, it's just an opinion.
The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world. The proof goes like this: P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence. P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events. P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes). P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes). C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.
What does a person "deserve"? Pereboom suggests that, due to determinism, there is nothing that anyone ever deserves. But then he brings up the question of how we raise our children. Like most people today, Pereboom suggests that when children behave badly, it is our duty to morally educate them, to explain how they should behave in the future, to insure that they are prepared to make better choices later in life. Ironically, Pereboom's position appears to be that this is what the child deserves. And most of us would readily agree with that. So, I don't believe Pereboom has made a case that determinism removes the notion that people deserve the appropriate treatment to correct their behavior. The issue is not free will versus determinism, but rather how people deserve to be treated when they behave well and when they behave badly. A system of justice attempts to protect everyone's rights as defined by our laws. The treatment that people deserve should be consistent with that goal. A "just penalty", the treatment that a person "justly deserves", would therefore include the following: (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) secure the offender to protect others until their behavior is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender or his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c). One final note. Rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of free will. If we tell the offender that, due to determinism, he had no control over his past behavior, then, to be logically consistent, we would also have to tell him that he will have no control over his future behavior. Obviously, that approach would defeat the goal of rehabilitation, which is to release to the public a person capable of choosing to do what is morally and legally right on his own volition (his own free will).
In the end, if determinism is true then it doesn't matter what position you or anyone else takes. We can't choose to act differently. If determinism is true then consciousness is like a ticket to a theme park ride and you're strapped in via your body. Enjoy the ride 😎
The only way to find out if the world is deterministic is to repeat some quantum level experiments by travelling back in time. If the results are always the same (albeit being probabilistic in nature) then all bets are off. That would mean the entire history is just a single script and we're actors of one role.
Basically that every moment is determined by the state of things just before it happened, and that moment is determined by the state of everything just before that happened and so on. So you have an unbroken chain of events that are dictated by the previous state and the laws of nature. With this reasoning, nothing is truly random in universe. Something might appear random to us, but in reality it’s the only possible outcome due to the particular state of the universe at that certain point.
@@Sam-gn5mq thank you so much. I have an analogy that two rectangular boxes, one within the other. The biggest one is about determinacy. We can not do anything about that one. Where to born, rich, poor, etc. But the smallest one within it is our free will, our momentary life. Me, writing these sentences is free will, no one is forcing me to write. I am more with Chomsky about free will. thank you again.
@@arifkizilay Yes, that is one way of looking at it. It comes down to how you define free will. The question could be "if you went back in time, could you have acted differently? If yes, then you have free will". So for example, let's say that I want to go to the fridge and choose to either drink orange juice or milk. If someone forces me under gun threat to drink milk, then my will in that situation is not free. I could not have chosen differently. However, without the gun you are very much free to choose between the two. You might choose orange juice, but you could just as well have picked the milk. However.... I think this gets more interesting if we look at our thoughts. If we turned back time to the moment right where I open the fridge...would I actually have picked the other option? I understand that nothing stops me from picking either one, but what if my thoughts are just a result of neural activity based on atoms that are bumping against each other according to the laws of nature. I think we can both agree on that if you throw a dice from a certain angle, with a certain velocity, against a certain surface, with a surface humidity in the air, earth rotation, air resitance and so on and so on - the dice will always end up in a certain position. And if we believe in casual determinism, this applies to all of universe. We could ask ourselves "what makes our thoughts different". Why would our brain not be just a bunch of atoms working together? And what if the world is NOT deterministic. What if the universe is random? Well, then you could say that we have even less free will. Because if we turn back time to when I open the fridge, my thoughts would always be random. Is that not even less free will? Not saying you're wrong, just what I think. Something to ponder over for sure!
@@Sam-gn5mq i also think that we dont have free will. However, i think that there are ramdom things in the universe, such as events in the Quantum World The thing is that that ramdomness doesnt, by any means ( in my opinion, of course) invalidate my assumption that free will doesnt exist because even those ramdom actions will serve as a cause to my next action.That said, do you feel like what im saying is logical and actually makes sense? Just asking because im doing a phylosophy work for school By the way, what im going to say is very very cliché but i couldnt not written this comment:)
@@arifkizilay You are correct. Universal causal necessity/inevitability is not a meaningful constraint. What I will inevitably do is exactly identical to me just being me, choosing what I choose, and doing what I do. And that's not a meaningful constraint. It's basically "what I would have done anyway".
Yet there is no reason for it to have free will. If it had free will it would be violating everything we know about modern day physics and chemistry as the causal link between events would be broken. It would mean that a decision seems to be coming from outside or universe as otherwise it would just be a causal reaction to what happened before making believing in free will the same as believing in a metaphysical power, something utterly unscientific and to the best of our knowledge absurd.
@@savingsoulsforchrist6185 I think what you are referring to is the lack of moral responsibility in a a world without free will. First, just because the conclusions drawn from a statement might be grim, it doesn't mean that the statement itself is false. Second, something being "okay" has nothing to do with free will, there are good and bad actions even in a world where we cannot choose between them. samharris.org/life-without-free-will/
Albert Koppelmaa if creation is life is an accident then purpose is not guided cannot be subjective cause no free will and all human existence will be destroyed either by entropy thy would compress the universe and heat would kill every life form. Or expand so much the ice would kill life or the sun will decay and as a black hole it will destroy our solar system. No free will point of life is useless, depressing and waste of every action in or daily life. Plus if we are just matter in motion destroying some matter cannot be morally wrong.
some people have free will....those still fighting for survival have to conform to the causal structure of the world. so these people don't have free will. but the ones that have gotten themselves out of this cycle can exert their free will. of course they have to face some trade off between exerting free will conforming to the natural causality, but these people have the reserves to suffer the losses from not conforming to natural causality
You are saying some people have more apparent choice, but that doesn't mean they are free to choose! If physical determinism is true, then the choices are not what they seem to be. As an analogy: There is an abundance of species in the tropics, but relatively few at the extremes of climate. Was any of this chosen? Choice arises when you identify with a little piece of it and believe it is different from the rest.
+Chris Dickerman I assume you're replying to my other post?! The point I'm making there is that incompatibilism has no moral power, unless it covertly adopts compatibilism. If you say that human actions cannot be blamed or praised, then you're contradicting reality, which is that they usually are. And if you say they ought not to be then that is precisely the 'free will worth having' of the compatibilist position. [Edit: Or where am I going wrong?!]
***** Well, I think we've both spotted the same dilemma. We agree there are two notions of free will (objective and subjective) and they must align in some way if reality is deterministic. However we also understand that if we deny any subjective freedom then it would be impossible to have an effective morality. It seems to me incompatibilism is based on that denial, so then I'm looking for the nuance that still allows for morality. Maybe I've missed it? Otherwise it would seem rather unhelpful. As an aside, I think we forget that objective truth (e.g. determinism) is actually a highly refined mental abstraction. It's an important one of course but you can't actually live there, any more than you can live in any single part of the mind. I feel sanity is a balance of all the parts rather than a victory of one over the others. (And I think you can feel you are serving the truth when in reality you are serving a process that brings division and imbalance. Certainly that seems the case in many other TH-cam comments I've visited!)
This makes so much sense. Regarding the treatment of criminals if we don't have the free will necessary for moral responsibility- I think Schoemans analogy with the sick that is quarantined is very good. He says that just as we have the right to quarantine carriers of serious diseases to protect people, we have the right to "quarantine" or detain criminals to protect people. But we must focus on rehabilitation 100 % and treat the criminals in the best way possible so as to make them better people.
But rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of free will and self-control. If we tell the criminal offender that, due to causal determinism, he had no control over his past behavior, then we must also tell him that, again due to causal determinism, he will have no control over his future behavior. That makes rehabilitation impossible.
@@marvinedwards737 his consciousness has no control, but your brain can still control you, that's why a person can change even without free will, that person will just be determined to chance and be rehabilitated.
@@marco_mate5181 First, your brain does not control you, it IS you. Second, causation never causes anything and determinism never determines anything. Causation is a concept used to describe the interaction of objects and forces as they bring about events. Place a bowling ball on a slope and gravity will cause it to roll downhill. Place a squirrel on that same slope and his biological drives will cause him to go uphill, downhill, or any other direction where he hopes to find his next acorn. Place a human being on a slope and he'll chop down trees to build a house, find a mate and form a family, join with other families to form a nation.
Note that there are three distinct causal mechanisms: physical (inanimate objects and gravity), biological (living organisms), and rational (intelligent species).
Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
@@marvinedwards737 @Marvin Edwards 1) "you" is the consciousness of the brain.
2) your brain controls you, it creates the colors you see, the feelings you have and the thoughts you hear inside your head. And your subconscious controls your behavior.
3) what you call free will is not the religious libertarian free will, which means "the ability to do otherwise", but is the soft-determinism free will, which in fact exists. Every being is free to act according to their needs and desires, and if they are constrained by external forces, then their are not experiencing freedom.
For instance you are free to buy a movie or not, but wheter you'll do it or not is not up to "you", it will be determined through unconscious processes that will either create the feeling or wanting it or not.
You can make choices free from externtal constraints, but never free from the determined unconscious reactions in your brain.
@@marco_mate5181 I'm pretty sure my conscious mind will be involved in any significant decision. Perhaps not in "choices" from the Libet experiments, like squeezing my hand or pressing a button at "random" intervals. But, if my unconscious mind decided to rob a bank, I'm pretty sure I'd be aware of it in time to alter that choice.
Both Michael Gazzaniga ("Who's in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain") and Michael Graziano ("Consciousness and the Social Brain") assert that it is not one or the other, but both.
The brain does organize sensory data into a model of reality, and uses that model to imagine possibilities, estimate how one option versus another will play out, and choose what the body as a whole will do.
That choice, that we make for ourselves, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence, is called "free will", because it is literally a freely chosen "I will".
My determinism is neither "soft" nor "hard". I presume a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, in which the meaningful and relevant causes of my choice are located within me. My choice is reliably caused by my own purposes and reasons, my own thoughts and feelings, my own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, my own beliefs and values...All of these things are part of who and what I am. And what they choose, I have chosen. There is no dualism as you keep suggesting.
10:30 - That isn't asymmetrical.. because the contrast is wrong.
People often contrast praise with blame..
But that should be praise and "criticise".
And the opposite of blame would be like.. "credit"..
I always had this weird mismatch in my thoughts where "blame" is not reasonable.. but "praise" was reasonable and useful, as long as we know that there's no true "deserve" concept in play.
But with this fix-up, it is now consistent.
Edit: Aside from that nitpick.. awesome video. Completely agree.
We lose actual responsibility, but we retain accountability and duty. So the whole thing doesn't just get thrown out the window. We retain the necessary aspects, whilst throwing out the illogical Libertarian Free Will and "deserve" aspect.
I agree! I think that the opposite of blame would be "award", because blame and praise are not of the same nature.
@@dfsdfsdfsfdsf-x7s - Do you mean "reward"?
I think the opposite of that would be "punish"...
Blame and credit = moral responsibility
Praise and condemn - behaviour modifiers
Punish and reward = consequences for actions (also with built-in behaviour modifying)
Something like that.
@@Siberius- I was trying to come up with something that would be roughly symmetrical to blame, but I don't think that blame and credit/reward would be good.
I think that credit and discredit = moral responsibility (moral attribution)
the rest are just not the same in nature. This could be due to human psychology (we are hardwired to pay attention to the negatives more than the positives). Contrast "condemning a behaviour" and "praising a behaviour".
@@dfsdfsdfsfdsf-x7s - I think blame and credit are pretty good for that...
"You did the thing in question, and so you get the blame/credit".
"Discredit" doesn't appear to be the antonym to "credit".
There actually is a better opposite word than "condemn" for "praise", but it was a weird word that isn't very used, and I forget what it was.
Tell me how is there no such thing as deserve
I think the asymmetric view is correct. A dog doesn't need free will to deserve praise. Why the difference? It's because the praise makes the dog happy. It can be unfair to us not to give us what makes us happy but that doesn't usually work the other way around.
When I say that, lack of free will still makes a difference. It still makes sense for the rewarded and praised to share in their good fortune with those less fortunate, which would make for a much fairer and happier society and world.
Absolutely amazing video! (even though you're not deserving of praise).
Any friend of Spinoza is a friend of mine.
Is that a confirmative bias?
Derk Pereboom advocates in favor of a hard determinist position (or, more precisely, a hard incompatibilist position) but acknowledges that there is a point to holding children accountable for their actions by praising or blaming them. He argues that although children wouldn't thereby get what they deserve (since they were causally determined to to whatever they did and hence it's not their fault), our attitudes of praising and blaming them can be "forward looking" and enable them to learn and to become better persons. Therefore we should praise and blame children for their own sake. Pereboom's position seems inconsistent since it tacitly presupposes that the adults who praise and blame children aren't themselves causally predetermined to do so. But if all human beings, children and adults alike, are part of the same causally predetermined physical world, and no genuine options are open to us either, then it is pointless to try to make children act better in the future than they would otherwise do. Before we make any decision to praise or blame children, all of their future actions (as well as ours) already are determined, according to Pereboom's own hard determinist stance. We should just sit back and watch them cross roads without warning them about incoming traffic. Whatever will happen was doomed to happen and we would be just as blameless for having failed to warn them as they themselves are.
you did not understand the point he makes in the video.
@@yurimagalhaes358 What is the point that I misunderstood?
Sovereign god. I dont get it.
somebody get this guy some lipbalm
Blame him all you want, he certainly doesn't deserve any.
There is no scope for independent choice, since the Universe in which we live is deterministic. All our choices, however deliberate they may seem, are dependent on factors which we have no control over. Since, no one has control over everything, no one can claim to have control over his/her “apparently deliberate” choices.
But, at the same time, it is also true that social norms, moral standards of a particular society and the degree of strict implementation of those norms and standards by that society, are more likely than not to participate as one of the many factors, that “determine” choices of an individual belonging that society.
This, however, doesn’t liberate the society from its deterministic fate, because the society is only a tiny subset of the entirely deterministic Universe. The norms / moral standards of the society as well as the degree of strict implementation of those norms / moral standards are also determined by factors which are beyond the control of the society.
And what was the universe's interest in what I had for breakfast this morning?
3:05 Pereboom's position for free will debate
It is so exciting to believe there is no free will. Think of implications for forgiveness of others and for ourselves. Extinguish regret, blame, and revenge and focus on knowledge as the supreme molder of morality in people. Our sole purpose would be to expose everyone as early as possible to the knowledge of being a good person and let the clock unwind.
Yes, mr Pereboom is right, and thus 'no free will'. Greetings from the Netherlands 🇳🇱
Have yer cake and eat it too! We don't have control because of determinism, ah, but we do have "enough" control to make decisions. So, no free will because we don't have control, but we choose....Can't have both... His example: children. Please! Adults are not children and we expect morally competence with adults and we don't with children so that example is silly. No blame because of determinism but enough control to make decisions. Circle man....
Rewards and punishments are never deserved, but they are often appropriate.
Yes but often they are inappropriate. So for instance the idea of the deserving poor is usually inappropriate. So things do change if we reject moral responsibility and it is for the better.
Yep, very good.
Very well said.
Good brief overview. Esp. appreciate the literature references at the end.
This explains why the criminal justice and economic systems in the US are toxic to human flourishing and require not blame but correction ASAP.
If free will do not exict- that is mean that society just can not treat prisoners in other way
If more people realise free will doesn't exist.. then those causal events will lead to treating prisoners better. We're not doomed to do the same things forever, just because there's no free will.
Or were you saying we shouldn't "blame" people who treat prisoners terrible with the retributive concept? in that case I would agree.
Ben Libet has said that you cannot draw conclusions about free will from his work. Pereboom knows this so why say that Libet claims you can't?. When using examples of "control" he brings as an example: children. Again, he knows that we don't consider children morally responsible. Bad example. If you agree with his underlying principles, ie, no free will and "forward looking" as opposed to "blame based" responses to an agent's action, you must also assume/accept that the agent is morally receptable, that is, capable and willing, to respond to moral instruction. I sincerely doubt this in the vast majority of cases. Finally, he suggests that neuroscience today is heavily leaning toward no free will. Have a look at the book: Free, by Alfred Mele who suggests that this is not the case.
If we tell someone that, due to causal determinism, they had no control over their past behavior, then, to be consistent, we must also tell them that they will have no control over their future behavior. Rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of ones control of their own choices and actions.
Free will skeptics believe that disposing of free will is a magic bullet that will reform our system of justice. But this is an illogical fantasy. If determinism excuses the thief who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who cuts off his hand.
Responsibility is assigned to the most meaningful and relevant causes of the action.
To be meaningful, a cause must efficiently explain why the action happened.
To be relevant, a cause must be something we can actually do something about.
(A) If the cause of the action was someone pointing a gun at the victim and saying, "Fill this bag with all the money in the cash drawer", then correcting our victim's behavior (handing over someone else's money to the robber) is a simple matter of removing the threat, because the threat was the meaningful and relevant cause of her action.
(B) But fixing the robber's deliberate choice to commit armed robbery will require changing the way he thinks about such actions in the future, because his deliberate choosing was the meaningful and relevant cause.
(C) If the cause of the action was mental illness (the cashier decides to hand out money to everyone who comes in the store) then we treat the mental illness, because it was the meaningful and relevant cause.
Obviously, there is nothing we can do about the Big Bang, so it is irrelevant.
Obviously, there is nothing we can do about Causal Necessity, so it is irrelevant.
And it is only the delusion that causal necessity has its own agenda and predetermined that the robber would hold up the bank that would make anyone dream up the notion that the robber's deliberate choice is not the responsible cause of the robbery.
You lost me at ‘…the robber’s *deliberate choice*…’
@@rortys.kierkegaard9980 A deliberate choice is the prior cause of a deliberate act. Deliberation is the process of thinking about our options.
@@marvinedwards737 …yup…
I think the incompatibilist position is incoherent. If everything is physically and therefore causally determined then blame and praise are also causally determined. They would have a non-physical reason for rejecting blame and praise.
Daniel A Collins
Indeed. But what then, practically speaking, is the difference between compatibilism and incompatibilism? For me incompatibilism offers nothing extra, except the flaw that it might excuse an immoral kind of fatalism.
Daniel A Collins I presume you understand the dilemma: "I'm going to do this immoral act because I've figured out how to avoid the moral consequences - and I should feel no shame because my wanting to do it and my doing it are both deterministically ordained." This is the kind of conundrum we all face during our moral development. How do we develop past that without the sense that we could do otherwise i.e. compatibilism?
+Daniel A Collins Perhaps I should say a bit more. But first, the lack of freedom seems to me totally theoretical if it arises only as a concept (scientific determinism.) It would become practical if it translated into actions - but as I've said I don't see how those actions would be different than for compatibilists, EXCEPT for the increased susceptibility to immoral choices which may result when one of the inputs to the decision-making process ("could I do otherwise"?) is philosophically undermined. The same criticism is applied to religious philosophies that believe in fate or immutable destiny - they don't develop because they assume they can't. So, whether or not it is determined, the sense of a "choice to do otherwise" is important - and it seems to me this is all that compatibilism concedes vs incompatibilism. And for good reason?
+Daniel A Collins Sorry if this is dragging ;-) I'm talking about about future choices, not past choices, and I'm saying the inputs to the choice should not be constrained by any sense of inevitability. At the extremes of moral choice, some people ruthlessly pursue what they want (because deterministic social darwinism) while others concede to things they don't want, because they feel pretty much the same way but from a negative POV. I feel the misapplication of determinism encourages these extremes.
Daniel A Collins No worries. I'm just airing my thoughts, and am grateful for constructive criticism :-)
We have a bit of free will as we have a bit of consciousness. Much of what's going on is unconscious but we don't know that, it's in the unknown. For criminality treatment has to exist for unconscious parts of behavior. Many making small mistakes don't know why, it is unknown to them. Others may be fully aware so it is a dilemma.
You are talking about consciousness as if exists outside the realm of our physical world. We have no reason to believe that consciousness comes from something otherworldly, just because we don't know how our brains architecture creates this concept of "consciousness" doesn't mean that any theory is plausible and we can, to the best of our knowledge as a scientific community, rule out the possibility of it coming from outside our universe or not being a consequence of all other laws of nature. As the laws of nature seem to be causal, one thing is always caused by another, our brains chemical reactions seem to be caused by the ones before, there is no reason to think consciousness is any different. Yes we don't know exactly what it is, but we can pretty much say for sure that free will doesn't exist as our brains are just a part of the universe that follow the same laws, if it wasn't this way, It would be one of the biggest scientific discoveries ever.
Determinism requires moral responsibility. You, your body, your actions and your mind (and even a your soul if you cling to such an idea) are just different ways of referring to the same thing. The state you were in, your history and the environment all play a role in explaining your actions and should be considered. Free will is a vague and confusing term that doesn't help in understanding. Do we have it or not? It doesn't matter.
So how is moral responsibility required by determinism? Determinism just states that all events are determined by previous causes, therefore ones choices are also determined by past causes, making them in a way inevitable (excluding randomness which we don't control either). If we don't control the outcomes of our actions ( or our want to control them in a specific way) why would we be morally responsible for them?
Thank you. This is helpful. A lot of combative compatibilists on the internet that make it really hard to get immersed in this problem.
What is the basic argument of a compatibilist?
@@illiniry My compatibilism views free will as a deterministic event, because choosing is a deterministic operation. My choice is reliably caused by my own purposes and reasons, my own thoughts and feelings, my own genetic dispositions and prior life experiences, to suit interests that exist within me. So, I am the meaningful and relevant prior cause of my choice. And no prior cause of me can participate in my deliberation without first becoming an integral part of who and what I am. As long as "that which is me" is the same as "that which is doing the choosing", then my choice is my own. And we call this "free will", as long as my choice was free of coercion and undue influence (which is the ordinary meaning of the term).
@@marvinedwards737 Thank you kindly, I still have trouble understanding that position though. If you are the product of genes and life experience and all of your choices stem from that, then how can they be free? You didn't choose all the prior causes that became a part of you. There is no choice that is free of external influence. Whatever causes your decisions is what causes them, if your choices were free then you'd be in a different universe where cause and effect don't apply. I don't see how free choice can exist deterministically, doesn't that imply that you could do otherwise if you rewind time to when you make any decision?
@@illiniry Oddly enough, "I could have done otherwise" is always true whenever a choosing event occurs in the causal chain. Determinism can only claim that "I would not have done otherwise". Given the same me, in the same circumstance, with the same issue to decide, I "would" always make the same choice. If my reasons were good the first time, and nothing has changed, then my reasons "will" lead to the same result every time.
But we need to avoid confusing what "will" happen with what "can" happen. If something "will" happen, then it will happen. But if something "can" happen it may happen or it may never happen. And if something "could have happened" then that logically implies that it definitely did not happen. And that's quite different from what we mean when we say something "will" happen.
At the beginning of every choosing event, two things are true by logical necessity (they are required for the operation to proceed): (1) there must be at least two real possibilities to choose from (e.g., A and B) and (2) it must be true that I "can" choose either one (e.g., "I can choose A" is true and "I can choose B" is also true).
At the end of a choosing operation we will have the single inevitable thing that I "will" do, plus the thing that I "could" have done, but didn't.
So, determinism may truthfully assert that "I would not have done otherwise" but it cannot truthfully assert that "I could not have done otherwise".
About the prior causes. No prior cause of me can participate in my choosing process without first becoming an integral part of who and what I am. Free will is when "that which is making the decision" is identical to "that which is me". My genes are me. My prior life experiences are me. My beliefs and values are me. My thoughts and feelings are me. These are not external entities making my choices for me. They "that which is me". So, whatever "they" decide, "I" have decided.
To put them in one corner of the room and put me in another corner, and then claim that they are external forces controlling me, requires a dualist notion of reality. You see, one of those two corners is empty.
@@marvinedwards737 Interesting, thank you, I'll have to read this a few times to fully grasp. You might find this forum up your alley despite the name, there are lots of compatibilists and interesting threads: facebook.com/groups/204367762908859
Seems like a contradiction
1. we aren't praise/blame worthy because we do not have control due to determinism.
2. we have the control to affect other people's lives and change their behavior even though determinism is true.
We don't live in a deterministic universe. Atoms and molecules are dead objects and don't determine anything. The word "determined" is an intuition pump that sets the mind ablaze with notions of imaginary chains if causation that are nothing more than mental constructs. Assigning causation is always a subjective exercise, in other words, it's just an opinion.
The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.
The proof goes like this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.
What does a person "deserve"? Pereboom suggests that, due to determinism, there is nothing that anyone ever deserves. But then he brings up the question of how we raise our children. Like most people today, Pereboom suggests that when children behave badly, it is our duty to morally educate them, to explain how they should behave in the future, to insure that they are prepared to make better choices later in life. Ironically, Pereboom's position appears to be that this is what the child deserves. And most of us would readily agree with that. So, I don't believe Pereboom has made a case that determinism removes the notion that people deserve the appropriate treatment to correct their behavior.
The issue is not free will versus determinism, but rather how people deserve to be treated when they behave well and when they behave badly. A system of justice attempts to protect everyone's rights as defined by our laws. The treatment that people deserve should be consistent with that goal. A "just penalty", the treatment that a person "justly deserves", would therefore include the following: (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the offender's future behavior if corrigible, (c) secure the offender to protect others until their behavior is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender or his rights than is reasonably required to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).
One final note. Rehabilitation is impossible without the notion of free will. If we tell the offender that, due to determinism, he had no control over his past behavior, then, to be logically consistent, we would also have to tell him that he will have no control over his future behavior. Obviously, that approach would defeat the goal of rehabilitation, which is to release to the public a person capable of choosing to do what is morally and legally right on his own volition (his own free will).
In the end, if determinism is true then it doesn't matter what position you or anyone else takes. We can't choose to act differently. If determinism is true then consciousness is like a ticket to a theme park ride and you're strapped in via your body. Enjoy the ride 😎
Knowing that free will doesn't exist causes you to care less and that causes you to say it doesn't matter and so forth
Mhhhh. Right to the points
The only way to find out if the world is deterministic is to repeat some quantum level experiments by travelling back in time. If the results are always the same (albeit being probabilistic in nature) then all bets are off. That would mean the entire history is just a single script and we're actors of one role.
Actually, we are "that which writes the role" of our actions. It was causally necessary/inevitable that we would be the writers.
GOODNESS IS AN ILLUSION.
Free will kung wala kang bossing
huevos
"Libet had the view that we don't have free will" That is something new.
Derp, nvm I was wrong
Nope. He was born in the Netherlands and his name really is spelled 'Derk'.
@@pokerandphilosophy8328 omg well I’ll be :’) I’m sorry, I stand corrected!
what is causal determination? thank you.
Basically that every moment is determined by the state of things just before it happened, and that moment is determined by the state of everything just before that happened and so on. So you have an unbroken chain of events that are dictated by the previous state and the laws of nature.
With this reasoning, nothing is truly random in universe. Something might appear random to us, but in reality it’s the only possible outcome due to the particular state of the universe at that certain point.
@@Sam-gn5mq thank you so much. I have an analogy that two rectangular boxes, one within the other. The biggest one is about determinacy. We can not do anything about that one. Where to born, rich, poor, etc. But the smallest one within it is our free will, our momentary life. Me, writing these sentences is free will, no one is forcing me to write. I am more with Chomsky about free will. thank you again.
@@arifkizilay Yes, that is one way of looking at it. It comes down to how you define free will. The question could be "if you went back in time, could you have acted differently? If yes, then you have free will".
So for example, let's say that I want to go to the fridge and choose to either drink orange juice or milk. If someone forces me under gun threat to drink milk, then my will in that situation is not free. I could not have chosen differently. However, without the gun you are very much free to choose between the two. You might choose orange juice, but you could just as well have picked the milk.
However.... I think this gets more interesting if we look at our thoughts. If we turned back time to the moment right where I open the fridge...would I actually have picked the other option? I understand that nothing stops me from picking either one, but what if my thoughts are just a result of neural activity based on atoms that are bumping against each other according to the laws of nature.
I think we can both agree on that if you throw a dice from a certain angle, with a certain velocity, against a certain surface, with a surface humidity in the air, earth rotation, air resitance and so on and so on - the dice will always end up in a certain position. And if we believe in casual determinism, this applies to all of universe. We could ask ourselves "what makes our thoughts different". Why would our brain not be just a bunch of atoms working together?
And what if the world is NOT deterministic. What if the universe is random? Well, then you could say that we have even less free will. Because if we turn back time to when I open the fridge, my thoughts would always be random. Is that not even less free will?
Not saying you're wrong, just what I think. Something to ponder over for sure!
@@Sam-gn5mq i also think that we dont have free will. However, i think that there are ramdom things in the universe, such as events in the Quantum World
The thing is that that ramdomness doesnt, by any means ( in my opinion, of course) invalidate my assumption that free will doesnt exist because even those ramdom actions will serve as a cause to my next action.That said, do you feel like what im saying is logical and actually makes sense? Just asking because im doing a phylosophy work for school
By the way, what im going to say is very very cliché but i couldnt not written this comment:)
@@arifkizilay You are correct. Universal causal necessity/inevitability is not a meaningful constraint. What I will inevitably do is exactly identical to me just being me, choosing what I choose, and doing what I do. And that's not a meaningful constraint. It's basically "what I would have done anyway".
What...a...doofus. Unbelievable...
9:20 descartes was a fool. i wouldn't base theories of free will on his ideas. there is no reason why the subconscious cannot have free will.
Yet there is no reason for it to have free will. If it had free will it would be violating everything we know about modern day physics and chemistry as the causal link between events would be broken. It would mean that a decision seems to be coming from outside or universe as otherwise it would just be a causal reaction to what happened before making believing in free will the same as believing in a metaphysical power, something utterly unscientific and to the best of our knowledge absurd.
Albert Koppelmaa no free will then killing people is okay nature forced us
@@savingsoulsforchrist6185 I think what you are referring to is the lack of moral responsibility in a a world without free will. First, just because the conclusions drawn from a statement might be grim, it doesn't mean that the statement itself is false. Second, something being "okay" has nothing to do with free will, there are good and bad actions even in a world where we cannot choose between them. samharris.org/life-without-free-will/
Albert Koppelmaa if creation is life is an accident then purpose is not guided cannot be subjective cause no free will and all human existence will be destroyed either by entropy thy would compress the universe and heat would kill every life form. Or expand so much the ice would kill life or the sun will decay and as a black hole it will destroy our solar system. No free will point of life is useless, depressing and waste of every action in or daily life. Plus if we are just matter in motion destroying some matter cannot be morally wrong.
th-cam.com/video/oBsI_ay8K70/w-d-xo.html I think idealism is the best way to look at a person check out the video then hmu I’m curious to see
some people have free will....those still fighting for survival have to conform to the causal structure of the world. so these people don't have free will. but the ones that have gotten themselves out of this cycle can exert their free will. of course they have to face some trade off between exerting free will conforming to the natural causality, but these people have the reserves to suffer the losses from not conforming to natural causality
You are saying some people have more apparent choice, but that doesn't mean they are free to choose! If physical determinism is true, then the choices are not what they seem to be. As an analogy: There is an abundance of species in the tropics, but relatively few at the extremes of climate. Was any of this chosen? Choice arises when you identify with a little piece of it and believe it is different from the rest.
+Chris Dickerman I assume you're replying to my other post?! The point I'm making there is that incompatibilism has no moral power, unless it covertly adopts compatibilism. If you say that human actions cannot be blamed or praised, then you're contradicting reality, which is that they usually are. And if you say they ought not to be then that is precisely the 'free will worth having' of the compatibilist position. [Edit: Or where am I going wrong?!]
*****
Well, I think we've both spotted the same dilemma. We agree there are two notions of free will (objective and subjective) and they must align in some way if reality is deterministic. However we also understand that if we deny any subjective freedom then it would be impossible to have an effective morality. It seems to me incompatibilism is based on that denial, so then I'm looking for the nuance that still allows for morality. Maybe I've missed it? Otherwise it would seem rather unhelpful.
As an aside, I think we forget that objective truth (e.g. determinism) is actually a highly refined mental abstraction. It's an important one of course but you can't actually live there, any more than you can live in any single part of the mind. I feel sanity is a balance of all the parts rather than a victory of one over the others. (And I think you can feel you are serving the truth when in reality you are serving a process that brings division and imbalance. Certainly that seems the case in many other TH-cam comments I've visited!)
How much is god in control? Hmm both?
Idk
Guess gods ways are too high to understand
Brainstormsssssss