Drachinifel has said on his channel that he would love to go back in time, with a bag of popcorn, and watch Admiral King "expressing his displeasure" with the Bureau of Ordinance.
As an officer and a gentleman, Adm. King would not have used bad language nor raised his voice. However, knowing his loathing of anything that would short change the sailors under his command, I can guarantee anyone who drew his attention on this matter would have left his presences missing one Butt cheek if not both.
@@jahbad01 Kings legend at his alma-mater was such that he didn't scream, but was a flamer of the first order. In a conversational tone he'd eviscerate those who failed to meet his expectation. The legend did not extend to language used...
As an engineer, I have always treated the story of the Mark 14 Torpedo as a lesson in the right attitude with which to address problem reports and the wrong one. If someone says there's a problem with your work, you absolutely have to set your ego aside before you address it.
I was a technical author for 20 years. The first thing I learned was to remove all emotional attachment to any work I did. That allowed me to accept valid criticism and reject invalid comments. One of the best (but unintended compliments) was a design engineer saying my instructions were “light weight”.
You are talking about the "real world", the military is a "peculiar institution." My personal experience-during the VietNam war soldiers at the platoon and company level had a way with dealing with in-competent leaders - a handgrenade-when your life is in the hands of the decisions of your leader, mistakes are dealt with.
The hubris exhibited by the Bureau of Ordinance is truly staggering, as while mistakes happen their unwillingness to seriously consider that there might be a problem (let alone multiple problems!) with the torpedos despite multiple reports from those using them is the height of arrogance.
Bill isn’t wrong with saying there are grounded fears of this happening today in our current methods. When the AH-64E came into service with the first full Battalion transition there were loads of incidents showing something was very wrong with the gun. It did not perform to the standards that had been shown to be normal with the A & D models. Boeing spent the better part of two years accusing the operators and maintainers of being the issue before finally acknowledging there was a serious fault in the software that was only found after repeated attempts to blame the people who were expected to use the system. It’s finally been mostly corrected, but the process took the better part of half a decade.
As a relatively disinterested party, may I suggest that one solution would be to rotate serving officers to the position of Head of Acquisition ? That would bring "field" experience to bear on just how important these issues are, and the pressing need for them to be addressed.
The hubris was displayed in people who had worked at Bureau of Ordinance developing the Mark 6 exploder, and were now serving in command positions in the Pacific (e.g. Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie) refused to consider that the design that they developed was horrible. Even after Rear Admiral Lockwood had ordered his boats to disable the magnetic portion of the exploder Christie insisted that there was nothing wrong with it and required boats that operated in his area use the magnetic portion of the exploder. The hubris almost borders on Narcissism (“of course it works, I designed it” & “everyone else is just incompetent and doing it wrong”).
Officer ranks are filled with the same type of people as now can presently found in government. This is obvious if anyone views interactions of citizens exercising their constitutional right to record public officials. Most times the videos expose public officials that do no work and don't want damaging exposure. The government people call police to violate the photographers rights and beat or arrest them in certain cases.
I was a Quartermaster on the USS Ethan Allen SSBN-608 in 1963 and '64. While on a shake down before going on patrol we were tested by our Squadron Command on our skill at firing a torpedo at a towed target. We fired only one torpedo which circled around in a long slow curve and returned to hit our hull with a loud thunk. Thankfully it was not armed and did no damage. Sobering to know that some problems still existed at that late date.
They should have skipped the court martials and gone straight for the shooting. Or tie 'em to Mk.14s and fire 'em in the general direction of Japan :P.
@@GaldirEonaiThat’s how you get the same morale problems that plagued the Soviets post purge. You can’t just shoot people without due process, even in wartime. It doesn’t solve problems, it just totally undermines the morale of your men and causes them to be more likely to conceal the very real problems in the field by pointing the finger at subordinates. Once that happens it’s a snowball effect that undermines combat effectiveness from the man in command right down to the enlisted men carrying out orders.
Probable on 5 Sept 1967 while serving as a QM-2 (SS) aboard USS Tench (SS-417) in the eastern Med we fired a LIVE Mk-14 torpedo at the stationary x-USS-Jack (SS-259) in an attempt to sink her as a part of a 6th Fleet exercise. The torpedo performed a circular run and came back at us - an infamous WW-2 trick! We flooded negative and went to at least 300 feet VERY quickly, successfully avoiding the live run-away fish. We came up and fired a second torpedo at a distance of only about 700 yards. The torpedo exploded against the Jack's outer hull with a dull bang, not creating any disturbance in the water at our firing position. The hit probably also penetrated the inner (pressure) hull somewhat but the Jack was not really sinking. Jack was completely devoid of fuels and ammunition - nothing aboard to explode. The destroyers finished her off with their 5"-38s. There were a LOT of dirty skivies next time we hit a Greek port to do laundry!
Bill: “The exploders didn’t explode but Momsen did!” Awesome! You two have the perfect balance of facts, truth, candor, and humor in telling these great stories. Thank you!!!
The Bureau of Ordinance was a classic example of what E Edward Deming called 'the pyramid of ignorance.' The basic concept is that of the person with all the power sits in command but either doesn't listen to or doesn't believe what he hears the lower levels of the corporate structure. Deming was an accountant and a business analyst and consultant who studied the American car industry after WWII and came up with a list of what he considered to be valuable suggestions that would not only improve the car companies profitability, but also allow the production of better quality cars. Deming went to Detroit to talk to the big auto execs, and they all said 'that's nice, but we aren't really interested in your ideas." Somewhat frustrated, Deming looked around for someone else to whom he could pitch his ideas and concepts and he found the Japanese. They were interested, and ten years later the US auto industry found itself sitting in what is still commonly referred to as 'the rust belt." To my knowledge, such as it is, much of Deming's work was adopted by the US Navy and integrated into the bureaucracy. How true this is today I can not say, but I would note that the war in Ukraine has made it very clear that the US Army has very much paid attention to Deming's ideas, and in particular they show up in the concepts of using combined arms and in the way lower grade officers are given much greater initiative in carrying out their orders. And today's winner of the pyramid of ignorance award just has to Putin.
Detroit didn’t listen as they had no problems selling sort of good cars from 1945-1970. When the oil crisis came and small Japanese cars priced both fuel efficient AND reliable cars: using Deming’s TQM, it was almost too late for Detroit
Edward Deming was indeed a genius. Fixing highly protected fraud within government services is impossible. As Bill has pointed out in this video the problem that then existed is still present.
@@markskeldon1347 I was an insurance agent. We were taught to always tell people that private insurance companies were always far more efficient than the government. Then my wife got on Medicare and I took a serious look at it. All that stuff preached to people about corporate efficiency out doing government work was actually complete BS. Look at what someone pays for Medicare when they get on it, including Part B. Medigap insurance policies cover the 20% of Part B that Medicare doesn't. Look at what that small percentage of private coverage costs relative to the government coverage. There is no comparison. That 20% of half of Medicare costs over twice as much as all of Medicare. Don't feed back to me the crap you have swallowed in ignorance all your life. When a Capitalist system becomes existentially challenged in a major war, what does it do? I converts to a centrally managed economy because that form of economy is far, far more efficient any the standard capitalist system. All that crap just allows people to steal from you, and you thinks it's just great that they do.
I've read all about the torpedo issues in several books about US submarine warfare in the Pacific. Your detailed description of how the contact exploder problem was solved is exceptional, especially how the firing pin material was sourced locally from aircraft scrap.
Gentleman, you've done it again. The two of you seem to have a knack for knowing just how much minute details to include and yet not get hung up in bogging down in technical details. In other words you inform us well without boring people. I've learn a considerable amount of information from your series and I cannot wait for more. Excellent job, gentlemen. 🙂 P.S. I really like how you name names and don't make excuses.
Given you're running a history show, there's never any need to apologise for using a relevant historical name for a location. Keep up the great work, guys.
Thank you for finally telling the entire story, its interesting and criminal, Momson retired a vice admiral in the US Navy and his work with the lung and the torpedoes was just the tip of the iceberg of stuff he developed
Excellent episode and it resonates for this son of a Navy Torpedoman. My dad (an E-3 at the time) was one of the torpedomen assigned to assist with the testing to identify the contact detonator issues. After he retired, he had some "choice words" when someone happened to bring up BuOrd in a conversation.
Just imagine what it must have been like for the Japanese crew on that crippled ship as they watched one torpedo wake after another come in one by one and not explode.....
I think BuOrd was shaped by its interwar experiences and could not/would not change when there was an actual war to fight. They had well equipped machine shops with skilled workers to build elaborate designs but not much else. Before the war, they had discontinued industry involvement, presumably to save money. I suspect the two torpedo magnetic exploder tests were also to save money. The Germans also had problems with faulty torpedos. The Japanese, to their credit, and to our detriment, tested their torpedos thoroughly before deployment.
This former aerospace engineer deeply appreciated this episode (they are all a master class in Pacific WWII history). The Mark 14 is of a piece with what led to the loss of shuttles Challenger and Columbia. I once worked for the Thiokol manager who was told to "take off his engineer's hat and put on his manager's hat" before Challenger's last flight. Bu Ord and their mentality were reincarnated a half century later.
46:46 Although never serving myself (my dad was a Chief petty officer), having been a machinist my entire adult life, that statement about those machinists serving above and beyond for the betterment of their brothers in arms makes me so proud to be an American.
wow,! the mightiest military in the world still can’t decide on a small safety bin($5),again to prove further,some generals and admirals were put into early retirement by opposing the burecrat lack of essential knowledge,just ridiculous especially if it’s still existed.
Duralumin was used in WW1 airships! The aeroplane aluminium alloys come in a very long list of slightly different formulations, the Japanese alloy in the Zero was a new formulation of the more recent zinc based aluminium alloys. The Japaneses gave it an ‘extra super duralumin’ name even though duralumins are the original copper based alloys.
I used to play the computer game Silent Hunter 4, Wolves of the Pacific, which was a WW2 US submarine sim. I started my first career in the game at the earliest time period selectable with the oldest and least capable boats, which was S boats in the Philippines just prior to the war starting for the USA. The S boats loaded Mk 10 torpedoes, which were worse than the Mk14 in every way except that they exploded when they hit a target. The S-boat could not use Mk14 torpedoes. When I progressed to a newer submarine that could load the Mk14, I only completed one deployment with it. Few, if any, of the Mk14 torpedoes exploded when they hit. The game let me load Mk 10 torpedoes on the newer boat. I don't know if that was realistic, but that is what I used until the game notified me that the Mk 14 was improved.
I've known that the US Navy had systemic, critical failures with torpedoes during WW2, and how frustrating that must have been for the crews. But I hadn't made the correlation between malfunctioning torpedoes and the loss of American lives. Thank you guys so much for the detailed analysis of the underlying issues. Great topic. Learned a lot. As usual.
Thank you both for this episode. I knew of the problem but not the details. Defence equipment is difficult enough without bureaucratic obfuscation, obstruction and just plain incompetence. Great work.
Wow didn’t know about the whole Einstein deal! Those officers involved should be posthumously busted down to cabin boy! Swede Momsen’s testing certainly had a factor on my Father surviving the war. Impossible to say on what degree, too many variables to consider. Glad the powers that were at the time recognized his talents. Thank you for another fine episode!
Excellent exposition of this enormous historcal failure, gentlemen. As a Marine who taught the Evolution of Amphibious war to NROTC midshipmen, I taught them that the Marine island hopping campaign was the principal reason for our victory in the Pacific War. It wasnt until later in my military career that I learned of the possibly equal or superior role that US Navy submarine warfare played in the ultimate victory over Imperial Japan. There are compelling parallels between the US Navy's Pacific submarine campaign and that of the Germans in the Battle of the Atlantic. Like Japan, the UK was an island nation, crucially dependent on merchant marine shipping for raw materials and consumable goods for their war efforts. Karl Doenitz's very effective use of submarines to cripple the British oceanic supply chain nearly brought Britain to her knees. Had it not been for the overwhelming war production of the Victory Ships, adoption of the convoy system, the cracking of the German Enigma codes, and more effective ASW tactics, the outcome of the war in Europe might have been different. A major key to the early German submarine successes was reliable and effective torpedoes. Had the US Navy possessed similarly effective torpedoes early in the Pacific campaign, it's easy to project that by sinking Japan's merchant shipping supply chain, the war could have been shortened by a year or two and saved hundreds of thousands of allied lives.
As far as I can tell, Tonan Maru No.3 was the only ship in history to be hit by 3 or more torpedoes in a single action and survive. Although, even this doesn’t really count as 11 of them were duds.
Thank you to say the very least. I looked up Admiral English he was a submariner very brave and seemed very capable. I have found in my corporate experience that us operations people with direct experience are frequently disdained by the expert theoreticians, the inertia and we/they tribalism are often extremely difficult to overcome. There is no excuse for throwing away brave American lives, I was surprised that Admiral King did not exercise his draconian capacities. Is there any reason for that? Again thank you so much for, indeed, a masterful explanation. You and WW2TV are superb in my estimation
Seth commented that these systemic problems exist in other areas and other branches of military services. In reference to the over-classification of a “system” or anything to be used by the fleet or soldiers in the field. A good example of this happening was the 75mm gun sighting stabilization system they put into the M-4 Sherman tanks fairly early in the war. The U.S. Army Ordinance Department so heavily classified that particular piece of equipment that entire U.S. Armored Divisions were not trained to use it nor were any operator/maintenance manuals allowed out of the continental United States after the system was built into or retrofitted into the tanks. Nobody used it, and much of the armored forces didn’t even know what the gizmo was. They just knew, whatever it was, it was in the way; in an already cramped tank interior. I believe later on 3rd Armored Division finally took it upon themselves to find out about the thing and subsequently set up their own field training program for the device. It was said they liked them once they figured out what they were and how to use them. Crews would use them until eventually, like anything else they would breakdown, and stay broken because nobody knew how to repair them and there were no maintenance manuals accompanying the devices because the manuals were so highly classified. Anybody seeing a bureaucratic pattern developing here…?
Congratulations again Seth and Bill. A superlative performance Bill, ive never seen, nor read a better explaination of the torpedo debacle. But, still waiting for Flucky and the Barb!!
Had the pleasure of working for a contractor for the US Military and after some fatal incidents with the platform that sadly resulted in US Military fatalities we engineers were placed in the same building with the servicemen who worked on the platform every day, it was a revelation and many of the engineering staff's eyes were opened when they saw the difference between what they designed versus the reality of day to day maintenance. I remember we worked 10-12 hour days 6 days a week to fix the issues and it felt like it was the absolute least we could do.
Once again, the two of you hit it out of the park. I've seen this sort of indefensible denial and apathy with a technical government agency in reference to tools used by the guys on the line who risked their lives to do a dangerous job under the best of circumstances. Incredibly frustrating to say the least. The Navy was incredibly lucky to have King, Nimitz, Lockwood, and Momson! If there were political "boot lickers" in their places, more submariners would have died unnecessarily and the war would have dragged on even longer than it did.
The unauthorized history of the Pacific war has become my favorite channel on World War II history. One of the things I like the most about this is that it doesn’t follow the politically correct history. It calls out the people who need to be called out. I also really enjoy the personal stories about individuals and the depth of the research on those particular individuals good or bad. I’d be interested to know how many hours of research go into each episode. I also really enjoy the different guests on the show.
Good video. Drachinfel in his video covering the mk14 said in the beginning torpedoes were so ungodly expensive back then that the Navy flat out could not afford to livefire torpedoes to thoroughly test them.
Great video, you guys packed a lot i to that hour. When I read history, I try to glean out the lessons. WWII provides numerous examples, many of which have their origins in the interwar years. The torpedo story lesson is test, test, and then do more tests. Bureaucracies are terrible at practical tests, they love the meeting room and set procedures, and are often fearful of budget limitations. My experience in the chemical industry starting up many new processes illustrated to me the the value of pre-construction pilot plant testing. When the organization put in the effort to set up trial runs, the startup was relatively smooth in the full size equipment. Without it, the plant was in for a painful year or two scrambling to develop a workable installation while the pressure was on. I agree with Bill that this will happen again. In the first decade of this century our boys in Iraq were getting blown up in humvees bu IED mines. It took the US Dept of Defence years to field a mine survival infantry truck. The South Africans had already invented a truck with an armored V bottom when they were dealing with a long insurgency, so an example was readily available. I forget the exact timing, but I remember it took longer to field these trucks than it took us to bring WWIi to a conclusion.
My grandfather was a submariner. he was a Nebraska farm boy who was drafted and finished boot camp as the war ended. His choice was go back to the farm or volunteer for the silent service. He was an electrician mate, cross trained on the diesels. After 6 years he took a contract to work on the Panama Canal. As the Navy started to prepare for WWII, with his sub training, he was able to get a civilian job working for the Navy at China Lake - he told stories of how grandma was pregnant with mom so he traded his Indian 4 with a Naval Aviator for his car. After Pearl Harbor he was transferred to Kitsap to on the testing of the torpedo problem.
A well dine, but very frustrating episode. Yes, somebody should have done jail time, or had their careers sidelined to commanding some Pacific island where they could no longer endanger the combat sailors! I remember reading in a book ("Silent Bictory", perhaps?) that the Naval Torpedo depot in Rhode Island not only suffered from bureaucratic rigidity but an excess of Congressional interference that protected bad workers and kept the Navy from running an efficient shop. The whole matter has been frustrating for years to read about US Navy ships and people being torn apart by one of the finest torpedo weapons of WW@, and then having our torpedoes fail so miserably. Thanks for a good explanation, and CPT Bill - thanks for your personal insights into the procurement process.
I think the HowTo Submarine episode may have been the best and most informative one you guys did. I learned a lot I did not know and it was very interesting as well I love this channel.
Bill and Seth fantastic episode, A gradiuate level course or textbook for reconstruction and analyses of these engineering design SNAFUs and BUORD FUBAR coverup would be a great learning tool for young engineers, and procurementas pros. I agree with Bill that these types of design problems still exist today. Your podcasts are a National Treasure. Thanks for all your hard work.
Glad to see awareness being spread about the terror that was the Bureau of Ordinance. It wasn't just torpedoes, go look into the Lewis Gun Trials pre US WWI involvement, the levels of incompetent fuckery in that dept is legendary.
Given the level of your vitriol directed against "Dugout Doug" (and appropriately so), I'm kind of surprised that you didn't heap more of it against Admiral English. In his position as head of the Newport, RI Torpedo Station, he had been active in the design of the American torpedoes. His deflecting the blame to the submarine crews was nothing short of criminal conflict of interest. Otherwise, your presentation of the material was spot-on. Great job as always!!
Back around 1990, a videogame company named Microprose made a bunch of good military-themed games. The games all had a large number of settings regarding realism. I've read that, when those settings were maxed out, the games were considered fairly realistic -- at least within the limitations of a single player videogame running on the PCs of the time. I played at least 5 of these games. One was Silent Service II, where you controlled an American submarine in the Pacific during World War 2. By far the most frustrating realism setting in any of those games was Silent Service II's campaign option for "realistic torpedos". In game, I experienced almost exactly the same thing USS Tinosa did: I hit a big tanker with a dozen torpedos, and not one exploded. I finally surfaced and used the deck gun (which was not as realistically modeled) to sink it.
Another excellent program, explaining the complicated problems very clearly. Well done. I had heard of it , but did not understand just what the various problems were.
Thanks again for another very informative video. When I was a kid and I first watched "Operation Pacific" and watched as are torpedo's would not explode which resulted in the death of the captain, Ward Bond character, in which the sub then rammed the vessel and sank it. Even back then as a kid I was thinking, why did this happen. The torpedo issues during the war is a crime and it's crimes were never really mentioned during the long and bloody war. Despite all of these issues brave men and commanders like "Dick" O'Kane and many other took the fight to the enemy and prevailed.
Read all of this in different places. Great to hear it all in one cup. This type of criminal conspiracy is not uncommon in the military and the military industry complex. The boots on the ground soldier sailor airman suffer flag officers' greed ego and cover up. M-16 comes to mind. Plenty of others.
I remember reading (likely in AWST) when the Gulf War started that they found F-18 missiles going a bit nuts when fired. Ended up when 2 planes fired missiles the pilots were guiding each other's missile. Because they never launched a pair simultaneously during tests because of the cost.
My understanding from other sources is that costs were the reason for the torpedoes/exploders not being live fired during peacetime. Torpedoes were very expensive, so dummy warheads were used in tests and exercises in the hopes of retrieving the torpedoes for reuse or retesting.
Great episode. It got me thinking of the individuals that make a difference to the system. Nimitz, Lockwood, Momsen, Edson, Thatch, Lee, etc. The list is long, and this list of fighters, leaders and innovators saved lives. I do not know if it shortened the war; but they did save lives. For me that is the bottom line...saving lives. Koodos to Lockwood & Momsen for getting the torps better & saving lives.
This episode hit particularly close to home illustrating the challenges the warfighter had to endure then, in Bill's experience, and my two decades watching the egos of senior DOD management get in the way of effective capability fielding. The level of denial of the ineffectiveness of the torpedoes then is playing out today in a different form factor. Nevertheless, senior DOD officials hold fast to their position in light of test results going so far as to suppress the conclusions. As a grad school friend said in his dissertation, "people are people."
Again, well done, guys. I've long looked for a definitive work on this topic, but have never come across it. As someone said below, bits and pieces of the story in various books on the submarine campaign. The Einstein angle was brand new, and spectacular. I believe that, of all forces, the Germans also had serious torpedo problems in the early part of the war - though obviously not enough to seriously blunt the impact of their U-boat campaign in that period (or did it??). And while I don't know for sure, I'd guess the Italian torpedoes were respectable, and it shouldn't be a surprise. Italy had excellent engineers at that point in history, it was mostly leadership, command, and resource issues that produced the war record most are familiar with. Their navy in particular was no laughing matter for the first few years, for the Royal Navy, as told well in the history of the Mediterranean campaign by Vince O'Hara (Struggle for the Middle Sea).
Yes. The Germans had problems with their magnetic detonators off the coast of Norway during Operation Weserübung and their torpedo design bureau insisted for a long time on the infallibility of their product and the fault must lie with the submariners.
In the shadow of Mt Fuji, at the end of a long winding road up through the forests lies the HQ of Hitachi's engineering division. 2000 people worked there designing everything from diesel electric locomotives, and also what sits in a display stand in the vast entrance foyer, a Long Lance Torpedo. Probably the most successful torpedo of the war by far.
@Steve1734 4 months ago In the shadow of Mt Fuji, at the end of a long winding road up through the forests lies the HQ of Hitachi's engineering division. 2000 people worked there designing everything from diesel electric locomotives, and also what sits in a display stand in the vast entrance foyer, a Long Lance Torpedo. Probably the most successful torpedo of the war by far. The Naval Academy has a long lance outside Ward Hall/ Dahlgren Hall area .
I've heard that BuOrd developed these contact and magnetic exploders back in the mid-1930s (during the Depression), and the Administration and Congress didn't appropriate enough funding to test, then produce them. The political priorities centered on funding the New Deal, not the military. So, the brass had to choose between: A) an expensive testing regime; or B) paying to produce enough torpedoes to stock the fleet's magazines. I can imagine that pressure from the fleet would have steered BuOrd towards option B. Military Program Managers always faced those kinds of choices (the exact choice faced by the antagonist in the movie "Pentagon Wars"), although now-a-days there are Federal laws that make the PMs thoroughly test items (especially weapons) before they go to the fleet or the field. It is still inexcusable that once the war started BuOrd was slow to react to the complaints of the skippers.
As a long time history buff of the Pacific war I love the work you guys are doing. I have watched every video that you have put up and am always looking forward to the next one to be posted. Great job and please keep up the outstanding effort.
@@GaldirEonai From Drachinifel's video in the issues with the torpedo, I'm suprised the phone line didn't melt when King found out what was going on. Especially when Bu-Ord tried to bring charges against the skipper of the submarines for illegally modifying there ordinance.
Thank you, this was terrific. It's a testament to how good the sailors were on those subs that they managed to make do with atrocious torpedoes until someone finally listened and fixed the problem.
Kind of funny Bill, when you brought up the term "battle stations" That brought me back to my childhood days of growing up with my dad who was a veteran of World War II South Pacific US Navy! Whenever I did something wrong or perceived as wrong my dad would tell me that we were going to go to battle stations! My first thought was this was going to be pretty cool! I thought we were going to go to a gas station or some facility that had cars and trucks and cool tires, etc. It wasn't until we went to battle stations at one point and I got a "love tap" from my father that I realized that Battle Stations was not such a cool place and I never wanted to go back there again! Rest in peace Dad! No hard feelings and I still love you dearly, you were and always will be my hero!💖🙏🇺🇲⚓️🍻🛥👍🎉😊❤
The background painting is arrestingly realistic, The artist should be complimented for choosing a perspective that would absolutely be impossible for a photographer, just aft of the screw, rudder, and stern planes!
"good enough for Government Work" - My father always defined 'Government Work' as something you 1} measure with a micrometer, 2} mark with chalk, and 3} cut with an axe.
As mentioned, the British and Germans had magnetic exploders too and also seemed to have problems with them, likely in part due to the geomagnetic issues Bill Toti discusses at 16:28 (early days for human understanding of the electromagnetic spectrum). Interestingly, at some point in his evolution into the CNO/CincUS role King demanded control over the bureaus, which were operating more or less as independent fiefdoms. It would be an interesting episode to see how and to what extent this bureaucratic struggle evolved- and why it took until later 1943 for the topredo problem to be fixed.
Unquestionably the Bureau fiefdom culture contributed to the design problems before the war, but I'm not sure that was a primary cause for the delays in identifying and fixing the various problems with the Mark XIV. Once the shooting war started, the main issue was communication (or lack thereof) between the operating forces and BuOrd. The designers and leaders within BuOrd had such confidence in their design that they could not accept that the frontline people were identifying real problems; any issues had to be the result of user error rather than design flaws. The other major obstacle, in my opinion, was Ralph Christie. He was essentially the father of the Mark VI exploder and the Mark XIV, and would never accept any criticism of their design. Unfortunately for the war effort, he rose to frontline command of the Southwest Pacific sub force, and provided strong supportive feedback of the torpedoes to BuOrd. People forget that BuOrd was therefore receiving at best mixed messages about Mark XIV performance. It wasn't until Charles Lockwood took command of the Pacific fleet subs that someone who commanded equal respect as Christie could basically force BuOrd into acknowledging the flaws.
According to Drachinfels, the depth problem had to do with where on the torpedo the depth sensors were placed...so that they gave an erroneous depth reading.
It's a bit more complicated. Basically they had a tube from a pressure sensor out to the surface of the torpedo to sense the outside water pressure. And when you tested the thing in a tank, it was accurate. But, when the torpedo was traveling through the water, due to water flow and the exact placement of the opening, you would get a different pressure reading. So it needed to be tested and calibrated when the torpedo was traveling through the water at normal speed.
If I recall correctly, a number of Skippers were relieved in the mistaken belief that the problem was “lack of aggressiveness” instead of faulty torpedos.
Torpedo issues was something the US Navy could hide from Senator Harry S Truman's committee, Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Had he caught wind of this I'm sure the Bureau of Ordnance would have responded much differently. Of course, the security and other investigations kept Truman's prying eyes away. Truman threaten to defund the B-26 program due to the large number of deaths in training. The Army Air Force & Martin jumped when Truman spoke.
Given their experience with the Congressman from TN and the enemy depth charge settings comment, it's so unfortunate that the Navy had reason to hesitate bringing Congress or the White House into the fight.
President Truman was the man. He also busted some of the jerks that kept pushing sub par landing craft in the system. He wouldn’t have that shit on his watch.
I understand the emphasis on the submarine torpedo issues, but the Mark 13 air-launched torpedo had different problems than those discussed for the Mark 14/18. During the look into why so many failures of aircraft launched torpedoes happened in 1942, the task to fix it was given to a university. They did an in-depth investigation into the dynamics of how the torpedo from an aircraft entered the water and what were the shortcomings of then current doctrine. From this investigation, the optimum entry angle range was determined and how an addition of wooden covers for the nose of the torpedo and the propeller area minimized damage to the torpedo components from the impact with water. This is a very different result than the fixes for the sub launched torpedoes. It wasn't until the last third of 1944 that the Mark 13 torpedo finally became the weapon it should have been at least 2.5 years earlier.
If I can add to Bill and Seth. There were specific causes for the 4 failures. except for the magnetic detonator they all traced back to the previous mk10. Kind of. >The magnetic detonator problem was what it was. We (everyone) simply didnt understand how the Earth's magnetic field worked. Everyone had the same problem. The Germans and British had the same problem when they went to war in 1939. After the Norway campaign in 1940 (2 years before us) they both just stopped using them and said "we'll figure it out later." >The deep running problem was because the dummy warhead they used for testing was from the lighter and slower mk10. So the actual warhead was heavier. >The contact detonator was also from the mk10 which, again, was lighter and slower so the plunger bent in the slide tube > The circling problem was because the gyros were, again, from the mark 10 so jammed when they were shot out of the torpedo tube because they couldnt handle the weight/speed. I'm sure Nimitz was very interested in current events concerning the silent service. Remember he himself, by his career path, was a submariner. Dont be to surprised if after CVN-68 is retired we see an SSN Nimitz. If I can wander off topic for a bit I do think that its interesting how career paths effected the commanders. Take minute and reflect with me. Nimitz was a submarine guys, "calculated risk." Spruance was a cruiser guy, quite and practical. Halsey was a destroyer guy, "attack, repeat, attack." Telling. Back on topic, Nimitz's interest was also personal. Nimitz, Spruance, and Turner all had family members on those subs. I'm not imply favoritism, dont take it that way. Spruance and Nimitz both had sons on submarines. Turner's nephew Manning Kimmel (Tuner and Husband Kimmel were brothers-in-law) served on subs and was executed as a POW. Yes it wasnt bad enough Kimmel was (arguably) railroaded, and crucified for Pearl Harbor but then he lost his son. oof. Seth and Bill also forgot to mention that when the pro-sailor Lockwood went from being ComSubSoWesPac (MacArthur) to ComSubPac (Nimitz) to replace the recently deceased pro-BurOrd Robert English he was replaced as ComSubSoWesPac by the pro-BurOrd Ralph Waldo Christie. The Merry go-round kept turning. >: (
Yes they did, it was the torpedo officer from HMS Victorious and the British had seen the failure of their magnetic detonator in the hunt for the Bismarck in May 1941
I like the way you mention 'Operation Pacific' in the video. Fixing the Mk. 14, the Hollywood version: 'Operation Pacific,' a WW2 movie released in 1951 and starring John Wayne, is based loosely on the Mk. 14 torpedo. Wayne and Ward Bond experience troubles with that torpedo during WW2 submarine operations, and by the end of the movie, THEY solve its problems.
Very interesting, one point though - the German Kriegsmarine (Navy ) had virtually the same problems with their depth settings, magnetic detonators and anti-circling systems at the start of the war as well. they just had people shot and someone else put in charge of fixing them.
Mk 14 torpedo for submarines. Mk13 for air launch, from planes, and Mk 15 from destroyers. The problem with the US torpedoes is that the "product development cycle" was never completed. As mentioned in this video, they tested them only once. All the problems these torpedoes had would have been discovered and fixed, if a normal development and testing cycle had been used. Both the Germans and British also had problematic magnetic exploders. All 3 countries didn't understand that the Earth's magnetic field varied over the world, so one working properly off the coast of England, would not work in the Mediterranean, nor the south Pacific. The US torpedoes had several problems, in addition, to just the magnetic exploder. All going back to an incomplete product.
Thanks for this deep dive into submarine history. It's a metaphor for our time that should alert us to do due diligence and hold people accountable when they fail their duty. It is the failure of the bureaucracy itself, which raises question about how we can do better to be better.
I am in strong agreement that we have to keep arguing with bureaucracies when our service members lives are at risk, we owe it to them. Thank you for this video.
brings to mind the M-16 issues. I read the Congressional Report, suggested that some people be charged. Nothing happened. How many young men in Viet Nam died because their weapon malfunctioned; the bosses blamed the soldiers, then finally made adjustment after years of problems. Never acknowleged their in-competence, so this problem was not confined to WWII.
Great episode. Pretty great that the Army Air Corps was more interested in helping to solve this problem than BuOrd. Goes to your earlier points (Guadalcanal, New Georgia, New Guinea) that Joint warfighting was really great at the tactical and operational levels.
Love how Bill and Seth just lay on the accountability here. No excuses. Some senior Navy BuOrd people should have been court martialed for dereliction of duty and possibly for aiding the enemy, so great was their negligence.
As always, another excellent episode, Bill & Seth. Thank you for the tremendous work you guys are doing! I really enjoy this podcast and the various angles in which you guys cover this fascinating theater of operations and the people who lived it!
One thing that came out of WWII in the Navy was the establishment of COMOPTEVFOR in 1945 for evaluation of weapons in an operational environment, unlike the testing that went on with the MK 14 torpedo during the war. At least the navy put that “Lesson learned “ from the MK 14 torpedo to bed in developing other weapons systems.
In Frank Herbert’s 1949 science fiction work *Under Pressure* about nuclear submarines, one of his best statements was made by a character that said “There is *no such thing* as a MINOR emergency in a 47:47 submarine!” That business with creating new firing pins out of aircraft metal is a great example of what is politely called “Southern engineering.” 😅
![กิโลเมตรที่ 0 เดินทางรอบโลกไม่ใช้เครื่องบิน [Around The World Ep. 1]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/toJG9oofLFY/mqdefault.jpg)
Drachinifel has said on his channel that he would love to go back in time, with a bag of popcorn, and watch Admiral King "expressing his displeasure" with the Bureau of Ordinance.
Semper Iratus 😂
You could have set the pan of un-popped corn in front of Ernie and let the heat of his commentary air pop it...
Might need asbestos earplugs to handle the language and volume of delivery! 😊
As an officer and a gentleman, Adm. King would not have used bad language nor raised his voice.
However, knowing his loathing of anything that would short change the sailors under his command, I can guarantee anyone who drew his attention on this matter would have left his presences missing one Butt cheek if not both.
@@jahbad01 Kings legend at his alma-mater was such that he didn't scream, but was a flamer of the first order. In a conversational tone he'd eviscerate those who failed to meet his expectation. The legend did not extend to language used...
As an engineer, I have always treated the story of the Mark 14 Torpedo as a lesson in the right attitude with which to address problem reports and the wrong one.
If someone says there's a problem with your work, you absolutely have to set your ego aside before you address it.
I was a technical author for 20 years. The first thing I learned was to remove all emotional attachment to any work I did. That allowed me to accept valid criticism and reject invalid comments. One of the best (but unintended compliments) was a design engineer saying my instructions were “light weight”.
Challenger 💔
Early Vietnam M-16's and ammo. Even when I was in basic in 1973, the dummies yelled at us to clean it all time.. every 10 minutes... which was bull.
@@StevenSeiller And the Columbia..... changing the good freon binder to a worse one, for EPA BS !!!
You are talking about the "real world", the military is a "peculiar institution." My personal experience-during the VietNam war soldiers at the platoon and company level had a way with dealing with in-competent leaders - a handgrenade-when your life is in the hands of the decisions of your leader, mistakes are dealt with.
The hubris exhibited by the Bureau of Ordinance is truly staggering, as while mistakes happen their unwillingness to seriously consider that there might be a problem (let alone multiple problems!) with the torpedos despite multiple reports from those using them is the height of arrogance.
Bill isn’t wrong with saying there are grounded fears of this happening today in our current methods. When the AH-64E came into service with the first full Battalion transition there were loads of incidents showing something was very wrong with the gun. It did not perform to the standards that had been shown to be normal with the A & D models. Boeing spent the better part of two years accusing the operators and maintainers of being the issue before finally acknowledging there was a serious fault in the software that was only found after repeated attempts to blame the people who were expected to use the system. It’s finally been mostly corrected, but the process took the better part of half a decade.
As a relatively disinterested party, may I suggest that one solution would be to rotate serving officers to the position of Head of Acquisition ? That would bring "field" experience to bear on just how important these issues are, and the pressing need for them to be addressed.
As evidenced by the recent publication of the Durham Report.
The hubris was displayed in people who had worked at Bureau of Ordinance developing the Mark 6 exploder, and were now serving in command positions in the Pacific (e.g. Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie) refused to consider that the design that they developed was horrible. Even after Rear Admiral Lockwood had ordered his boats to disable the magnetic portion of the exploder Christie insisted that there was nothing wrong with it and required boats that operated in his area use the magnetic portion of the exploder. The hubris almost borders on Narcissism (“of course it works, I designed it” & “everyone else is just incompetent and doing it wrong”).
Officer ranks are filled with the same type of people as now can presently found in government. This is obvious if anyone views interactions of citizens exercising their constitutional right to record public officials. Most times the videos expose public officials that do no work and don't want damaging exposure. The government people call police to violate the photographers rights and beat or arrest them in certain cases.
I was a Quartermaster on the USS Ethan Allen SSBN-608 in 1963 and '64. While on a shake down before going on patrol we were tested by our Squadron Command on our skill at firing a torpedo at a towed target. We fired only one torpedo which circled around in a long slow curve and returned to hit our hull with a loud thunk. Thankfully it was not armed and did no damage. Sobering to know that some problems still existed at that late date.
There should have been court martials for the Ordinance Bureau staff
And the loudmouthed congressman should have been shot
👍
They should have skipped the court martials and gone straight for the shooting.
Or tie 'em to Mk.14s and fire 'em in the general direction of Japan :P.
Should be sent to the firing squad for treason. Along with that Congressman.
@@GaldirEonaiThat’s how you get the same morale problems that plagued the Soviets post purge. You can’t just shoot people without due process, even in wartime. It doesn’t solve problems, it just totally undermines the morale of your men and causes them to be more likely to conceal the very real problems in the field by pointing the finger at subordinates. Once that happens it’s a snowball effect that undermines combat effectiveness from the man in command right down to the enlisted men carrying out orders.
Probable on 5 Sept 1967 while serving as a QM-2 (SS) aboard USS Tench (SS-417) in the eastern Med we fired a LIVE Mk-14 torpedo at the stationary x-USS-Jack (SS-259) in an attempt to sink her as a part of a 6th Fleet exercise. The torpedo performed a circular run and came back at us - an infamous WW-2 trick! We flooded negative and went to at least 300 feet VERY quickly, successfully avoiding the live run-away fish. We came up and fired a second torpedo at a distance of only about 700 yards. The torpedo exploded against the Jack's outer hull with a dull bang, not creating any disturbance in the water at our firing position. The hit probably also penetrated the inner (pressure) hull somewhat but the Jack was not really sinking. Jack was completely devoid of fuels and ammunition - nothing aboard to explode.
The destroyers finished her off with their 5"-38s. There were a LOT of dirty skivies next time we hit a Greek port to do laundry!
Bill: “The exploders didn’t explode but Momsen did!” Awesome! You two have the perfect balance of facts, truth, candor, and humor in telling these great stories. Thank you!!!
The Bureau of Ordinance was a classic example of what E Edward Deming called 'the pyramid of ignorance.' The basic concept is that of the person with all the power sits in command but either doesn't listen to or doesn't believe what he hears the lower levels of the corporate structure. Deming was an accountant and a business analyst and consultant who studied the American car industry after WWII and came up with a list of what he considered to be valuable suggestions that would not only improve the car companies profitability, but also allow the production of better quality cars. Deming went to Detroit to talk to the big auto execs, and they all said 'that's nice, but we aren't really interested in your ideas." Somewhat frustrated, Deming looked around for someone else to whom he could pitch his ideas and concepts and he found the Japanese. They were interested, and ten years later the US auto industry found itself sitting in what is still commonly referred to as 'the rust belt."
To my knowledge, such as it is, much of Deming's work was adopted by the US Navy and integrated into the bureaucracy. How true this is today I can not say, but I would note that the war in Ukraine has made it very clear that the US Army has very much paid attention to Deming's ideas, and in particular they show up in the concepts of using combined arms and in the way lower grade officers are given much greater initiative in carrying out their orders. And today's winner of the pyramid of ignorance award just has to Putin.
General trend, the battle lines are moving one way.
Detroit didn’t listen as they had no problems selling sort of good cars from 1945-1970.
When the oil crisis came and small Japanese cars priced both fuel efficient AND reliable cars: using Deming’s TQM, it was almost too late for Detroit
Edward Deming was indeed a genius. Fixing highly protected fraud within government services is impossible. As Bill has pointed out in this video the problem that then existed is still present.
@@markskeldon1347 I was an insurance agent. We were taught to always tell people that private insurance companies were always far more efficient than the government. Then my wife got on Medicare and I took a serious look at it. All that stuff preached to people about corporate efficiency out doing government work was actually complete BS. Look at what someone pays for Medicare when they get on it, including Part B. Medigap insurance policies cover the 20% of Part B that Medicare doesn't. Look at what that small percentage of private coverage costs relative to the government coverage. There is no comparison. That 20% of half of Medicare costs over twice as much as all of Medicare. Don't feed back to me the crap you have swallowed in ignorance all your life. When a Capitalist system becomes existentially challenged in a major war, what does it do? I converts to a centrally managed economy because that form of economy is far, far more efficient any the standard capitalist system. All that crap just allows people to steal from you, and you thinks it's just great that they do.
I've read all about the torpedo issues in several books about US submarine warfare in the Pacific. Your detailed description of how the contact exploder problem was solved is exceptional, especially how the firing pin material was sourced locally from aircraft scrap.
Gentleman, you've done it again. The two of you seem to have a knack for knowing just how much minute details to include and yet not get hung up in bogging down in technical details. In other words you inform us well without boring people. I've learn a considerable amount of information from your series and I cannot wait for more. Excellent job, gentlemen. 🙂 P.S. I really like how you name names and don't make excuses.
I would have given 50 'likes' if I had been able to.
Given you're running a history show, there's never any need to apologise for using a relevant historical name for a location. Keep up the great work, guys.
Thank you for finally telling the entire story, its interesting and criminal, Momson retired a vice admiral in the US Navy and his work with the lung and the torpedoes was just the tip of the iceberg of stuff he developed
Excellent episode and it resonates for this son of a Navy Torpedoman. My dad (an E-3 at the time) was one of the torpedomen assigned to assist with the testing to identify the contact detonator issues. After he retired, he had some "choice words" when someone happened to bring up BuOrd in a conversation.
Just imagine what it must have been like for the Japanese crew on that crippled ship as they watched one torpedo wake after another come in one by one and not explode.....
Nothing on earth like the emotion you get when someone has tried to kill you and failed.
"Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result." Winston Churchill.
That had to result in some colorful Japanese slogans. Bulletin board material, for sure.
It would be a roller coaster of fear and relief.
I think BuOrd was shaped by its interwar experiences and could not/would not change when there was an actual war to fight. They had well equipped machine shops with skilled workers to build elaborate designs but not much else. Before the war, they had discontinued industry involvement, presumably to save money. I suspect the two torpedo magnetic exploder tests were also to save money. The Germans also had problems with faulty torpedos. The Japanese, to their credit, and to our detriment, tested their torpedos thoroughly before deployment.
This former aerospace engineer deeply appreciated this episode (they are all a master class in Pacific WWII history). The Mark 14 is of a piece with what led to the loss of shuttles Challenger and Columbia. I once worked for the Thiokol manager who was told to "take off his engineer's hat and put on his manager's hat" before Challenger's last flight. Bu Ord and their mentality were reincarnated a half century later.
46:46 Although never serving myself (my dad was a Chief petty officer), having been a machinist my entire adult life, that statement about those machinists serving above and beyond for the betterment of their brothers in arms makes me so proud to be an American.
The worst part of this is Bill’s observations that a similar mindset still exists with acquisitions.
Great stuff as usual guys!
wow,! the mightiest military in the world still can’t decide on a small safety bin($5),again to prove further,some generals and admirals were put into early retirement by opposing the burecrat lack of essential knowledge,just ridiculous especially if it’s still existed.
The alloy they used to replace the firing pin was duralumin (duraluminum). In case anyone wanted to know what it was
Yep. Japan/Mitsubishi had leapfrogged both the US and the European powers when it came to aluminum and its alloys in the early war years.
Duralumin was used in WW1 airships! The aeroplane aluminium alloys come in a very long list of slightly different formulations, the Japanese alloy in the Zero was a new formulation of the more recent zinc based aluminium alloys. The Japaneses gave it an ‘extra super duralumin’ name even though duralumins are the original copper based alloys.
I used to play the computer game Silent Hunter 4, Wolves of the Pacific, which was a WW2 US submarine sim. I started my first career in the game at the earliest time period selectable with the oldest and least capable boats, which was S boats in the Philippines just prior to the war starting for the USA. The S boats loaded Mk 10 torpedoes, which were worse than the Mk14 in every way except that they exploded when they hit a target. The S-boat could not use Mk14 torpedoes. When I progressed to a newer submarine that could load the Mk14, I only completed one deployment with it. Few, if any, of the Mk14 torpedoes exploded when they hit. The game let me load Mk 10 torpedoes on the newer boat. I don't know if that was realistic, but that is what I used until the game notified me that the Mk 14 was improved.
Tough topic, and Seth and Bill get an A+. So sad for the unnecessary losses.
They consistently get A+ on all their episodes. This team has the right stuff.
I've known that the US Navy had systemic, critical failures with torpedoes during WW2, and how frustrating that must have been for the crews. But I hadn't made the correlation between malfunctioning torpedoes and the loss of American lives.
Thank you guys so much for the detailed analysis of the underlying issues. Great topic. Learned a lot. As usual.
No accountablity. Great Job Bill and Seth!!! But blame needs names.
Thank you both for this episode. I knew of the problem but not the details. Defence equipment is difficult enough without bureaucratic obfuscation, obstruction and just plain incompetence. Great work.
And several countries are probably depending on private companies' secrets. Today!
Wow didn’t know about the whole Einstein deal! Those officers involved should be posthumously busted down to cabin boy! Swede Momsen’s testing certainly had a factor on my Father surviving the war. Impossible to say on what degree, too many variables to consider. Glad the powers that were at the time recognized his talents. Thank you for another fine episode!
Excellent exposition of this enormous historcal failure, gentlemen.
As a Marine who taught the Evolution of Amphibious war to NROTC midshipmen, I taught them that the Marine island hopping campaign was the principal reason for our victory in the Pacific War. It wasnt until later in my military career that I learned of the possibly equal or superior role that US Navy submarine warfare played in the ultimate victory over Imperial Japan.
There are compelling parallels between the US Navy's Pacific submarine campaign and that of the Germans in the Battle of the Atlantic. Like Japan, the UK was an island nation, crucially dependent on merchant marine shipping for raw materials and consumable goods for their war efforts. Karl Doenitz's very effective use of submarines to cripple the British oceanic supply chain nearly brought Britain to her knees. Had it not been for the overwhelming war production of the Victory Ships, adoption of the convoy system, the cracking of the German Enigma codes, and more effective ASW tactics, the outcome of the war in Europe might have been different.
A major key to the early German submarine successes was reliable and effective torpedoes. Had the US Navy possessed similarly effective torpedoes early in the Pacific campaign, it's easy to project that by sinking Japan's merchant shipping supply chain, the war could have been shortened by a year or two and saved hundreds of thousands of allied lives.
As far as I can tell, Tonan Maru No.3 was the only ship in history to be hit by 3 or more torpedoes in a single action and survive. Although, even this doesn’t really count as 11 of them were duds.
I don't know how you two can get better every week, but you do. That can't be an accident. Thank you for your fantastic videos.
Thank you to say the very least. I looked up Admiral English he was a submariner very brave and seemed very capable. I have found in my corporate experience that us operations people with direct experience are frequently disdained by the expert theoreticians, the inertia and we/they tribalism are often extremely difficult to overcome. There is no excuse for throwing away brave American lives, I was surprised that Admiral King did not exercise his draconian capacities. Is there any reason for that? Again thank you so much for, indeed, a masterful explanation. You and WW2TV are superb in my estimation
same thought about King; out of character
Seth commented that these systemic problems exist in other areas and other branches of military services. In reference to the over-classification of a “system” or anything to be used by the fleet or soldiers in the field. A good example of this happening was the 75mm gun sighting stabilization system they put into the M-4 Sherman tanks fairly early in the war. The U.S. Army Ordinance Department so heavily classified that particular piece of equipment that entire U.S. Armored Divisions were not trained to use it nor were any operator/maintenance manuals allowed out of the continental United States after the system was built into or retrofitted into the tanks. Nobody used it, and much of the armored forces didn’t even know what the gizmo was. They just knew, whatever it was, it was in the way; in an already cramped tank interior.
I believe later on 3rd Armored Division finally took it upon themselves to find out about the thing and subsequently set up their own field training program for the device. It was said they liked them once they figured out what they were and how to use them. Crews would use them until eventually, like anything else they would breakdown, and stay broken because nobody knew how to repair them and there were no maintenance manuals accompanying the devices because the manuals were so highly classified. Anybody seeing a bureaucratic pattern developing here…?
I love Bill's background! Great video again! Your series are outstanding!
Congratulations again Seth and Bill.
A superlative performance
Bill, ive never seen, nor read a better explaination of the torpedo debacle.
But, still waiting for Flucky and the Barb!!
Had the pleasure of working for a contractor for the US Military and after some fatal incidents with the platform that sadly resulted in US Military fatalities we engineers were placed in the same building with the servicemen who worked on the platform every day, it was a revelation and many of the engineering staff's eyes were opened when they saw the difference between what they designed versus the reality of day to day maintenance. I remember we worked 10-12 hour days 6 days a week to fix the issues and it felt like it was the absolute least we could do.
That"s what makes your channel great. You call it like you see it. Once again what a great background photo Captain !
Once again, the two of you hit it out of the park. I've seen this sort of indefensible denial and apathy with a technical government agency in reference to tools used by the guys on the line who risked their lives to do a dangerous job under the best of circumstances. Incredibly frustrating to say the least. The Navy was incredibly lucky to have King, Nimitz, Lockwood, and Momson! If there were political "boot lickers" in their places, more submariners would have died unnecessarily and the war would have dragged on even longer than it did.
Beautiful work gentlemen
The unauthorized history of the Pacific war has become my favorite channel on World War II history. One of the things I like the most about this is that it doesn’t follow the politically correct history. It calls out the people who need to be called out.
I also really enjoy the personal stories about individuals and the depth of the research on those particular individuals good or bad.
I’d be interested to know how many hours of research go into each episode.
I also really enjoy the different guests on the show.
A lot of research, mostly by Seth.
Thank you for telling us the problem honestly. The American people need to hear this!
Good video.
Drachinfel in his video covering the mk14 said in the beginning torpedoes were so ungodly expensive back then that the Navy flat out could not afford to livefire torpedoes to thoroughly test them.
Great job, gentlemen! You've provided the most comprehensive and detailed explanation of this issue - by FAR - that I've seen to date. Bless you.
An amazing story well told.
I seriously doubt Admiral King was that polite.
Great video, you guys packed a lot i to that hour.
When I read history, I try to glean out the lessons. WWII provides numerous examples, many of which have their origins in the interwar years. The torpedo story lesson is test, test, and then do more tests. Bureaucracies are terrible at practical tests, they love the meeting room and set procedures, and are often fearful of budget limitations. My experience in the chemical industry starting up many new processes illustrated to me the the value of pre-construction pilot plant testing. When the organization put in the effort to set up trial runs, the startup was relatively smooth in the full size equipment. Without it, the plant was in for a painful year or two scrambling to develop a workable installation while the pressure was on.
I agree with Bill that this will happen again. In the first decade of this century our boys in Iraq were getting blown up in humvees bu IED mines. It took the US Dept of Defence years to field a mine survival infantry truck. The South Africans had already invented a truck with an armored V bottom when they were dealing with a long insurgency, so an example was readily available. I forget the exact timing, but I remember it took longer to field these trucks than it took us to bring WWIi to a conclusion.
The anecdote about Albert Einstein and BuOrd was a new one to me! Terrific episode on an important subject, gentlemen.
My grandfather was a submariner. he was a Nebraska farm boy who was drafted and finished boot camp as the war ended. His choice was go back to the farm or volunteer for the silent service. He was an electrician mate, cross trained on the diesels. After 6 years he took a contract to work on the Panama Canal. As the Navy started to prepare for WWII, with his sub training, he was able to get a civilian job working for the Navy at China Lake - he told stories of how grandma was pregnant with mom so he traded his Indian 4 with a Naval Aviator for his car. After Pearl Harbor he was transferred to Kitsap to on the testing of the torpedo problem.
A well dine, but very frustrating episode. Yes, somebody should have done jail time, or had their careers sidelined to commanding some Pacific island where they could no longer endanger the combat sailors! I remember reading in a book ("Silent Bictory", perhaps?) that the Naval Torpedo depot in Rhode Island not only suffered from bureaucratic rigidity but an excess of Congressional interference that protected bad workers and kept the Navy from running an efficient shop. The whole matter has been frustrating for years to read about US Navy ships and people being torn apart by one of the finest torpedo weapons of WW@, and then having our torpedoes fail so miserably. Thanks for a good explanation, and CPT Bill - thanks for your personal insights into the procurement process.
I think the HowTo Submarine episode may have been the best and most informative one you guys did. I learned a lot I did not know and it was very interesting as well I love this channel.
Bill and Seth fantastic episode, A gradiuate level course or textbook for reconstruction and analyses of these engineering design SNAFUs and BUORD FUBAR coverup would be a great learning tool for young engineers, and procurementas pros. I agree with Bill that these types of design problems still exist today. Your podcasts are a National Treasure. Thanks for all your hard work.
Read Arthur C Clarke's short story "Superiority", an interesting tale about weapons development.
Yet another great episode! I'm never disappointed...Thank you gentlemen!
Glad to see awareness being spread about the terror that was the Bureau of Ordinance. It wasn't just torpedoes, go look into the Lewis Gun Trials pre US WWI involvement, the levels of incompetent fuckery in that dept is legendary.
Given the level of your vitriol directed against "Dugout Doug" (and appropriately so), I'm kind of surprised that you didn't heap more of it against Admiral English. In his position as head of the Newport, RI Torpedo Station, he had been active in the design of the American torpedoes. His deflecting the blame to the submarine crews was nothing short of criminal conflict of interest. Otherwise, your presentation of the material was spot-on. Great job as always!!
Admiral Christie had been involved with the Mark XIV's development as well, I believe. He kept his fingers in his ears for a long time as well.
Back around 1990, a videogame company named Microprose made a bunch of good military-themed games. The games all had a large number of settings regarding realism. I've read that, when those settings were maxed out, the games were considered fairly realistic -- at least within the limitations of a single player videogame running on the PCs of the time.
I played at least 5 of these games. One was Silent Service II, where you controlled an American submarine in the Pacific during World War 2. By far the most frustrating realism setting in any of those games was Silent Service II's campaign option for "realistic torpedos".
In game, I experienced almost exactly the same thing USS Tinosa did: I hit a big tanker with a dozen torpedos, and not one exploded. I finally surfaced and used the deck gun (which was not as realistically modeled) to sink it.
Another excellent program, explaining the complicated problems very clearly. Well done. I had heard of it , but did not understand just what the various problems were.
Thanks!
Thanks again for another very informative video. When I was a kid and I first watched "Operation Pacific" and watched as are torpedo's would not explode which resulted in the death of the captain, Ward Bond character, in which the sub then rammed the vessel and sank it. Even back then as a kid I was thinking, why did this happen. The torpedo issues during the war is a crime and it's crimes were never really mentioned during the long and bloody war. Despite all of these issues brave men and commanders like "Dick" O'Kane and many other took the fight to the enemy and prevailed.
Read all of this in different places. Great to hear it all in one cup. This type of criminal conspiracy is not uncommon in the military and the military industry complex. The boots on the ground soldier sailor airman suffer flag officers' greed ego and cover up. M-16 comes to mind. Plenty of others.
I remember reading (likely in AWST) when the Gulf War started that they found F-18 missiles going a bit nuts when fired. Ended up when 2 planes fired missiles the pilots were guiding each other's missile. Because they never launched a pair simultaneously during tests because of the cost.
My understanding from other sources is that costs were the reason for the torpedoes/exploders not being live fired during peacetime. Torpedoes were very expensive, so dummy warheads were used in tests and exercises in the hopes of retrieving the torpedoes for reuse or retesting.
@@christopherrowe7460 - Yet there were issues that SHOULD have been found even with dummy warheads if tested.
Great episode. It got me thinking of the individuals that make a difference to the system. Nimitz, Lockwood, Momsen, Edson, Thatch, Lee, etc. The list is long, and this list of fighters, leaders and innovators saved lives. I do not know if it shortened the war; but they did save lives. For me that is the bottom line...saving lives. Koodos to Lockwood & Momsen for getting the torps better & saving lives.
Great episode gentlemen!
This episode hit particularly close to home illustrating the challenges the warfighter had to endure then, in Bill's experience, and my two decades watching the egos of senior DOD management get in the way of effective capability fielding. The level of denial of the ineffectiveness of the torpedoes then is playing out today in a different form factor. Nevertheless, senior DOD officials hold fast to their position in light of test results going so far as to suppress the conclusions. As a grad school friend said in his dissertation, "people are people."
Again, well done, guys. I've long looked for a definitive work on this topic, but have never come across it. As someone said below, bits and pieces of the story in various books on the submarine campaign. The Einstein angle was brand new, and spectacular. I believe that, of all forces, the Germans also had serious torpedo problems in the early part of the war - though obviously not enough to seriously blunt the impact of their U-boat campaign in that period (or did it??).
And while I don't know for sure, I'd guess the Italian torpedoes were respectable, and it shouldn't be a surprise. Italy had excellent engineers at that point in history, it was mostly leadership, command, and resource issues that produced the war record most are familiar with. Their navy in particular was no laughing matter for the first few years, for the Royal Navy, as told well in the history of the Mediterranean campaign by Vince O'Hara (Struggle for the Middle Sea).
Yes. The Germans had problems with their magnetic detonators off the coast of Norway during Operation Weserübung and their torpedo design bureau insisted for a long time on the infallibility of their product and the fault must lie with the submariners.
In the shadow of Mt Fuji, at the end of a long winding road up through the forests lies the HQ of Hitachi's engineering division. 2000 people worked there designing everything from diesel electric locomotives, and also what sits in a display stand in the vast entrance foyer, a Long Lance Torpedo. Probably the most successful torpedo of the war by far.
@Steve1734
4 months ago
In the shadow of Mt Fuji, at the end of a long winding road up through the forests lies the HQ of Hitachi's engineering division. 2000 people worked there designing everything from diesel electric locomotives, and also what sits in a display stand in the vast entrance foyer, a Long Lance Torpedo. Probably the most successful torpedo of the war by far.
The Naval Academy has a long lance outside Ward Hall/ Dahlgren Hall area .
I've heard that BuOrd developed these contact and magnetic exploders back in the mid-1930s (during the Depression), and the Administration and Congress didn't appropriate enough funding to test, then produce them. The political priorities centered on funding the New Deal, not the military. So, the brass had to choose between: A) an expensive testing regime; or B) paying to produce enough torpedoes to stock the fleet's magazines. I can imagine that pressure from the fleet would have steered BuOrd towards option B. Military Program Managers always faced those kinds of choices (the exact choice faced by the antagonist in the movie "Pentagon Wars"), although now-a-days there are Federal laws that make the PMs thoroughly test items (especially weapons) before they go to the fleet or the field. It is still inexcusable that once the war started BuOrd was slow to react to the complaints of the skippers.
As a long time history buff of the Pacific war I love the work you guys are doing. I have watched every video that you have put up and am always looking forward to the next one to be posted. Great job and please keep up the outstanding effort.
These are so comprehensive and informative history lessons, i feel lucky to have found this channel. 10/10! Thanks for these
Well done as usual. Given King's reputation, I'm a bit surprised he didn't march down to BUORD with a pistol when he found out what was going on.
He was pretty far away when he found out, but apparently there was a VERY angry phonecall. Like...phonelines catching fire angry.
King should have reduced the flag rank at Buord to Ltjg and forced retired !! Staff Officers at BuOrd reduced to Ensigns and sent off to battle zones.
@@johnmarlin4661 It is truly sad that there were no real consequences for this massive malfeasance at BuOrd.
@@GaldirEonai From Drachinifel's video in the issues with the torpedo, I'm suprised the phone line didn't melt when King found out what was going on. Especially when Bu-Ord tried to bring charges against the skipper of the submarines for illegally modifying there ordinance.
Thank you, this was terrific. It's a testament to how good the sailors were on those subs that they managed to make do with atrocious torpedoes until someone finally listened and fixed the problem.
Most if not all sub history refer to the crew studying and to turnover as experienced crew was transferred to new construction.
Seth’s correct. A masterful explanation of the torpedo problem during WW2 by Captain Toti!
Kind of funny Bill, when you brought up the term "battle stations" That brought me back to my childhood days of growing up with my dad who was a veteran of World War II South Pacific US Navy! Whenever I did something wrong or perceived as wrong my dad would tell me that we were going to go to battle stations! My first thought was this was going to be pretty cool! I thought we were going to go to a gas station or some facility that had cars and trucks and cool tires, etc. It wasn't until we went to battle stations at one point and I got a "love tap" from my father that I realized that Battle Stations was not such a cool place and I never wanted to go back there again! Rest in peace Dad! No hard feelings and I still love you dearly, you were and always will be my hero!💖🙏🇺🇲⚓️🍻🛥👍🎉😊❤
Great episode with lessons that are still valid.
Arguing with Nimitz, Lockwood, Momsen, King, and Einstein. Amazing.
Operation Pacific is where I first learned of the torpedoes issue many many years ago.
Seth and Bill, another great episode (as they all are) and Bill, thanks for the return of the perfect background for your presentation! IMO.😅
The background painting is arrestingly realistic, The artist should be complimented for choosing a perspective that would absolutely be impossible for a photographer, just aft of the screw, rudder, and stern planes!
"good enough for Government Work" - My father always defined 'Government Work' as something you 1} measure with a micrometer, 2} mark with chalk, and 3} cut with an axe.
As mentioned, the British and Germans had magnetic exploders too and also seemed to have problems with them, likely in part due to the geomagnetic issues Bill Toti discusses at 16:28 (early days for human understanding of the electromagnetic spectrum). Interestingly, at some point in his evolution into the CNO/CincUS role King demanded control over the bureaus, which were operating more or less as independent fiefdoms. It would be an interesting episode to see how and to what extent this bureaucratic struggle evolved- and why it took until later 1943 for the topredo problem to be fixed.
Unquestionably the Bureau fiefdom culture contributed to the design problems before the war, but I'm not sure that was a primary cause for the delays in identifying and fixing the various problems with the Mark XIV. Once the shooting war started, the main issue was communication (or lack thereof) between the operating forces and BuOrd. The designers and leaders within BuOrd had such confidence in their design that they could not accept that the frontline people were identifying real problems; any issues had to be the result of user error rather than design flaws. The other major obstacle, in my opinion, was Ralph Christie. He was essentially the father of the Mark VI exploder and the Mark XIV, and would never accept any criticism of their design. Unfortunately for the war effort, he rose to frontline command of the Southwest Pacific sub force, and provided strong supportive feedback of the torpedoes to BuOrd. People forget that BuOrd was therefore receiving at best mixed messages about Mark XIV performance. It wasn't until Charles Lockwood took command of the Pacific fleet subs that someone who commanded equal respect as Christie could basically force BuOrd into acknowledging the flaws.
According to Drachinfels, the depth problem had to do with where on the torpedo the depth sensors were placed...so that they gave an erroneous depth reading.
That was such a good episode Failure Is Like Onions I think it was called his dry wit made it even better.
It's a bit more complicated. Basically they had a tube from a pressure sensor out to the surface of the torpedo to sense the outside water pressure. And when you tested the thing in a tank, it was accurate. But, when the torpedo was traveling through the water, due to water flow and the exact placement of the opening, you would get a different pressure reading. So it needed to be tested and calibrated when the torpedo was traveling through the water at normal speed.
Great stuff guys
Great as always guys, albeit hard truths ....
This was one of the best TH-cam videos I have ever seen.
If I recall correctly, a number of Skippers were relieved in the mistaken belief that the problem was “lack of aggressiveness” instead of faulty torpedos.
Bill & Seths excellent podcast.
Torpedo issues was something the US Navy could hide from Senator Harry S Truman's committee, Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Had he caught wind of this I'm sure the Bureau of Ordnance would have responded much differently. Of course, the security and other investigations kept Truman's prying eyes away. Truman threaten to defund the B-26 program due to the large number of deaths in training. The Army Air Force & Martin jumped when Truman spoke.
Given their experience with the Congressman from TN and the enemy depth charge settings comment, it's so unfortunate that the Navy had reason to hesitate bringing Congress or the White House into the fight.
President Truman was the man. He also busted some of the jerks that kept pushing sub par landing craft in the system. He wouldn’t have that shit on his watch.
I understand the emphasis on the submarine torpedo issues, but the Mark 13 air-launched torpedo had different problems than those discussed for the Mark 14/18. During the look into why so many failures of aircraft launched torpedoes happened in 1942, the task to fix it was given to a university. They did an in-depth investigation into the dynamics of how the torpedo from an aircraft entered the water and what were the shortcomings of then current doctrine. From this investigation, the optimum entry angle range was determined and how an addition of wooden covers for the nose of the torpedo and the propeller area minimized damage to the torpedo components from the impact with water.
This is a very different result than the fixes for the sub launched torpedoes. It wasn't until the last third of 1944 that the Mark 13 torpedo finally became the weapon it should have been at least 2.5 years earlier.
I remember Enterprise's Air Group 10 still dealt with cursed versions of the Mark 13 in Operation Hailstone (the Attack on Truk) in February 1944.
If I can add to Bill and Seth. There were specific causes for the 4 failures. except for the magnetic detonator they all traced back to the previous mk10. Kind of.
>The magnetic detonator problem was what it was. We (everyone) simply didnt understand how the Earth's magnetic field worked. Everyone had the same problem. The Germans and British had the same problem when they went to war in 1939. After the Norway campaign in 1940 (2 years before us) they both just stopped using them and said "we'll figure it out later."
>The deep running problem was because the dummy warhead they used for testing was from the lighter and slower mk10. So the actual warhead was heavier.
>The contact detonator was also from the mk10 which, again, was lighter and slower so the plunger bent in the slide tube
> The circling problem was because the gyros were, again, from the mark 10 so jammed when they were shot out of the torpedo tube because they couldnt handle the weight/speed.
I'm sure Nimitz was very interested in current events concerning the silent service. Remember he himself, by his career path, was a submariner. Dont be to surprised if after CVN-68 is retired we see an SSN Nimitz.
If I can wander off topic for a bit I do think that its interesting how career paths effected the commanders. Take minute and reflect with me. Nimitz was a submarine guys, "calculated risk." Spruance was a cruiser guy, quite and practical. Halsey was a destroyer guy, "attack, repeat, attack." Telling.
Back on topic, Nimitz's interest was also personal. Nimitz, Spruance, and Turner all had family members on those subs. I'm not imply favoritism, dont take it that way.
Spruance and Nimitz both had sons on submarines. Turner's nephew Manning Kimmel (Tuner and Husband Kimmel were brothers-in-law) served on subs and was executed as a POW. Yes it wasnt bad enough Kimmel was (arguably) railroaded, and crucified for Pearl Harbor but then he lost his son. oof.
Seth and Bill also forgot to mention that when the pro-sailor Lockwood went from being ComSubSoWesPac (MacArthur) to ComSubPac (Nimitz) to replace the recently deceased pro-BurOrd Robert English he was replaced as ComSubSoWesPac by the pro-BurOrd Ralph Waldo Christie. The Merry go-round kept turning. >: (
Thank you gentlemen. (Nice backdrop Bill)
I love your posts. Please, please, please keep them coming!
So apparently the British warned the Navy about the magnetic triggers (The British tried and found they didn’t work)…but it was ignored
Yes they did, it was the torpedo officer from HMS Victorious and the British had seen the failure of their magnetic detonator in the hunt for the Bismarck in May 1941
I like the way you mention 'Operation Pacific' in the video. Fixing the Mk. 14, the Hollywood version: 'Operation Pacific,' a WW2 movie released in 1951 and starring John Wayne, is based loosely on the Mk. 14 torpedo. Wayne and Ward Bond experience troubles with that torpedo during WW2 submarine operations, and by the end of the movie, THEY solve its problems.
Very interesting, one point though - the German Kriegsmarine (Navy ) had virtually the same problems with their depth settings, magnetic detonators and anti-circling systems at the start of the war as well. they just had people shot and someone else put in charge of fixing them.
The Crash Dive series of books/audiobooks nails this issue. It an awesome series.
Mk 14 torpedo for submarines. Mk13 for air launch, from planes, and Mk 15 from destroyers.
The problem with the US torpedoes is that the "product development cycle" was never completed. As mentioned in this video, they tested them only once. All the problems these torpedoes had would have been discovered and fixed, if a normal development and testing cycle had been used.
Both the Germans and British also had problematic magnetic exploders. All 3 countries didn't understand that the Earth's magnetic field varied over the world, so one working properly off the coast of England, would not work in the Mediterranean, nor the south Pacific.
The US torpedoes had several problems, in addition, to just the magnetic exploder. All going back to an incomplete product.
Thanks for this deep dive into submarine history. It's a metaphor for our time that should alert us to do due diligence and hold people accountable when they fail their duty. It is the failure of the bureaucracy itself, which raises question about how we can do better to be better.
Hi Bill. Glad you retired to Cocoa Beach and not Mayport. Mayport is boring. Also, you are about the best part of this channel. Glad you are here.
I am in strong agreement that we have to keep arguing with bureaucracies when our service members lives are at risk, we owe it to them. Thank you for this video.
brings to mind the M-16 issues. I read the Congressional Report, suggested that some people be charged. Nothing happened. How many young men in Viet Nam died because their weapon malfunctioned; the bosses blamed the soldiers, then finally made adjustment after years of problems. Never acknowleged their in-competence, so this problem was not confined to WWII.
Great episode. Pretty great that the Army Air Corps was more interested in helping to solve this problem than BuOrd. Goes to your earlier points (Guadalcanal, New Georgia, New Guinea) that Joint warfighting was really great at the tactical and operational levels.
Love how Bill and Seth just lay on the accountability here. No excuses. Some senior Navy BuOrd people should have been court martialed for dereliction of duty and possibly for aiding the enemy, so great was their negligence.
Great explanation! Thank you!
As always, another excellent episode, Bill & Seth. Thank you for the tremendous work you guys are doing! I really enjoy this podcast and the various angles in which you guys cover this fascinating theater of operations and the people who lived it!
Just discovered your channel. You are very good...I've a good deal to catch up on. Thanks.
You can really tell the personal outrage felt by Bill regarding the inexcusable failings of BuOrd regarding the Torpedoes.
So refreshing to hear someone raise the issue of overclassification.
One thing that came out of WWII in the Navy was the establishment of COMOPTEVFOR in 1945 for evaluation of weapons in an operational environment, unlike the testing that went on with the MK 14 torpedo during the war. At least the navy put that “Lesson learned “ from the MK 14 torpedo to bed in developing other weapons systems.
In Frank Herbert’s 1949 science fiction work *Under Pressure* about nuclear submarines, one of his best statements was made by a character that said “There is *no such thing* as a MINOR emergency in a 47:47 submarine!”
That business with creating new firing pins out of aircraft metal is a great example of what is politely called “Southern engineering.” 😅