The Teleological Argument from Hume's "Dialogues"

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  • เผยแพร่เมื่อ 15 ต.ค. 2024

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  • @intelligentdesign2295
    @intelligentdesign2295 ปีที่แล้ว

    Many of Hume's objections can be answered.
    Objection (1) "A great number of men join in building a house or a ship, in rearing a
    city, in framing a commonwealth: why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world?"(Dialogues)
    Responses:
    "And, to jump ahead a bit, there are two further problems with
    polytheism as an explanation of the existence of not merely a universe but a universe governed throughout space and time by the same
    natural laws.
    If this order in the world is to be explained by many gods, then some
    explanation is required for how and why they cooperate in producing
    the same patterns of order throughout the universe. This becomes a
    new datum requiring explanation for the same reason as the fact of
    order itself. The need for further explanation ends when we postulate
    one being who is the cause of the existence of all others, and the
    simplest conceivable such-I urge-is God. And, further, the power
    of polytheism to explain this order in the world is perhaps not as
    great as that of theism. If there were more than one deity responsible
    for the order of the universe, we would expect to see characteristic
    marks of the handiwork of different deities in different parts of the
    universe, just as we see different kinds of workmanship in the
    different houses of a city. We would expect to find an inverse square
    of law of gravitation obeyed in one part of the universe, and in
    another part a law that was just short of being an inverse square
    law-without the difference being explicable in terms of a more
    general law."(Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God")
    "If the
    physical universe is the product of intelligent design, rather than
    being a pure accident, it is more likely to be the handiwork of only
    one rather than more than one intelligence. This is so for two broad
    reasons. The first reason is the need for theoretical parsimony. In the
    absence of any evidence for supposing the universe to be the handiwork of more than one intelligence rather than only one, then, faced
    with a choice between supposing it the handiwork of one or of more
    than one intelligent designer, we should choose to suppose it to be the
    creation of only one. For it is not necessary to postulate more than
    one to account for the phenomena in question. The second reason for
    preferring the hypothesis of there being only one designer of the
    universe to supposing more than one is that the general harmony and
    uniformity of everything in the universe suggest that, should it be the
    product of design, it is more likely to be the handiwork of a single
    designer, rather than a plurality of designers who might have been
    expected to have left in their joint product some trace of their plural
    individualities."(David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")
    "Of the ‘unity of the Deity’ the proof is, the uniformity of plan
    observable in the universe. The universe itself is a system; each part
    either depending upon other parts, or being connected with other
    parts by some common law of motion, or by the presence of some
    common substance. One principle of gravitation causes a stone to
    drop towards the earth, and the moon to wheel round it. One law of
    attraction carries all the different planets about the sun. This philosophers demonstrate. There are also other points of agreement
    amongst them, which may be considered as marks of the identity of
    their origin, and of their intelligent author. In all are found the
    conveniency and stability derived from gravitation. They all experience vicissitudes of days and nights, and changes of season. They all,
    at least Jupiter, Mars, and Venus, have the same advantages from
    their atmospheres as we have. In all the planets the axes of rotation
    are permanent. Nothing is more probable, than that the same attracting influence, acting according to the same rule, reaches to the fixed
    stars: but, if this be only probable, another thing is certain, viz. that
    the same element of light does.* The light from a fixed star affects our
    eyes in the same manner, is refracted and reflected according to the
    same laws, as the light of a candle. The velocity of the light of the
    fixed stars, is also the same as the velocity of the light of the sun,
    reflected from the satellites of Jupiter. The heat of the sun, in kind,
    differs nothing from the heat of a coal fire.
    In our own globe the case is clearer. New countries are continually
    discovered, but the old laws of nature are always found in them: new
    plants perhaps or animals, but always in company with plants and
    animals, which we already know; and always possessing many of the
    same general properties. We never get amongst such original, or
    totally different, modes of existence, as to indicate, that we are come
    into the province of a different Creator, or under the direction of a
    different will. In truth, the same order of things attends us, wherever
    we go. The elements act upon one another, electricity operates, the
    tides rise and fall, the magnetic needle elects its position, in one
    region of the earth and sea, as well as in another. One atmosphere invests all parts of the globe, and connects all: one sun illuminates;
    one moon exerts its specific attraction upon all parts. If there be a
    variety in natural effects, as, e. g. in the tides of different seas, that
    very variety is the result of the same cause, acting under different
    circumstances. In many cases this is proved; in all is probable.
    The inspection and comparison of living forms, add to this argument examples without number. Of all large terrestrial animals the
    structure is very much alike. Their senses nearly the same. Their
    natural functions and passions nearly the same. Their viscera nearly
    the same, both in substance, shape, and office. Digestion, nutrition,
    circulation, secretion, go on, in a similar manner, in all. The great
    circulating fluid is the same: for, I think, no difference has been
    discovered in the properties of blood, from whatever animal it be
    drawn. The experiment of transfusion proves, that the blood of one
    animal will serve for another. The skeletons also of the larger terrestrial animals, shew particular varieties, but still under a great general
    affinity. The resemblance is somewhat less, yet sufficiently evident,
    between quadrupeds and birds. They are alike in five respects, for
    one in which they differ.
    In fish, which belong to another department, as it were, of nature,
    the points of comparison become fewer. But we never lose sight of
    our analogy, e. g. we still meet with a stomach, a liver, a spine; with
    bile and blood; with teeth; with eyes, which eyes are only slightly
    varied from our own, and which variation, in truth, demonstrates,
    not an interruption, but a continuance, of the same exquisite plan;
    for it is the adaptation of the organ to the element, viz. to the different refraction of light passing into the eye out of a denser medium.
    The provinces, also, themselves of water and earth, are connected by
    the species of animals which inhabit both; and also by a large tribe of
    aquatic animals, which closely resemble the terrestrial in their
    internal structure: I mean the cetaceous tribe,* which have hot blood,
    respiring lungs, bowels, and other essential parts, like those of land
    animals. This similitude, surely, bespeaks the same creation and the
    same Creator."(William Paley "Natural Theology")

  • @intelligentdesign2295
    @intelligentdesign2295 ปีที่แล้ว

    Many of Hume's objections can be answered.
    Objection (2) “But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain.”(Dialogues)
    Responses:
    "From time to time various writers have told us that we cannot
    reach any conclusions about the origin or development of the universe, since it is the only one of which we have knowledge, and
    rational inquiry can reach conclusions only about objects that belong
    to kinds, for example, it can reach a conclusion about what will
    happen to this bit of iron only because there are other bits of iron,
    the behaviour of which can be studied. This objection has the
    surprising, and to most of these writers unwelcome, consequence,
    that physical cosmology could not reach justified conclusions about
    such matters as the size, age, rate of expansion, and density of the
    universe as a whole (because it is the only one of which we have
    knowledge); and also that physical anthropology could not reach
    conclusions about the origin and development of the human race
    (because, as far as our knowledge goes, it is the only one of its kind).
    The implausibility of these consequences leads us to doubt the
    original objection, which is indeed totally misguided." (Richard Swinburne "The Existence Of God")
    "By tracing the origin of
    the physical universe to a supposed 'Big Bang', modern cosmology
    places Hume in the following dilemma. Either, he must deny that the
    physical universe as a whole is singular and unique, on the grounds
    that it resembles other things besides it that explode, such as
    grenades. Or, alternatively, should he insist on the uniqueness of the
    physical universe, he must concede that there are some unique things
    which are capable of standing as terms of causal relations." (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")
    "Second, Hume seems to assume that the universe is unique and conclusions cannot be reached about
    unique objects by analogy. But this is false as well. Astronomers reach conclusions all the time about
    the origin of the universe and this is unique. Furthermore, all events are unique in some sense, but no
    one would want to say that arguments by analogy do not apply to any objects whatever. The fact that
    the universe or some other object is unique does not rule out the possibility that it has properties in
    common with some other object, including some of its parts. For example, there may be only one
    object which satisfies the description "the tallest man in Maryland," but one could still compare this
    object with other objects and make judgments about the origination of the object." (J.P Morlend "Scaling The Secular City")

  • @intelligentdesign2295
    @intelligentdesign2295 ปีที่แล้ว

    Many of Hume's objections can be answered.
    Objection (3) "If we survey the universe ..., it bears a great resemblance to an
    animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle
    of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it ...: a
    continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: the closest
    sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part
    or member ... operates both to its own preservation and to that of
    the whole [I]t must be confessed, that... the universe resembles
    more a human body than it does the works of human art and
    contrivance [Y]et is the analogy also defective in many circumstances ...: no organs of sense; no seat of thought or reason; no one
    precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to bear a
    stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal." (Dialogues)
    Response:
    "Hume's argument seems weak. Hume's claim is that the physical
    universe - more specifically, our solar system - bears a closer resemblance to some animal or a vegetable than it does some machine or
    other artefact. The claim is unconvincing.
    In its manifest workings,
    the physical universe in general, and our own solar system in particular, exhibits a degree of regularity and predictability that far exceeds
    that which is exhibited by any animal or vegetable. After all, it is by
    the sun that we set our clocks and not by the comings and goings of
    sun-flowers or salamanders! That this is so suggests that the physical
    universe more closely resembles some regular and predictable
    machine or artefact, for example a clock, than it does any far less
    regular and predictable animal or vegetable." (David Conway "Rediscovery Of Wisdom")