Why does "this comparison" have to be a physical process? One could argue that things within the mental world are not material, and vice-versa. We obviously gain knowledge through our intellect, and if the intellect or knowledge are not physical then your argument blows up.
@parliecharker4316 You have raised an important distinction between the materialist view of consciousness and the other philosophical views, such as the various types of dualism. However, I think the notion of correspondence theory, can fit in to both types of views on consciousness.
Was this made in 1998? It is weird they mentioned that Einstein's side on the debate was making a comeback. If anything it is the opposite given the results of Bell's inequality violations that disprove local realism, known since the 80s.
The Word of Truth is ever faithful (loyal, true, isomorphic) to Reality (That which is). Masses do not curve space. Space is the hollow or volume of magnetic fields. Magnetic fields are inherently curvilinear. In Reality, gravity is inductive acceleration toward a mutual null point of inertia (potential). 0. Potential = Being 1. Actual = Becoming (actualized)
With the advance of science n technology, I do not think philosophy has any use other than logical thinking or critical thinking it treasures. But logical thinking critical thinking derive from mathematics. As such, philosophy has no place in this scientific and technological era. It has served its historical function. In the past, natural philosophers. mean scientists in the present days.With evolution, quantum mechanics, relativity, we human beings have almost solve every puzzles of universe and life . What remains is perhaps the relationship between mind and matters. Science eventually manage to explore and come up with satisfactory evidence based results. What science has not explained remains to be explored by empirical evidence based method, not by claims or resort to supernatural "explanation" which is not an explanation as such
The problem is in supposing 'truth' is a single concept that covers everything that we describe as being true. That it is true that the sun is many times larger than the earth is conceptually distinct from it is true that 4 +4 = 8. The former describes a matter of fact, whereas the latter explains a relation of ideas (see Hume). While it is true (matter of fact) that we use ideas to describe and comprehend the world, ideas can only serve this purpose to the extent they are non-contradictory. To say that an idea, or relation of ideas, is non-contradictory is to say that it is true in the latter sense of 'truth' (relation of ideas). Obviously, the two senses of 'truth' are connected because you have to have true ideas (as a prerequisite) in order to give a true description of matters of fact in the world. The confusion arises when these conceptual distinctions between the two senses of 'truth' are either ignored or blurred by a Socratic (Platonic) desire to make every sense of a word conform to a single form (or concept).
Yes, well said. Mathematics intersects with reality in terms of its predictive power as opposed to the conceptually distinct and cohesively true systems of, say, theology and many others that appear to support ideas within their systems but have no foundation in nature. Just because something is true within a bounded system of ideas doesn't make it in any sense true. A theory might help justify phenomena, but without evidence, it simply isn't true.
@@Khuno2 I see... Not sure what charity has to with it, but I obviously misunderstood your question. It's been a long time since I read Hume, so I was thinking I had misstated his terminology. It is now clear that you are not making an editorial critique, but a logical one. It's a good question, and one that I don't think Hume addresses. I, however, would say the distinction itself is a matter of fact -- for, it's certainly not a relation of ideas. I already see where you are probably going with this, but I don't want to misinterpret you again, so I'll let you reply before going further...
@@alwaysgreatusa223 Great. We're on the same page (hopefully). If the distinction between these two types of, say, propositions itself depends upon the way that the world is (is just another contingent matter of fact subject to empirical investigation), then relations among ideas must depend upon the way that the world is, right? But if that's so, then there is no distinction at all. That is, if relations among ideas are distinct from matters of fact (do not depend upon the way the world is for their truth), we could not come to know of them/understand them as we do matters of fact. Yet if the distinction is also a matter of fact, we must, as they depend on the way that the world is constituted. Similarly, if the distinction isn't a matter of fact, but a relation among ideas, then matters of fact would not rely upon the way that the world is for their truth, and that can't be right, either.
When every philosopher has their own word for some aspect of truth, it's fair to say that they're lost in space.
Amazing talk
Thank you ✌❤️
Why'd they give Karl Popper a British accent? lol.
Because he was British
@@amulyamishra5745 he was Austrian and speaks with an Austrian accent.
@@amulyamishra5745 he was austrian and lived in Vienna until he was 35 yo. His primary language was german.
@@amulyamishra5745 he was from Austria, but then he moved to New Zealand, and after WW2 to UK, to teach at London School of Economics.
Is Searle right that in the end we return to the common sense view, i.e. the correspondence theory? Certainly not for some of his colleagues!
Correspondence theory suffers from vagueness. What reality are we referring to… perception?
Why does "this comparison" have to be a physical process? One could argue that things within the mental world are not material, and vice-versa. We obviously gain knowledge through our intellect, and if the intellect or knowledge are not physical then your argument blows up.
lool what
@parliecharker4316 You have raised an important distinction between the materialist view of consciousness and the other philosophical views, such as the various types of dualism. However, I think the notion of correspondence theory, can fit in to both types of views on consciousness.
Was this made in 1998? It is weird they mentioned that Einstein's side on the debate was making a comeback. If anything it is the opposite given the results of Bell's inequality violations that disprove local realism, known since the 80s.
The Word of Truth is ever faithful (loyal, true, isomorphic) to Reality (That which is).
Masses do not curve space. Space is the hollow or volume of magnetic fields. Magnetic fields are inherently curvilinear.
In Reality, gravity is inductive acceleration toward a mutual null point of inertia (potential).
0. Potential = Being
1. Actual = Becoming (actualized)
With the advance of science n technology, I do not think philosophy has any use other than logical thinking or critical thinking it treasures. But logical thinking critical thinking derive from mathematics. As such, philosophy has no place in this scientific and technological era. It has served its historical function. In the past, natural philosophers. mean scientists in the present days.With evolution, quantum mechanics, relativity, we human beings have almost solve every puzzles of universe and life . What remains is perhaps the relationship between mind and matters. Science eventually manage to explore and come up with satisfactory evidence based results. What science has not explained remains to be explored by empirical evidence based method, not by claims or resort to supernatural "explanation" which is not an explanation as such
The problem is in supposing 'truth' is a single concept that covers everything that we describe as being true. That it is true that the sun is many times larger than the earth is conceptually distinct from it is true that 4 +4 = 8. The former describes a matter of fact, whereas the latter explains a relation of ideas (see Hume). While it is true (matter of fact) that we use ideas to describe and comprehend the world, ideas can only serve this purpose to the extent they are non-contradictory. To say that an idea, or relation of ideas, is non-contradictory is to say that it is true in the latter sense of 'truth' (relation of ideas). Obviously, the two senses of 'truth' are connected because you have to have true ideas (as a prerequisite) in order to give a true description of matters of fact in the world. The confusion arises when these conceptual distinctions between the two senses of 'truth' are either ignored or blurred by a Socratic (Platonic) desire to make every sense of a word conform to a single form (or concept).
Yes, well said. Mathematics intersects with reality in terms of its predictive power as opposed to the conceptually distinct and cohesively true systems of, say, theology and many others that appear to support ideas within their systems but have no foundation in nature. Just because something is true within a bounded system of ideas doesn't make it in any sense true. A theory might help justify phenomena, but without evidence, it simply isn't true.
Is the distinction between matters of fact and relations among ideas a matter of fact or a relation of ideas?
@@Khuno2 Made the edit... Good catch !
@@Khuno2 I see... Not sure what charity has to with it, but I obviously misunderstood your question. It's been a long time since I read Hume, so I was thinking I had misstated his terminology. It is now clear that you are not making an editorial critique, but a logical one. It's a good question, and one that I don't think Hume addresses. I, however, would say the distinction itself is a matter of fact -- for, it's certainly not a relation of ideas. I already see where you are probably going with this, but I don't want to misinterpret you again, so I'll let you reply before going further...
@@alwaysgreatusa223 Great. We're on the same page (hopefully). If the distinction between these two types of, say, propositions itself depends upon the way that the world is (is just another contingent matter of fact subject to empirical investigation), then relations among ideas must depend upon the way that the world is, right? But if that's so, then there is no distinction at all. That is, if relations among ideas are distinct from matters of fact (do not depend upon the way the world is for their truth), we could not come to know of them/understand them as we do matters of fact. Yet if the distinction is also a matter of fact, we must, as they depend on the way that the world is constituted. Similarly, if the distinction isn't a matter of fact, but a relation among ideas, then matters of fact would not rely upon the way that the world is for their truth, and that can't be right, either.