Hey man, amazing video as always. Could you please point me toward some literature on these topics, especially to things you talked about in the end, that there are a lot of philosophers thinking about how to deal with hyperextensional contexts. Always great learning from you.
This is not the most unexpected resource, but I think absolutely the best place to start reading is at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: plato.stanford.edu/entries/hyperintensionality/
Could you elaborate on extensional treatment of concepts being limited? I mean, it's obvious in a language, when the word refers to the same thing, but has different style, implications, etc. But is it so in philosophy too?
@@АклызМелкенды Suppose I want to talk about knowledge, clearly a philosophical concept. We all know that the winner of the 1952 US Presidential election won the 1952 US Presidential election. But not all of us know that Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 US Presidential election. Even though 'Dwight D. Eisenhower' and 'the winner of the 1952 US Presidential election' are extensionally equivalent. So in the context of knowledge (and in many other contexts) extensionality fails.
Are there any published papers making the point you made at the end of the video, that hyperintentionality is just intentionality once you realize the expressive power gained by possible worlds semantics was inadequate to obsolesce intentionality. Moreover, is your discussion here related to why some philosophers say propositions are "sets of possible worlds", they think they can dispose of the idea that a proposition has a sense (perhaps in someway dependent on its sub-sentential components, or by its inferential relations to other propositions)?
On the first point, my sense is that most defenders of hyperintensionality think this way... but I actually don´t know whether it is explicit in print anywhere! On the second point, yes. Or rather, I suppose most philosophers who identify propositions with sets of possible worlds believe that they thereby explain what sense is. Of course, hyperintensionally equivalent sentences are true in the same possible worlds, so there the approach either falters, or one must bite some bullets. (E.g., one has to say that the sense of '1+1=2' is the same as the sense of 'all dogs are dogs'.)
Thanks a lot! I was just finishing reading a lecture on Kripke, really useful
@@aev1990 Glad it came at the right moment!
Hey man, amazing video as always. Could you please point me toward some literature on these topics, especially to things you talked about in the end, that there are a lot of philosophers thinking about how to deal with hyperextensional contexts. Always great learning from you.
This is not the most unexpected resource, but I think absolutely the best place to start reading is at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: plato.stanford.edu/entries/hyperintensionality/
Could you elaborate on extensional treatment of concepts being limited? I mean, it's obvious in a language, when the word refers to the same thing, but has different style, implications, etc. But is it so in philosophy too?
@@АклызМелкенды Suppose I want to talk about knowledge, clearly a philosophical concept. We all know that the winner of the 1952 US Presidential election won the 1952 US Presidential election. But not all of us know that Dwight D. Eisenhower won the 1952 US Presidential election. Even though 'Dwight D. Eisenhower' and 'the winner of the 1952 US Presidential election' are extensionally equivalent. So in the context of knowledge (and in many other contexts) extensionality fails.
Are there any published papers making the point you made at the end of the video, that hyperintentionality is just intentionality once you realize the expressive power gained by possible worlds semantics was inadequate to obsolesce intentionality.
Moreover, is your discussion here related to why some philosophers say propositions are "sets of possible worlds", they think they can dispose of the idea that a proposition has a sense (perhaps in someway dependent on its sub-sentential components, or by its inferential relations to other propositions)?
On the first point, my sense is that most defenders of hyperintensionality think this way... but I actually don´t know whether it is explicit in print anywhere!
On the second point, yes. Or rather, I suppose most philosophers who identify propositions with sets of possible worlds believe that they thereby explain what sense is. Of course, hyperintensionally equivalent sentences are true in the same possible worlds, so there the approach either falters, or one must bite some bullets. (E.g., one has to say that the sense of '1+1=2' is the same as the sense of 'all dogs are dogs'.)