Retired Jarhead (US Marine) here. While I like to think I know far more about the US Navy during WW2 then 95% of jarheads this series is dramatically expanding that knowledge . Thanks! And keep up the good work.
Hey Crayon-Eater. Everyone knows that the Marines are the smartest troops in the US, with the Airborne and MTN Division (Rangers), cause they are expected to do more with less. May I suggest you enjoy some Drachinifel too? I think you will like it.
@@PalleRasmussen That's funny, I was going to suggest the same. Just saw Drach on the Leyte Gulf 80 podcast. It was cool seeing Drach dressed all nice & using his real name Alex Clarke. I been listening to Drach for 4 years now & that's the first I've heard his real name. But much love & respect for Drach. A person asked the question that "Shouldn't Captain Evans of the USS Johnston, once his ship was down to only one screw on his ship working, shouldn't he have done what he could to save his crew rather than keep engaging the Japanese?" And Drach gave THE PERFECT ANSWER! That foremost in Captain Evans mind was protecting the 6 escort carriers that those Japanese ships could have ran down & sank. Each of those carriers had about 900 sailors aboard each ship. So 900x6= almost 5,000 sailors that him & his crew were trying to protect by giving them time to get away. And that is why Captain Evans sacrificed his ship & crew in the effort to save those ships & sailors that were very vulnerable. And that is why Captain Evans & the crew of the USS Johnston and of course the Samuel B Roberts as well is held in such a high place of honor in Navy lore.
@@kennethdeanmiller7324 Drach's name is not Alexander Clarke. Alex Clarke is "Dr. Clarke" on TH-cam, cause he has a Ph.D. in naval history. Drach is named Alex/Alexander, but AFAIK he prefers to not have his surname known. I happen to, cause he has done me a good turn. You are right to some extent; if you add up the airplanes from those escort carriers, it is quite a significant force, and *that* is most likely what the Japanese are running from; they are constantly getting hit by airplanes.
My dad, Sgt. James Gordon Richardson, was attached to Battery "D" AAA,Third Defense Battalion at Pearl Harbor during the attack. He said he was on his way to chapel at the shipyards when the attack began. The munitions for the 3" AA guns were on the ships. He said he took out his sidearm and began firing .I feel blessed to be able to listen to your podcasts. Thank you.
Great discussion. About the timing of Guadalcanal. It is true that the Americans were not ready. But by invading in August 1942, the Marines took the island initially at little cost and before the Japanese had completed the airstrip. Given that the battle for the island hinged on the airstrip, a good case can be made for acting when King did. In addition, the Guadalcanal action played a key role in the Australian victories in the Kokoda Trail and Milne Bay. The Japanese had to divert land forces planned for these operations to Guadalcanal. The Australians would have had a hard time if it were not for these diversions. All three of these actions have to be viewed as a whole. And while you guys did a great job on assessing King, I think the most underappreciated of America's four-star warriors, I was surprised that you did not mention King's refusal to order Atlantic Seaboard convoys in 1942. I would have liked to have heard a discussion on this.
Agree Both Guadalcanal and Port Moresby had to happen at the same time to split japanese forces and stretch the supply lines. These campaigns ate into the "six to twelve months" that Yamamoto had calculated.
Once the Japanese had established an airfield at Guadalcanal the battle very likely could have been completely inverted. The USN would have been compelled to reopen communication with Australia at all costs. It could have been our naval and air assets being attrited during 1942 in favor of the Japanese. Japan would have held the unsinkable aircraft carrier.
Ditto on the rush to take Guadalcanal. What would have been the consequences if the Japanese had an operational airstrip on Guadalcanal at the time we tried to land an amphibious asualt?
And even less about Germany's Eastern Front with the Soviet Union. That's where most of World War II's land war occurred. Most Americans think only D-Day and 11 months later, Germany surrendered. The Eastern Front lasted three years and 11 months.
The bug of military history bites even non-service amateurs, who eventually dig deeper into the grit, background and detail. My idea of an almost perfect example is Ian Toll's history of the Navy in the eastern pacific campaigns. This series is at the same level of authority, and I continually go back to pick the brains of the hosts on details I'm foggy on. There is no comparable series that covers the entire pacific war in such depth. Thank you and keep it up.
This was probably one of the most balanced views I have heard of the controversial Admiral King. Whatever one's opinion, I think most can agree that he was a very patriotic man, a true Naval Officer of the "Old school" who was looking out for the interests of the United States as well as the Navy. The fact that President Roosevelt had confidence in him, despite his cantankerous ways speaks volumes. He may have been an SOB, but he was the right SOB for the times IMHO. Very interesting discussion. I especially appreciated the Captain's "insider" viewpoints.
Hello! I know this is 1 year after the video released but I have only found this channel 3 days ago. You said that you find this take on Admiral King as been well balanced. I want to ask you if you really looked at opinions not coming from The Annapolis Club. I ask you because I am absolutely amazed on how much opinions differ between Americans and Brits for example. And I really think that this take is very polite and very not going to say negative things about him.
@@mihaiserafim Thank you for your question, and yes I am considering other points of view beside Annapolis graduates. For instance, I have read that the British admirals and officers who had to deal with Admiral King decidedly did not like him very much, especially when he refused to take advice from them in dealing with the U Boat menace off the U.S. Coastline in 1942. Many British merchant vessels were sunk because of his obstinance. Many American officers also disliked his style of command as well.
@@davidlavigne207 Exactly! They don't mention this at all and it's very important in the next episode because it must have an impact on his thinking deciding to go into Watchtower. The sinkings I mean.
@@mihaiserafim In February of 1942 RAdm John Godfrey, knowing of King's reticence to play second fiddle to the RN, sent his assistant, one Capt Rodger Winn to meet with the Americans. His mission was to get them to set up a U Boat Tracking Room such as the one set up in England. When Kings assistant RAdm Ralph Edwards resisted, on the orders of King I'm sure, Capt Winn said. "The trouble is, Admiral, it's not only your bloody ships you are losing. A lot of them are ours!" Finally King agreed to a meeting which got things sorted out. As for his insistence on Watchtower after Midway, King always had a Pacific first mentality despite him having to adopt President Roosevelts Germany First policy. The Atlantic sinking's had little to do with that decision.
I had a class in high school, The Naval and Military History of the United States. The teacher was a Mr. Bill Oxx. He said he was the youngest naval officer to serve in the Nuremberg trials. He was an interesting gentleman and I enjoyed that class. He would have enjoyed your discussions. ...I certainly do. I just liked and subbed to help push your content out to others. V/R, Steve
Even more lost in the entire history of the U.S. participation in the WW II is the Fleet Admiral who not only ranked King, but served as the highest ranking active-duty officer of the U.S. military - and who happened to be President Roosevelt's 'Chief of Staff': William D. Leahy. He stands beyond the precise remit of your 'unauthorized history' yet surely plays a role in it as well. It would be fascinating to see how you treat him.
Mr. Guttmann, thanks for your comments, and I concur. I have in my home library, Witness to power : the life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy by Henry H. Adams. It's an excellent read about the quiet Admiral in the background during WWII. I proudly served abroad the U.S.S. LEAHY (DLG-16), March of 70 to Aug of 71, Engineering Department. But the brief here on Admiral King is excellent and a great adjunct to books written about him. BRAVO ZULU to the OPs.
Leahy was dubbed the second most powerful man in USA during the period of WWII, since he has the president's eyes and ears and could influence his military decision during the war, although he was more of an advisor to the president rather than a supreme commander, he also agreed with FDR on arming the North Carolina class BBs with 9x16inch guns instead of 12x14inch guns. He travelled with FDR in numerous ocassions overseas to Allied conferences, meeting with his British and Soviet counterparts, also he was FDR's advisor for some time, replacing Harry Hopkins when he was unavailable or on sick leave. Even after FDR's death he advised Truman to not invade mainland Japan directly with naval and ground troops fearing for high casualties for US. Although he was criticized heavily for his stance during the Post War and early Cold War, he was regarded as one of the officers who had unusual yet vital role during height of WWII. Also he was the first flag officer to have reach the rank of five star admiral
Very glad I found your channel. When I was a kid growing up, I was surrounded by WW2 and Korean War vets and unfortunately, because of my age at the time, I didn't realize what treasures I was surrounded by. Fortunately though I did get to hear about a fair amount of stories from time to time and it was amazing what these people endured during that time period. Sure wish I could wind the clock back and have more in depth discussions with these great people.
I think King was also wrong about Frank Jack Fletcher. Yup, I'm one of the John Lundstrom disciples on that item, lol. (Lundstrom's "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral", btw, is a superb read not just for specifics on Fletcher himself, but in the process of telling that story, is itself an excellent discussion of the 1942 carrier war in general). IMO a bit of larger context was missed while discussing King's qualification in aviation. Right around that time in the late 1920s, Congress passed a reasonable-enough law that naval aviation commands - including aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders - had to be commanded by naval aviators. Okay, fair enough, but there was one problem...naval aviation was still so new that there weren't yet any true career-long naval aviators actually senior enough in rank for these major commands, especially 30K-ish ton ships like Lexington and Saratoga. And there would not be for years. So there were a LOT of surface destroyer/battleship-type officers suddenly going through aviation training in mid/late career. Ernest King was part of that larger trend. It wasn't just that these surface-fleet guys finagled their way into aviation solely through ambition (although obviously that played a large part too)...the Navy NEEDED a cadre of such officers for more than a decade. I've read that Commander R.K. Turner was in King's same flight-school class. William Halsey and John S. McCain are two more examples. Yeah, the "Johnny Come Lately's" were resented by the true career aviators, but there wasn't much of a way around it...they were the best - well, only - solution available for a relatively small but critical officer-management personnel issue from the late 1920s through the beginning of the war. And there was a "domino effect" as well....by 1941/42, now some of these "true" aviators have gotten through or into carrier command as CAPTs, but there's still very few who've actually made flag rank yet. If one wonders why so many 1942 carrier task forces were commanded by "black shoe" admirals like Spruance, Fletcher, Wilson Brown, and Thomas Kinkaid, well, a scarcity of readily-available aviation admirals was one factor.
My understanding from reading Jonathon Parshall, is that Nimitz bascially had to sandbag King to get his to support to go to Midway. Not only that but Nimitz had to cut protocols to get the intelligence about the Midway attack, because once it came from DC, it was late, or washed.
Interesting episode and thoroughly enjoyed the discussion. Was most interested in your comment that Guadalcanal was too early. Agree that no one had a crystal ball that would have predicted how persistently the Japanese would react to take it back. The converse of that is what would it have been like to invade the island if Henderson Field had been an operational Japanese airbase? Perhaps the move to invade was to deny this - not only as a threat to cutting off the direct route from US to Australia - but also having to deal with it; as the Japanese later had to as an American airbase.
Thank you for setting right the narrative of King's leadership and essential contribution to the enormity of the U.S. Navy's growth to become the undisputed master of the seven seas. I am tired of the carping about u boats and such. Not that the losses sustained on the eastern seaboard were not worthy of remembrance. But, come on, the fleet that sailed into Tokyo Bay in September 1945 was the greatest achievement in naval history. And COMINCH was King, and thus nobody else deserves the ultimate credit for that triumph.
Delaying the beginning of convoying off the US East Coast was a serious mistake. It wasn't the only problem contributing to that painful time, but serious.
I'll say that King did under estimate the U-boats range & audacity to come to the Eastern Seaboard. But that gets overblown a little more than what's real. As soon as King saw the threat he tried to do what he could but at first he didn't have the right ships for convoy escorts & it takes a lot to coordinate convoys when there was no convoys in that area to begin with. It's merchant vessels that he has no control over being sunk. So it takes a bit of time to get convoy escort ships & merchant vessels to coordinate into a convoy when there hadn't been a previous threat there. Main thing being that it wasn't a problem until Germany declared war on the US. Then it became a problem. But you don't fix something if it isn't broken. The US had already been doing "neutrality patrols" escorting convoys in the Caribbean and into the Atlantic but just not so close to the Eastern Seaboard. And that was where the U-boats targeted & used the lights on the coast to make out vessels passing by. And King didn't think blackouts would help either but they may have helped some if implemented quick enough. But King didn't have the authority to do that. That was up to the politicians. But I think King took care of the problem fairly quickly as soon as it became a problem. You also have to realize that the man had a huge commitment in planning a war & planning on having ships built & refit & the entire Pacific fleet had just been demolished at Pearl Harbor. Which is why the fleet should have been at San Diego & NOT Pearl Harbor. That was a HUGE mistake on Roosevelt's part. He was the one that ordered the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor. Good thing they weren't ordered to the Philippines! But I doubt it would have mattered either way. Those ships action at the Serigao Straight was basically the last time battleships crossed an enemy T. It was epic for them, I'm sure after being sunk at Pearl Harbor but still having the last say against the Japanese! The only justification for their salvage considering they were almost obsolete when they were sunk & were in poor repair is the reason many of them sank.
@charlesmartin1121 The Normandy invasion had more ships than they knew what to do with!!! If you want to put down King try again cuz that one doesn't hold water!
Good Presentation. I am surprised the part about King having doubts about Nimitz was not discussed. My view has always been that King was most heavily in planning and strategy while Nimitz was the man that executed the plans.
I have always been much more interested in the European Theater WWII till I found your series. I find every minute of all your videos so far to be interesting. WOW
About 25 years ago I read King’s autobiography. It was interesting, but the thing that I remember most about the book was it was the only autobiography I ever read that was written in 3rd person.
The phrase Hair Fire brought back a memory. A phrase that had oft' been used after I left submarine duty (short time compared to Mr. Toti) was August Hair Fire. It always happened in August back then.
I think you got the timing of the biography episodes of Admiral king and recently Admiral William D Leahy in a very useful order. Describing who was in charge when FDR became more and more limited due to chronic illness by mid 1944 would have been getting ahead of the events. The extent FDR was limited was unknown to the public AND to some of the inner circle until late 1944. Leahy and Marshall were in charge through this period and did an outstanding service to FDR AND our people. FDR had reservations about running for re-election in 1944 because he knew how sick he was, but he didn't have a succession plan in place he was OK with.
I think the best thing I could say about you two is that I would love to sit down and have a beer with you guys and talk history. Could not imagine a better time!
Very good job. Concerning the timing of the Guadalcanal campaign, you guys seem to forget that Japan had a LOT of influence on that. The US needed to keep the Japanese from building an airfield there, so it was a case of, ready or not, we had to go.
I’m so glad I found this podcast. I forget how I stumbled upon it, may have been searching Guadalcanal. Sadly I’ll be caught up and current in no time then I’ll have to wait a week in between videos.
Great podcast! True, eye-opening discussion on Ernest King's contribution to winning WW2. Please comment on his apparently ineffective anti-submarine strategy, against the U-boats, off the eastern shore of the US, where the Germans sunk a large number of ships with apparent ease. Looking forward to your next podcast!
Before seeing this presentation the only thing I knew about Admiral King was his name. Concerning Captain McVeigh, I understand that Condition Yoke was not fully set and USS Indianapolis was not zigzagging when she was attacked and sunk. Still, I think he was scapegoated to cover up for failures higher up. I’m sure you guys will cover this in detail later on. I really enjoyed this discussion. Thanks for starting to bring this relatively obscure personage to life.
This is the whole McVay deal in one paragraph: There wasn't anything to cover up. McVay was court-martialed (at Forrestal's insistence) to satisfy the public's demand for someone's scalp. After it was over, the verdict was set-aside by Forrestal, at the recommendation of everyone from Nimitz on down (Nimitz by this time was CNO, King retired), including the prosecuting counsel. McVay returned to duty, was promoted to rear admiral upon retirement. His suicide was the culmination of guilt over losing his ship and crew and being harangued for years by distraught family members.
@@JackNiles-hc8yz Shameful episode in the history of the US Navy. Thanks for clarifying the events after USS Indianapolis was sunk. A similar prosecution almost happened in the Royal Navy after the Bismarck was sunk. First Sea Lord Dudley Pound wanted Admiral Wake-Walker, commanding the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, and Captain Leach of HMS Prince of Wales court-martialed for not continuing to engage Bismarck and Prinz Eugen after Hood had been sunk and POW had been hit seven times by the German ships, including a hit below the waterline and a hit on the bridge that killed or wounded everyone on the bridge except Captain Leach. Admiral Wake-Walker, senior officer present afloat after Hood was sunk, ordered POW to break off the action and continue shadowing the German ships along with the two cruisers. Admiral John Tovey, C-in-C of the Home Fleet, was indignant over the very idea that Wake-Walker and Leach had acted improperly, and threatened to resign after Dudley Pound suggested a court-martial for the two officers. Wisely, the First Sea Lord quietly let the matter drop.
King also realized that any British interests in the pacific would necessarily have colonial overtones. Later this would become "self determination except east of Suez," a famous quote.
The rumor of the vendetta against McVay III was due to the letter of reprimand from McVay II when he was a junior officer and was caught with a woman on board his ship. The rumor was started by McVay senior as there was no other explanation for his pushing for the Courts-martial when even the captain of the Japanese sub said zig-zaging would not have prevented the sinking. To this day I wonder how he became so powerful with all the things he did.
There is no evidence that King was pushing for McVay's court-martial, although I doubt that he did much to stop it, either. James Forrestal was the guy who wanted McVay court-martialed.
The timing of the Canal in 1942, Was there ever a good time. As you both stated in the program the Japanese were only going to get stronger. Had the Japanese made another major push in 1942, well we would have had to counter. The canal would have waited until 43, how well defended could it have been then? I was just a GMG2 71-75, but I consider myself well read on the Pacific war. regarding the USS Indianapolis, I have always been dumbfounded as to how the Captain was found guilty of the loss of that ship. Great show thank you.
Mk 14 torpedo ... Sorry you missed the boat, not right about that. Excellent audio quality, something that too many others fail to do on this platform.
I fully agree with you on King's importance, brilliance, and near-prescience in running the US war at sea. Your podcast and channel are entitled to highlight the war in the Pacific. However, there is one other significant mistake King made that cost lives unnecessarily. From January to August of 1942 in the Atlantic, King ignored the advice and experiences of the British in running convoys and anti-submarine warfare practices. The German submariners call this the Second Happy Time they killed so many merchantmen and DE's and DDEs.
I really admire how aggressive our top Navy brass was during the Pacific war--pressure and gaining /retaining initiative was exactly the right strategy. Sure he was a meanie, who got things done. Administrative is a word for a lot of nut and bolt logistics; it takes a sharp intellect to handle all of it.
Liked the commentary very much. The comentators seem well-informed and truly interested in the subject matter. I've read many treatments of King. Seth & Bill touched on most of the important issues surrounding his "colorful" wartiime career. Look forward to more topics from the Pacific war.
Great episode gentlemen. A great source on King is the book ‘The Admirals’. It really goes into King and his career and success as CNO. I know we may not have been fully ready for Guadalcanal but neither were the Japanese.
That's a subtle but important point. Obviously very different in almost any/all respects...but in one way I see a parallel between Guadalcanal and another big battle that was going on concurrently: Stalingrad. In each case, both sides initially may not have foreseen just how enormous a commitment it would be, but both fights somewhat took on a life of their own, and grew into these titanic, lengthy struggles which wound up having a outsized, even decisive, impact on the conduct of all subsequent operations - by both sides - in their respective theaters for the rest of the war.
King was a fighter. I love the anecdote about his war at the Academy against his superiors, where he orchestrated a training and study regimen to ensure none of his fellow cadets washed out, and none did.
King also helped Kenny get through the redtape goop pile, enabling special supplies to get to Kenny's Airforce..leading to bombers being turned in strafing nightmares..
Good discussion. But if anyone wants a truly great overview of his career I recommend a video from Drachnifel. Thorough view and goes over well about how he turned a third rate navy into a world dominating navy. His subordinates Lee and Nimitz did him well too.
Thank you gents. Bit of a latecomer, but trawling through your excellent content. It makes me look forward to otherwise mundane household tasks now, because it's become enjoyable with you guys chatting in the background. Not heard of the acronym CINCUS before, and initially can well understand the desire for change. Having thought about it for a while I kind of like it though. It seems an appropriately Laconic response by a Navy to give when asked to surrender!
The metaphor between Apollo 13 and the early Pacific campaign had been made by director Gene Kranz. All of his systems station chiefs said they had all but crashed, and the infighting started & Kranz had it . " Alright!! What systems work!?" And completely redirected operations towards a goal of survival and returning to earth 🌎
Everyone know about King's hatred for the British, but fewer know about him hating on Macarthur and Bureau of Ordinance even more than he hates the British, for MacArthur he did his damnest to not having the Navy and Marines to go through Mac's head on assault on Rabaul (which was ludicrous), that's why he moved the boundaries of Guadalcanal area of operations into Navy's SoPac Command not Mac's SoWestPac Command. Also for Leyte Gulf he and Nimitz would never let Mac gains control or authority of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF38/58), Mac eventually settled with Kinkaid's older standard battleships, some cruisers and the escort carriers, that is why there was a conflict of command and this problem shows lack of unify overall commander of Leyte operations which was then evident when Halsey steamed north with all his force without telling Kinkaid where he was going and never let him know there's no US surface force guarding Bernardino Strait.
But the thing about Guadal Canal is that WE COULDN'T let the Japanese cut off supplies going to & from Australia. That was a very real threat with them building that air base on Guadal Canal. And the fact that we took it from them & used it to our benefit, well at first it was rather consequential considering how many ships & sailors we lost to Iron Bottom Sound but because of the air base & the Marines defending it, we were able to hold it & finally cause the Japanese to abandon it. But the BIGGEST THING about Guadal Canal was that the US Navy was still trying to learn HOW TO FIGHT. AND Guadal Canal gave us enough experience to start learning and anticipating what was going to happen & how to counter what was going to happen before it happened. And that was the start of the Japanese ever withdrawing & losing ships while the US is learning how to fight and having all kinds of ships being built. So the Japanese are losing ships, planes, sailors, soldiers & pilots that they can never replace while the US is training sailors, soldiers & pilots & building ships & planes that will eventually completely overwhelm the Japanese. But our soldiers still have to go in & fight for their very lives to extricate the Japanese from some of these places. Not going in to do Battle at Formosa probably saved more lives than we will ever know. And lots of other islands that we just cut off from re-supply without landing troops also saved a lot of lives & was a very smart strategy too! And we have King to thank for that as well. Cause he had the audacity to cut off these islands from re-supply but didn't lose soldiers in fighting for those areas. A lot of sons came home to Mama because of Admiral King fighting smarter instead of harder. If MacArthur had gotten his way, we probably would have had a half million more sons die in the Pacific than the ones that did. And a lot of people are walking the streets in America today because their Grandfather made it home.
FADM King’s island hopping was following War Plan Orange with deviations for updated facts. War Plan Orange was originally devised in 1911. The plan didn’t fully appreciate carrier warfare, but it did foresee a push through the Marshall Islands.
I think the next major naval battles will be disgusting. Weird and very unexpected things will happen and it won't be good. We will have to learn again, but will we have the industry this time around in order to compete and conquer?
I am disgusted that they did not defend Joe Rochefort. Joe Rochefort won the early Pacific War for Nimitz. He, from the start of his career (mid 1920's) was a crypto-analyst. Over a course of three years he learned Japanese. To further his education he was stationed in Japan. On the trip over to Japan he met a guy named Layton. Layton was also into code breaking and speaking Japanese. In the build up to Midway, in Washington, D.C. was a parallel office of Japanese codebreaking. They were competition with Nimitz' operations in Hawaii. They both read the same crypto and D.C. did not believe Rochefort's analysis about Midway. Layton, also had Nimitz' ear. Together they convinced Nimitz they were right. The rest is History. Nimitz stood up for Rochefort as much as he could. The office in D.C. was running a political campaign against Rochefort mainly because he wasn't Annapolis and because he was not a 4.0 in attire (smoking jacket, slippers). Washington had to "cover"their embarrassment that they were wrong about Midway and he was right. The guy who replaced Rochefort was a communications specialist named Redman. His admiral brother was a friend of King. King had a personal vendetta against Rochefort, because Washington was covering their butts and lying to King. Rochefort, crypto trained his entire career, bilingual in Japanese ended being put in charge of a dry dock and never went to a sea command ever. To top it off he wasn't even replaced by someone with crypto skills. That is King and Redman's doing. Nimitz' medal recommendations for Rochefort were denied by King. Just like Alan Turing (enigma), how fast we forget. Rochefort was awarded a few medals posthumously. Food for thought: How would Guadalcanal turned out if the Japanese navy kept two carriers from the Midway battle. You can thank Rochefort and his staff for that. www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/world-war-ii-profiles/rochefort-station-hypo.html
- And in the Atlantic, King was criticized for not adopting convoying in the Atlantic from the beginning of the war. The U-boats caused huge losses in 1942, but in all fairness, the US wasn't ready to adopt convoying at a large scale, and holding up shops until convoys could be organized would have imposed significant costs in delays of material. Once he had the opportunity to accumulate sufficient forces in quantity and quality, King's "10th Fleet" did very well in handling the U-Boat menace.
@@ejt3708 King didn't "fight" anything of the sort. There were no escorts available for coastal convoys, and the Navy correctly declined to operate unescorted convoys.
Guadalcanal was King's finest hour. Midway gave us the breathing room to do something aggressive, and King's decision to invade NOW (not later when we were stronger), when the Japanese possessed greater surface assets, was the key. The Japanese were out of balance because of their loss of most of the Combined fleet's flight decks, and King's brilliant mind sensed that THIS site was where the Japanese could be bled. In another two months the airfield at Guadalcanal would have been finished, the number of defenders would have increased A LOT, and the marines may not have been able to do the job. Timing here, is crucial. The distance the Japanese land-based air assets had to travel to reach Henderson was central to the plan, and we should have been able to track surface forces (even Cruiser 8), too. Some missteps and Japanese tenacity kept things in doubt for a good while. Guadalcanal, and the US industrial capacity, sealed the deal. If the first thing any American reads about the Pacific war is Morison, you won't have an inaccurate view of King. He loved Nimitz and Spruance and is (in my view) unfair to Jack Fletcher, but Morison's King seems fair to me.
@@briancooper2112 Of course you're correct; the people putting their lives on the line and actually DOING the lifting deserve the most respect and credit. They are the tip of the spear, as the saying goes. I was only considering (when I made the comment) the command decisions that create the framework around which those actions take place. Everyone knows the garbage truck drivers are MUCH MORE important than the city managers who design the program, see that it is funded and maintained, or the citizens who vote for the funding. Here we should ONLY talk about the drivers and the equipment maintenance crews. The same can be said of cops and tax collectors or border security. The politicians and citizens selecting those who set policy don't matter much at all.
I'm just wondering, with respect to the timing of the Guadalcanal campaign, if it wasn't due to a need to have a campaign on the drawing board and, thereby, being able to show a need for materiel in the Pacific theater, and not all the available material going to the North African campaign.
The thing seems to be called a memorial. Some on line comments are that it is like a Presidential library. Given his role in Japan, that might be understandable. His role elsewhere is much more debatable (see episode 103), and some even suggest that the Japan work is overrated (a comment in that episode, if memory serves, asserts documentary evidence to that effect).
When you study the war college and the surgers vs. the island hoppers its very interesting. One school of thought was to hit Japan as quickly as possible, while the others were more conservative. These studies were going on during the 30’s especially after Japan shows its aggression toward Korea and China. When they played out the surge doctrine the losses were really surprising with the technology we had. They didn’t play out the development of the kamikaze which may have changed some of our notions about charging across the pacific….
Relative to Japan, I wonder what the existing plans stated, or were there existing operational plans in place? It would be interesting to discuss the history of Joint / Naval / operational planning. I'm a 2013 Army War College grad. Love what you guys are doing. COL (RET) R.
When Admiral King was a midshipman at Annapolis he conspired with a couple of other classmates to tutor the classmates who were struggling before exams and were especially interested in the classmates who were being targeted by instructors bent upon failing them. None of his classmates failed. His daughter said that he had two moods: angry and enraged.
Seems he was the expert in amphibious landings. Still use his uncanny accuracy in amphibious landings for casualties, still in use today. Wrote the book on modern warfare.
As I understand history, King was an ardent Anglophobe. Thus, he refused to take the advice of the Commonwealth about convoys and thereby condemned countless American merchant seamen to death by u-boat in 1942. We had had two years of fighting the Natis in the Atlantic and our experience, in King's eyes, amounted to nought. This might be an interesting angle to explore.
One wonders how much more effective an extremely talented and hard-working ADM King might have been had he not been a "screamer," a boozer, and a serial philanderer ... somewhat more like his equally effective fellow joint chiefs -- Arnold, Leahy and Marshall ... great video by the way, thanks.
His stubborn refusal to learn from the British officers sent to pass on their war experience led to the second U-Boat "happy time " . So many ships sunk and lives lost.
Yes the margin was thin for the Guadalcanal campaign - But from the point of view where Admiral King was sitting in July-august 1942, it looked better than it would look after early American losses in the campaign. King was presented with the opportunity to get a strategically located island with an almost completed - but not well-defended airfield. He had temporary superiority in aircraft carriers, with 4 at his disposal. Japan only had two fleet carriers. I don't think King should have anticipated the disastrous one-sided loss at Savo Island. Even more-so, the loss of the Wasp, North Carolina (albeit temporary) and O'Brien in one torpedo salvo by the I-19 was a fluke that substantially changed the balance of power in the seas off of Guadalcanal. If the US would have at least held its own at Savo Island, and if the Wasp and North Carolina would have been available for the rest of the campaign, things would have been easier for the Americans.
Okay, this desert rat, Army Vet, Air Force Brat (so far away from you Navy types) didn’t know anything about this cat! Thanks for expanding my knowledge 👍🫡
I agree regarding King and the Pacific War management, as well as his being wrong about McVeigh. I realize it's out if the channel's scope, but how would you respond to those who say he totally botched things on our eastern coast, resulting in the sinking if so many merchant ships early in the war?
We do briefly touch on this in one of our episodes where we mention his distribution of forces Atlantic/Pacific and his leadership of 10th Fleet. Can't remember which one.
You guys are so outstanding with this podcast/YT channel, I can’t get enough of your intelligent conversation. I normally agree with 98% of the things you say, but I have to take exception to your assessment of Admiral King in so far as something he failed to do; Acting to counter the German navy’s Operation Drumbeat in a more reasonable period of time. Admiral King dithered in responding effectively to the almost year long wholesale slaughter of U.S. and Allied merchant tanker shipping along the North American Eastern Seaboard during the earlier part of the war in the Atlantic (The U-Boat’s 2nd “happy time”). How much of this foot dragging by King was a product of his obvious Anglophobia and refusal to accept assistance and support from the British is debatable, but it was certainly a factor. A very dark stain on King’s record as far as I’m concerned. And I’m a little surprised you guys never discussed the issue in this particular video edition.
Bil responding here (I'm sure Seth has an opinion too). IMO we should have included King's dislike of anything British as one of the things he got wrong. And yes, he might (emphasize "might") have been able to do more vis-a-vis the U-boat threat. But recall the first "happy time" was before King was COMINCH or CNO, and was largely metered by our ability to construct transports, and it's not like when he became COMINCH he was holding escorts back. He committed 100% of them to one theater or the other. You can argue with the mix Atlantic vs Pacific, and you can argue with his motives, but the plain truth is we didn't have enough escorts to fight a two ocean war. But you can't argue with his disdain for our staunchest ally-- like so many of his other foibles, it was inexcusable.
@parrot849 It is all the more difficult to understand given the U.S. Navy's operations in the North Atlantic in 1940-41 focused on protecting convoys. I would have liked to have heard a discussion of this.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar HOW ABOUT THEN THE FAMOUS QUOTE :"There will always be an E N G L A N D in the USN ! " = the most penetrating example ever of orwellian semi-schizophrenic double-think throughout the ages ...; heavily doubt there is 1 (USS) any longer. Suggest dig up when the order was countermanded ! The day Ernie expired ?
@@dukeford8893 While I basically agree with you, I think the U.S. Navy's reaction to Drumbealt was inadequate at best. But, unlike King's critics, recognize that Pearl Harbor meant that the Navy had to shift much of what little it had to the Pacific. I would have liked to have heard a discussion of this. While a lot of shipping was lost as a result of Drumbeat, I think you are correct that it did not affect the overall American response to the U-boats.
If you look at tonnage losses it can be argued that the U-boats on the Eastern seaboard were the smallest threat of those facing the USN. IIRC they needed to sink something like 300,000 tons a month to shut down the UK. The best they ever did was about 270k. Is it more important for those destroyers to be hunting U-boats in the Gulf Stream, screening carriers in the Pacific, escorting convoys in the Med to keep 8th Army fighting, escorting convoys to Britain, or escorting convoys to Russia? Russia is critical. Britain and the bombing campaign is critical. 8th Army is keeping Rommel out of the oil fields and the Suez Canal. The entire Pacific theater and Australia hinges on carriers. Losing coastal commerce is bad but not going to lose the war.
General MacArthur also had a role in island hopping, it wasn't just Admiral King alone. It seems both MacArthur and King had poor personalities but were well endowed in strategic thinking.
@warrenklein7817 Island hopping is an inevitable development when you have command of the sea. I would like to see a detailed discussion as to who was responsible for the actual development (King, MacArthur, or Nimitz). Note that MacArthur at first was gung ho for taking Rabaul. Did he change his mind on his own or did King and Nimitz talk him out of it?
@@CFarnwide MacArthur was a flawed commander in many ways. He should have been court marshaled for his defense of the Philippines. And he treated the Australians shabbily. Any competent commander could have achieved victories in the Pacific given the massive American balance of power. One thing he did superbly was the occupation of Japan.
@@dennisweidner288 he did his best inthe philipines he cause one japanese general to be fired his defensive lasted to may 1942 when a british general that out number and had better equipment was defeated in 2 weeks in singpore
@@brucenadeau2172 The men on Americans and Filipinos on Bataan performed brilliantly. There was no Singapore-like collapse. You are absolutely correct about that. It was the first real resistance, with the exception of the Flying Tigers, that the Japanese encountered after Pearl Harbor. But little of that was due to MacArthur. He was warned about what happened at Pearl and had hours to prepare. Yet he allowed much of American air power to be destroyed on the ground. The defense of the Philippines was a shambles. When the men retreated to Bataan they did so without supplies. And there was no pre-positioning of supplies. MacArthur holed up on Corregidor and had little to do with the fighting on Bataan. The men called him "Dugout Doug". The men at Bataan were not defeated militarily. They ran out of food and ammunition. All of which MacArthur was responsible for.
Re Adml King's opinions on landing in Europe, some thoughts - Only after 'Black May', 1943, were Atlantic convoys sufficiently safe from U-boats for troops and supplies. Air superiority prevented air attack on shipping and landings. Developments before D-Day landings, random order... -Numbers of landing craft and ships -Mulberry harbours -PLUTO fuel pipeline -'Hobart's Funnies', modified tanks, incl DD (swimming) Shermans, Crocodiles, AVRE, bridging, ditch-filling, mine clearing -One million air photos -Locations of shoreline radars determined for attack from air -FUSAG deception plan -Bombing railways and road bridges over rivers to delay re-inforcements I am sure there are others from US Air Force, Army and Navy
After watching the Nimitz and King episodes back to back this one on King seems a bit unbalanced to me, I would expect the Nimitz session to be much longer instead the situation was reversed. I was left a bit confused as to who the author of the island hopping campaign was. Drachinifel’s session on King is about the same length and is much more informative IMO.
I question whether delaying Watchtower would have been better. In a month or so the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal would have been complete an operational, as would the seaplane base on Tulagi. The US would not have had any more carrier aviation in October than in August. Yes there would have been time for more thorough training but Ghormley would still have been in charge All in all it is at least questionable.
JOHN TOWERS is the father of U.S. Naval Aviation - excellent monography on him exists by Reynolds 600pp, (IMMSMC). Was in Nimitz ' s close staff throughout the war, but never in combat cmd cause N would not risk his ....services.
Must watch an episode every night, I learn so much that I had so little knowledge of and for that I thank you all, one point.....could you organize them so we can better follow them, a matrix or alpha listing would do wonders, thanks again.
Island hopping was of necessity due to lack of resources - ETO first was eating all logistics and of design if you consider Japs lines of communications. King was caustically toxic. Would have made a typical USMC Officer.
![[UNCUT] The Loyal Pin ปิ่นภักดิ์ EP.15 (2/4)](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/qbHbshrA1f0/mqdefault.jpg)
Retired Jarhead (US Marine) here.
While I like to think I know far more about the US Navy during WW2 then 95% of jarheads this series is dramatically expanding that knowledge .
Thanks! And keep up the good work.
Hey Crayon-Eater.
Everyone knows that the Marines are the smartest troops in the US, with the Airborne and MTN Division (Rangers), cause they are expected to do more with less.
May I suggest you enjoy some Drachinifel too? I think you will like it.
@@PalleRasmussen That's funny, I was going to suggest the same. Just saw Drach on the Leyte Gulf 80 podcast. It was cool seeing Drach dressed all nice & using his real name Alex Clarke. I been listening to Drach for 4 years now & that's the first I've heard his real name. But much love & respect for Drach. A person asked the question that "Shouldn't Captain Evans of the USS Johnston, once his ship was down to only one screw on his ship working, shouldn't he have done what he could to save his crew rather than keep engaging the Japanese?" And Drach gave THE PERFECT ANSWER! That foremost in Captain Evans mind was protecting the 6 escort carriers that those Japanese ships could have ran down & sank. Each of those carriers had about 900 sailors aboard each ship. So 900x6= almost 5,000 sailors that him & his crew were trying to protect by giving them time to get away. And that is why Captain Evans sacrificed his ship & crew in the effort to save those ships & sailors that were very vulnerable. And that is why Captain Evans & the crew of the USS Johnston and of course the Samuel B Roberts as well is held in such a high place of honor in Navy lore.
@@kennethdeanmiller7324 Drach's name is not Alexander Clarke. Alex Clarke is "Dr. Clarke" on TH-cam, cause he has a Ph.D. in naval history. Drach is named Alex/Alexander, but AFAIK he prefers to not have his surname known. I happen to, cause he has done me a good turn.
You are right to some extent; if you add up the airplanes from those escort carriers, it is quite a significant force, and *that* is most likely what the Japanese are running from; they are constantly getting hit by airplanes.
My dad, Sgt. James Gordon Richardson, was attached to Battery "D" AAA,Third Defense Battalion at Pearl Harbor during the attack. He said he was on his way to chapel at the shipyards when the attack began. The munitions for the 3" AA guns were on the ships. He said he took out his sidearm and began firing .I feel blessed to be able to listen to your podcasts. Thank you.
Thanks to your dad for his service.
@@stischer47I appreciate your thanks.
Great discussion. About the timing of Guadalcanal. It is true that the Americans were not ready. But by invading in August 1942, the Marines took the island initially at little cost and before the Japanese had completed the airstrip. Given that the battle for the island hinged on the airstrip, a good case can be made for acting when King did. In addition, the Guadalcanal action played a key role in the Australian victories in the Kokoda Trail and Milne Bay. The Japanese had to divert land forces planned for these operations to Guadalcanal. The Australians would have had a hard time if it were not for these diversions. All three of these actions have to be viewed as a whole.
And while you guys did a great job on assessing King, I think the most underappreciated of America's four-star warriors, I was surprised that you did not mention King's refusal to order Atlantic Seaboard convoys in 1942. I would have liked to have heard a discussion on this.
Agree
Both Guadalcanal and Port Moresby had to happen at the same time to split japanese forces and stretch the supply lines.
These campaigns ate into the "six to twelve months" that Yamamoto had calculated.
@@ricardokowalski1579 Midway was right at 6 months.
Once the Japanese had established an airfield at Guadalcanal the battle very likely could have been completely inverted. The USN would have been compelled to reopen communication with Australia at all costs. It could have been our naval and air assets being attrited during 1942 in favor of the Japanese. Japan would have held the unsinkable aircraft carrier.
@@haldorasgirson9463 Absolutely correct. And the critical process of attriitng the Japanese corps of extremely capable airmen would have been slowed.
Ditto on the rush to take Guadalcanal. What would have been the consequences if the Japanese had an operational airstrip on Guadalcanal at the time we tried to land an amphibious asualt?
Nice to see a youtube channel that emphasizes the Pacific War for a change. Most Americans know little about that part of WW II
And even less about Germany's Eastern Front with the Soviet Union. That's where most of World War II's land war occurred.
Most Americans think only D-Day and 11 months later, Germany surrendered.
The Eastern Front lasted three years and 11 months.
Most people all over know little about this war. I’m one of them. It’s truly fascinating
The bug of military history bites even non-service amateurs, who eventually dig deeper into the grit, background and detail. My idea of an almost perfect example is Ian Toll's history of the Navy in the eastern pacific campaigns. This series is at the same level of authority, and I continually go back to pick the brains of the hosts on details I'm foggy on. There is no comparable series that covers the entire pacific war in such depth. Thank you and keep it up.
Two well-educated, personable, articulate gentlemen sharing important history. Well done.
This was probably one of the most balanced views I have heard of the controversial Admiral King. Whatever one's opinion, I think most can agree that he was a very patriotic man, a true Naval Officer of the "Old school" who was looking out for the interests of the United States as well as the Navy. The fact that President Roosevelt had confidence in him, despite his cantankerous ways speaks volumes. He may have been an SOB, but he was the right SOB for the times IMHO. Very interesting discussion. I especially appreciated the Captain's "insider" viewpoints.
Hello! I know this is 1 year after the video released but I have only found this channel 3 days ago.
You said that you find this take on Admiral King as been well balanced. I want to ask you if you really looked at opinions not coming from The Annapolis Club. I ask you because I am absolutely amazed on how much opinions differ between Americans and Brits for example.
And I really think that this take is very polite and very not going to say negative things about him.
@@mihaiserafim Thank you for your question, and yes I am considering other points of view beside Annapolis graduates. For instance, I have read that the British admirals and officers who had to deal with Admiral King decidedly did not like him very much, especially when he refused to take advice from them in dealing with the U Boat menace off the U.S. Coastline in 1942. Many British merchant vessels were sunk because of his obstinance. Many American officers also disliked his style of command as well.
@@davidlavigne207 Exactly! They don't mention this at all and it's very important in the next episode because it must have an impact on his thinking deciding to go into Watchtower.
The sinkings I mean.
@@mihaiserafim In February of 1942 RAdm John Godfrey, knowing of King's reticence to play second fiddle to the RN, sent his assistant, one Capt Rodger Winn to meet with the Americans. His mission was to get them to set up a U Boat Tracking Room such as the one set up in England. When Kings assistant RAdm Ralph Edwards resisted, on the orders of King I'm sure, Capt Winn said. "The trouble is, Admiral, it's not only your bloody ships you are losing. A lot of them are ours!" Finally King agreed to a meeting which got things sorted out.
As for his insistence on Watchtower after Midway, King always had a Pacific first mentality despite him having to adopt President Roosevelts Germany First policy. The Atlantic sinking's had little to do with that decision.
I had a class in high school, The Naval and Military History of the United States. The teacher was a Mr. Bill Oxx. He said he was the youngest naval officer to serve in the Nuremberg trials. He was an interesting gentleman and I enjoyed that class. He would have enjoyed your discussions. ...I certainly do. I just liked and subbed to help push your content out to others. V/R, Steve
Even more lost in the entire history of the U.S. participation in the WW II is the Fleet Admiral who not only ranked King, but served as the highest ranking active-duty officer of the U.S. military - and who happened to be President Roosevelt's 'Chief of Staff': William D. Leahy. He stands beyond the precise remit of your 'unauthorized history' yet surely plays a role in it as well. It would be fascinating to see how you treat him.
Yes; and it was Leahy, not Stark as stated in the podcast, who was the fourth member (and chairman) of the JCS.
Mr. Guttmann, thanks for your comments, and I concur. I have in my home library, Witness to power : the life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
by Henry H. Adams. It's an excellent read about the quiet Admiral in the background during WWII. I proudly served abroad the U.S.S. LEAHY (DLG-16), March of 70 to Aug of 71, Engineering Department. But the brief here on Admiral King is excellent and a great adjunct to books written about him. BRAVO ZULU to the OPs.
Leahy was dubbed the second most powerful man in USA during the period of WWII, since he has the president's eyes and ears and could influence his military decision during the war, although he was more of an advisor to the president rather than a supreme commander, he also agreed with FDR on arming the North Carolina class BBs with 9x16inch guns instead of 12x14inch guns. He travelled with FDR in numerous ocassions overseas to Allied conferences, meeting with his British and Soviet counterparts, also he was FDR's advisor for some time, replacing Harry Hopkins when he was unavailable or on sick leave. Even after FDR's death he advised Truman to not invade mainland Japan directly with naval and ground troops fearing for high casualties for US. Although he was criticized heavily for his stance during the Post War and early Cold War, he was regarded as one of the officers who had unusual yet vital role during height of WWII. Also he was the first flag officer to have reach the rank of five star admiral
@ramal5708 p
B
.igsalgi,: cc
@@ramal5708 Leahy refused to believe the Atomic Bomb would work until it did. He claimed once that as an expert on explosives it COULD NOT WORK.
Very glad I found your channel. When I was a kid growing up, I was surrounded by WW2 and Korean War vets and unfortunately, because of my age at the time, I didn't realize what treasures I was surrounded by. Fortunately though I did get to hear about a fair amount of stories from time to time and it was amazing what these people endured during that time period. Sure wish I could wind the clock back and have more in depth discussions with these great people.
I think King was also wrong about Frank Jack Fletcher. Yup, I'm one of the John Lundstrom disciples on that item, lol. (Lundstrom's "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral", btw, is a superb read not just for specifics on Fletcher himself, but in the process of telling that story, is itself an excellent discussion of the 1942 carrier war in general).
IMO a bit of larger context was missed while discussing King's qualification in aviation. Right around that time in the late 1920s, Congress passed a reasonable-enough law that naval aviation commands - including aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders - had to be commanded by naval aviators. Okay, fair enough, but there was one problem...naval aviation was still so new that there weren't yet any true career-long naval aviators actually senior enough in rank for these major commands, especially 30K-ish ton ships like Lexington and Saratoga. And there would not be for years. So there were a LOT of surface destroyer/battleship-type officers suddenly going through aviation training in mid/late career. Ernest King was part of that larger trend. It wasn't just that these surface-fleet guys finagled their way into aviation solely through ambition (although obviously that played a large part too)...the Navy NEEDED a cadre of such officers for more than a decade. I've read that Commander R.K. Turner was in King's same flight-school class. William Halsey and John S. McCain are two more examples. Yeah, the "Johnny Come Lately's" were resented by the true career aviators, but there wasn't much of a way around it...they were the best - well, only - solution available for a relatively small but critical officer-management personnel issue from the late 1920s through the beginning of the war.
And there was a "domino effect" as well....by 1941/42, now some of these "true" aviators have gotten through or into carrier command as CAPTs, but there's still very few who've actually made flag rank yet. If one wonders why so many 1942 carrier task forces were commanded by "black shoe" admirals like Spruance, Fletcher, Wilson Brown, and Thomas Kinkaid, well, a scarcity of readily-available aviation admirals was one factor.
My understanding from reading Jonathon Parshall, is that Nimitz bascially had to sandbag King to get his to support to go to Midway. Not only that but Nimitz had to cut protocols to get the intelligence about the Midway attack, because once it came from DC, it was late, or washed.
Interesting episode and thoroughly enjoyed the discussion. Was most interested in your comment that Guadalcanal was too early. Agree that no one had a crystal ball that would have predicted how persistently the Japanese would react to take it back. The converse of that is what would it have been like to invade the island if Henderson Field had been an operational Japanese airbase? Perhaps the move to invade was to deny this - not only as a threat to cutting off the direct route from US to Australia - but also having to deal with it; as the Japanese later had to as an American airbase.
Thank you for setting right the narrative of King's leadership and essential contribution to the enormity of the U.S. Navy's growth to become the undisputed master of the seven seas. I am tired of the carping about u boats and such. Not that the losses sustained on the eastern seaboard were not worthy of remembrance. But, come on, the fleet that sailed into Tokyo Bay in September 1945 was the greatest achievement in naval history. And COMINCH was King, and thus nobody else deserves the ultimate credit for that triumph.
Delaying the beginning of convoying off the US East Coast was a serious mistake. It wasn't the only problem contributing to that painful time, but serious.
I'll say that King did under estimate the U-boats range & audacity to come to the Eastern Seaboard. But that gets overblown a little more than what's real. As soon as King saw the threat he tried to do what he could but at first he didn't have the right ships for convoy escorts & it takes a lot to coordinate convoys when there was no convoys in that area to begin with. It's merchant vessels that he has no control over being sunk. So it takes a bit of time to get convoy escort ships & merchant vessels to coordinate into a convoy when there hadn't been a previous threat there. Main thing being that it wasn't a problem until Germany declared war on the US. Then it became a problem. But you don't fix something if it isn't broken. The US had already been doing "neutrality patrols" escorting convoys in the Caribbean and into the Atlantic but just not so close to the Eastern Seaboard. And that was where the U-boats targeted & used the lights on the coast to make out vessels passing by. And King didn't think blackouts would help either but they may have helped some if implemented quick enough. But King didn't have the authority to do that. That was up to the politicians. But I think King took care of the problem fairly quickly as soon as it became a problem. You also have to realize that the man had a huge commitment in planning a war & planning on having ships built & refit & the entire Pacific fleet had just been demolished at Pearl Harbor. Which is why the fleet should have been at San Diego & NOT Pearl Harbor. That was a HUGE mistake on Roosevelt's part. He was the one that ordered the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor. Good thing they weren't ordered to the Philippines! But I doubt it would have mattered either way. Those ships action at the Serigao Straight was basically the last time battleships crossed an enemy T. It was epic for them, I'm sure after being sunk at Pearl Harbor but still having the last say against the Japanese! The only justification for their salvage considering they were almost obsolete when they were sunk & were in poor repair is the reason many of them sank.
@charlesmartin1121 The Normandy invasion had more ships than they knew what to do with!!! If you want to put down King try again cuz that one doesn't hold water!
@@charlesmartin1121 read a book
Good Presentation. I am surprised the part about King having doubts about Nimitz was not discussed. My view has always been that King was most heavily in planning and strategy while Nimitz was the man that executed the plans.
Keep watching. We do talk about it.
I have always been much more interested in the European Theater WWII till I found your series. I find every minute of all your videos so far to be interesting. WOW
Yes. Until recently, I had never heard of him. What a guy. Also, I did see a picture of him smiling.
There is a picture of him laughing... Oh God Admiral King is laughing!!!
@brandonclark435 that's what schadenfreude looks like ..
About 25 years ago I read King’s autobiography. It was interesting, but the thing that I remember most about the book was it was the only autobiography I ever read that was written in 3rd person.
David Kohnen at the Naval War College has written a three volume on King. Unfortunately, he is having difficulty finding a publisher.
Dr. Kohnen has a publisher, and the new book will be published in September 2024. Looking forward to reading it!
o
He should self publish. I can help
THAT should be interesting!
The phrase Hair Fire brought back a memory. A phrase that had oft' been used after I left submarine duty (short time compared to Mr. Toti) was August Hair Fire. It always happened in August back then.
Great episode guys thanks for that!
I think you got the timing of the biography episodes of Admiral king and recently Admiral William D Leahy in a very useful order. Describing who was in charge when FDR became more and more limited due to chronic illness by mid 1944 would have been getting ahead of the events. The extent FDR was limited was unknown to the public AND to some of the inner circle until late 1944. Leahy and Marshall were in charge through this period and did an outstanding service to FDR AND our people. FDR had reservations about running for re-election in 1944 because he knew how sick he was, but he didn't have a succession plan in place he was OK with.
I’ve learned so much from this podcast it’s just ridiculous.
I think the best thing I could say about you two is that I would love to sit down and have a beer with you guys and talk history. Could not imagine a better time!
Gentlemen: Another excellent episode. Well done! Thank you.
Glad you enjoyed it
Very good job. Concerning the timing of the Guadalcanal campaign, you guys seem to forget that Japan had a LOT of influence on that. The US needed to keep the Japanese from building an airfield there, so it was a case of, ready or not, we had to go.
I’m so glad I found this podcast. I forget how I stumbled upon it, may have been searching Guadalcanal. Sadly I’ll be caught up and current in no time then I’ll have to wait a week in between videos.
Great podcast! True, eye-opening discussion on Ernest King's contribution to winning WW2.
Please comment on his apparently ineffective anti-submarine strategy, against the U-boats, off the eastern shore of the US, where the Germans sunk a large number of ships with apparent ease. Looking forward to your next podcast!
Before seeing this presentation the only thing I knew about Admiral King was his name. Concerning Captain McVeigh, I understand that Condition Yoke was not fully set and USS Indianapolis was not zigzagging when she was attacked and sunk. Still, I think he was scapegoated to cover up for failures higher up. I’m sure you guys will cover this in detail later on. I really enjoyed this discussion. Thanks for starting to bring this relatively obscure personage to life.
Bill responding: Itching to tell that story...
This is the whole McVay deal in one paragraph: There wasn't anything to cover up. McVay was court-martialed (at Forrestal's insistence) to satisfy the public's demand for someone's scalp. After it was over, the verdict was set-aside by Forrestal, at the recommendation of everyone from Nimitz on down (Nimitz by this time was CNO, King retired), including the prosecuting counsel. McVay returned to duty, was promoted to rear admiral upon retirement. His suicide was the culmination of guilt over losing his ship and crew and being harangued for years by distraught family members.
@@JackNiles-hc8yz Shameful episode in the history of the US Navy. Thanks for clarifying the events after USS Indianapolis was sunk. A similar prosecution almost happened in the Royal Navy after the Bismarck was sunk. First Sea Lord Dudley Pound wanted Admiral Wake-Walker, commanding the cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, and Captain Leach of HMS Prince of Wales court-martialed for not continuing to engage Bismarck and Prinz Eugen after Hood had been sunk and POW had been hit seven times by the German ships, including a hit below the waterline and a hit on the bridge that killed or wounded everyone on the bridge except Captain Leach. Admiral Wake-Walker, senior officer present afloat after Hood was sunk, ordered POW to break off the action and continue shadowing the German ships along with the two cruisers. Admiral John Tovey, C-in-C of the Home Fleet, was indignant over the very idea that Wake-Walker and Leach had acted improperly, and threatened to resign after Dudley Pound suggested a court-martial for the two officers. Wisely, the First Sea Lord quietly let the matter drop.
Great series so far. Looking forward to finishing it in the coming days.
King also realized that any British interests in the pacific would necessarily have colonial overtones. Later this would become "self determination except east of Suez," a famous quote.
Admiral King once said this about dealing with the media - don't tell them anything, then tell them you won
The rumor of the vendetta against McVay III was due to the letter of reprimand from McVay II when he was a junior officer and was caught with a woman on board his ship. The rumor was started by McVay senior as there was no other explanation for his pushing for the Courts-martial when even the captain of the Japanese sub said zig-zaging would not have prevented the sinking. To this day I wonder how he became so powerful with all the things he did.
There is no evidence that King was pushing for McVay's court-martial, although I doubt that he did much to stop it, either. James Forrestal was the guy who wanted McVay court-martialed.
Incredible knowledge and awareness of the Pacific campaign. These guys are truly amazing. Thank you.
He made big plans with meager forces because he expected the ships to be manned by sailors like him.
Really informative regarding Admiral King and comments about him from other senior officers.
Symonds, & Ian Toll (& Hornfisher) included King's early heavy handedness for the first year in the Pacific
You didn't finish your thought here.
Learned a lot in this one guys. Thanks
The timing of the Canal in 1942, Was there ever a good time. As you both stated in the program the Japanese were only going to get stronger. Had the Japanese made another major push in 1942, well we would have had to counter. The canal would have waited until 43, how well defended could it have been then? I was just a GMG2 71-75, but I consider myself well read on the Pacific war. regarding the USS Indianapolis, I have always been dumbfounded as to how the Captain was found guilty of the loss of that ship. Great show thank you.
You guys are great! The best place to get the skinny! Thank you Gentlemen!
You guys are doing a great job with these videos
Mk 14 torpedo ...
Sorry you missed the boat, not right about that.
Excellent audio quality, something that too many others fail to do on this platform.
I fully agree with you on King's importance, brilliance, and near-prescience in running the US war at sea. Your podcast and channel are entitled to highlight the war in the Pacific.
However, there is one other significant mistake King made that cost lives unnecessarily. From January to August of 1942 in the Atlantic, King ignored the advice and experiences of the British in running convoys and anti-submarine warfare practices.
The German submariners call this the Second Happy Time they killed so many merchantmen and DE's and DDEs.
I really admire how aggressive our top Navy brass was during the Pacific war--pressure and gaining /retaining initiative was exactly the right strategy. Sure he was a meanie, who got things done. Administrative is a word for a lot of nut and bolt logistics; it takes a sharp intellect to handle all of it.
Liked the commentary very much. The comentators seem well-informed and truly interested in the subject matter. I've read many treatments of King. Seth & Bill touched on most of the important issues surrounding his "colorful" wartiime career. Look forward to more topics from the Pacific war.
Great episode gentlemen. A great source on King is the book ‘The Admirals’. It really goes into King and his career and success as CNO.
I know we may not have been fully ready for Guadalcanal but neither were the Japanese.
It is indeed a great book...
That's a subtle but important point. Obviously very different in almost any/all respects...but in one way I see a parallel between Guadalcanal and another big battle that was going on concurrently: Stalingrad. In each case, both sides initially may not have foreseen just how enormous a commitment it would be, but both fights somewhat took on a life of their own, and grew into these titanic, lengthy struggles which wound up having a outsized, even decisive, impact on the conduct of all subsequent operations - by both sides - in their respective theaters for the rest of the war.
King was a fighter. I love the anecdote about his war at the Academy against his superiors, where he orchestrated a training and study regimen to ensure none of his fellow cadets washed out, and none did.
King also helped Kenny get through the redtape goop pile, enabling special supplies to get to Kenny's Airforce..leading to bombers being turned in strafing nightmares..
You guys are great! I love your shows!
Love the dark (Navy Blue) covers. Wish we had them during my brief time.
Thanks, good job gentlemen.
Good discussion.
But if anyone wants a truly great overview of his career I recommend a video from Drachnifel.
Thorough view and goes over well about how he turned a third rate navy into a world dominating navy.
His subordinates Lee and Nimitz did him well too.
I very much enjoy Drachnifel.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar I found this channel because of Drach.
Yep. Drach sent me here too.
Thank you gents. Bit of a latecomer, but trawling through your excellent content. It makes me look forward to otherwise mundane household tasks now, because it's become enjoyable with you guys chatting in the background.
Not heard of the acronym CINCUS before, and initially can well understand the desire for change. Having thought about it for a while I kind of like it though. It seems an appropriately Laconic response by a Navy to give when asked to surrender!
You guys I love watching
The metaphor between Apollo 13 and the early Pacific campaign had been made by director Gene Kranz. All of his systems station chiefs said they had all but crashed, and the infighting started & Kranz had it . " Alright!! What systems work!?" And completely redirected operations towards a goal of survival and returning to earth 🌎
Such a great series gentlemen!
Everyone know about King's hatred for the British, but fewer know about him hating on Macarthur and Bureau of Ordinance even more than he hates the British, for MacArthur he did his damnest to not having the Navy and Marines to go through Mac's head on assault on Rabaul (which was ludicrous), that's why he moved the boundaries of Guadalcanal area of operations into Navy's SoPac Command not Mac's SoWestPac Command. Also for Leyte Gulf he and Nimitz would never let Mac gains control or authority of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF38/58), Mac eventually settled with Kinkaid's older standard battleships, some cruisers and the escort carriers, that is why there was a conflict of command and this problem shows lack of unify overall commander of Leyte operations which was then evident when Halsey steamed north with all his force without telling Kinkaid where he was going and never let him know there's no US surface force guarding Bernardino Strait.
But the thing about Guadal Canal is that WE COULDN'T let the Japanese cut off supplies going to & from Australia. That was a very real threat with them building that air base on Guadal Canal. And the fact that we took it from them & used it to our benefit, well at first it was rather consequential considering how many ships & sailors we lost to Iron Bottom Sound but because of the air base & the Marines defending it, we were able to hold it & finally cause the Japanese to abandon it. But the BIGGEST THING about Guadal Canal was that the US Navy was still trying to learn HOW TO FIGHT. AND Guadal Canal gave us enough experience to start learning and anticipating what was going to happen & how to counter what was going to happen before it happened. And that was the start of the Japanese ever withdrawing & losing ships while the US is learning how to fight and having all kinds of ships being built. So the Japanese are losing ships, planes, sailors, soldiers & pilots that they can never replace while the US is training sailors, soldiers & pilots & building ships & planes that will eventually completely overwhelm the Japanese. But our soldiers still have to go in & fight for their very lives to extricate the Japanese from some of these places. Not going in to do Battle at Formosa probably saved more lives than we will ever know. And lots of other islands that we just cut off from re-supply without landing troops also saved a lot of lives & was a very smart strategy too! And we have King to thank for that as well. Cause he had the audacity to cut off these islands from re-supply but didn't lose soldiers in fighting for those areas. A lot of sons came home to Mama because of Admiral King fighting smarter instead of harder. If MacArthur had gotten his way, we probably would have had a half million more sons die in the Pacific than the ones that did. And a lot of people are walking the streets in America today because their Grandfather made it home.
Thank-you... King : Semper Iratus.. Capt, It was Gene Krantz; What do we have that still works.
FADM King’s island hopping was following War Plan Orange with deviations for updated facts.
War Plan Orange was originally devised in 1911. The plan didn’t fully appreciate carrier warfare, but it did foresee a push through the Marshall Islands.
Great episode!
All served from beginning to end.
Drachinifel has a great and amusing episode on Adm King....worth the watch. Title: Fleet Admiral Ernest King - Semper Iratus
Love it you guys are great. Thank you for the informative show😎
I think the next major naval battles will be disgusting. Weird and very unexpected things will happen and it won't be good. We will have to learn again, but will we have the industry this time around in order to compete and conquer?
I am disgusted that they did not defend Joe Rochefort. Joe Rochefort won the early Pacific War for Nimitz. He, from the start of his career (mid 1920's) was a crypto-analyst. Over a course of three years he learned Japanese. To further his education he was stationed in Japan. On the trip over to Japan he met a guy named Layton. Layton was also into code breaking and speaking Japanese. In the build up to Midway, in Washington, D.C. was a parallel office of Japanese codebreaking. They were competition with Nimitz' operations in Hawaii. They both read the same crypto and D.C. did not believe Rochefort's analysis about Midway. Layton, also had Nimitz' ear. Together they convinced Nimitz they were right. The rest is History.
Nimitz stood up for Rochefort as much as he could. The office in D.C. was running a political campaign against Rochefort mainly because he wasn't Annapolis and because he was not a 4.0 in attire (smoking jacket, slippers). Washington had to "cover"their embarrassment that they were wrong about Midway and he was right. The guy who replaced Rochefort was a communications specialist named Redman. His admiral brother was a friend of King. King had a personal vendetta against Rochefort, because Washington was covering their butts and lying to King. Rochefort, crypto trained his entire career, bilingual in Japanese ended being put in charge of a dry dock and never went to a sea command ever. To top it off he wasn't even replaced by someone with crypto skills. That is King and Redman's doing. Nimitz' medal recommendations for Rochefort were denied by King.
Just like Alan Turing (enigma), how fast we forget. Rochefort was awarded a few medals posthumously.
Food for thought: How would Guadalcanal turned out if the Japanese navy kept two carriers from the Midway battle. You can thank Rochefort and his staff for that.
www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/world-war-ii-profiles/rochefort-station-hypo.html
Thank you ! ADMIRAL KING did SCREW the POOCH HERE !
Roquefort was gifted, certainly. You are describing Edwin Leyton. He was in Japan as a naval attache. He spoke Japanese. And he knew Yamamoto.
Sorry. Rochefort.
- And in the Atlantic, King was criticized for not adopting convoying in the Atlantic from the beginning of the war. The U-boats caused huge losses in 1942, but in all fairness, the US wasn't ready to adopt convoying at a large scale, and holding up shops until convoys could be organized would have imposed significant costs in delays of material. Once he had the opportunity to accumulate sufficient forces in quantity and quality, King's "10th Fleet" did very well in handling the U-Boat menace.
@stevehofer3482 I don't see that "in all fairness" is being fair. King fought reasonable protections and a lot of men died.
@@ejt3708 King didn't "fight" anything of the sort. There were no escorts available for coastal convoys, and the Navy correctly declined to operate unescorted convoys.
Guadalcanal was King's finest hour. Midway gave us the breathing room to do something aggressive, and King's decision to invade NOW (not later when we were stronger), when the Japanese possessed greater surface assets, was the key. The Japanese were out of balance because of their loss of most of the Combined fleet's flight decks, and King's brilliant mind sensed that THIS site was where the Japanese could be bled. In another two months the airfield at Guadalcanal would have been finished, the number of defenders would have increased A LOT, and the marines may not have been able to do the job. Timing here, is crucial.
The distance the Japanese land-based air assets had to travel to reach Henderson was central to the plan, and we should have been able to track surface forces (even Cruiser 8), too. Some missteps and Japanese tenacity kept things in doubt for a good while. Guadalcanal, and the US industrial capacity, sealed the deal.
If the first thing any American reads about the Pacific war is Morison, you won't have an inaccurate view of King. He loved Nimitz and Spruance and is (in my view) unfair to Jack Fletcher, but Morison's King seems fair to me.
Guadalcanal was won by marines sailors and army people. Not King.
@@briancooper2112 Of course you're correct; the people putting their lives on the line and actually DOING the lifting deserve the most respect and credit. They are the tip of the spear, as the saying goes.
I was only considering (when I made the comment) the command decisions that create the framework around which those actions take place. Everyone knows the garbage truck drivers are MUCH MORE important than the city managers who design the program, see that it is funded and maintained, or the citizens who vote for the funding. Here we should ONLY talk about the drivers and the equipment maintenance crews.
The same can be said of cops and tax collectors or border security. The politicians and citizens selecting those who set policy don't matter much at all.
I'm just wondering, with respect to the timing of the Guadalcanal campaign, if it wasn't due to a need to have a campaign on the drawing board and, thereby, being able to show a need for materiel in the Pacific theater, and not all the available material going to the North African campaign.
Thanks
If you want to take another swipe at douggie you can talk about how Norfolk houses the MacArthur Presidential Library…..
You’ve got to be kidding me. . .
The thing seems to be called a memorial. Some on line comments are that it is like a Presidential library. Given his role in Japan, that might be understandable. His role elsewhere is much more debatable (see episode 103), and some even suggest that the Japan work is overrated (a comment in that episode, if memory serves, asserts documentary evidence to that effect).
@@mkaustralia7136MARCOS PAID the funds 4 it. = Phi. Overdone.
When you study the war college and the surgers vs. the island hoppers its very interesting. One school of thought was to hit Japan as quickly as possible, while the others were more conservative. These studies were going on during the 30’s especially after Japan shows its aggression toward Korea and China. When they played out the surge doctrine the losses were really surprising with the technology we had. They didn’t play out the development of the kamikaze which may have changed some of our notions about charging across the pacific….
Great observations! Which war college did you attend?
Thanks
Relative to Japan, I wonder what the existing plans stated, or were there existing operational plans in place? It would be interesting to discuss the history of Joint / Naval / operational planning. I'm a 2013 Army War College grad. Love what you guys are doing. COL (RET) R.
1st boots in Marine corps history are the Edson's. Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli and the pepper wars in-between.
When Admiral King was a midshipman at Annapolis he conspired with a couple of other classmates to tutor the classmates who were struggling before exams and were especially interested in the classmates who were being targeted by instructors bent upon failing them. None of his classmates failed. His daughter said that he had two moods: angry and enraged.
2 much testosterone inside his balls ..
Wasn't Ulysses S. Grant also summoned from 'exile' when the chips were down?
Seems he was the expert in amphibious landings. Still use his uncanny accuracy in amphibious landings for casualties, still in use today. Wrote the book on modern warfare.
As I understand history, King was an ardent Anglophobe. Thus, he refused to take the advice of the Commonwealth about convoys and thereby condemned countless American merchant seamen to death by u-boat in 1942. We had had two years of fighting the Natis in the Atlantic and our experience, in King's eyes, amounted to nought. This might be an interesting angle to explore.
That "angle" has been flogged to death.
One wonders how much more effective an extremely talented and hard-working ADM King might have been had he not been a "screamer," a boozer, and a serial philanderer ... somewhat more like his equally effective fellow joint chiefs -- Arnold, Leahy and Marshall ... great video by the way, thanks.
An amazing admiral just like myself.
What about the east coast resistance to convoys and losses to u-boats?? However, great series- keep it going
His stubborn refusal to learn from the British officers sent to pass on their war experience led to the second U-Boat "happy time " . So many ships sunk and lives lost.
@@daniellarge9784 Nonsense.
Yes the margin was thin for the Guadalcanal campaign - But from the point of view where Admiral King was sitting in July-august 1942, it looked better than it would look after early American losses in the campaign. King was presented with the opportunity to get a strategically located island with an almost completed - but not well-defended airfield. He had temporary superiority in aircraft carriers, with 4 at his disposal. Japan only had two fleet carriers. I don't think King should have anticipated the disastrous one-sided loss at Savo Island. Even more-so, the loss of the Wasp, North Carolina (albeit temporary) and O'Brien in one torpedo salvo by the I-19 was a fluke that substantially changed the balance of power in the seas off of Guadalcanal. If the US would have at least held its own at Savo Island, and if the Wasp and North Carolina would have been available for the rest of the campaign, things would have been easier for the Americans.
Thanks!
Okay, this desert rat, Army Vet, Air Force Brat (so far away from you Navy types) didn’t know anything about this cat!
Thanks for expanding my knowledge 👍🫡
I agree regarding King and the Pacific War management, as well as his being wrong about McVeigh. I realize it's out if the channel's scope, but how would you respond to those who say he totally botched things on our eastern coast, resulting in the sinking if so many merchant ships early in the war?
We do briefly touch on this in one of our episodes where we mention his distribution of forces Atlantic/Pacific and his leadership of 10th Fleet. Can't remember which one.
You guys are so outstanding with this podcast/YT channel, I can’t get enough of your intelligent conversation. I normally agree with 98% of the things you say, but I have to take exception to your assessment of Admiral King in so far as something he failed to do; Acting to counter the German navy’s Operation Drumbeat in a more reasonable period of time.
Admiral King dithered in responding effectively to the almost year long wholesale slaughter of U.S. and Allied merchant tanker shipping along the North American Eastern Seaboard during the earlier part of the war in the Atlantic (The U-Boat’s 2nd “happy time”).
How much of this foot dragging by King was a product of his obvious Anglophobia and refusal to accept assistance and support from the British is debatable, but it was certainly a factor. A very dark stain on King’s record as far as I’m concerned. And I’m a little surprised you guys never discussed the issue in this particular video edition.
Bil responding here (I'm sure Seth has an opinion too). IMO we should have included King's dislike of anything British as one of the things he got wrong. And yes, he might (emphasize "might") have been able to do more vis-a-vis the U-boat threat. But recall the first "happy time" was before King was COMINCH or CNO, and was largely metered by our ability to construct transports, and it's not like when he became COMINCH he was holding escorts back. He committed 100% of them to one theater or the other. You can argue with the mix Atlantic vs Pacific, and you can argue with his motives, but the plain truth is we didn't have enough escorts to fight a two ocean war. But you can't argue with his disdain for our staunchest ally-- like so many of his other foibles, it was inexcusable.
@parrot849 It is all the more difficult to understand given the U.S. Navy's operations in the North Atlantic in 1940-41 focused on protecting convoys. I would have liked to have heard a discussion of this.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar HOW ABOUT THEN THE FAMOUS QUOTE :"There will always be an E N G L A N D in the USN ! " = the most penetrating example ever of orwellian semi-schizophrenic double-think throughout the ages ...; heavily doubt there is 1 (USS) any longer. Suggest dig up when the order was countermanded ! The day Ernie expired ?
@@dukeford8893 While I basically agree with you, I think the U.S. Navy's reaction to Drumbealt was inadequate at best. But, unlike King's critics, recognize that Pearl Harbor meant that the Navy had to shift much of what little it had to the Pacific. I would have liked to have heard a discussion of this. While a lot of shipping was lost as a result of Drumbeat, I think you are correct that it did not affect the overall American response to the U-boats.
If you look at tonnage losses it can be argued that the U-boats on the Eastern seaboard were the smallest threat of those facing the USN. IIRC they needed to sink something like 300,000 tons a month to shut down the UK. The best they ever did was about 270k. Is it more important for those destroyers to be hunting U-boats in the Gulf Stream, screening carriers in the Pacific, escorting convoys in the Med to keep 8th Army fighting, escorting convoys to Britain, or escorting convoys to Russia?
Russia is critical. Britain and the bombing campaign is critical. 8th Army is keeping Rommel out of the oil fields and the Suez Canal. The entire Pacific theater and Australia hinges on carriers. Losing coastal commerce is bad but not going to lose the war.
General MacArthur also had a role in island hopping, it wasn't just Admiral King alone. It seems both MacArthur and King had poor personalities but were well endowed in strategic thinking.
Reminds me of an old saying, “He was an awful SOB but… He was OUR SOB”.
@warrenklein7817 Island hopping is an inevitable development when you have command of the sea. I would like to see a detailed discussion as to who was responsible for the actual development (King, MacArthur, or Nimitz). Note that MacArthur at first was gung ho for taking Rabaul. Did he change his mind on his own or did King and Nimitz talk him out of it?
@@CFarnwide MacArthur was a flawed commander in many ways. He should have been court marshaled for his defense of the Philippines. And he treated the Australians shabbily. Any competent commander could have achieved victories in the Pacific given the massive American balance of power. One thing he did superbly was the occupation of Japan.
@@dennisweidner288 he did his best inthe philipines he cause one japanese general to be fired his defensive lasted to may 1942 when a british general that out number and had better equipment was defeated in 2 weeks in singpore
@@brucenadeau2172 The men on Americans and Filipinos on Bataan performed brilliantly. There was no Singapore-like collapse. You are absolutely correct about that. It was the first real resistance, with the exception of the Flying Tigers, that the Japanese encountered after Pearl Harbor.
But little of that was due to MacArthur. He was warned about what happened at Pearl and had hours to prepare. Yet he allowed much of American air power to be destroyed on the ground. The defense of the Philippines was a shambles. When the men retreated to Bataan they did so without supplies. And there was no pre-positioning of supplies. MacArthur holed up on Corregidor and had little to do with the fighting on Bataan. The men called him "Dugout Doug". The men at Bataan were not defeated militarily. They ran out of food and ammunition. All of which MacArthur was responsible for.
Re Adml King's opinions on landing in Europe, some thoughts -
Only after 'Black May', 1943, were Atlantic convoys sufficiently safe from U-boats for troops and supplies.
Air superiority prevented air attack on shipping and landings.
Developments before D-Day landings, random order...
-Numbers of landing craft and ships
-Mulberry harbours
-PLUTO fuel pipeline
-'Hobart's Funnies', modified tanks, incl DD (swimming) Shermans, Crocodiles, AVRE, bridging, ditch-filling, mine clearing
-One million air photos
-Locations of shoreline radars determined for attack from air
-FUSAG deception plan
-Bombing railways and road bridges over rivers to delay re-inforcements
I am sure there are others from US Air Force, Army and Navy
so supposedly that was Flight Director Gene Kranz that said "what on the spacecraft is good?".. Kranz was a real air boss, bringing home 13...
After watching the Nimitz and King episodes back to back this one on King seems a bit unbalanced to me, I would expect the Nimitz session to be much longer instead the situation was reversed. I was left a bit confused as to who the author of the island hopping campaign was. Drachinifel’s session on King is about the same length and is much more informative IMO.
Thanks a lot for your great effort.
It is very Clear that Bill and Seth's favorite major actors in the Pacific War are Admiral King and Nimitz. Almost gushing over King.
Bill and Seth are both very smart guys.
I question whether delaying Watchtower would have been better. In a month or so the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal would have been complete an operational, as would the seaplane base on Tulagi. The US would not have had any more carrier aviation in October than in August. Yes there would have been time for more thorough training but Ghormley would still have been in charge
All in all it is at least questionable.
JOHN TOWERS is the father of U.S. Naval Aviation - excellent monography on him exists by Reynolds 600pp, (IMMSMC). Was in Nimitz ' s close staff throughout the war, but never in combat cmd cause N would not risk his ....services.
Of course there was a lot of conflict between Towers and Nimitz, but the latter was discrete and managed it well.
Reference your critisim of the timing of Guadacanal, should he have delayed the landing t allow a combat load out?
Must watch an episode every night, I learn so much that I had so little knowledge of and for that I thank you all, one point.....could you organize them so we can better follow them, a matrix or alpha listing would do wonders, thanks again.
Island hopping was of necessity due to lack of resources - ETO first was eating all logistics and of design if you consider Japs lines of communications. King was caustically toxic. Would have made a typical USMC Officer.
What about the not using convoys?
And the BoD torpedo fuck up?
(iirc, King did fix that, but it took him way too long to receive/believe the reports?)