Very interesting video. Two points should be noted however. The first is that the RN did not take into account the rate at which both shells and armor progressed in the decade and a half between the Battle of Tsushima and the Battle of Jutland. As you mentioned, they also failed to update operating procedures and supply the proper ammunition to their ships Second, the RN believed, incorrectly, that a higher rate of fire would make up for any loss in actual accuracy that would ultimately arise from rushing the process of properly laying the guns. It is this mistaken belief that led to the improper handling of ammunition, such as stacking propellant charges taken out of their flash-proof containers along corridors for quick use, and leaving flash-tight doors open around the magazines and shell handling rooms to facilitate rapid firing. This practice nullified all the safety measures built into the warships and was the primary cause of the detonations that destroyed the 3 battle cruisers at Jutland.
To counter your two 'points'. How can you claim the Royal Navy did not take into account the rate at which shells and armour progressed? This was the Navy who had built HMS Dreadnaught, which was not only the first all big gun Battleship in the world, but also at the time of her construction, the most heavily armoured. Similarly the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge Classes of battleships were the most heavily armoured Battleships of their day, the Queen Elizabeth's being laid down in 1913. Second argument against your 'points' is you made the assumption that the poor ammunition handling was widespread across the Royal Navy. That is not supported by the documentation, nor Royal Navy procedural doctrine at the time. Ammunition handling in the Battleships squadrons for example was fully within the margins used by other navies. The poor ammunition handling and focus on rate of fire over accuracy was ONLY present in the battlecruiser Force, and not even all of them as two of the Battlecruiser Captains refused to implement these unsafe practices. Ironically the ship of one of those men was one of those that exploded, indicating in her case at least ammunition handling was NOT in fact the cause of the detonation (it was a direct magazine hit, she got unlucky). The reason the Battleships used standard ammunition handling practices, and the Battlecruisers did not is really quite simple. The battleships were based in Scapa Flow, thus could regularly undergo Gunnery practice up to and including live fire target practice. As a result the gunnery of the battleships, as shown by the second phase of Jutland, was actually very good. The battlecruisers however were based closer the the North Eastern ports of England in order to be able to rapidly intercept German Bombardment raids on those Ports. They could NOT indulge in regular gunnery training, and especially not live fire target practice. Which is WHY they removed many of the safety features of their ammunition handling.... But it was NOT a widespread practice in the Royal Navy, in fact it was broadly discouraged even before Jutland, and especially after....
To be fair to the RN,the loss of 2 of the ships and the near loss of Lion were attributable to poor ammunition & cordite handling within the battlecruiser squadron. This was a result of Beattys obsession with rate of fire to make up for the lack of gunnery practice, itself a result of Beatty's style of command and being based at Rosyth rather than Scapa. By the time the RN reports concluding this were ready Beatty was in command so the reports were not widely circulated. The RN had done trials which showed that a big pile of burning cordite could explode due to the internal build up of pressure so cordite exploding was not a surprise. The surprise was that the venting did not prevent this but in at Jutland the conditions were such that large numbers of charges probably ignited simultaneously, either from the flash/magazine hit or sympathetic detonation.
The fact that the battlecruiser squadron shooting was generally mediocre certainly didn't help. The RN didn't start hitting the Germans effectively until the Queen Elizabeth class ships joined the fight.
@cathybrind2381 This was down to a combination of Beatty generally expecting that things would be "all right on the night" rather than drilling his men regularly and the battlecruisers being based in Rosyth where the possibilities for practice were fewer. It is noticeable that the 2nd BC squadron was back at Scapa for gunnery training and so was part of the Grand Fleet at Jutland.
Good quality video as always. I got some more suggestions if you are interested. 1. Cover ships that have been over looked 2. Maybe cover smaller ships or each nations naval strategy 3. Specific battles.
At what point does fouling become an issue for naval guns? Land cannon, and wooden ship cannon, were swabbed out between shots to remove silk and chemical propellant remnants. These polluting substances led to misfires, overpressure explosions, and in-barrel detonations. As I understand it, much of this was "cured" by the introduction of gun cotton propellants. What was it like for pre-dreadnaught cannon and rifles? Could the Japanese have been using reduced powder charges to help maintain steady rate of fire and the in-barrel detonations were due to fouling and not faulty fuzes?
I know that the final fire control computers took into account barrel erosion, but I bet it was just some standard wear rate, not like modern tanks which (I think!) can measure muzzle velocity. Maybe they factored in shots since last cleaning.
The swabbing out was more for making sure no burning embers were present so the next powder charge would not prematurely detonate during loading. Any debrea in a mussel loader would be pushed to the bottom rear of the chamber during loading. also compressed air was shot up the barrel to clear smoke and any debris. The shells that blew up in the barrels was likely from the shock of firing or faulty fuzes
Hi, the muzzle loading cannons were swabbed out between rounds - the Admiral class (pre-dreadnoughts) had loading systems that included a swab, loading and ramming gear in the barbette. This required the guns to traverse back to fore/aft between rounds for reloading. Breech loading cannons (bagged charges) had a series of interlocks, requiring an air blast after firing (to remove flammable gases, volatile gases before the breech could be opened. You’ll see pictures of large naval guns firing, then emitting a smoke discharge - that’s the air blast. Small breech loading guns (quick firing) had the shell and propellant in a metal case, these didn’t need the same precautions.
had no idea how much testing they had done. Thanks for that. But I have read that after the battle of Dogger Bank or some other early war battle, the Royal Navy was not happy with their rate of fire and so started storing powder outside magazines so the first few shots could be got off faster, and this was what likely doomed the battle cruisers at Jutland. I'm not near my books right now and don't remember the details.
One other item is in handling the charges nitroglycerin dust would accumulate in the turrets before Jutland a new chief giinners mate went in board the lion . Seeing the dust he had it swept up and put the pile on deck and lit it in front of a crowd of turret men and magazine men. the resulting pyrotechnique display was very impressive and there after at least on the hms lion dust was no longer allowed to accumulate. Ps even regular dust if shocked into the air can explode
At 15:25 that is a Lion in the center and on the right, an Iron Duke left and another behind the center Lion. Early war as still have tall foremasts, upper spotting stations are not expanded, and Dukes small searchlight platforms on back of aft stack. All good looking ships, unlike some dreadnaughts and BCs. Probably Scapa Flow, before BC squadron was based at Firth of Forth.
Reading all the comments suggests that at the Battle of Jutland the British failed to achieve any effective hits on German ships, which is patently untrue. Luetzow was shot so full of holes that her crew could not keep the flooding under control; forward movement wasn't possible due to the pressure on the bulkheads threatening their collapse, while the attempt to go astern also failed because the stern was so high the screws and rudders simply lifted out of the water. She had to be abandoned. Seydlitz is hailed as a super-ship as she got back to Germany with tremendous damage; not mentioned is that key to this was the state of the North Sea, which resembled a mill pond rather than its usual boisterous state. Had the latter applied, Seydlitz would not have made it, and even so, on reaching the Jade estuary she was so low in the water she could not clear the sandbanks to reach Wilhelmshaven. They eventually let her sink on the Amrum Bank where she settled with her upper decks above water and salvage could be done. This took two days, counter flooding, the building of cofferdams and the removal of the guns and roof of Anton turret. This got her to Wilhelmshaven for more work to get her bows two inches (50mm) higher than the drydock sill so that repairs could begin, this work involving the removal of the guns and roof on the Port wing turret. Derflinger and Koenig were also in a very sorry state, and many other German ships weren't much better. Problems with British shells and their filling - and the propellant - there certainly were but it wasn't a total disaster. To return to my teaching days, I would comment "Could have done batter," probably much better. But as others have already said, the Royal Navy, as other navies, were undergoing a steep learning curve, although it certainly had some slow learners.
Very interesting! Just a small point, I think you use the word 'excessive'.. erm... excessively, when most of the time 'extensive' would suit far better. an example is where you talk about the powder-filled shells and the splinter damage they caused.
What many people ignore (or never find out) is that Hipper also encouraged the same recklessness in handling ammunition prior to Dogger Bank. This is what caused the near loss of Seydlitz at that battle when the two aft turrets were burnt out. The ship was only saved by the heroic and self sacrificing actions of crew members who suffered severe burns when turning the flooding valve. Hipper was very lucky there as was Beatty at Jutland but Hipper found out in a small action whereas Beatty only found out in a major fleet action.
over and above that ammunition recklessness was the total failure to carry out the primary duty of the battlecruiser squadron and report the enemy position to the main fleet, the failure to communicate with the QEs being an extra charge against him
I would say it goes with start the obvious. But when there's an battle be it on land or in this case at sea. Any nation with large navy would take notice of what go's on and hopefully learn what they can.
Your comment got me thinking along those lines . . . Both velocity of the incoming round and the pounds per square inch pressure applied against the point of contact are important factors in penetration. If the shell noses weren't pointed, then the pressure at point of incidence would be less per unit of area. Of course the more pointy the nose of the projectile, the weaker it is against impact stresses, too. A blunt point might not penetrate as far as a sharp point, but the sharper the point, the more readily it breaks. Also, if the nose impacts at any angle of nutation*, it would reduce penetration, too. *If the point is not quite aiming at the impact point as it rotates or free flies when the strike occurs, the round penetrates less.
It is worth keeping in mind that armour penetration is significantly influenced by the design of the cap. Shell design at the end of the 19th century was in its infancy.
Very strange the way top navy echelons do not listen to/pass info to senior ranks afloat. While WW2 Japan had the most amazing torpedo, the US Navy refused to believe reports about how poor their Mk14 torpedo was. Eventually sub skippers refused to follow orders and altered torpedo adjustments until they worked. Finally a senior officer ordered an investigation. US subs were really effective after that.
Most of the top Navy personnel DID in fact listen. The ones who did not however were those in BuOrd who were responsible for all Ordnance of the US Navy. They refused to believe there was an issue until King eventually got so pissed off with them he dragged them over the coals and ordered them flat out to sort the problems... Even then they dragged their feet. Most of the major improvements o the Mk 14, at least to submarine version, were ordered by Admiral of Submarines... So he was most DEFINITELY listening to his boat skippers....
Given the importance of the royal Navy to the British empire; I would say they did a horrible job of testing and verifying their conclusions which were based on extremely limited data. they didn't even worse job of implementing the solutions that they thought they found. More inexcusable in my opinion. Separately, the battle cruisers in question were deliberately built to have much less armor than a battleship. It was thought that in exchange they would have more speed for dealing with cruisers. They were never supposed to go up against battleships which have the size guns that they themselves carry. Apparently somebody forgot this and the result was three exploded and sunk ships. Finally, please learn how to pronounce Edinburgh, hint, it is not pronounce the same as Pittsburgh
To be fair the RN drew the best conclusions they could based upon the limited data they had. There were moves to both improve testing and replace liddite with a more stable charge pre-WW1 but with the rapid expansion of the fleet, budget restrictions and the political connections of the main suppliers these came to naught. It is notable how quickly the Greenboy shells were available after Jutland showed just how poorly pure liddite performed - everything was ready but without evidence it wasn't possible to push the change through. As for putting the battlecruisers in the line against other battlecruisers, the Lions were up-armoured to account for this. What I personally find inexcusable was that the armour of the Indefatigables was thinned even compared to the Invincibles so wasn't even proof against armoured cruiser fire. This was however an economy measure forced on the RN by the treasury.
You claim that the ineffectiveness of Lyddite was not communicated to the lower ranks. Orders to load and fire a particular type of ammunition would be given by an officer, usually the gunnery officer commanding the director. He would usually be a Lieutenant Commander. It is conceivable that Lieutenant Commanders were not issued with specific instructions regarding the effectiveness of Lyddite. But some at least would have been keen enough on developing their professionalism to read up on all the available literature, and be fully prepared to avoid its use. It is more likely that orders to fire Lyddite were given by each squadron's Admiral, or even by the fleet Admiral. The gunnery officers would then have had no choice but to follow orders.
Very interesting video. Two points should be noted however.
The first is that the RN did not take into account the rate at which both shells and armor progressed in the decade and a half between the Battle of Tsushima and the Battle of Jutland. As you mentioned, they also failed to update operating procedures and supply the proper ammunition to their ships
Second, the RN believed, incorrectly, that a higher rate of fire would make up for any loss in actual accuracy that would ultimately arise from rushing the process of properly laying the guns.
It is this mistaken belief that led to the improper handling of ammunition, such as stacking propellant charges taken out of their flash-proof containers along corridors for quick use, and leaving flash-tight doors open around the magazines and shell handling rooms to facilitate rapid firing.
This practice nullified all the safety measures built into the warships and was the primary cause of the detonations that destroyed the 3 battle cruisers at Jutland.
To counter your two 'points'.
How can you claim the Royal Navy did not take into account the rate at which shells and armour progressed? This was the Navy who had built HMS Dreadnaught, which was not only the first all big gun Battleship in the world, but also at the time of her construction, the most heavily armoured.
Similarly the Queen Elizabeth and Revenge Classes of battleships were the most heavily armoured Battleships of their day, the Queen Elizabeth's being laid down in 1913.
Second argument against your 'points' is you made the assumption that the poor ammunition handling was widespread across the Royal Navy. That is not supported by the documentation, nor Royal Navy procedural doctrine at the time. Ammunition handling in the Battleships squadrons for example was fully within the margins used by other navies.
The poor ammunition handling and focus on rate of fire over accuracy was ONLY present in the battlecruiser Force, and not even all of them as two of the Battlecruiser Captains refused to implement these unsafe practices. Ironically the ship of one of those men was one of those that exploded, indicating in her case at least ammunition handling was NOT in fact the cause of the detonation (it was a direct magazine hit, she got unlucky).
The reason the Battleships used standard ammunition handling practices, and the Battlecruisers did not is really quite simple. The battleships were based in Scapa Flow, thus could regularly undergo Gunnery practice up to and including live fire target practice. As a result the gunnery of the battleships, as shown by the second phase of Jutland, was actually very good.
The battlecruisers however were based closer the the North Eastern ports of England in order to be able to rapidly intercept German Bombardment raids on those Ports. They could NOT indulge in regular gunnery training, and especially not live fire target practice. Which is WHY they removed many of the safety features of their ammunition handling....
But it was NOT a widespread practice in the Royal Navy, in fact it was broadly discouraged even before Jutland, and especially after....
Metallurgy of both armor and projectile matter greatly during these encounters.
To be fair to the RN,the loss of 2 of the ships and the near loss of Lion were attributable to poor ammunition & cordite handling within the battlecruiser squadron. This was a result of Beattys obsession with rate of fire to make up for the lack of gunnery practice, itself a result of Beatty's style of command and being based at Rosyth rather than Scapa. By the time the RN reports concluding this were ready Beatty was in command so the reports were not widely circulated.
The RN had done trials which showed that a big pile of burning cordite could explode due to the internal build up of pressure so cordite exploding was not a surprise. The surprise was that the venting did not prevent this but in at Jutland the conditions were such that large numbers of charges probably ignited simultaneously, either from the flash/magazine hit or sympathetic detonation.
The fact that the battlecruiser squadron shooting was generally mediocre certainly didn't help. The RN didn't start hitting the Germans effectively until the Queen Elizabeth class ships joined the fight.
@cathybrind2381 This was down to a combination of Beatty generally expecting that things would be "all right on the night" rather than drilling his men regularly and the battlecruisers being based in Rosyth where the possibilities for practice were fewer. It is noticeable that the 2nd BC squadron was back at Scapa for gunnery training and so was part of the Grand Fleet at Jutland.
Really interesting video, thanks!
Good quality video as always. I got some more suggestions if you are interested.
1. Cover ships that have been over looked
2. Maybe cover smaller ships or each nations naval strategy
3. Specific battles.
At what point does fouling become an issue for naval guns? Land cannon, and wooden ship cannon, were swabbed out between shots to remove silk and chemical propellant remnants. These polluting substances led to misfires, overpressure explosions, and in-barrel detonations. As I understand it, much of this was "cured" by the introduction of gun cotton propellants. What was it like for pre-dreadnaught cannon and rifles?
Could the Japanese have been using reduced powder charges to help maintain steady rate of fire and the in-barrel detonations were due to fouling and not faulty fuzes?
I know that the final fire control computers took into account barrel erosion, but I bet it was just some standard wear rate, not like modern tanks which (I think!) can measure muzzle velocity. Maybe they factored in shots since last cleaning.
The swabbing out was more for making sure no burning embers were present so the next powder charge would not prematurely detonate during loading. Any debrea in a mussel loader would be pushed to the bottom rear of the chamber during loading. also compressed air was shot up the barrel to clear smoke and any debris. The shells that blew up in the barrels was likely from the shock of firing or faulty fuzes
Hi, the muzzle loading cannons were swabbed out between rounds - the Admiral class (pre-dreadnoughts) had loading systems that included a swab, loading and ramming gear in the barbette. This required the guns to traverse back to fore/aft between rounds for reloading.
Breech loading cannons (bagged charges) had a series of interlocks, requiring an air blast after firing (to remove flammable gases, volatile gases before the breech could be opened. You’ll see pictures of large naval guns firing, then emitting a smoke discharge - that’s the air blast.
Small breech loading guns (quick firing) had the shell and propellant in a metal case, these didn’t need the same precautions.
had no idea how much testing they had done. Thanks for that.
But I have read that after the battle of Dogger Bank or some other early war battle, the Royal Navy was not happy with their rate of fire and so started storing powder outside magazines so the first few shots could be got off faster, and this was what likely doomed the battle cruisers at Jutland. I'm not near my books right now and don't remember the details.
Boom mezzanine
One other item is in handling the charges nitroglycerin dust would accumulate in the turrets before Jutland a new chief giinners mate went in board the lion . Seeing the dust he had it swept up and put the pile on deck and lit it in front of a crowd of turret men and magazine men. the resulting pyrotechnique display was very impressive and there after at least on the hms lion dust was no longer allowed to accumulate. Ps even regular dust if shocked into the air can explode
At 15:25 that is a Lion in the center and on the right, an Iron Duke left and another behind the center Lion. Early war as still have tall foremasts, upper spotting stations are not expanded, and Dukes small searchlight platforms on back of aft stack. All good looking ships, unlike some dreadnaughts and BCs. Probably Scapa Flow, before BC squadron was based at Firth of Forth.
Reading all the comments suggests that at the Battle of Jutland the British failed to achieve any effective hits on German ships, which is patently untrue. Luetzow was shot so full of holes that her crew could not keep the flooding under control; forward movement wasn't possible due to the pressure on the bulkheads threatening their collapse, while the attempt to go astern also failed because the stern was so high the screws and rudders simply lifted out of the water. She had to be abandoned. Seydlitz is hailed as a super-ship as she got back to Germany with tremendous damage; not mentioned is that key to this was the state of the North Sea, which resembled a mill pond rather than its usual boisterous state. Had the latter applied, Seydlitz would not have made it, and even so, on reaching the Jade estuary she was so low in the water she could not clear the sandbanks to reach Wilhelmshaven. They eventually let her sink on the Amrum Bank where she settled with her upper decks above water and salvage could be done. This took two days, counter flooding, the building of cofferdams and the removal of the guns and roof of Anton turret. This got her to Wilhelmshaven for more work to get her bows two inches (50mm) higher than the drydock sill so that repairs could begin, this work involving the removal of the guns and roof on the Port wing turret. Derflinger and Koenig were also in a very sorry state, and many other German ships weren't much better.
Problems with British shells and their filling - and the propellant - there certainly were but it wasn't a total disaster. To return to my teaching days, I would comment "Could have done batter," probably much better. But as others have already said, the Royal Navy, as other navies, were undergoing a steep learning curve, although it certainly had some slow learners.
I've read that Empress of India capsized and sank earlier than anticipated, somewhat spoiling the tests.
@@tomlindsay4629 That is true. They wanted to put it through another round of shelling, but it sank before that could happen.
Very interesting! Just a small point, I think you use the word 'excessive'.. erm... excessively, when most of the time 'extensive' would suit far better. an example is where you talk about the powder-filled shells and the splinter damage they caused.
We also had that issue - USS Maine.
I’m never was a fan of Beatty since he encouraged such recklessness when it came to action at Jutland.
Was not a certain level of recklessness (a.k.a. bravery) expected / encouraged in the RN?
What many people ignore (or never find out) is that Hipper also encouraged the same recklessness in handling ammunition prior to Dogger Bank.
This is what caused the near loss of Seydlitz at that battle when the two aft turrets were burnt out. The ship was only saved by the heroic and self sacrificing actions of crew members who suffered severe burns when turning the flooding valve.
Hipper was very lucky there as was Beatty at Jutland but Hipper found out in a small action whereas Beatty only found out in a major fleet action.
over and above that ammunition recklessness was the total failure to carry out the primary duty of the battlecruiser squadron and report the enemy position to the main fleet, the failure to communicate with the QEs being an extra charge against him
Interesting thanks!
I would say it goes with start the obvious. But when there's an battle be it on land or in this case at sea. Any nation with large navy would take notice of what go's on and hopefully learn what they can.
Only 1 12inch shell successfully penetrated anything at Tsushima from both sides? Really?
Your comment got me thinking along those lines . . .
Both velocity of the incoming round and the pounds per square inch pressure applied against the point of contact are important factors in penetration. If the shell noses weren't pointed, then the pressure at point of incidence would be less per unit of area. Of course the more pointy the nose of the projectile, the weaker it is against impact stresses, too. A blunt point might not penetrate as far as a sharp point, but the sharper the point, the more readily it breaks.
Also, if the nose impacts at any angle of nutation*, it would reduce penetration, too.
*If the point is not quite aiming at the impact point as it rotates or free flies when the strike occurs, the round penetrates less.
@@WildBillCox13 Borodino is reported to been penetrated by several 12inch which detonated 6inch magazines
It is worth keeping in mind that armour penetration is significantly influenced by the design of the cap. Shell design at the end of the 19th century was in its infancy.
Very strange the way top navy echelons do not listen to/pass info to senior ranks afloat. While WW2 Japan had the most amazing torpedo, the US Navy refused to believe reports about how poor their Mk14 torpedo was. Eventually sub skippers refused to follow orders and altered torpedo adjustments until they worked. Finally a senior officer ordered an investigation. US subs were really effective after that.
Most of the top Navy personnel DID in fact listen. The ones who did not however were those in BuOrd who were responsible for all Ordnance of the US Navy. They refused to believe there was an issue until King eventually got so pissed off with them he dragged them over the coals and ordered them flat out to sort the problems...
Even then they dragged their feet. Most of the major improvements o the Mk 14, at least to submarine version, were ordered by Admiral of Submarines... So he was most DEFINITELY listening to his boat skippers....
Given the importance of the royal Navy to the British empire; I would say they did a horrible job of testing and verifying their conclusions which were based on extremely limited data. they didn't even worse job of implementing the solutions that they thought they found. More inexcusable in my opinion.
Separately, the battle cruisers in question were deliberately built to have much less armor than a battleship. It was thought that in exchange they would have more speed for dealing with cruisers. They were never supposed to go up against battleships which have the size guns that they themselves carry. Apparently somebody forgot this and the result was three exploded and sunk ships.
Finally, please learn how to pronounce Edinburgh, hint, it is not pronounce the same as Pittsburgh
Correct. Perhaps the closest is Head-in-bra, but with the H taken out. Once you get into "Borough" territory, it's a very sticky wicket for Americans
@@phaasch Ed-in-Bruh, maybe?
Eh. How do you pronounce the capital of France? Or of Italy?
@@grizwoldphantasia5005 Pah-ree, Row-ma. Obviously.
To be fair the RN drew the best conclusions they could based upon the limited data they had. There were moves to both improve testing and replace liddite with a more stable charge pre-WW1 but with the rapid expansion of the fleet, budget restrictions and the political connections of the main suppliers these came to naught. It is notable how quickly the Greenboy shells were available after Jutland showed just how poorly pure liddite performed - everything was ready but without evidence it wasn't possible to push the change through.
As for putting the battlecruisers in the line against other battlecruisers, the Lions were up-armoured to account for this. What I personally find inexcusable was that the armour of the Indefatigables was thinned even compared to the Invincibles so wasn't even proof against armoured cruiser fire. This was however an economy measure forced on the RN by the treasury.
You claim that the ineffectiveness of Lyddite was not communicated to the lower ranks. Orders to load and fire a particular type of ammunition would be given by an officer, usually the gunnery officer commanding the director. He would usually be a Lieutenant Commander. It is conceivable that Lieutenant Commanders were not issued with specific instructions regarding the effectiveness of Lyddite. But some at least would have been keen enough on developing their professionalism to read up on all the available literature, and be fully prepared to avoid its use. It is more likely that orders to fire Lyddite were given by each squadron's Admiral, or even by the fleet Admiral. The gunnery officers would then have had no choice but to follow orders.
👋🏻
nothing pertinent (or impertinent) to add.
just making an offering to the tube'y'all's algo-deities.