Hume's Objections to the Cosmological Argument
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 16 ก.ย. 2024
- An explanation and analysis of Hume's Objections to the Cosmological Argument as proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas.
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
Elizabeth Anscombe responded to Hume's objection that by claiming you imagined an object coming out of nothing without a cause you need to further demonstrate why couldn't we talk about the object being transformed from another "place".
Not to mention, Hume's first objection stating that only parts need to be explained would not account for the arrangement of those parts. For example go back to the brick wall from Russell's objection. I don't care if you can tell me that each individual brick was made of cement from man 1 if you can't tell me how the brick layered itself on another brick and another on top of that etc.
I like that thought, thank you! What if Russell's objection would include the mortar, and not just the bricks?
I'm confused
In what work does Hume mention the second objection discussed in the video?
Off the top of my head it might be An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, or it might be Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Check out the SEP's article on the Cosmological Argument for more on Hume's objections.
what books by mackie should I read for more on this stuff?
"In such a ... succession of objects, each part is caused by that
which preceded it and causes that which succeeds it. Where then
is the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer
that the uniting of parts into a whole, like the uniting of several
distinct countries into one kingdom, .. . is performed merely by
an arbitrary act of the mind and has no influence on the nature of
things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in
a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable should you afterwards ask me what was the cause of
the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the
cause of the parts." (Dialogues)
To this objection of Hume, answers can be given:
"Consider an illustration. Suppose that the series of contingent beings were merely a series of self-propagating robots, each one bringing the next into existence. No matter how far back in time you go,
there was just one of these robots functioning. Each robot functions
for, say, ten years, then, in the last few minutes of functioning, propagates a new robot. (Just as the new robot starts to function, the old
one ceases to function and disintegrates.) Now, in this scheme, we
have a cause for the existence and functioning of each of the robots.
But we have not identified a cause of the robot series as a whole. For
example, what causes (or caused) the series to be one of robots rather
than one of rocks, roses, rats, or reindeer? What is the cause of there
being any robots at all? That question has not been answered.
In the same way, even if we know that each contingent being is
caused to exist by some other contingent being, we still do not have
an explanation for the fact that there are contingent beings. There
might have been nothing at all or only necessary beings.
" (Stephen Layman "Letters To Doubting Thomas")
"Hume's objection has force only if he is correct to suppose that the
parts of any whole none of which exist necessarily in and of themselves can each and all be fully explained in terms of other members
of that same whole. This supposition may be doubted. The causal
explanations of the parts of any such whole in terms of other parts
cannot add up to a causal explanation of the whole, if the items
mentioned as causes are items whose own existence stands in need of a causal explanation. The fatal flaw in Hume's supposition has been
well put by James Sadowsky. He asks,
"how any member [of any such causal series] can do any causing
unless it first exists. B cannot cause A until D brings it into existence. What is true of D is equally true of E and F without end.
Since each condition for the existence of A requires the fulfilment
of a prior condition, it follows that none of them can ever be
fulfilled. In each case what is offered as part of the solution turns
out instead to be part of the problem." (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")
This objection is also faulty. God's causality is not deistic act of creation at some beggining but constant creation and he sustains everything that is contingent separatly. He is also enabeling motion and essential (per se) casual series, which cannot be explained otherwise. Saying that 'everything in the universe has a cause then universe as a whole has a cause' is very much overslimplified and a straw-man.
Also we can imagine universe being different or it's non existance so I would say that if God sustains everything in the universe he sustains it as a whole. Also denying Principle of Casuality (and consequently - Principle of Sufficient Reason) seems irrational to me if it means in traditional sense that cause means explanation of a being or phenomenon. Something can't just happen or pop into existance without reason.
While we can imagine the universe being different than it is, if we accept that god is causing everything as a necessary expression of god's essential nature then all the things sustained by god are also necessarily the way they are and can't be any different. This would be corrosive to a christian paradigm which includes any notion of sin since there is no free will.
@@proudfootz Nice summary:
th-cam.com/video/oQ5P0k6Pwb4/w-d-xo.html
@@TheGeneralGrievous19 - Thanks for the link, but I don't think it really addresses the logical difficulty an unfree and amoral god imposes on the notion of humans as free and moral agents.
The video says that choice is an act of will attached to desire. Desire is of course a product of unactualized potential - it is a 'want' which presupposes a lack of something. These are all things that god lacks since god has no unrealized potential.
But if this god has no potential then there is a problem: where does this potential necessary for moral choices come from?
Hey! I'm still kinda confused about Hume's 7 criticism to Aquinas 5 ways.
Can you possibly help me? :)
I'd love to help, but each of those are a series of videos on their own (and I'm keeping pretty busy with this whole One Hundred Days of Logic thing). Do you have a specific question about one of the ways or the criticisms?
Thank you so much 💙
thank you!
Excellent
Thanks! I'm glad you enjoyed it.
hey everyone looking for answers that just isn't in your textbook at all
I'm glad to help!
Uh... Hume is absoultley NOT a Christian. Have you read "On Miracles"?