The part of the debate that moved me the most was when both sides ended peacefully after understanding each other's perspectives, without resorting to sophistry, fallacies, or personal attacks. I despise debate competitions and debaters, but I admire these two individuals.
Amazingly, my wife and I discussed this very issue, of contingency, at Breakfast the other morning. I, for my part, took a position similar to Russell's that Contingency is not a entity or relevant line of thought while she, siding with Copleston supported Contingency as a prime and central tenant of existence...we bought the sofa.
Russel used words like bricks. His vocabulary was a tool of his self conceit. He never really pondered or grasped their meaning. He did however without listening impose his very snobbish view of himself onto others. His condescension drips off every word!
and when the debate concluded, Russell hurried back to catch his train home. he believed in the contingency of the timetable of the train schedule. He sounds like a little ferret or chipmunk when he talks.
Does anyone else find the conclusion of this arguement amusing? It was one big circle that lead to nothing, yet managed to produce what could be an endless debate. Wonderful.
Very civil, totally unlike an equivalent debate today far more verbal sophistication on display here and I cannot say that I fully understood all arguments or references made, of course this is down to my own shortfalls. I am left with a better agreement with Copleston even if I do not believe in a god and also hold that Russell’s Celestial teapot holds philosophically sound that we cannot know what we do not know and neither prove nor disprove what we can not find either because we are looking in the wrong place or because it doesn't exist. While Russell spoke of not finding gold, I can certainly say that this debate delivered it.
Since you couldn't understand the words they used, probably because you haven't studied epistemology and so don't know what contingent and necessary truths are, or apriori or aposteriori knowledge, analytical or synthetics, etc, then how could you agree with either man in an argument expressed entirely using those things? As for Russel's teapot, that's an answer to the specific logical fallacy of Argument from ignorance, it's not an argument against the existence of god. Take a logic course, you'll love it.
@@HueyLewisRocks I wouldn’t say I couldn’t understand so many of the words that the arguments were entirely lost on my but perhaps the context was unfamiliar to me. I do have a wider vocabulary than might be expected. I did search the OED for some of the words used where the meaning was unclear and I did get the thrust of the argument. Good suggestion for the logic course, definitely something I’ll consider when I have the time.
@@Hugh_de_Mortimer At risk of sounding condescending, I think if you learned something about logic and epistemology you'd realise just how much of that debate you didn't understand, as I did when I was introduced to those subjects The concepts they're using have very specific meanings, they're not really words you can 'look up', you have to understand the academic context.
@@HueyLewisRocks If the other person can't explain "God" other than in a made up, faulty argument, then that is a loss. It's not a tie. You can't lose a soccer game ten times and call it "undecided" because the opponent grants you another chance.You're still a loser. These models that they present are just the normie way of complicating things they don't understand. Same goes with the incessant use of dumb wordings. If you can't explain things to a child, you don't understand it yourself. And of course this is an argument against a "God", especially when all the representatives of this "God" try to trick you all the time. I see comments here that this Coplestone "held his own", which is just false. Russel is being a good sport, that's all. But it's also his fault for acting insecure when he is proving himself right. This "civil" discussion hype is nonsense.
I felt persuaded by Copelston's line of argument after the first watch, but after rewatching I realized he's actually not addressing Russel's point at all. Russel said the elements of a set having a particular property (all humans having a mother, for example) is not proof of the set having that property (the human race having a property), and Copelston's reply affirmed the opposite, "and if it (the whole) is sufficient to itself, it is what I call necessary. But it can't be necessary, since each member is contingent". Why does each member being contingent entail the set's contingency? It seems like a fallacy to me.
I think because the "set" is only a set because of its members. With the human race example, there is no human race apart from individual humans. Therefore, if all human beings are contingent, then the "set" that is the human race is contingent, since it is simply what we call the collective of human beings. It seems that neither Copleston nor Russell believe that there is a transcendent thing called "humanity," separate and distinct from any particular humans.
@@stephanjwilliams Your argument makes sense. However, I would add that while the set of all humans does not count with any emergent property outside of those shared by each individual human, the set proposed by Copleston would need to behave similarly if his argument were to be consistent. Notwithstanding, it would be possible to imagine a world in which every object is contingent while the totality is necessary. An example of such a system would be a pendulum and its possible states: namely either left-sided or right-sided. Although its oscillations may be understood as taking part either on the right side or on the left side, and hence both and all of its possible states are always contingent, the oscillatory system as a whole would be a constant. In other words, it is possible to conceptualize a whole whose status or mode is different than the status or mode of its parts. It is maybe in this sense that Russel affirms the question “What is the cause of the world?” to be meaningless, for it supposes a cause due to the world’s contingency as a whole (due to the contingency of its parts) on the first place.
This was refreshing & fantastic in the aspect of having a civil & respectful debate/challenge/disagreement. They've acknowledged one another's pts & challenged one another's pts & attacked the position not the person & when they hit an impasse they moved on..its too bad moat debates/discussions can't be this way today where folks emote, get offended, project & converse intellectually dishonest..
Asking "why is there something rather than nothing?" is the same as asking "why is existence existent?“ But the proposition "existence exists" is an analytical truth by virtue of the identity between the subject and predicate. So it seems to me that the answer to the question is “simply because all things are identical to themselves”.
Appreciate Capturing Christianity turning me onto this debate. It was the only one I hadn't seen before and probably my favorite of his list. The brevity and wit both these men demonstrate in this debate is inspiring. While I am biased towards Russell's side due to my atheism there is little doubt that Copleston is right there with him going jab for jab with every argument.
@@bun197 Not obvious at all, nor true. Copleston was unable to logically deduce the existence of a necessary being (doing so on the basis of observed things is a species of composition fallacy; as Russell says, just because every human has a mother, it doesn't follow that humankind has a mother), let alone show that the necessary being would logically require any of the additional attributes (additional to necessary existence, that is) we associate with a theistic god.
@@8s700 But did you listen to Copleston’s reply, that he was not arguing by a fallacy of composition, rather by saying; ‘the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series, therefore the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause’? Russell then goes on to doubt the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), which is the real crux of this debate. Copleston’s argument was not fallacious. Even Russell does not continue with his accusation of a fallacy of composition, instead arguing against the PSR with his gold mining analogy. Copleston claims that denying the PSR undermines all of science, since physicists assume that all things have an explanation for their existence. We would open the possibility of objects in nature that are simply there with no explanation. He adds that the statement ‘the world is simply there’ is not an analytic truth, which seems to contradict Russell’s epistemological standard. They never even mentioned the additional attributes of God, so I don’t think Russell or Copleston won on that point. Ultimately, I think whether or not the PSR is true determines who won the debate, but they both decided to move on. Although Copleston did successfully defend the validity of his argument, i.e., Russell’s objections failed. So on that basis (also while considering the consequences of denying the PSR) I would say Copleston won.
" Bertrand Russell somewhere has joked, “If I calculate all my sins, sins that I have committed and sins that I have not committed, only brooded over - if even they are included - the hardest judge can’t send me to jail for more than four years. And Christianity sends you to hell forever.” Bertrand Russell has written a book, Why I am not a Christian; this is one of his arguments. It is a beautiful argument because the whole thing seems to be ridiculous. Bertrand Russell, one of the geniuses of our times, tried hard to get rid of the Christian mind, not because it was Christian, but simply because it was given to him by others. He wanted his own fresh outlook about things. He did not want to see things from somebody else’s glasses; he wanted to come in contact with reality immediately, and directly. He wanted his own mind. Bertrand Russell has made a statement that if there were no death, there would be no religion. There is some truth in it. I will not agree totally, because religion is a vast continent. It is not only death, it is also the search for bliss, it is also the search for truth, it is also the search for the meaning of life; it is many more things. But certainly Bertrand Russell is right: if there were no death, very few, very rare people would be interested in religion. Death is the great incentive. Your mind is not your mind - this is something basic to be remembered. Your mind is an implantation of the society in which you have accidentally been born. If you were born in a Christian home, but immediately transferred to a Mohammedan family and brought up by the Mohammedans, you would not have the same mind; you would have a totally different mind that you cannot conceive of. So it was not a question of being against the Christian mind; if he had been a Hindu he would have done the same, if he had been a Mohammedan he would have done the same, if he had been a communist he would have done the same. Bertrand Russell tried hard and wrote a book, WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN. But in a letter to a friend he wrote, “Although I have written the book, although I do not believe that I am a Christian, I have dropped that mind, still, deep down… One day I asked myself, `Who is the greatest man in history?’ Rationally I know it is Gautam Buddha, but I could not put Gautam Buddha above Jesus Christ. “That day I felt that all my efforts have been futile. I am still a Christian. I know rationally that Jesus Christ stands no comparison with Gautam Buddha - but it is only rational. Emotionally, sentimentally I cannot put Gautam Buddha above Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ remains in my unconscious, still affecting my attitudes, my approaches, my behavior. The world thinks I am no longer a Christian, but I know… It seems difficult to get rid of this mind! They have cultivated it with such acumen, with such craftsmanship.”"
Wow I recently found out about Copleston’s 11 volume History of Philosophy series, it wasn’t cheap but I bought them (but haven’t gotten to it yet, I’m saving it for 1300 rainy days lol). So apparently back when he wrote them it was only meant to be for Catholic students, however it unexpectedly became a huge hit with secular and religious people alike.
Well, if it is well written... I am an atheist but I never had particular qualms reading people like Albertus Magnus, Maimonides, Averroes or Thomas Aquinus... No reason a modern cleric wouldn't be able to have the same depth of reasoning.
@@azarshadakumuktir4551 it’s actually still on hold for me, but that’s on purpose. I decided that I would rather not dig into it until I build a solid basic/intermediate philosophical foundation first (other books). I would rather have it be more of a fun historical ride, as opposed to me struggling/learning through it because I don’t have a good grasp of many concepts & terms yet. Although I’m sure that it will still have some meat to it for me when I get to it. I’m not an atheist, but I think that Copleston and AJ Ayer (atheist) were good friends for life, and talked all the time. That must have been a cool arrangement of friendly & deep intellectual volleying!
What is the cause of the world ? The question implies that there are things "outside" the world. If we define the world as everything that exists, then there is no outside. I think this explains why Russell does not accept that the world has a cause.
Exactly, if the 'Universe' is the 'set of all things,' then to say "God is the cause of the Universe" is to really say that "the Universe is the cause of the Universe."
Some play-by-play: Coplestone grounds his opening argument in the philosophy of Lebnitz. Russell asks Copleston whether he accepts Lebnitz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. Copleston rejects that distinction on the grounds that for Lebnitz all truths are truths of reason. In my opinion, its possible to accept the distinction without accepting Lebnitz's radical thesis. Russell restates the distinction in his own words. He also asserts that most analytic knowledge depend on empirical knowledge. Copleston bites and makes the baffling assertion that "if there is a contingent being, then their is a necessary" is analytic. It is baffling because it is not at all obvious that it would entail a contradition to deny, "if there is a contingent being, then their is a necessary being". Russell likely saw the problem with Copleston's argument. However, he shift the topic onto the question whether 'necessary being' is a meaningful expression within the logic he accepts. The logic he accepts is the one that he invented, which means he is on home turf. The downside is that it might seems idiosyncratic and give Copleston room to argue. On the whole, its was a blunder. Copleston goes on the attack. He reiterates some of his argument and winds up making it out that Russell denies God's existence without understanding what God means. Russell accuses Copleston of making the ontological argument. The ontological argument is an analytic argument. Yet nothing analytic can be predictated of a proper name and 'God' is a proper name, so "Gods essence involves existence" is not an analytic proposition. Copleston set out not to make the ontological argument. Copleston ignores Russell's challenge. He presses the question of Russell's understanding. Russell clairifies his meaning. Necessary existent is valid. But 'God exists' is meaningless. No existencial statement is analytic.
This was a very civilized debate between 2 philosophers. Of course it is a never ending debate and cannot be resolved by science and reason. At the end of the day, it becomes identity politics. In these postmodern times, self-ID has been accepted as a legitimate form of self-expression. If a male can identify as a female, then a theist can identify as an atheist and vice versa. Bertram Russell “identified” as an agnostic in the debate, but said he would “identify” as an atheist to the ordinary man. This bypasses the truth and falsity issue. By the same token, I can “identify” as a theist, without having to argue the case. This identity is “who I am”. Jordan Peterson taught me this approach. When badgered by his critics who wanted him to declare whether or not he believes in the Christian God, he would neither confirm or deny. He put it this way: “I act as if God exists”. Then he goes on to talk about the deep existential, psychological & moral truth he finds in the Bible, upon which Western civilization has drawn its enduring strength & weaknesses for thousands of years.
Basically; R: Everything between the parentheses is all that is because that is all that is between the parentheses. C: The parentheses imply something else outside of them. Both: Welp, we’re at an impass. Have a great day.
@@2msvalkyrie529 In other words, because it is impossible to demonstrate nothingness, common sense urges one to conclude that something has always been. And since something will not come from nothing, an eternal being is neccesary. Agree?
@@henrybarrick7205 correct. in layman's terms, for anything to exist there must be something eternal. no beginning no end. human mind doesn't cant intuit because we have no experience with it. the first question to consider, is it more likely that the eternal is inanimate (like energy matter) or a conscious being that created? all other discussions kick the can down the road and avoid the only question that matters. The answer is also simple. In no other circumstance would complex design be argued by brilliant people to have come into existence randomly. oddly its now popular to consider the idea we live in a simulation because the universe is too precisely coded. 😆
17 minutes of gold plated intellectualism! Two highly articulate and imaginative minds debating the impossible with respect and good grace. For me, Russell's contention that there need be no explanation for existence wins the day. This is a brilliant channel. Thank you.
Like all discussions about the existence of god, they ultimately do nowhere, as their final phrases indicate. At least, there appears to be some kind of mutual respect in how to behave towards each other during the course of their discussion.
This is all there is!! That's the most beautiful part about this. If you want to see the breaking down of this argument , go to 'Capturing Christianity'. He discusses this with an expert on the contingency argument. ❤️
I think Copleston is conflating "being" (i.e. a thing that exists) with "personal being" (i.e. a being with thoughts and feelings and the ability to act consciously). The necessary "being" upon which all of us are contingent could just as well be something non-personal, such as the universe, the big bang, etc. And that regress has been at least as ably addressed by modern physics as the regress of a God has been by religious philosophers (i.e. "because it has to be that way").
This is an excellent point. I would also add that our notion of contingency is based on our everyday notion of cause and effect. We are still discovering things about the nature of time. I have a feeling that questions such as “what caused the universe” may ultimately have no meaning.
No, it can't be the Universe as the Universe, per Copleston's and Russel's agreement, does not exist per se but is in itself a chain of existing entities(Copleston arguing they are contingent). The Big Bang is non-contingent and not necessary, so you require a necessary being, and I don't think Copleston conflates the both. He is very well learned and knows extremely well the difference in the two, but he proves the existence of the Universe by the philosophical God that is necessary. It doesn't prove the theistic God but it does prove God.
you are missing the point with that. his idea is that the universe is simply the sum or series of non self explanatory and contingent things, it does not suddenly gain a power over and above its constituent parts just because you give it a name. he’s basically saying the necessary reality is immaterial, it’s more an argument against materialism
This kind of “ argument from contingency “ is originally from Ibn Sina , I disagree with it . This theists insist on some old philosophical argument which has been proven to have some logical issues .
Is big bang singularity seen as part or as totality? And if it is both at the same time, then how it can be that for the talking here that there is a cause for a part and not a cause for a totality?
Hi I'm a quantum physicist, and I'd like to let you know that causation is still a feature of QM. Now, the result of a single measurement is not explained by QM beyond giving a probability distribution according to the Born rule, but let's not confuse that state of affairs with causation being not required. The Schrodinger equation, the bread and butter of quantum dynamics, is totally casual.
What interests me most is the high intellectual plane on which Fr. Coppleston, and many other famous Jesuit scholars, existed. Today my clergy are rather marked by intense stupidity, beginning with the one currently occupying the Vatican.
The Buddhist concept of dependent causation seems somewhat relevant here, that there is no single cause, or absolute cause of any or all things, but that everything causes everything else, infinitely. It is a decentralised notion of causation.
but if there is an infinite chain then there is no before or after, no creator before the created. But we can observe a now and a past and a future. A child does not exist before it is created so the idea of an infinite chain doesn't make sense.
I remember asking my teacher - who was a Buddhist - about this and he commented that when people asked Buddha "what was the first cause?" he would be silent and not respond. Thus, it seems that Buddhist don't have an answer for that, they recognize that there must be a first cause, but they simply don't comprehend it, consequently, I don't think they have much to add in this debate.
@@Smoomty Why doesn't an infinite chain make sense or is tit that such just feels unacceptable? Any particular state is simply a link in the chain. If one has no issue with the idea of a thing existing eternally, then it follows that one shouldn't have an issue with an infinite chain, since, both are infinite past continuums.
@@MyContext When we say that God exists "eternally" it's because He's outside of time. The way He perceives and lives is different. We however are within time and bound to it. An infinite regress would imply that there's no begining. Besides your point is answered right at the beginning, contingent things are those which do not have a cause/explanation in themselves and are caused by something else. If the universe started to exist at some point (and science says it did) then the logic would follow.
@@Joleyn-Joy 1. What is your definition of time wherein something can be claimed to anything AND be outside of time? I denote time as change or the potential for change which entails that my concept of time is past eternal but not necessarily applicable to some future state of affairs. 2. Do you accept matter/energy as a candidate non-contingent thing? I have no issue with the idea and/or the implications of the concept non-contingency. However, I do have issue with such being interlinked with concepts (which are contingent such as intelligence) which are developmental and thus inherently contingent (insofar as my understanding of the idea of intelligence).
A highest quality debate between two great intellectuals, by the way great philosophers and scientists like Einstein Howkins don't believe in the existence of God some even said it's dead.
The main problem of our existence is that we cannot know if there is existence without being, and if there can be being without awareness (mind). The whole process of our coming into being is formed both of contigent processes (those that can be understood in scientific terms, like chemistry and evolution), but also incontingent steps, like the Big Bang, abiogenesis, sudden explosions of birth of new species, which are too improbable in a scientific context. Thus both religion and science are unable to provide an answer to this problem. Thus, the main thesis of Herbert Spencer remains that the origin of our existence is an inscrutible mystery.
@@WMAlbers1 In the debate with Russell, he's defining contingent in terms of that which does not contain in itself the complete reason for its existence and therefore something that is meaningful to ask the cause of. It is perfectly reasonable and coherent to ask the reason for abiogeneis, for the explosion of birth and the Big Bang; that is, they are not self-explained and invite rational enquiry into their causes. It is possible, for example, that abiogenesis is explained through a natural set of chemical processes. As such, that would be the cause of an abiogenesis event and therefore abiogenesis is an effect. One could also ask, on a more metaphysical note, that given abiogenesis is a temporal event, that there must be a temporal cause or a metaphysical cause which gives rise to the historic and temporal conditions for abiogenesis. So, if something is not self-explained(has a cause, for example), then it would be contingent and so it does not stop the metaphysical chain of explanation seeking. Does that make sense?
@@rodomolina7995 All entities under Copleston's view and their relations are contingent. The only non-contingent essence is God per Gods essence as Absolute
I find it amusing to imagine everyday people going about their daily work, in offices or factories, coal mines or maybe cow sheds and somewhere in the background someone has turned on a radio which is broadcasting this debate. I imagine them.listenining respectfully with varying degrees of comprehension to the arguemts from both sides, enunciated with these delightful antique accents. There is something delicious about Russell's. Intellectual confidence and aristocratic detachment which is somehow hilarious.
That’s certainly an aesthetic analysis on radio casts. Wouldn’t hold up to the usual literary criticism though, since it is philosophy, only Derrida’s deconstruction would work for this literary analysis.
The problem of contingency argument is that the line between cause and effect of existence is somewhat arbitrary. Your existence is contingent upon the existence if your parents only because you assume your existence is a separate existence whereas your existence can be considered an extension of your parents. If a plant for example reproduces by extending its roots, the new plant that is still connected through the root is not a completely new existence but an extension of the same existence, therefore one can argue that all existence is connected not through cause and effect but through extension and division of one and the same existence. All boundaries between individual existences are arbitrary. And if all existence is only one existence, it has to be self-contained and non-contingent. Then at the end we arrive at the claim that existence exists without any cause.
Problem is, you cannot show that your model of the plant reproducing by extending its roots applies to anything but plants, so your generalization fails.
Very well, do extension/division still not entail that the growth of the new plant is contingent on the presence of the former? With such terminology, you would still have to extend this to seemingly inanimate objects and ultimately the whole universe. As one can not seriously accept that the existence of the human race, be it a single “collective” existence, is self-contained and without a cause. You pose a totality that you wish to call a single existence that has been dividing and extending. However, your conclusion is unsupported as you have to demonstrate that it is possible for the universe’s existence to be necessary for it to be self-contained. When one considers that the universe came into existence (cannot extend infinitely into the past) and judging by its transient parts, this becomes challenging to do. You are thus left with the original problem.
@@mathewsamuel1386 plant was just an example to make it easier to understand. Let me give you another example. I use a lighter to light a candle. The candle flame seems to be an independent existence, but it was caused by the flame of the lighter. Are they two distinct existences just because they appear to be separate? Another example: Imagine a big rock. If I crush it into hundred pieces, does this create hundred new existences? Where is the line separating an existence from the cause of that existence? The line is illusory. There is no real line.
@@mjfk872 Yes, I see the difference very clearly. In the case of the candle, the lighter was the source of the energy that ignited the candle; it did not transfer any part of its flame to the candle, and the candle does not depend on the lighter to continue to burn once ignited. In fact, the lighter would usually be put out when the candle is lighted. Accordingly, once the flame of the candle began, it became completely independent of the lighter. The lighter existed before the candle, and if it remained on after the candle had been ignited, we would count two flames not one. You can move each flame to a separate location as far from the other as you possibly can without changing the other, so again showing their independence and desperate existence. Also, to an observer who wasn't present to observe the lighting of the candle, there would have been no way to tell which flame caused the other or preceded the other, and it would be correct to conclude in that circumstance that the two flames may have always existed independently and separate from each other. In the case of the rock, we would have individual pieces, each of which can be taken to a different location from the others, hence separate from them. It doesn't matter that they were derived from the same parent rock; they are numerically and locationally distinct. Instances of the same class must be distinct, otherwise there would be no way of identifying them to begin with. How this goes back to the question of God, however, is unclear to me. Do we think God exists only because nothing can come from nothing? Then we would ask, "what did God come from, and what did what God came from come from and..." ad infinitum. Or do we think that God exists because it gives meaning, order and purpose to our own existence? I do not see any objection to accepting the latter. However, one can choose to accept the existence of God or not. No debate can settle the question one way or the other.
@@mathewsamuel1386 The main focus is on existence. In all of your explanations you are correctly pointing out to the fact that we consider separation in time and space as criteria for distinguishing two individually separated existences. My point is that this separation and classification is arbitrary and applies to the appearance of objects not their existence. To establish the 'cause' and 'effect' relation between the existence of objects you need to connect them in time and space at some point. The flame of lighter and flame of the candle have been one entity at a point of time and space, which would technically make them extensions/divisions of the one and the same existence. Even if you succeed in establishing the separation between the existence of cause and its effects, then the supposed God who was the primary cause would be a far and removed entity that is separated from our existence with infinite degrees of separation, thus it becomes more or less irrelevant to our existence. If on the other hand, you agree that every seemingly separate existence is merely an extension/division of the same existence, then this unit of existence is without any cause, because nothing exists beyond it to become its cause. But that one existence can be the cause of infinite divisions and extensions to itself. For me, the biggest takeaway from contingency argument is that the cause and effect is an internal process not an external one.
@Philosophy Overdose Great debate! First of all, a lesson on how to address an intellectual oponent relying on elegance, polite manners, patience and some indulgence in following an argument one does not relate to. Although, I suspect Coppleston's argument to be fallacious somehow, I think that Russell dismissed it rather too quickly and on wrong grounds. An explanation for the existence of everything as a whole is in principle a legitimate desideratum of metaphysics, and one that is even among the physicist interests these days (paraphrased in the language of current cosmological models). Albeit suspicious, as in the case of Anselm's ontological argument, I don't see where it breaks. However, conceding for a minute that there is a necessary being that is itself his own explanation and the ultimate explanation of an infinite series of contigent beings, what I think it is most susceptible to be attacked is the implicit importance of this being. By this argument, one has not demonstrated that the necessary being has will, neither that the nature of the explanation of contingent beings by means of the necessary being is creation. Contingent beings in the series might be related by causal explanations that does not involve creation, but composition, interaction, and many others. Therefore, calling this necessary being God might be unwarranted. Nothing in its definition is connected to purposeful creation, which I guess is essential for the concept of God.
It seems to me that you dismiss the logical conclusion of the argument simply because it doesn't answer the objections you have to other points not made here. The argument only sets out to demonstrate that at the end of contingent things, there is a neccesarry thing. So you are correct. By this argument no one has demonstrated that this neccesarry thing has a will, neither your other point. However, there's other arguments for those conclusions. So it sounds to me, if intellectually honest, that you deem Coppleston's logic sound. And your issue is rather with other arguments that are commonly used together with this one to get to the conclusion of God existing. Is this a fair assessment?
@@shanevan1 Notice that I admired the debate, especially on the side of Coppleston. However, notice as well that I was suspicious of the Coppleston's analysis to be fallacious. Only suspicious, since I don't have any proofs. Philosophical conundrums are not easy to disentangle, a fortiori for an amateur like me. Why I am suspicious? Just because it recalls to me the way Anselm's ontological argument operates. For Anselm, the misleading step is taken when existence is predicated of God as any other of his attributes. Frege duly noticed that the statement "horses exist" functions differently as e.g. "horses are tall". The correct decomposition would be "there is at least one thing and such thing is a horse", the second part of which reduces the elusive problem of existence to identification. We know that horses exist because we recognize that some (already existing) things match the description of a horse. Attribute values under different aspects that are equally ascribable to particular things can be conjoint without any loss in meaning. For instance, "horses are tall and hairy", "horses are short and bold", or any other combination of height and hairiness conditions are equally tenable (they might me false empirically, but that is not at issue, they are still meaningful). However, when you say "horses are tall and non-existent" you can't make sense of what you say. The moral is that taking existence as an attribute brings along ill-posed sentences. Note that I am not raising any issues regarding empirical evidence or valid inferences from them. When you ascribe a predicate to a thing you presuppose existence. Knowing that it is false you cannot say that "unicorns are tall" unless you are in fictional domain or in a conversation that is parasitic on such fiction. That being said I cannot pin down what is the nature of the fallacious argument by Coppleston's, if I am rightly suspicious of it. It is very well accommodated within logic as far as I can see. But again, I don't trust my amateur philosophical sight any more than my intuitions. Now, in my previous post I went along with the existence of necessary things as presupposition for two other criticisms, the ones related to God's will and his creation of contingent things in our universe, such as ourselves. I don't concur with you in your consideration of those as beyond the point since to talk of a proof of God's existence you have to be clear of what is God. As far as I know, God has to be an agent (*) that crafted the universe (*). If you remove those characteristics you are not proving God. I can conceive of necessary things that are not necessarily God. Finally, I am a believer of a certain kind, at least I want to believe. Please see my comment in the lecture of Kaufman about Kirkegaard. But here we are engaging in critical, unbiased reasoning. This is the full extent of my intellectual honesty on this regard. Thanks for replying!
@@Gabriel-pt3ci Is it right for me to say that I am suspicious of the priciple of sufficient reason itself? It seems like an unwarranted presupposition.
If you are searching for a moral principle of politeness and an aesthetical principle of elegance grounded on pure reason, I cannot spell it out. What I can say is that humbly I appreciate those features, perhaps as a result of my cultural background and my personality. From a different perspective, I can also add that a debate that is conducted with elegance and politeness is more difficult to sustain simply because it is subject to extra constraints. And I suppose we do often admire self-hampered but effective executions of any kind... (Incidentally, that is why we appreciate some circus skills).
@William Frost What--do you regret that they were yelling at each other like some cable-TV talk show commentators on each side of the political aisle? The debate was civilized, like the two men engaged in the debate. Do you have an issue with people being civilized? The world is full of crass, uncivil people--it's a major problem.
Clerics automatically assume that this argument from contingency or from primary reason or whatever Thomas Aquinas pointed out proves the existence of that one specific God, that their structure represents. But why? Why can't it be Ra or Brahma or Huitzilopochtli?
It could. It is a generic argument, not an argument for the theistic or a particular theistic God, merely for God itself. Later on, further properties can be argued or not.
They do not assume that is proves the existence of one specific God. It is a starting ground which leads to a God with certain attributes, which further reasoning can develop. Ultimately, the triune nature of the Christian/true God is known through public revelation, not through natural reasoning (indeed, it is impossible to know from pure reason that God is triune).
"...the impregnable position of science may be stated in a few words: we claim, and we shall wrest from theology, the entire domain of cosmological theory." Mr Tyndall in 'Fragments of Science'. And this is from the 1800s. I've been re-reading Blavatsky's contention with science... She ends this quote with " - the end is not difficult to foresee :-)
Copleston (2:28): there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence. My parents didn't create the matter that makes me up, they reorganized it. Does he mean 'current organization of matter' when he says 'object'? It seems from physics that matter (energy, quantum field) cannot be created or destroyed, it just is. The thing that has a beginning is a specific organization of these fundamental things. So 'reason of existence' is more accurately 'reason of transitioning from one state of matter to another', isn't it? Russell: (7:50) I think a subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate.... (8:43) Well, certainly the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" is a question that has meaning. But if you say "Yes, God is the cause of the world" you're using God as a proper name; then "God exists" will not be a statement that has meaning; that is the position that I'm maintaining. Because, therefore, it will follow that it cannot be an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that exists. For example, suppose you take as your subject "the existent round-square," it would look like an analytic proposition that "the existent round- square exists," but it doesn't exist. Is his contention that 'being' consists of the property 'existent'? So to say 'contingent being' would be equal to 'something that exists that could possibly not exist'. Which would be incoherent because in the case it didn't exists it couldn't be 'something that exists'. So a being (something that exists) can only exist, it can never 'possibly not exist'. Is this the crux of his argument?
How can someone like Russell deny that it is necessary for Bertrand Russell to be human? Could Bertrand Russell "become" a dog and still be Bertrand Russell? Certainly, the statement "Bertrand Russell is a human" is necessarily true if it is true at all, but under most interpretations of "analytic" it won't turn out to be an analytical statement, even though a necessary statement. Maybe a good reason to deny that all necessary statements are analytical statements? There are necessary truths about individuals and we can refer to them both by logical proper names as by definite descriptions. Modality does not always establish referentially opaque contexts. I have great respect for Russell, but the stuff which he did for radio stations was generally speaking .... not his best.
To be clear, Russell has no problem with _propositions_ being necessary, his problem is with _beings_ or _entities_ being necessary. In other words, it's perfectly fine to attribute necessity to a statement or a proposition, or if you like, a truth about some object or entity. But it makes no sense to say that a particular object or entity itself is necessary (anymore than that you can say an object itself, rather than a proposition about an object, is true or false).
@@Philosophy_Overdose Yes and no. Russell says 1) Necessity can be only reasonably understood when it is ascribed to propositions, but he also says that 2) all necessary statements are analytical statements, thereby excluding all atomic statements of subject-predicate structure, (statements whose function, if properly analysed, has only has one argument slot) in whose subject position is a logical proper name. There are no analytical statements of the form "F(a)". The statement "Bertrand Russell is human" seems to be true. If it is true at all, it is necessarily true. But Russell also states that such a proposition cannot be necessarily true, because all necessary propositions are analytical statements and the statement "B. Russell is human" is not analytical, (if we don't understand "B. Russell" as a hidden denoting phrase, but as a logical proper name, whose logical structure is simple,) and that therefore the statement "B. Russell is human" cannot be necessary/necessarily true. Russell was, of course, famously ambiguous on the status and logical structure of proper names, and his views on the matter ranged from seeing proper names as logically simple and distinct from denoting phrases, over only regarding "this" (whenb referring to sense data) as the only true proper names, to not accepting logically simple proper names at all and as he viewed them all as just shorthands for some a means of picking out a definite reference by means of description (somewhat similar to their analysis proposed by Quine). But here in this recording, he states that proper names are logically different from definite denoting phrases in that proper names are logically simple whereas denoting phrases are logically complex and that therefore there cannot be any necessary statement whose meaning is already contained in its subject (Kant's old distinction between analytic and synthetic statements) if the subject term is a proper name. However, he does not speak about relations, and it seems obvious that "a=a" has to be true if the term "a" is not empty. The same goes for compound statements like "~(Fa&~Fa)", so one can build analytically true statements with proper names, but there can be no analytical statement of the form "Fa". The statement "Bertrand Russell is human" however is of exactly this structure.
@Oners82 1) If we want to modify "Bertrand Russell is human" with the modal operator for necessity, we have two options, de dicto and de re. You write "A proposition is only necessarily true if it holds across ALL possible worlds, not just the actual world.". But: For a the de re necessity, we need only quantify over the worlds in which B. Russel exists. 2) If you already take up the possible worlds talk, maybe consider viewing names as rigid designators. Of course, not something that Russell did, but I am not aware of him using possible worlds in order to explain modality by means of quantification either. 3) Bertrand Russell is a particular (first substance in Aristotelean terms) and "Bertrand Russell" a singular term, whereas "is human" a universal predicate, and human a second substance. Copleston seems to assume the Aristotelean position that substances have essences (since he is using these concepts in his arguiment). Under the Aristotelean Framework it is a necessary truth that every first substance participates essentially in its respective second substance. Russell did not argue against Coppleston's assumption of essences. There are however no essences for the first substances as such, so names of individual first subtances have to be treated as logically simple. Even if you take the Aristotelean view that propositions are not tensed and that statements about future contingents have no truth value, "Bertrand Russell is essentially human" would have been true in the past as well, just like "Tomorrow a sea battle will either take place or won't take place" is to be considered as already true now as well. However, if you take the view that propositions are tensed, then there is no problem with "Bertrand Russell is human [in e.g. 1905 A.D.]" anyway.
To my mind, cause and effect can extend infinitely in both directions. That is to say that our universe is just a link in a chain going backwards and forwards in time indefinitely in cycles of creation and destruction. Contingent things are simply cycling states of non contingent primordial substance and process. It’s the ultimate recycling bin. We can say that something can’t come from nothing, but how do we know if “nothing” ever existed. By definition nothing can’t exist. It messes with your mind.
It is one of those things that nobody knows until we die, which is the great unkown of humanity. I hope that there is something after death, but i don't expect it
I’m a Christian, but yes a necessary proposition must be analytic. It is daft to try to prove gods existence. Russell was one of the few universal geniuses of the 20th century, and the 19th! Not a believer but 50 years in heaven.
Better than most contemporary debates on this supremely importantly issue . Copleston's argument , I find compelling , but I am a theist anyway . I am however an admirer of Russell , not obviously for his metaphysics of naturalism but rather for his well documented humanitarian activism and his aptitude for elucidating complex and often obscure philosophical concepts comprehensible to the scholastically uninitiated . An aptitude that , generally speaking , is too often lacking in otherwise erudite philosophical expositors .
How did Copleston miss the following proof: Proof of God's Existence: (1) The word 'true' entails a cognitive presence; (2) The laws of the universe were true before they were discovered by corporeal life; therefore... (3) The laws of the universe were true before corporeal life existed, identifying the existence of a non-corporeal entity that knew the laws were true.
No, Deflationism that describes reality counts “is-true” as redundant, and in objective fact, fact is non-subjective, which does not “entail a cognitive presence” or any such subject. I like the structure of the argument though, and although the premises are presumptuous, the argument itself is valid.
In basic terms, first you have to show a god exists before you can posit a god exists. Bad arguments exist, but they do not help toward understanding. A necessary being is meaningless unless you can show that a necessary being exists, show that it is indeed necessary and was not merely inserted into the argument. To say that a god is necessary is just inserting the god into existence. Making things up into existence is what humans do in fictional works. Asserting that a god is necessary or the cause of all matter must be demonstrated and not just asserted. Making stuff up is a human endeavor and some think they are better at it than others.
The first problem is in the beggining: "we all are contengent to something else" yes but the something else doesn't need to be being and shows it doesn't need and as we go trought "infinite" regress we explain "whole" on its own so we end up with explanation on its own... everything else is pretext inserted by religious doctrine
I guess it is hard to accept the existence of things considering that scientists say that the universe and everything in it came from nothing. All the more is it harder to accept the existence of God because nobody knows where He came from. But man , because he is able to experience both, is capable of believing.... Man is an enigma within a puzzle.
It's easy to misinterpret what various scientists mean by 'nothing' - which, to me, is a term serving only as a logical placeholder, like '0'. I embrace the notion of eternal existence - that 'something', i.e. some kind of universe, has always existed; but what can one truly know? After all, we are absurdly tiny collections of molecules, stirred into fleeting consciousness. As for beliefs, it's inevitable that we have them, but there's inner peace to found in keeping one's own counsel.
I like to give analogy. A living cell, plant or animal, has the ability to produce a copy of it. All factories created by human beings are able to produce something, but can a factory produce a factory without the help of a living cell (or a human being). Say a computer virus, it can produce a copy of itself but it is a code that reside inside some device produced by humans. So far self replicating things do not exist outside the living cells. If human beings are able to produce such a thing, then it is proof that no god exist. As long as it is not possible we can assume that some specialty outside the science exists inside a living cell. That cannot be explained by logic or science!
The debate seems even-handed, and Copleston, IMHO, is winning it. But the photographs are bias. Russel was born in 1872, and Copleston in 1907. In 1948, they'd be aged 76 and 41, respectively.
@Sky Gardener To which Copleston replied that a series of phenomenal causes (e.g. mothers) is an insufficient explanation of the series, therefore the phenomenal series has not a phenomenal cause (e.g. mother of the human race), but a transcendental cause (i.e. God). They both agreed that physicists and police detectives search for causes, the only difference between them being that Russell believed it was illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world. Why it should be illegitimate, I don’t known, Russell didn’t explain, but it’s hardly an argument.
@Sky Gardener I don't really get your point about atoms. What do mean by atoms? Or atoms pre-existing? We've come a long way since Dalton's theory. and now we have particle physics. which is very much subatomic. The thing about human beings and life in general is that it's incredibility complex. Take proteins for instance, immensely complex chains of molecules that form task-specific machines, pumps, motors, rotary engines, etc. These are much more than "lumps" - it is mathematically impossible for amino acids to have randomly assembled into such complex proteins even within the most extensive estimations of the age of the universe - currently believed to be 13 or 14 billion years old. Likewise, the creation of atoms such as carbon is far from simple, which why even out-and-out atheists such as Fred Hoyle had to conclude that the universe is extremely fine-tuned. Therefore, science general tends to confirm rather than disprove the so-called cosmological argument, which is indeed much older than Christianity itself, dating back at least to the 5th or 6th century BC, when Parmenides argued that nothing comes from nothing. It's a very old argument and it's never been disproved. That's why Copleston was even willing to accept the ridiculous notion of an infinite series, knowing that this old argument would still hold.
@Sky Gardener We will always naturally drift away from what was actually said in the Copleston-Russell exchange because they were two exceptionally articulate individuals holding a strictly philosophical debate, using strictly philosophical reasoning and terms. ‘Fine-tuning’ is not a philosophical term, nor is it a term that I have invented or adopted for the sake of a ‘desired outcome’, it is a term used by physicists, and I’d stress that it was coined by physicists who if anything had a rather atheistic or agnostic bent. I mean Steve Hawkins, for instance, wondered why the universe was so ‘lumpy’, and wonder he might. There is, after all, a well-known concept in physics, that of entropy. The second law of thermodynamics is, after all, a law. Yet the complexity of life seems to fly in its face. The fact that physicists choose to call the universe ‘fine-tuned’ doesn’t mean the universe is smooth, or consistent or predictable. If anything, recent discoveries have shown it to be dynamic. The design, such as it is, is baffling, just look at the immense variety of living things (including ourselves), it would suggest if anything, that the Designer has a sense of humour. It might seem extremely cruel, but then you’d have to concede that there are also concepts such as beauty and love in this world. But back to the philosophy, how can you claim not to understand the concept of sufficient reason?
@Sky Gardener The sufficient reason principle follows from the fact that we are contingent beings, our cause lies outside us, in our parents, and same can be said about our parents, grandparents, great grandparents, etc. That’s a series, but ultimately these series of humans, dogs, cats, birds and butterflies need to have a sufficient reason for existing. You seem to believe that this can happen by accident: there’s stuff in the universe (we don’t know where it came from), and it somehow, randomly self-assembled into life. I’d stress that this is impossible because living beings are far too complex and its simply a matter of scale. The sheer complexity of a single living cell may be likened to an ultra-modern, state-of-the-art factory with self-assembling and disassembling highways (microtubules) along which molecular motor proteins travel, transporting vesicles and organelles. Yes, design features are repeated in very diverse creatures, but you’d have to concede that despite their diversity, they are all perfectly designed. And those common features can perfectly serve very different purposes. This sheer, exquisite complexity poses the combinatorial inflation problem. I don’t know if the million monkeys with typewriters producing the complete works of Shakespeare analogy is even adequate, but it's good enough, it just can’t be done. Of course Copleston and Russell would have never heard of molecular motors in 1948, but even back then the sufficient reason argument was rational and valid.
@Sky Gardener I think we all agree that an infinite series cannot adequately explain the existence of anything, and that’s exactly the point that Copleston made. Indeed, let’s return to Copleston’s exact argument because I couldn’t put it across any more comprehensively and succinctly: “First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence. There isn't any world distinct from the objects which form it, any more than the human race is something apart from the members. Therefore, I should say, since objects or events exist, and since no object of experience contains within itself reason of its existence, this reason, the totality of objects, must have a reason external to itself. That reason must be an existent being. Well, this being is either itself the reason for its own existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. If it is not, then we must proceed farther. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of existence at all. So, I should say, in order to explain existence, we must come to a being which contains within itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say, which cannot not exist.” This is what Russell tried to pick apart and, IMHO, failed. So, yes, we all agree that we’re talking about absolutely everything. Returning to your point about Russell being an assemblage of atoms, I’ll repeat that it’s a very inadequate description of Bertrand Russell, who like everyone else, was a unique individual. What made him unique wasn’t the actual material his body was made of - you may call it atoms if you will, but these atoms are shed and recycled all the time - nature is efficient in that way. Of Aristotle’s four causes, the first, material cause, is easiest to accept. We’re all made of water and carbon and stuff, science has explained a lot, but there are three more causes. Then there’s the formal cause, the pattern or form which when present makes matter into a particular type of thing, e.g. a human being, one that looks like Bertrand Russell, not exactly like his father because half his genes were inherited by his mother. We now know that there is a genetic code. And of course the form may be altered to some extent by lifestyle choices. But that’s really part of the efficient cause, the agent that brings something about. It could be a carpenter or a sculptor. Ultimately, it would be God. And then there’s the final cause, telos, the sake for which a thing exists. No problems when we think about certain objects or animals, but a great mystery when we think about ourselves. These are problems that cannot be solved by physics, or mathematics for that matter. Take the Big Bang theory, how can physicists explain the start of the Big Bang or what was before it? We all accept the existence of time, but what can we say about gravitational singularity? How can Penrose’s conformal cyclic cosmology model help in our understanding of anything? It doesn’t. It’s just a theory, one like many that just kicks the can further down the road.
Another question would be, is there anything in your imagination where, if you did see it in reality, then you'd believe God is real? For some people, the honest answer would still be, "No."
@Sky Gardener Hi Sky. The Devil’s Delusion is a current book written by Berlinski. He is not a Theist. Yet he has an open mind to the possibly of a Designer. He writes about Victor Stenger, Christopher Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris, and calls them Militant Atheists. Every epoch of time produces this type of angry individual who hate God and belittle and mock anyone who has a different experience. Russel comes from the same mold. You can enjoy his writings. I will enjoy the Gospel. Peace Dennis
Coppleston is looking much more formidable after the big bang. Now Russel has to maintain that there isn't a cause and there's a beginning. That's a very odd position.
It may help his case a bit, but Russell doesn't necessarily have to maintain that there was a beginning without any cause. I mean, it's an open question whether the big bang was actually the absolute beginning. It may very well be that the big bang was simply one event in a much larger universe (e.g. a multiverse).
@@Philosophy_Overdose Yes, that's true. I just mean in view of history. If you look at the debate through the eyes of those present then vs. today. It very much looks like there was a beginning. in abductive reasoning there is always a subjective element. You say it helps his case a bit. I would say quite a bit. But this might be saying more about us than the data. Part of why it leans more heavily toward Coppleston on my side is that I am looking at the evidence that we have, not speculating on what evidence there could be. We know it collapses to a singularity. We know this universe exists. That's all we know for now. I can reformulate my position later when more data comes in. For now Copplestone's position is certainly much more formidable than it was half a century ago.
@@MiloMay I'm not saying I don't believe you. But do you have a source for that? I've read in three different books that disagree with you. The authors of those books are Francis Collins, Stephen Barr, and Luke Barnes, two are physicists and one is a geneticist.
@@christiangadfly24 Brian greene, Sean Caroll,Lawrence Krauss,Brian Cox, Neil Degrass Tyson, Alexander vilenken are all some scientist that are agnostic towards the start of the universe
theres not much logic behind 'if we exist because of cause and effect, then there must be a *being* that is an inciting event', why does he suppose that the inciting event need to have happened by a living thing, theres nothing to suggest an experience or will behind the big bang other than his personification of it
The term being is not defined here. god, can mean many things and not necessarily a personified being. Replace “being” with “something metaphysical” if that suits you.
Copleston understands the issue of rendering God an a priori concept, but his justification not to do so seems ad-hoc. He doesn't really spell it out, but it seems to me he thinks that one can know God through experiencing the world (that's his supposed a posteriori), which is clearly a claim rooted in Paul's letters (Romans 1:18-20). A claim that is ultimately circular. _One can see the creator by looking at creation._ I see a naturor by looking at nature. And I define naturor to mean non-agent, non-sentient cause. That would be equally circular, and equally analytic. But Russell is right. The reasoning natural theology seeks to do has barely anything to do with experiencing nature. It is ultimately nothing but analytical reasoning.
I wish the Christian’s in this debate knew the Bible- Jesus said that miracles prove his existence. And although you don’t see “Christians” performing these miracles- there are plenty out there who walk in the power of God as Christian’s are called to- and to this day people testify of being raised from the dead, radical healing experiences directly clearly related to God, and much more
My ability to prove our existence, both terrestrially and celestially, is to find the story and the sequence that brings meaning to the story. This story has been revealed to me first by you and secondly by the Bible. My duality of spirit automatically tracks a parallel story, the celestial story, and the miraculous events of my revelations and confirmations prove that everything we do on earth, including the story, is a journey of my life on earth as a divine being. My purpose terrestrially is to get to Heaven (London) and be with my family, to find love and share love. My celestial purpose is to save as many of my children as possible so we may spend eternity in our celestial home of joy.
Coplestone make a brilliant effort to outline a beautiful and comprehensively intelligible argument to which rustle only utters : "It's not logical" Well....it's not for Him! That's why you either experience God or you don't. Too much wit clouds one's judgment.
Russell doesn't have a grasp of metaphysics. With his denial of God with his lack of precision if God's attributes Russell destroys all ideals. Without those chaos and self devouring mass murder with a smile. There is nothing constraining the lowest and the most vile fabrications of the human mind.
The part of the debate that moved me the most was when both sides ended peacefully after understanding each other's perspectives, without resorting to sophistry, fallacies, or personal attacks. I despise debate competitions and debaters, but I admire these two individuals.
This wasn't a debate. They never once got off topic or interrupted and shouted over each other.
You are being ironic of course but well put.
@@RevRMBWest Agreed! 😄👏🏻😄
Amazingly, my wife and I discussed this very issue, of contingency, at Breakfast the other morning. I, for my part, took a position similar to Russell's that Contingency is not a entity or relevant line of thought while she, siding with Copleston supported Contingency as a prime and central tenant of existence...we bought the sofa.
Be j
Russel used words like bricks. His vocabulary was a tool of his self conceit. He never really pondered or grasped their meaning. He did however without listening impose his very snobbish view of himself onto others. His condescension drips off every word!
@@johnfisher247 You rejected his arguments? :)
and when the debate concluded, Russell hurried back to catch his train home. he believed in the contingency of the timetable of the train schedule. He sounds like a little ferret or chipmunk when he talks.
why doesn`t trinity is written in bible brian
A truly enjoyable debate and a good example for everyone on TH-cam that disagrees with one another.
I do maintain that the opening narration by Eric Idle is surely among the best of the voice work he’s done.
You'd like this: th-cam.com/video/HVQrpok9KPA/w-d-xo.html
Nudge nudge wink wink say no more.
I was expecting him to declare it to be a no holds barred wrestling match.
Does anyone else find the conclusion of this arguement amusing? It was one big circle that lead to nothing, yet managed to produce what could be an endless debate. Wonderful.
If there's a God and it's intelligible it would find this fact you mention the greatest comedy to itself
Well I’m glad this has been cleared up…
Very civil, totally unlike an equivalent debate today far more verbal sophistication on display here and I cannot say that I fully understood all arguments or references made, of course this is down to my own shortfalls.
I am left with a better agreement with Copleston even if I do not believe in a god and also hold that Russell’s Celestial teapot holds philosophically sound that we cannot know what we do not know and neither prove nor disprove what we can not find either because we are looking in the wrong place or because it doesn't exist.
While Russell spoke of not finding gold, I can certainly say that this debate delivered it.
It is 2022 God is dead.
Since you couldn't understand the words they used, probably because you haven't studied epistemology and so don't know what contingent and necessary truths are, or apriori or aposteriori knowledge, analytical or synthetics, etc, then how could you agree with either man in an argument expressed entirely using those things?
As for Russel's teapot, that's an answer to the specific logical fallacy of Argument from ignorance, it's not an argument against the existence of god.
Take a logic course, you'll love it.
@@HueyLewisRocks I wouldn’t say I couldn’t understand so many of the words that the arguments were entirely lost on my but perhaps the context was unfamiliar to me. I do have a wider vocabulary than might be expected. I did search the OED for some of the words used where the meaning was unclear and I did get the thrust of the argument.
Good suggestion for the logic course, definitely something I’ll consider when I have the time.
@@Hugh_de_Mortimer At risk of sounding condescending, I think if you learned something about logic and epistemology you'd realise just how much of that debate you didn't understand, as I did when I was introduced to those subjects The concepts they're using have very specific meanings, they're not really words you can 'look up', you have to understand the academic context.
@@HueyLewisRocks If the other person can't explain "God" other than in a made up, faulty argument, then that is a loss. It's not a tie. You can't lose a soccer game ten times and call it "undecided" because the opponent grants you another chance.You're still a loser. These models that they present are just the normie way of complicating things they don't understand. Same goes with the incessant use of dumb wordings. If you can't explain things to a child, you don't understand it yourself. And of course this is an argument against a "God", especially when all the representatives of this "God" try to trick you all the time. I see comments here that this Coplestone "held his own", which is just false. Russel is being a good sport, that's all. But it's also his fault for acting insecure when he is proving himself right. This "civil" discussion hype is nonsense.
I felt persuaded by Copelston's line of argument after the first watch, but after rewatching I realized he's actually not addressing Russel's point at all. Russel said the elements of a set having a particular property (all humans having a mother, for example) is not proof of the set having that property (the human race having a property), and Copelston's reply affirmed the opposite, "and if it (the whole) is sufficient to itself, it is what I call necessary. But it can't be necessary, since each member is contingent". Why does each member being contingent entail the set's contingency? It seems like a fallacy to me.
I think because the "set" is only a set because of its members. With the human race example, there is no human race apart from individual humans. Therefore, if all human beings are contingent, then the "set" that is the human race is contingent, since it is simply what we call the collective of human beings. It seems that neither Copleston nor Russell believe that there is a transcendent thing called "humanity," separate and distinct from any particular humans.
@@stephanjwilliams Your argument makes sense. However, I would add that while the set of all humans does not count with any emergent property outside of those shared by each individual human, the set proposed by Copleston would need to behave similarly if his argument were to be consistent. Notwithstanding, it would be possible to imagine a world in which every object is contingent while the totality is necessary. An example of such a system would be a pendulum and its possible states: namely either left-sided or right-sided. Although its oscillations may be understood as taking part either on the right side or on the left side, and hence both and all of its possible states are always contingent, the oscillatory system as a whole would be a constant. In other words, it is possible to conceptualize a whole whose status or mode is different than the status or mode of its parts. It is maybe in this sense that Russel affirms the question “What is the cause of the world?” to be meaningless, for it supposes a cause due to the world’s contingency as a whole (due to the contingency of its parts) on the first place.
This was refreshing & fantastic in the aspect of having a civil & respectful debate/challenge/disagreement. They've acknowledged one another's pts & challenged one another's pts & attacked the position not the person & when they hit an impasse they moved on..its too bad moat debates/discussions can't be this way today where folks emote, get offended, project & converse intellectually dishonest..
The only problem with this video is that it is too short.
Asking "why is there something rather than nothing?" is the same as asking "why is existence existent?“ But the proposition "existence exists" is an analytical truth by virtue of the identity between the subject and predicate. So it seems to me that the answer to the question is “simply because all things are identical to themselves”.
Appreciate Capturing Christianity turning me onto this debate. It was the only one I hadn't seen before and probably my favorite of his list. The brevity and wit both these men demonstrate in this debate is inspiring. While I am biased towards Russell's side due to my atheism there is little doubt that Copleston is right there with him going jab for jab with every argument.
And no one has disliked the video so far when 117 people have liked it
Copleston obviously won this...
@@bun197 Not obvious at all, nor true. Copleston was unable to logically deduce the existence of a necessary being (doing so on the basis of observed things is a species of composition fallacy; as Russell says, just because every human has a mother, it doesn't follow that humankind has a mother), let alone show that the necessary being would logically require any of the additional attributes (additional to necessary existence, that is) we associate with a theistic god.
@@8s700 But did you listen to Copleston’s reply, that he was not arguing by a fallacy of composition, rather by saying; ‘the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series, therefore the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause’? Russell then goes on to doubt the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), which is the real crux of this debate. Copleston’s argument was not fallacious. Even Russell does not continue with his accusation of a fallacy of composition, instead arguing against the PSR with his gold mining analogy. Copleston claims that denying the PSR undermines all of science, since physicists assume that all things have an explanation for their existence. We would open the possibility of objects in nature that are simply there with no explanation. He adds that the statement ‘the world is simply there’ is not an analytic truth, which seems to contradict Russell’s epistemological standard.
They never even mentioned the additional attributes of God, so I don’t think Russell or Copleston won on that point. Ultimately, I think whether or not the PSR is true determines who won the debate, but they both decided to move on. Although Copleston did successfully defend the validity of his argument, i.e., Russell’s objections failed. So on that basis (also while considering the consequences of denying the PSR) I would say Copleston won.
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" Bertrand Russell somewhere has joked, “If I calculate all my sins, sins that I have committed and sins that I have not committed, only brooded over - if even they are included - the hardest judge can’t send me to jail for more than four years. And Christianity sends you to hell forever.” Bertrand Russell has written a book, Why I am not a Christian; this is one of his arguments. It is a beautiful argument because the whole thing seems to be ridiculous.
Bertrand Russell, one of the geniuses of our times, tried hard to get rid of the Christian mind, not because it was Christian, but simply because it was given to him by others. He wanted his own fresh outlook about things. He did not want to see things from somebody else’s glasses; he wanted to come in contact with reality immediately, and directly. He wanted his own mind.
Bertrand Russell has made a statement that if there were no death, there would be no religion. There is some truth in it. I will not agree totally, because religion is a vast continent. It is not only death, it is also the search for bliss, it is also the search for truth, it is also the search for the meaning of life; it is many more things. But certainly Bertrand Russell is right: if there were no death, very few, very rare people would be interested in religion. Death is the great incentive.
Your mind is not your mind - this is something basic to be remembered. Your mind is an implantation of the society in which you have accidentally been born.
If you were born in a Christian home, but immediately transferred to a Mohammedan family and brought up by the Mohammedans, you would not have the same mind; you would have a totally different mind that you cannot conceive of.
So it was not a question of being against the Christian mind; if he had been a Hindu he would have done the same, if he had been a Mohammedan he would have done the same, if he had been a communist he would have done the same.
Bertrand Russell tried hard and wrote a book, WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN. But in a letter to a friend he wrote, “Although I have written the book, although I do not believe that I am a Christian, I have dropped that mind, still, deep down… One day I asked myself, `Who is the greatest man in history?’ Rationally I know it is Gautam Buddha, but I could not put Gautam Buddha above Jesus Christ. “That day I felt that all my efforts have been futile. I am still a Christian. I know rationally that Jesus Christ stands no comparison with Gautam Buddha - but it is only rational. Emotionally, sentimentally I cannot put Gautam Buddha above Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ remains in my unconscious, still affecting my attitudes, my approaches, my behavior. The world thinks I am no longer a Christian, but I know… It seems difficult to get rid of this mind! They have cultivated it with such acumen, with such craftsmanship.”"
Nice c0mment 👍
beautifull comment my brother
Wow I recently found out about Copleston’s 11 volume History of Philosophy series, it wasn’t cheap but I bought them (but haven’t gotten to it yet, I’m saving it for 1300 rainy days lol). So apparently back when he wrote them it was only meant to be for Catholic students, however it unexpectedly became a huge hit with secular and religious people alike.
Well, if it is well written... I am an atheist but I never had particular qualms reading people like Albertus Magnus, Maimonides, Averroes or Thomas Aquinus... No reason a modern cleric wouldn't be able to have the same depth of reasoning.
@@azarshadakumuktir4551 it’s actually still on hold for me, but that’s on purpose. I decided that I would rather not dig into it until I build a solid basic/intermediate philosophical foundation first (other books). I would rather have it be more of a fun historical ride, as opposed to me struggling/learning through it because I don’t have a good grasp of many concepts & terms yet. Although I’m sure that it will still have some meat to it for me when I get to it.
I’m not an atheist, but I think that Copleston and AJ Ayer (atheist) were good friends for life, and talked all the time. That must have been a cool arrangement of friendly & deep intellectual volleying!
Just buying Copleston's work shows a bias that you may not be able to get past.
no price on knowledge my friend
record-breaking utterances of the word "proposition" from 5:12 to 6:12
Welcome to analytic philosophy 🥴
What are you proposing?!
Lawrence Krauss needs to take some debating tips from Bertrand Russell.
huh didnt expect russell to sound like that
？
He does have an unexpectedly weird sounding voice. It fits his appearance though.
What is the cause of the world ?
The question implies that there are things "outside" the world.
If we define the world as everything that exists, then there is no outside.
I think this explains why Russell does not accept that the world has a cause.
Exactly, if the 'Universe' is the 'set of all things,' then to say "God is the cause of the Universe" is to really say that "the Universe is the cause of the Universe."
Some play-by-play:
Coplestone grounds his opening argument in the philosophy of Lebnitz.
Russell asks Copleston whether he accepts Lebnitz's distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact.
Copleston rejects that distinction on the grounds that for Lebnitz all truths are truths of reason. In my opinion, its possible to accept the distinction without accepting Lebnitz's radical thesis.
Russell restates the distinction in his own words. He also asserts that most analytic knowledge depend on empirical knowledge.
Copleston bites and makes the baffling assertion that "if there is a contingent being, then their is a necessary" is analytic. It is baffling because it is not at all obvious that it would entail a contradition to deny, "if there is a contingent being, then their is a necessary being".
Russell likely saw the problem with Copleston's argument. However, he shift the topic onto the question whether 'necessary being' is a meaningful expression within the logic he accepts. The logic he accepts is the one that he invented, which means he is on home turf. The downside is that it might seems idiosyncratic and give Copleston room to argue. On the whole, its was a blunder.
Copleston goes on the attack. He reiterates some of his argument and winds up making it out that Russell denies God's existence without understanding what God means.
Russell accuses Copleston of making the ontological argument. The ontological argument is an analytic argument. Yet nothing analytic can be predictated of a proper name and 'God' is a proper name, so "Gods essence involves existence" is not an analytic proposition. Copleston set out not to make the ontological argument.
Copleston ignores Russell's challenge. He presses the question of Russell's understanding.
Russell clairifies his meaning. Necessary existent is valid. But 'God exists' is meaningless. No existencial statement is analytic.
This was a very civilized debate between 2 philosophers. Of course it is a never ending debate and cannot be resolved by science and reason. At the end of the day, it becomes identity politics. In these postmodern times, self-ID has been accepted as a legitimate form of self-expression. If a male can identify as a female, then a theist can identify as an atheist and vice versa. Bertram Russell “identified” as an agnostic in the debate, but said he would “identify” as an atheist to the ordinary man. This bypasses the truth and falsity issue. By the same token, I can “identify” as a theist, without having to argue the case. This identity is “who I am”. Jordan Peterson taught me this approach. When badgered by his critics who wanted him to declare whether or not he believes in the Christian God, he would neither confirm or deny. He put it this way: “I act as if God exists”. Then he goes on to talk about the deep existential, psychological & moral truth he finds in the Bible, upon which Western civilization has drawn its enduring strength & weaknesses for thousands of years.
Basically;
R: Everything between the parentheses is all that is because that is all that is between the parentheses.
C: The parentheses imply something else outside of them.
Both: Welp, we’re at an impass. Have a great day.
Great summarization
I love this debate.
The most intellectual argument that the professors at Hogwarts ever had.
Hogwarts?
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@@Hugh_de_Mortimer I’ve heard of the place. They bought a ton of rubles early on in April of this year
@@JJJJJVVVVVLLLLL knew it.
10 points for Hufflepuff
What a cordial way of debating a contentious subject!
How could the non demonstrable nature of nothingness not be demonstrative of the necessity for the existance of one eternal being?
er.......yeah.......right. ! Just what I was about to say..
@@2msvalkyrie529 In other words, because it is impossible to demonstrate nothingness, common sense urges one to conclude that something has always been. And since something will not come from nothing, an eternal being is neccesary. Agree?
@@henrybarrick7205 correct. in layman's terms, for anything to exist there must be something eternal. no beginning no end. human mind doesn't cant intuit because we have no experience with it.
the first question to consider, is it more likely that the eternal is inanimate (like energy matter) or a conscious being that created? all other discussions kick the can down the road and avoid the only question that matters. The answer is also simple. In no other circumstance would complex design be argued by brilliant people to have come into existence randomly.
oddly its now popular to consider the idea we live in a simulation because the universe is too precisely coded. 😆
@@jdawg5960 and sometimes its about the journey and not the destination
17 minutes of gold plated intellectualism! Two highly articulate and imaginative minds debating the impossible with respect and good grace. For me, Russell's contention that there need be no explanation for existence wins the day. This is a brilliant channel. Thank you.
Cope. Him saying that was a concession because he got backed into a corner. Nobody really thinks that.
It was definitely nostalgic
So it basically ends it with, well if you don't think it's worth discussing then why are we discussing it?
Russell bows out
i think that it's kind of funny. Russell must have felt uncomfortable a bit
why doesn`t trinity is written in bible
Proposition, Analytic, Contingent is all I keep hearing over and over
I believe in the Tooth Fairy 🧚♀️. 😶
@@alphaomega1351 thank you for adding your intellectual gravitas to the conversation......
@@terribleTed-ln6cm
You are welcome! It's what I does. It's what I do. 😶
These conversations take some background information to digest over time before it makes sense.
It's like steampunk robots arguing
Like all discussions about the existence of god, they ultimately do nowhere, as their final phrases indicate. At least, there appears to be some kind of mutual respect in how to behave towards each other during the course of their discussion.
I wish I could find the rest of this debate. Doesn't seem to be anywhere on the internet. Also Ayer's debate with Copleston.
Yes!! Where the hell is the rest?
This is all there is!! That's the most beautiful part about this. If you want to see the breaking down of this argument , go to 'Capturing Christianity'. He discusses this with an expert on the contingency argument. ❤️
There is a written transcript in Russell's "Why I am not a Christian"
you can read it in print
Where can I go to have a conversation like this in our modern world?!?
The Infrared Discord Server
Engage with Mr Bean. G'day from Australia mate 🇦🇺 👌
@@fromhegel4036 lmao
Right here
@@fromhegel4036 thank you, with my 30 years of rigorous epistemological and analytic logic knowledge I'll head my way into there
I think Copleston is conflating "being" (i.e. a thing that exists) with "personal being" (i.e. a being with thoughts and feelings and the ability to act consciously).
The necessary "being" upon which all of us are contingent could just as well be something non-personal, such as the universe, the big bang, etc. And that regress has been at least as ably addressed by modern physics as the regress of a God has been by religious philosophers (i.e. "because it has to be that way").
This is an excellent point. I would also add that our notion of contingency is based on our everyday notion of cause and effect. We are still discovering things about the nature of time. I have a feeling that questions such as “what caused the universe” may ultimately have no meaning.
No, it can't be the Universe as the Universe, per Copleston's and Russel's agreement, does not exist per se but is in itself a chain of existing entities(Copleston arguing they are contingent). The Big Bang is non-contingent and not necessary, so you require a necessary being, and I don't think Copleston conflates the both. He is very well learned and knows extremely well the difference in the two, but he proves the existence of the Universe by the philosophical God that is necessary. It doesn't prove the theistic God but it does prove God.
you are missing the point with that. his idea is that the universe is simply the sum or series of non self explanatory and contingent things, it does not suddenly gain a power over and above its constituent parts just because you give it a name. he’s basically saying the necessary reality is immaterial, it’s more an argument against materialism
This kind of “ argument from contingency “ is originally from Ibn Sina ,
I disagree with it .
This theists insist on some old philosophical argument which has been proven to have some logical issues .
Russell brings a now-discredited cosmology and a very contentious and now-discredited philosophy of language to the debate.
Russell is the one that was right.
Sounds like a debate between two AI's lol
I wonder why is it really like that?
@@oguzzengin9435 old and sophisticated people just talk like that
@@oguzzengin9435 Also they already pretty much knew the position that the other side had beforehand.
The introduction needs to have The Liberty Bell March playing in the background?
Whatever happened to part 2 and 3, anyone knows?
The philosophical concept of "contingency" presupposes the idea of "necessity." The conclusion is taken for granted in the premise.
no it doesn't, necessity is derived from contingency. The only thing presupposed here is the PSR, the strong PSR albeit.
thats how debate are meant to be
Is big bang singularity seen as part or as totality? And if it is both at the same time, then how it can be that for the talking here that there is a cause for a part and not a cause for a totality?
I wonder what Copleston thought about cosmology in the light of quantum physics, where causation is generally speaking not required?
Thinking of the world in separate objects which are contingent on one another might also kind of miss the point.
Causation (and its implied contingency) is always required, unless the argument begins with something self-existent.
Probably nothing? It’s completely tangential. If anything, distinctions and word games.
Hi I'm a quantum physicist, and I'd like to let you know that causation is still a feature of QM. Now, the result of a single measurement is not explained by QM beyond giving a probability distribution according to the Born rule, but let's not confuse that state of affairs with causation being not required. The Schrodinger equation, the bread and butter of quantum dynamics, is totally casual.
@Sky Gardener That is a very peculiar perspective.
Legendary debate
Thank you valuable resource
Should inter finite(s) 'causation'' be extrapolated to any of that of the non finite/finite?
What interests me most is the high intellectual plane on which Fr. Coppleston, and many other famous Jesuit scholars, existed. Today my clergy are rather marked by intense stupidity, beginning with the one currently occupying the Vatican.
The earlier clergy were classically trained and formed in seminaries of all denominations. Now, it is pop psychology and public relations training.
What's the point of debating something that is incomprehensible to most people.
God is incomprehensible to all
such polite digression!
Theological arguments never go in staight line lol
The Buddhist concept of dependent causation seems somewhat relevant here, that there is no single cause, or absolute cause of any or all things, but that everything causes everything else, infinitely. It is a decentralised notion of causation.
but if there is an infinite chain then there is no before or after, no creator before the created. But we can observe a now and a past and a future. A child does not exist before it is created so the idea of an infinite chain doesn't make sense.
I remember asking my teacher - who was a Buddhist - about this and he commented that when people asked Buddha "what was the first cause?" he would be silent and not respond. Thus, it seems that Buddhist don't have an answer for that, they recognize that there must be a first cause, but they simply don't comprehend it, consequently, I don't think they have much to add in this debate.
@@Smoomty Why doesn't an infinite chain make sense or is tit that such just feels unacceptable? Any particular state is simply a link in the chain.
If one has no issue with the idea of a thing existing eternally, then it follows that one shouldn't have an issue with an infinite chain, since, both are infinite past continuums.
@@MyContext When we say that God exists "eternally" it's because He's outside of time. The way He perceives and lives is different. We however are within time and bound to it. An infinite regress would imply that there's no begining.
Besides your point is answered right at the beginning, contingent things are those which do not have a cause/explanation in themselves and are caused by something else. If the universe started to exist at some point (and science says it did) then the logic would follow.
@@Joleyn-Joy
1. What is your definition of time wherein something can be claimed to anything AND be outside of time?
I denote time as change or the potential for change which entails that my concept of time is past eternal but not necessarily applicable to some future state of affairs.
2. Do you accept matter/energy as a candidate non-contingent thing?
I have no issue with the idea and/or the implications of the concept non-contingency. However, I do have issue with such being interlinked with concepts (which are contingent such as intelligence) which are developmental and thus inherently contingent (insofar as my understanding of the idea of intelligence).
A highest quality debate between two great intellectuals, by the way great philosophers and scientists like Einstein Howkins don't believe in the existence of God some even said it's dead.
The main problem of our existence is that we cannot know if there is existence without being, and if there can be being without awareness (mind). The whole process of our coming into being is formed both of contigent processes (those that can be understood in scientific terms, like chemistry and evolution), but also incontingent steps, like the Big Bang, abiogenesis, sudden explosions of birth of new species, which are too improbable in a scientific context. Thus both religion and science are unable to provide an answer to this problem. Thus, the main thesis of Herbert Spencer remains that the origin of our existence is an inscrutible mystery.
The Big Ban, abigenesis, and explosions of birth are not incontingent upon Copleston's definition.
@@natanaellizama6559 interesting... Maybe you could send a link to his interview... Or did I miss something he said in this interview?
@@WMAlbers1
In the debate with Russell, he's defining contingent in terms of that which does not contain in itself the complete reason for its existence and therefore something that is meaningful to ask the cause of. It is perfectly reasonable and coherent to ask the reason for abiogeneis, for the explosion of birth and the Big Bang; that is, they are not self-explained and invite rational enquiry into their causes. It is possible, for example, that abiogenesis is explained through a natural set of chemical processes.
As such, that would be the cause of an abiogenesis event and therefore abiogenesis is an effect. One could also ask, on a more metaphysical note, that given abiogenesis is a temporal event, that there must be a temporal cause or a metaphysical cause which gives rise to the historic and temporal conditions for abiogenesis.
So, if something is not self-explained(has a cause, for example), then it would be contingent and so it does not stop the metaphysical chain of explanation seeking. Does that make sense?
@@natanaellizama6559I think the Big Bang could be contingent using Hawkins' model
@@rodomolina7995
All entities under Copleston's view and their relations are contingent. The only non-contingent essence is God per Gods essence as Absolute
I find it amusing to imagine everyday people going about their daily work, in offices or factories, coal mines or maybe cow sheds and somewhere in the background someone has turned on a radio which is broadcasting this debate. I imagine them.listenining respectfully with varying degrees of comprehension to the arguemts from both sides, enunciated with these delightful antique accents. There is something delicious about Russell's. Intellectual confidence and aristocratic detachment which is somehow hilarious.
That’s certainly an aesthetic analysis on radio casts. Wouldn’t hold up to the usual literary criticism though, since it is philosophy, only Derrida’s deconstruction would work for this literary analysis.
The problem of contingency argument is that the line between cause and effect of existence is somewhat arbitrary. Your existence is contingent upon the existence if your parents only because you assume your existence is a separate existence whereas your existence can be considered an extension of your parents. If a plant for example reproduces by extending its roots, the new plant that is still connected through the root is not a completely new existence but an extension of the same existence, therefore one can argue that all existence is connected not through cause and effect but through extension and division of one and the same existence. All boundaries between individual existences are arbitrary. And if all existence is only one existence, it has to be self-contained and non-contingent. Then at the end we arrive at the claim that existence exists without any cause.
Problem is, you cannot show that your model of the plant reproducing by extending its roots applies to anything but plants, so your generalization fails.
Very well, do extension/division still not entail that the growth of the new plant is contingent on the presence of the former? With such terminology, you would still have to extend this to seemingly inanimate objects and ultimately the whole universe. As one can not seriously accept that the existence of the human race, be it a single “collective” existence, is self-contained and without a cause. You pose a totality that you wish to call a single existence that has been dividing and extending. However, your conclusion is unsupported as you have to demonstrate that it is possible for the universe’s existence to be necessary for it to be self-contained. When one considers that the universe came into existence (cannot extend infinitely into the past) and judging by its transient parts, this becomes challenging to do. You are thus left with the original problem.
@@mathewsamuel1386 plant was just an example to make it easier to understand. Let me give you another example. I use a lighter to light a candle. The candle flame seems to be an independent existence, but it was caused by the flame of the lighter. Are they two distinct existences just because they appear to be separate?
Another example: Imagine a big rock. If I crush it into hundred pieces, does this create hundred new existences? Where is the line separating an existence from the cause of that existence? The line is illusory. There is no real line.
@@mjfk872 Yes, I see the difference very clearly. In the case of the candle, the lighter was the source of the energy that ignited the candle; it did not transfer any part of its flame to the candle, and the candle does not depend on the lighter to continue to burn once ignited. In fact, the lighter would usually be put out when the candle is lighted. Accordingly, once the flame of the candle began, it became completely independent of the lighter. The lighter existed before the candle, and if it remained on after the candle had been ignited, we would count two flames not one. You can move each flame to a separate location as far from the other as you possibly can without changing the other, so again showing their independence and desperate existence. Also, to an observer who wasn't present to observe the lighting of the candle, there would have been no way to tell which flame caused the other or preceded the other, and it would be correct to conclude in that circumstance that the two flames may have always existed independently and separate from each other. In the case of the rock, we would have individual pieces, each of which can be taken to a different location from the others, hence separate from them. It doesn't matter that they were derived from the same parent rock; they are numerically and locationally distinct. Instances of the same class must be distinct, otherwise there would be no way of identifying them to begin with. How this goes back to the question of God, however, is unclear to me. Do we think God exists only because nothing can come from nothing? Then we would ask, "what did God come from, and what did what God came from come from and..." ad infinitum. Or do we think that God exists because it gives meaning, order and purpose to our own existence? I do not see any objection to accepting the latter. However, one can choose to accept the existence of God or not. No debate can settle the question one way or the other.
@@mathewsamuel1386
The main focus is on existence. In all of your explanations you are correctly pointing out to the fact that we consider separation in time and space as criteria for distinguishing two individually separated existences. My point is that this separation and classification is arbitrary and applies to the appearance of objects not their existence. To establish the 'cause' and 'effect' relation between the existence of objects you need to connect them in time and space at some point. The flame of lighter and flame of the candle have been one entity at a point of time and space, which would technically make them extensions/divisions of the one and the same existence. Even if you succeed in establishing the separation between the existence of cause and its effects, then the supposed God who was the primary cause would be a far and removed entity that is separated from our existence with infinite degrees of separation, thus it becomes more or less irrelevant to our existence. If on the other hand, you agree that every seemingly separate existence is merely an extension/division of the same existence, then this unit of existence is without any cause, because nothing exists beyond it to become its cause. But that one existence can be the cause of infinite divisions and extensions to itself. For me, the biggest takeaway from contingency argument is that the cause and effect is an internal process not an external one.
@Philosophy Overdose Great debate! First of all, a lesson on how to address an intellectual oponent relying on elegance, polite manners, patience and some indulgence in following an argument one does not relate to. Although, I suspect Coppleston's argument to be fallacious somehow, I think that Russell dismissed it rather too quickly and on wrong grounds. An explanation for the existence of everything as a whole is in principle a legitimate desideratum of metaphysics, and one that is even among the physicist interests these days (paraphrased in the language of current cosmological models). Albeit suspicious, as in the case of Anselm's ontological argument, I don't see where it breaks. However, conceding for a minute that there is a necessary being that is itself his own explanation and the ultimate explanation of an infinite series of contigent beings, what I think it is most susceptible to be attacked is the implicit importance of this being. By this argument, one has not demonstrated that the necessary being has will, neither that the nature of the explanation of contingent beings by means of the necessary being is creation. Contingent beings in the series might be related by causal explanations that does not involve creation, but composition, interaction, and many others. Therefore, calling this necessary being God might be unwarranted. Nothing in its definition is connected to purposeful creation, which I guess is essential for the concept of God.
It seems to me that you dismiss the logical conclusion of the argument simply because it doesn't answer the objections you have to other points not made here.
The argument only sets out to demonstrate that at the end of contingent things, there is a neccesarry thing. So you are correct. By this argument no one has demonstrated that this neccesarry thing has a will, neither your other point. However, there's other arguments for those conclusions.
So it sounds to me, if intellectually honest, that you deem Coppleston's logic sound. And your issue is rather with other arguments that are commonly used together with this one to get to the conclusion of God existing.
Is this a fair assessment?
@@shanevan1 Notice that I admired the debate, especially on the side of Coppleston. However, notice as well that I was suspicious of the Coppleston's analysis to be fallacious. Only suspicious, since I don't have any proofs. Philosophical conundrums are not easy to disentangle, a fortiori for an amateur like me.
Why I am suspicious? Just because it recalls to me the way Anselm's ontological argument operates. For Anselm, the misleading step is taken when existence is predicated of God as any other of his attributes. Frege duly noticed that the statement "horses exist" functions differently as e.g. "horses are tall". The correct decomposition would be "there is at least one thing and such thing is a horse", the second part of which reduces the elusive problem of existence to identification. We know that horses exist because we recognize that some (already existing) things match the description of a horse. Attribute values under different aspects that are equally ascribable to particular things can be conjoint without any loss in meaning. For instance, "horses are tall and hairy", "horses are short and bold", or any other combination of height and hairiness conditions are equally tenable (they might me false empirically, but that is not at issue, they are still meaningful). However, when you say "horses are tall and non-existent" you can't make sense of what you say. The moral is that taking existence as an attribute brings along ill-posed sentences. Note that I am not raising any issues regarding empirical evidence or valid inferences from them. When you ascribe a predicate to a thing you presuppose existence. Knowing that it is false you cannot say that "unicorns are tall" unless you are in fictional domain or in a conversation that is parasitic on such fiction.
That being said I cannot pin down what is the nature of the fallacious argument by Coppleston's, if I am rightly suspicious of it. It is very well accommodated within logic as far as I can see. But again, I don't trust my amateur philosophical sight any more than my intuitions.
Now, in my previous post I went along with the existence of necessary things as presupposition for two other criticisms, the ones related to God's will and his creation of contingent things in our universe, such as ourselves. I don't concur with you in your consideration of those as beyond the point since to talk of a proof of God's existence you have to be clear of what is God. As far as I know, God has to be an agent (*) that crafted the universe (*). If you remove those characteristics you are not proving God. I can conceive of necessary things that are not necessarily God.
Finally, I am a believer of a certain kind, at least I want to believe. Please see my comment in the lecture of Kaufman about Kirkegaard. But here we are engaging in critical, unbiased reasoning.
This is the full extent of my intellectual honesty on this regard.
Thanks for replying!
@@Gabriel-pt3ci Is it right for me to say that I am suspicious of the priciple of sufficient reason itself? It seems like an unwarranted presupposition.
If you are searching for a moral principle of politeness and an aesthetical principle of elegance grounded on pure reason, I cannot spell it out. What I can say is that humbly I appreciate those features, perhaps as a result of my cultural background and my personality. From a different perspective, I can also add that a debate that is conducted with elegance and politeness is more difficult to sustain simply because it is subject to extra constraints. And I suppose we do often admire self-hampered but effective executions of any kind... (Incidentally, that is why we appreciate some circus skills).
@William Frost What--do you regret that they were yelling at each other like some cable-TV talk show commentators on each side of the political aisle? The debate was civilized, like the two men engaged in the debate. Do you have an issue with people being civilized? The world is full of crass, uncivil people--it's a major problem.
The most polite debate in british history
Clerics automatically assume that this argument from contingency or from primary reason or whatever Thomas Aquinas pointed out proves the existence of that one specific God, that their structure represents. But why? Why can't it be Ra or Brahma or Huitzilopochtli?
It could. It is a generic argument, not an argument for the theistic or a particular theistic God, merely for God itself. Later on, further properties can be argued or not.
They do not assume that is proves the existence of one specific God. It is a starting ground which leads to a God with certain attributes, which further reasoning can develop. Ultimately, the triune nature of the Christian/true God is known through public revelation, not through natural reasoning (indeed, it is impossible to know from pure reason that God is triune).
The audio seems to be playing a tad too fast.
Was nice of Eric Idle to take care of the intro..
Lol
You cant define god into existence.
"...the impregnable position of science may be stated in a few words: we claim, and we shall wrest from theology, the entire domain of cosmological theory." Mr Tyndall in 'Fragments of Science'. And this is from the 1800s. I've been re-reading Blavatsky's contention with science... She ends this quote with " - the end is not difficult to foresee :-)
Blavatsky the fraudulent medium who was exposed by Richard Hodgson?
if you're waiting for science to provide an answer as to first causes or origins then you will pass away disappointed
Copleston (2:28): there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence.
My parents didn't create the matter that makes me up, they reorganized it. Does he mean 'current organization of matter' when he says 'object'? It seems from physics that matter (energy, quantum field) cannot be created or destroyed, it just is. The thing that has a beginning is a specific organization of these fundamental things. So 'reason of existence' is more accurately 'reason of transitioning from one state of matter to another', isn't it?
Russell: (7:50) I think a subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate....
(8:43) Well, certainly the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" is a question that has meaning. But if you say "Yes, God is the cause of the world" you're using God as a proper name; then "God exists" will not be a statement that has meaning; that is the position that I'm maintaining. Because, therefore, it will follow that it cannot be an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that exists. For example, suppose you take as your subject "the existent round-square," it would look like an analytic proposition that "the existent round- square exists," but it doesn't exist.
Is his contention that 'being' consists of the property 'existent'? So to say 'contingent being' would be equal to 'something that exists that could possibly not exist'. Which would be incoherent because in the case it didn't exists it couldn't be 'something that exists'. So a being (something that exists) can only exist, it can never 'possibly not exist'. Is this the crux of his argument?
One says, the existence of god can be proved. No it can’t, debate over. Well done Bertrand.
There is no answer. We are on an endless search for a language that will describe reality . No such language exists.
Maths
I didn’t realize have a high both of their voices were, I pictured them both as slow talking and low voiced lol
How can someone like Russell deny that it is necessary for Bertrand Russell to be human? Could Bertrand Russell "become" a dog and still be Bertrand Russell?
Certainly, the statement "Bertrand Russell is a human" is necessarily true if it is true at all, but under most interpretations of "analytic" it won't turn out to be an analytical statement, even though a necessary statement. Maybe a good reason to deny that all necessary statements are analytical statements? There are necessary truths about individuals and we can refer to them both by logical proper names as by definite descriptions. Modality does not always establish referentially opaque contexts.
I have great respect for Russell, but the stuff which he did for radio stations was generally speaking .... not his best.
To be clear, Russell has no problem with _propositions_ being necessary, his problem is with _beings_ or _entities_ being necessary. In other words, it's perfectly fine to attribute necessity to a statement or a proposition, or if you like, a truth about some object or entity. But it makes no sense to say that a particular object or entity itself is necessary (anymore than that you can say an object itself, rather than a proposition about an object, is true or false).
@@Philosophy_Overdose Yes and no. Russell says
1) Necessity can be only reasonably understood when it is ascribed to propositions,
but he also says that
2) all necessary statements are analytical statements, thereby excluding all atomic statements of subject-predicate structure, (statements whose function, if properly analysed, has only has one argument slot) in whose subject position is a logical proper name. There are no analytical statements of the form "F(a)".
The statement "Bertrand Russell is human" seems to be true. If it is true at all, it is necessarily true. But Russell also states that such a proposition cannot be necessarily true, because all necessary propositions are analytical statements and the statement "B. Russell is human" is not analytical, (if we don't understand "B. Russell" as a hidden denoting phrase, but as a logical proper name, whose logical structure is simple,) and that therefore the statement "B. Russell is human" cannot be necessary/necessarily true.
Russell was, of course, famously ambiguous on the status and logical structure of proper names, and his views on the matter ranged from seeing proper names as logically simple and distinct from denoting phrases, over only regarding "this" (whenb referring to sense data) as the only true proper names, to not accepting logically simple proper names at all and as he viewed them all as just shorthands for some a means of picking out a definite reference by means of description (somewhat similar to their analysis proposed by Quine). But here in this recording, he states that proper names are logically different from definite denoting phrases in that proper names are logically simple whereas denoting phrases are logically complex and that therefore there cannot be any necessary statement whose meaning is already contained in its subject (Kant's old distinction between analytic and synthetic statements) if the subject term is a proper name.
However, he does not speak about relations, and it seems obvious that "a=a" has to be true if the term "a" is not empty. The same goes for compound statements like "~(Fa&~Fa)", so one can build analytically true statements with proper names, but there can be no analytical statement of the form "Fa". The statement "Bertrand Russell is human" however is of exactly this structure.
@Oners82
1) If we want to modify "Bertrand Russell is human" with the modal operator for necessity, we have two options, de dicto and de re. You write "A proposition is only necessarily true if it holds across ALL possible worlds, not just the actual world.". But: For a the de re necessity, we need only quantify over the worlds in which B. Russel exists.
2) If you already take up the possible worlds talk, maybe consider viewing names as rigid designators. Of course, not something that Russell did, but I am not aware of him using possible worlds in order to explain modality by means of quantification either.
3) Bertrand Russell is a particular (first substance in Aristotelean terms) and "Bertrand Russell" a singular term, whereas "is human" a universal predicate, and human a second substance. Copleston seems to assume the Aristotelean position that substances have essences (since he is using these concepts in his arguiment). Under the Aristotelean Framework it is a necessary truth that every first substance participates essentially in its respective second substance. Russell did not argue against Coppleston's assumption of essences. There are however no essences for the first substances as such, so names of individual first subtances have to be treated as logically simple. Even if you take the Aristotelean view that propositions are not tensed and that statements about future contingents have no truth value, "Bertrand Russell is essentially human" would have been true in the past as well, just like "Tomorrow a sea battle will either take place or won't take place" is to be considered as already true now as well. However, if you take the view that propositions are tensed, then there is no problem with "Bertrand Russell is human [in e.g. 1905 A.D.]" anyway.
To my mind, cause and effect can extend infinitely in both directions. That is to say that our universe is just a link in a chain going backwards and forwards in time indefinitely in cycles of creation and destruction. Contingent things are simply cycling states of non contingent primordial substance and process. It’s the ultimate recycling bin. We can say that something can’t come from nothing, but how do we know if “nothing” ever existed. By definition nothing can’t exist. It messes with your mind.
@@die_schlechtere_Milch Your naive realism became characteristically desperate.
It is one of those things that nobody knows until we die, which is the great unkown of humanity. I hope that there is something after death, but i don't expect it
I’m a Christian, but yes a necessary proposition must be analytic. It is daft to try to prove gods existence. Russell was one of the few universal geniuses of the 20th century, and the 19th! Not a believer but 50 years in heaven.
What happened to the previous "philosophy overdose" channel?
Better than most contemporary debates on this supremely importantly issue . Copleston's argument , I find compelling , but I am a theist anyway . I am however an admirer of Russell , not obviously for his metaphysics of naturalism but rather for his well documented humanitarian activism and his aptitude for elucidating complex and often obscure philosophical concepts comprehensible to the scholastically uninitiated . An aptitude that , generally speaking , is too often lacking in otherwise erudite philosophical expositors .
Fancy fancy
Yeah , whatever , John Dodo@@JohnDoe-uk6si
Is this the debate that was included in "Why I am not a Christian"?
Yeah
How did Copleston miss the following proof:
Proof of God's Existence:
(1) The word 'true' entails a cognitive presence;
(2) The laws of the universe were true before they were discovered by corporeal life; therefore...
(3) The laws of the universe were true before corporeal life existed, identifying the existence of a non-corporeal entity that knew the laws were true.
No, Deflationism that describes reality counts “is-true” as redundant, and in objective fact, fact is non-subjective, which does not “entail a cognitive presence” or any such subject. I like the structure of the argument though, and although the premises are presumptuous, the argument itself is valid.
Thank you
Where can the rest be heard?
In basic terms, first you have to show a god exists before you can posit a god exists. Bad arguments exist, but they do not help toward understanding. A necessary being is meaningless unless you can show that a necessary being exists, show that it is indeed necessary and was not merely inserted into the argument. To say that a god is necessary is just inserting the god into existence. Making things up into existence is what humans do in fictional works. Asserting that a god is necessary or the cause of all matter must be demonstrated and not just asserted. Making stuff up is a human endeavor and some think they are better at it than others.
The first problem is in the beggining: "we all are contengent to something else" yes but the something else doesn't need to be being and shows it doesn't need and as we go trought "infinite" regress we explain "whole" on its own so we end up with explanation on its own... everything else is pretext inserted by religious doctrine
I guess it is hard to accept the existence of things considering that scientists say that the universe and everything in it came from nothing. All the more is it harder to accept the existence of God because nobody knows where He came from. But man , because he is able to experience both, is capable of believing.... Man is an enigma within a puzzle.
It's easy to misinterpret what various scientists mean by 'nothing' - which, to me, is a term serving only as a logical placeholder, like '0'. I embrace the notion of eternal existence - that 'something', i.e. some kind of universe, has always existed; but what can one truly know? After all, we are absurdly tiny collections of molecules, stirred into fleeting consciousness. As for beliefs, it's inevitable that we have them, but there's inner peace to found in keeping one's own counsel.
I like to give analogy. A living cell, plant or animal, has the ability to produce a copy of it. All factories created by human beings are able to produce something, but can a factory produce a factory without the help of a living cell (or a human being). Say a computer virus, it can produce a copy of itself but it is a code that reside inside some device produced by humans. So far self replicating things do not exist outside the living cells. If human beings are able to produce such a thing, then it is proof that no god exist. As long as it is not possible we can assume that some specialty outside the science exists inside a living cell. That cannot be explained by logic or science!
Can a living cell make a factory? A human is more sophisticated than a living cell.
Two guys arguing about what is an analytic proposition and what is contingent... They forgot about God from the beginning...
10 points to Gryffindor
This debate would only be enhanced, if not entirely illuminated, by the presence of Professor Irwin Corey.
Mmmm, indeed. Quite right.
The debate seems even-handed, and Copleston, IMHO, is winning it. But the photographs are bias. Russel was born in 1872, and Copleston in 1907. In 1948, they'd be aged 76 and 41, respectively.
@Sky Gardener To which Copleston replied that a series of phenomenal causes (e.g. mothers) is an insufficient explanation of the series, therefore the phenomenal series has not a phenomenal cause (e.g. mother of the human race), but a transcendental cause (i.e. God). They both agreed that physicists and police detectives search for causes, the only difference between them being that Russell believed it was illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world. Why it should be illegitimate, I don’t known, Russell didn’t explain, but it’s hardly an argument.
@Sky Gardener I don't really get your point about atoms. What do mean by atoms? Or atoms pre-existing? We've come a long way since Dalton's theory. and now we have particle physics. which is very much subatomic. The thing about human beings and life in general is that it's incredibility complex. Take proteins for instance, immensely complex chains of molecules that form task-specific machines, pumps, motors, rotary engines, etc. These are much more than "lumps" - it is mathematically impossible for amino acids to have randomly assembled into such complex proteins even within the most extensive estimations of the age of the universe - currently believed to be 13 or 14 billion years old. Likewise, the creation of atoms such as carbon is far from simple, which why even out-and-out atheists such as Fred Hoyle had to conclude that the universe is extremely fine-tuned. Therefore, science general tends to confirm rather than disprove the so-called cosmological argument, which is indeed much older than Christianity itself, dating back at least to the 5th or 6th century BC, when Parmenides argued that nothing comes from nothing. It's a very old argument and it's never been disproved. That's why Copleston was even willing to accept the ridiculous notion of an infinite series, knowing that this old argument would still hold.
@Sky Gardener We will always naturally drift away from what was actually said in the Copleston-Russell exchange because they were two exceptionally articulate individuals holding a strictly philosophical debate, using strictly philosophical reasoning and terms. ‘Fine-tuning’ is not a philosophical term, nor is it a term that I have invented or adopted for the sake of a ‘desired outcome’, it is a term used by physicists, and I’d stress that it was coined by physicists who if anything had a rather atheistic or agnostic bent. I mean Steve Hawkins, for instance, wondered why the universe was so ‘lumpy’, and wonder he might. There is, after all, a well-known concept in physics, that of entropy. The second law of thermodynamics is, after all, a law. Yet the complexity of life seems to fly in its face. The fact that physicists choose to call the universe ‘fine-tuned’ doesn’t mean the universe is smooth, or consistent or predictable. If anything, recent discoveries have shown it to be dynamic. The design, such as it is, is baffling, just look at the immense variety of living things (including ourselves), it would suggest if anything, that the Designer has a sense of humour. It might seem extremely cruel, but then you’d have to concede that there are also concepts such as beauty and love in this world. But back to the philosophy, how can you claim not to understand the concept of sufficient reason?
@Sky Gardener The sufficient reason principle follows from the fact that we are contingent beings, our cause lies outside us, in our parents, and same can be said about our parents, grandparents, great grandparents, etc. That’s a series, but ultimately these series of humans, dogs, cats, birds and butterflies need to have a sufficient reason for existing. You seem to believe that this can happen by accident: there’s stuff in the universe (we don’t know where it came from), and it somehow, randomly self-assembled into life. I’d stress that this is impossible because living beings are far too complex and its simply a matter of scale. The sheer complexity of a single living cell may be likened to an ultra-modern, state-of-the-art factory with self-assembling and disassembling highways (microtubules) along which molecular motor proteins travel, transporting vesicles and organelles. Yes, design features are repeated in very diverse creatures, but you’d have to concede that despite their diversity, they are all perfectly designed. And those common features can perfectly serve very different purposes. This sheer, exquisite complexity poses the combinatorial inflation problem. I don’t know if the million monkeys with typewriters producing the complete works of Shakespeare analogy is even adequate, but it's good enough, it just can’t be done. Of course Copleston and Russell would have never heard of molecular motors in 1948, but even back then the sufficient reason argument was rational and valid.
@Sky Gardener I think we all agree that an infinite series cannot adequately explain the existence of anything, and that’s exactly the point that Copleston made. Indeed, let’s return to Copleston’s exact argument because I couldn’t put it across any more comprehensively and succinctly:
“First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason for their existence. There isn't any world distinct from the objects which form it, any more than the human race is something apart from the members. Therefore, I should say, since objects or events exist, and since no object of experience contains within itself reason of its existence, this reason, the totality of objects, must have a reason external to itself. That reason must be an existent being. Well, this being is either itself the reason for its own existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. If it is not, then we must proceed farther. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of existence at all. So, I should say, in order to explain existence, we must come to a being which contains within itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say, which cannot not exist.”
This is what Russell tried to pick apart and, IMHO, failed. So, yes, we all agree that we’re talking about absolutely everything.
Returning to your point about Russell being an assemblage of atoms, I’ll repeat that it’s a very inadequate description of Bertrand Russell, who like everyone else, was a unique individual. What made him unique wasn’t the actual material his body was made of - you may call it atoms if you will, but these atoms are shed and recycled all the time - nature is efficient in that way. Of Aristotle’s four causes, the first, material cause, is easiest to accept. We’re all made of water and carbon and stuff, science has explained a lot, but there are three more causes.
Then there’s the formal cause, the pattern or form which when present makes matter into a particular type of thing, e.g. a human being, one that looks like Bertrand Russell, not exactly like his father because half his genes were inherited by his mother. We now know that there is a genetic code. And of course the form may be altered to some extent by lifestyle choices.
But that’s really part of the efficient cause, the agent that brings something about. It could be a carpenter or a sculptor. Ultimately, it would be God.
And then there’s the final cause, telos, the sake for which a thing exists. No problems when we think about certain objects or animals, but a great mystery when we think about ourselves.
These are problems that cannot be solved by physics, or mathematics for that matter. Take the Big Bang theory, how can physicists explain the start of the Big Bang or what was before it? We all accept the existence of time, but what can we say about gravitational singularity? How can Penrose’s conformal cyclic cosmology model help in our understanding of anything? It doesn’t. It’s just a theory, one like many that just kicks the can further down the road.
The honest answer is I don't know I can't prove anything but I have seen NOTHING that would make me bet on god being real
God isn't real. It's a malignant delusion so you're on the money 💰. G'day from Australia mate 🇦🇺. :) 😀
Another question would be, is there anything in your imagination where, if you did see it in reality, then you'd believe God is real? For some people, the honest answer would still be, "No."
Just by looking at the faces there is evidence of God’s joy verses ungodly anger.
Both gentlemen are probably thinking about all the children molested by Jesuits and other clergymen over the centuries.
👍😅
That lowered the tone. Go back to your wars and your bombs and your own judgement and leave this place as you found it -in peace.
@Sky Gardener Hi Sky. The Devil’s Delusion is a current book written by Berlinski. He is not a Theist. Yet he has an open mind to the possibly of a Designer. He writes about Victor Stenger, Christopher Hitchens, Dawkins, Harris, and calls them Militant Atheists. Every epoch of time produces this type of angry individual who hate God and belittle and mock anyone who has a different experience. Russel comes from the same mold. You can enjoy his writings. I will enjoy the Gospel. Peace Dennis
Hail Santa!
Coppleston is looking much more formidable after the big bang. Now Russel has to maintain that there isn't a cause and there's a beginning. That's a very odd position.
It may help his case a bit, but Russell doesn't necessarily have to maintain that there was a beginning without any cause. I mean, it's an open question whether the big bang was actually the absolute beginning. It may very well be that the big bang was simply one event in a much larger universe (e.g. a multiverse).
@@Philosophy_Overdose Yes, that's true. I just mean in view of history. If you look at the debate through the eyes of those present then vs. today. It very much looks like there was a beginning. in abductive reasoning there is always a subjective element. You say it helps his case a bit. I would say quite a bit. But this might be saying more about us than the data.
Part of why it leans more heavily toward Coppleston on my side is that I am looking at the evidence that we have, not speculating on what evidence there could be. We know it collapses to a singularity. We know this universe exists. That's all we know for now. I can reformulate my position later when more data comes in. For now Copplestone's position is certainly much more formidable than it was half a century ago.
@@christiangadfly24 Most scientist dont actually think the big bang was the start
@@MiloMay I'm not saying I don't believe you. But do you have a source for that? I've read in three different books that disagree with you. The authors of those books are Francis Collins, Stephen Barr, and Luke Barnes, two are physicists and one is a geneticist.
@@christiangadfly24 Brian greene, Sean Caroll,Lawrence Krauss,Brian Cox, Neil Degrass Tyson, Alexander vilenken are all some scientist that are agnostic towards the start of the universe
theres not much logic behind 'if we exist because of cause and effect, then there must be a *being* that is an inciting event', why does he suppose that the inciting event need to have happened by a living thing, theres nothing to suggest an experience or will behind the big bang other than his personification of it
The term being is not defined here. god, can mean many things and not necessarily a personified being. Replace “being” with “something metaphysical” if that suits you.
Would loved to have heard what Christopher Hitchens would've thought about this debate.
Would've drank a glass of jack and said gods a delusion , wait that wS Dawkins
Copleston understands the issue of rendering God an a priori concept, but his justification not to do so seems ad-hoc. He doesn't really spell it out, but it seems to me he thinks that one can know God through experiencing the world (that's his supposed a posteriori), which is clearly a claim rooted in Paul's letters (Romans 1:18-20). A claim that is ultimately circular. _One can see the creator by looking at creation._ I see a naturor by looking at nature. And I define naturor to mean non-agent, non-sentient cause. That would be equally circular, and equally analytic.
But Russell is right. The reasoning natural theology seeks to do has barely anything to do with experiencing nature. It is ultimately nothing but analytical reasoning.
In trying to be central authority, political government blasphemy demonstrates God's existence
They know now...for sure!
If there's nothing in the afterlife then they don't
Their voices plus the quality of the recording distorts their voices into cartoon characters.
I wish the Christian’s in this debate knew the Bible- Jesus said that miracles prove his existence. And although you don’t see “Christians” performing these miracles- there are plenty out there who walk in the power of God as Christian’s are called to- and to this day people testify of being raised from the dead, radical healing experiences directly clearly related to God, and much more
Does infinity exist?
the welsh boy-o won through in this debate
Get me a new carpet bagger!
My ability to prove our existence, both terrestrially and celestially, is to find the story and the sequence that brings meaning to the story. This story has been revealed to me first by you and secondly by the Bible. My duality of spirit automatically tracks a parallel story, the celestial story, and the miraculous events of my revelations and confirmations prove that everything we do on earth, including the story, is a journey of my life on earth as a divine being. My purpose terrestrially is to get to Heaven (London) and be with my family, to find love and share love. My celestial purpose is to save as many of my children as possible so we may spend eternity in our celestial home of joy.
Coplestone make a brilliant effort to outline a beautiful and comprehensively intelligible argument to which rustle only utters : "It's not logical"
Well....it's not for Him!
That's why you either experience God or you don't. Too much wit clouds one's judgment.
Russell doesn't have a grasp of metaphysics. With his denial of God with his lack of precision if God's attributes Russell destroys all ideals. Without those chaos and self devouring mass murder with a smile. There is nothing constraining the lowest and the most vile fabrications of the human mind.
And too much credulity leads many to label chemical processes in their brain as "God in their blood pump".
@@dimbulb23 The confusion of process with cause is fairly widespread.
@@tomgreene1843 A well understood process has value.
A so-called cause that can't be shown to exist is just noise.
Existence in omnipresent and singular. It is conscious. What else do you need?!
i only hear Stewie and Bertrand from Family Guy arguing
You missed out a bit where Russell says, “You see that John Merrick? That’s your girlfriend that is. That’s like…your girlfriend.”
I have not understood anything.
Nothing to really understand. Just trying to solve things through logic absent any evidence. You get nowhere doing that.
It was the best example