I'd read in the past that the P-38, once all the kinks were finally worked out, was a superb long range escort by the time of the L model, and with hydraulic boosted ailerons could maneuver with single engine fighters at high speed where pilot physical strength limited roll rate, BUT it was about 50% more expensive per unit than a P-51 and this was a major motivation to withdraw it from Europe even after its problems were resolved.
It was never a great fighter in Europe. Doolittle used it for bomber support in the Med because it had the range and nothing else did, but its loss rate was very high. However, losses among the bombers were kept very low and that was his criterion for success. There were no P-38 fighter groups in 8th AF from Torch until Oct 1943, and this grew to 3 or 4 FGs by Feb 1944. They were all equipped with the J series, which is usually said to have solved the engine reliability problems. That doesn't seem to be true, though. The 8th AF had fuel pump & leakage issues through Feb & Mar 1944, and 9th AF grounded their entire P-38 fleet in early April 1944 while they sorted out engine problems. These were ALL J series planes. By July 1944 Doolittle was describing the P-38 to General Arnold as 'second rate' compared to the P-47 and P-51.
@@Splattle101 Also, like the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain they hadn't worked out the right tactics in the early days and tried closely escorting the bombers. A P38 escorting bombers at about 200 mph needed considerable time to wind up to 400mph to deal with enemy fighters. Turbochargers were in their early days without the modern electronic controls and needed care and inputs from the pilot to build up to speed. Not easy when you're suddenly being attacked.
Another issue with the P38 while a great interceptor the FW-190 could out dog fight it at medium and low altitudes. They could out turn and were faster in short bursts of speed. The P38 was faster but it took a bit for it to get up to speed.
@@earlhuff7847 The J series was a little faster than the FW-190A, but the first P-38s in Europe were the F series sent to the Med. They were power limited because of cooling issues and their top speed was only (only!) 390 mph. The G & H models got that up to about 405 mph. There's no speed advantage there for the P-38.
I think the main limitation for the P-38 in a high-altitude escort role is its dive speed. It would be easy for a German fighter to escape, they could just dive away. The P-38 was developed earlier than the others, and didn't benefit from as many NACA aerodynamics studies. The machine gun fairings (compare them to the P-51's) and exposed turbos (compare to the P-47) are examples of this. It could have used a drag cleanup, but I don't think a change that interrupted production would have been accepted (like the P-38K).
I read a quote by a German pilot somewhere that one reason the long range fighters helped so much is it put the Germans in a quandary. They had been putting more and more cannon on their fighters so they could knock down the tough heavy bombers, which worked until escort fighters turned up and made good work against the over weight German bomber attack fighters. Lightening the fighters would have made them competitive against the escorts but degraded their ability to shoot down bombers. So the escorts had an impact on the weapons configuration of the German fighters in a way that helped the bombers. The answer for Germany was aircraft specialised for the bomber attack or fighter role aircraft, but they didn’t have enough planes and pilots to make that work, as evidenced by the losses sustained by German night fighters desperate enough to be flown in the day bomber attack role.
The performance of the Messerschmitt BF109 was particularly degraded by adding extra cannons. The BF109E version used in the Battle of Britain had two 20mm wing cannons but only 60 rounds ammunition for each, not enough for bringing down heavy bombers. The 109F generally had a single 20mm firing through the nose - plenty of ammunition but not enough firepower. In the 109G version. in order to get 2 x 20 mm cannons and enough ammunition they went to two heavy underwing pods containing both guns and ammunition which reduced the agility/handling (weight in the wrong places) and reduced the speed (a lot of extra drag).
"Constituted one of the most serious errors in America's pre-war planning." The bomber will always get thru was a bizarre belief. Right up there for worst pre-war decision exacerbated by bureaucratic malfeasance is the Type 14 torpedo.
Fairly different than the mark 14, simply because it didn't encounter the same bureaucratic resistance to fix, but quite the opposite when evidence began to show it didn't work.
_The bomber will always get thru was a bizarre belief._ Not really. The bomber DID always get through --- the problem was that without fighter escort the bomber losses would be prohibitive and unsustainable.
The idea of the B-17 combat box, with lots of .50 cal guns covering the formation was too blinding. That strategy got stood on its head towards the end of the war, with lower-altitude heavier loads, and losing guns to lighten them.
To be fair, there was a time in the 20s-30s, before radar, when large, high-flying, multi-engine bombers probably DID have the performance to out-pace single-engine interceptors launched after the bombers had penetrated enemy airspace. The bomber doctrine didn't change fast enough once fighters could be launched and given intercept vectors while the bombers were still over their own territory.
Fascinating document, Development of the Long Range Escort Fighter. It's somebody's thesis paper. I found it really interesting the way it touches on parallel developments in thinking on 'bomber support' in different parts of the US army air force/air corps, and gives the strong impression the left hand didn't know what the right was doing. Some of it is mentioned only in passing, like the range extension program begun in Oct 1940 (!!) and applied to the P-38 & P-47 even though the '47 wasn't even flying. Or the way the Pratt & Whitney reps met with officers of the 56 FG in Jan 1943 and noted their P-47s were designed and equipped to use long range tanks but that the tanks themselves hadn't been delivered. And lots more. Fascinating read.
_P-47s were designed and equipped to use long range tanks but that the tanks themselves hadn't been delivered_ That appears to have been more of an issue with Republic than the USAAF.
The quote is a bit out of context - using ferry tanks they could theoretically get 200 miles further inland but the FGs themselves refused as it rendered them dangerously vulnerable. Only when Lt. Col. Cass Hough and VIIIFC ATS had developed a fuel pressurization system for the external tanks and had Republic begin producing kits was it useful (included in the birds after D-15). Sadly it didn't fix the internal fuel issue; which remained the Jug's Achilles Heel until after the P-51 arrived. Recommend looking up Achtung Indianer if you like that one; history of VIIIFC. May have already read it.
@@ME-xh7zp Yes, you're right. Cass Hough was critical to the successful introduction of the P-47. I noted that incident (and the others) to highlight the confusion of the situation. History is usually written as a narrative - it has to be readable, after all - but it doesn't happen that way to the people involved. The paper I was referring to conveys the confusion really well, drawing out contradictory initiatives, parallel but seemingly disconnected programs, and sometimes plain old pig ignorance. Another issue it shows (inadvertently or otherwise) is the way the senior figures crafted their message to their audience. For example, in public Eaker would say the bombers would fight their way to the target. In private, he would write about the Germans probably taking 3-6 months to 'work out' the high altitude bomber, which is a much more nuanced position. There's a lot of this sort of material in that paper. The author obviously had access to the corro of Eaker, Arnold, Spaatz, Doolittle, Anderson, et als, and it makes for an interesting but very messy read.
@@Splattle101 Just trying to fight against a certain incorrect narrative pushed by a different TH-camr that's become prevalent. Needed to add the required nuance about the early P-47's tank limitations.
Thank you. An excellent video regarding one of the most important issues of WWII. In the larger context; probably the major - decisive - benefit of the US daylight bomber raids was not the bombs dropped, but that the Luftwaffe had been very substantially weakened, many of their aces killed, and their air superiority was lost by May 1944 (this tremendous feat was done largely by P-47 Thunderbolts equipped with drop-tanks, and before the P-51 Mustangs had arrived in significant numbers!). It was vital that the allies had air superiority by May 44 - so that the D-Day invasion could safely be ventured the next month. Those months of late 1943 and early 1944 - and in the air over occupied Europe, when superiority switched from Germany to Allies (essentially the work of the US air force) - was when the tide of war turned decisively on the Western front.
US conducted "Get Yamamoto" operation in April 1943, they employed 18 P38s with drop tanks attached and flew a 1000 miles round trip mission. This proved that the means for long range escort missions were in place as early as April 1943 and bomber command choose to ignore the means and criminally kept on sending bombers to perform missions without escort. During the 2 disastrous ball bearing factory bombing missions, had there been long range fighter escort, 80 out of the 120 total lost bombers were most likely could have been saved.
_US conducted "Get Yamamoto" operation in April 1943, they employed 18 P38s with drop tanks attached and flew a 1000 miles round trip mission._ Using Pacific cruise techniques, designed for use across vast stretches of open uncontested ocean, over the contested European continental airspace would have been suicidal. There were enormous operational differences between the theaters you are overlooking.
Escorting bombers is way different than economically cruising in a straight line for an intercept and then cruising home in a straight line. Escorting bombers involves a lot of weaving and consumes a lot more gas.
@@gort8203 Later the weaving tactics were dropped in favor of agressively seeking out the enemy and relays where new fighter squadrons would fly out and take over for a previous squadron every 2 hours
@@fazole Yes, I know. That does not disprove my point that flying in straight line to intercept Yamamoto took less fuel it would take to escort bombers over the same distance, which would not have been possible. The bomber escorts had to use relays on long range missions even before they were allowed to pursue enemy fighters. Later when fighter groups went ahead of the bombers on sweeps they used less fuel for a given distance, but by then the critical period of bomber vulnerability was passing because drop tanks and the longer-range fighters were available. With the bombers becoming less vulnerable to interceptors the role of allied fighters expanded to destroying the Luftwaffe as quickly as possible rather than just protecting the bombers.
Unfortunately, Greg is wrong, and ignores the numerous historical documents which contradicts his narrative. He also seems to think an unpressurized 200 gallon ferry tank would have worked fine as a combat drop tank. (It wouldn't have.)
Greg is not wrong ... the P47 could have been used for escort duty if the air force thought they needed a long range escort.. they didn't and neglected development of extending the range .. What is the difference between a ferry drop tank and combat drop tank? Pressurization?
@@keithdubose2150 Yes Greg is wrong. Yes, carrying an unpressurized ferry tank while escorting did not extend combat radius much because most of the fuel was unusable.
@@keithdubose2150 _What is the difference between a ferry drop tank and combat drop tank? Pressurization?_ In order to draw fuel from an external tank at higher altitudes, the tank must be pressurized. Furthermore, a combat drop tank must be able to separate quickly and cleanly from the fighter. A combat tank should also have a shape which is relatively aerodynamic so as to reduce drag thus improving fuel efficiency. The 200 gallon ferry tank for the P-47 was none of these things. That shouldn't be surprising, since it was designed for ferry missions, not combat. As it happened, the ferry tank was used for some combat operations. It was filled with 50-100 gallons (it leaked too much to store fuel in it for more than a few hours) and used to cover much of the fuel expended in climbing to high altitude and then jettisoned. That allowed a bit more fuel to be available for cruising, extending the combat radius slightly. But this was a temporary measure until a more appropriate combat drop tank was available.
@@primmakinsofis614 He does mention pressurized tanks in service in late 43, plus you are ignoring his main point, which is that the lack of tanks was a fully political issue and not a technical issue with the P-47. From early '43, a effective drop tank for the Thunderbolt could have been put in service in a matter of weeks if the USAAF leadership had chosen to do so.
They're being a bit hard on themselves. Fighters have to be light, and *superior* at the same time. There's extra fuel, and navigational issues. That's not easy.
I've always been curious about how comfortable the seats were in the long-range escort fighters. Are you sitting on a park bench or a Lay-Z-Boy? I know you'd be sitting on your parachute but is that all anyone ever used? I'm no longer 20 years old but ouch!
As usual, a great job of research. In this case I have an issue with the conclusion of the presentation: “the neglect of developing a long-range fighter escort can be considered a travesty”. First of all, this use of the word travesty does not comport with the actual definition of the word. The word is not stand alone and is used in ways such as “it is a travesty of justice”. So, of what is this particular failure a travesty? A travesty of military technological or doctrinal development? I can guess at that meaning, but the word has an emotional connotation that can imply deceptive or malicious intent, and it oversimplifies how this “failure” evolved. The statement that nobody believed long range escort fighters (as we now think of them) were possible was quite true for a long time. Anyone reading the primary source document to this video can see this was the case. Yes, if people had a crystal ball they would have known what to work on to achieve this capability sooner, but there were barriers both technical and bureaucratic that had to be overcome. But to call it a travesty implies an intentional design to pretend that a thing was something it was not, and I think that is an unjust charge. Use of this word can imply support of the absurd myth that the so called “bomber mafia” continued to actively and maliciously inhibit long range escort to in order to prove outdated prewar assumptions about bomber self-defense. By 1942 they knew escort fighters would reduce the loss rate, and Hap Arnold took steps to address the issue. In the meantime they still had a war to wage, and continued to develop tactics to make bombardment successful. They never expected a low loss rate, just a sustainable one.
Keith, I very much enjoy every one of your videos. I particularly appreciate the factual content you put together as well as your delivery. Thanks and keep up the good work. I have an opinion regarding the assumption by the USAAF that the heavy bombers could defend themselves. The B-17, a fine airplane, was designed in the early 1930s and first flew in the mid 1930s. At this time the B-17 is reported to have been faster than the USAAF’s fighters at that time. It’s quite understandable that bomber gunners were thought capable of an adequate defense. During the next 7 years aviation experienced great advancements, multiplying the capabilities of aircraft, particularly fighters. Apparently the USAAF decision makers maintained their same strategy even as increases in fighter speed made them harder to hit from a bomber’s guns. This situation was made worse by the austerity of the depression years. The USAAC promoted the turbocharger over the supercharger. Aircraft numbers were meager, and testing minimal. In short, the US was inadequately prepared for the conflict. Thank goodness we caught up fast. Greg’s Airplanes and Automobiles has a series on the P-47, which with the correct drop tanks would have had the range for bomber escort in 1944.
Greg's video on the P-47 and range is incorrect, let me know if you'd like the extended explanation. He's not a good source, and suppresses critique. Also the critical factor was never fighter speed, it was the development of radar allowing anticipation of direction and target easing interception.
_Greg’s Airplanes and Automobiles has a series on the P-47, which with the correct drop tanks would have had the range for bomber escort in 1944._ Greg unfortunately and incorrectly thinks unpressurized 200 gallon ferry drop tanks would have been perfectly fine for combat missions.
Wow, this is the first time I have encountered Greg being contradicted. He certainly uses good sources and shows on screen where the information comes from. No one is infallible. I appreciate your mentioning this.
@@ME-xh7zp The fighter speed comment was meant in the targeting difficulty from a bomber gun position. The faster the fighter, the less time it is in range, and the quicker it streaks across your gun position. The one exception is the tail gun position, where an astern attack closing speed is much less and the fighter is coming straight at the tail position.
@@markam306 He *appears* to - but does not. He's overall a poor source. If you'd like a full accounting let me know. If you need some proof to get started, watch his P-47 Range and Deceit video for the page from the P-47 flight manual that supposedly shows the 200 gallon ferry tank could operate up to 30,000'. Very clearly, that page is for the tank empty, not feeding fuel. It could not feed fuel above ~18k, partially because the P-47 couldn't even receive pressurized external fuel until modified (developed by LTC Cass Hough at VIIIFC ATS). Republic didn't create the capability when requested like the other companies.
I always wondered what became of the drop tanks when the long-range escorts encountered enemy fighters early in the mission. I have listened to many accounts of bomber crew saying this happened, and it was always a bummer as it meant they were alone for the remainder of the journey. I imagine loads fell away and caused no issues, but some must have landed on innocent folk, property etc. I do love your videos, no fancy guff, just facts and decent presentation. 👌
Once enough fighters were available, the relay system alleviated this. As even if one leg of the fighter cover was forced to turn around early, the next leg of coverage would be on station in 20 ish mins
Early on the Luftwaffe had its fighters deployed in a belt nearer the coast, I assume because they did not know the targets and didn't want the fighters based too far inland where the bombers might not go on any given mission. Once the bombers penetrated this belt with the help of fighter escort they were better able to defend themselves against the smaller numbers of fighters over Germany. The Luftwaffe learned their lesson, and as the bombers began flying to deeper targets their improved their strategy by redeploying more fighters to the interior, beyond the reach of the escorts. This was the critical period for the 8th Air Force and losses to fighters threatened sustainability. One the drop tanks became more prevalent on fighters allowing deeper escort, some believed the Luftwaffe should have intercepted the escorts to force them to drop their tanks early. But they did not do this as a routine because they did not believe they had enough fighters. They wanted the fighters to focus on attacking the bombers, and they did not want to lose those fighters in combat with superior numbers of allied fighters in a war of attrition they could not win. Even so some considered that decision questionable, and later they did employ a portion of their fighters to try to disrupt escorts while the rest focused on the bombers.
“A typical interception in the fall of 1942 has been described by Johannes Naumann, at that time the an Oberleutnant in II/JG 26. The Gruppe was ordered to attack the bombers on their return flight as there was no chance of reaching them on their bomb run. The B-17’s were flying in a staggered formation at about 26,000 feet. The Focke Wulfs finally struggled up to 27,000 feet, only to see the American formation receding into the distance. The speed of the FW 190’s at that altitude was only a little greater than that of the bombers…No bombers were downed; none had even suffered visible damage.” Attacking a B-17 formation from the German side! page
Another great video. Pre-war articles plus mistaken lessons from the Spanish Civil War repeated the myth: "The bomber will always get through." This thinking didn't foresee newer fighters with higher performance and heavier armament, radar, and fighting an enemy with a sophisticated air defense.
Wait… so why did did the luftwaffes change in tactics, from attacking escorts first to ignoring them, result in having a disastrous effect on the luftwaffe? Was it the distance at which they were ordered to engage 400M? Or the fact they had to attack from the rear? Idk why but that part was confusing for me, especially bc you just said it had disastrous effect but didn’t say to who until a little later. But regardless it’s unclear what was catastrophic in the change in tactics
It's a shame the issue with provisioning drop tanks for the P47 and P51 was purposely ignored by the Bomber Mafia, but I'm sure we can all relate to the tendancy of holding on too long to an idea out of stubbornness.
"It's a shame" and "we can all relate" does not cut it. Thousands of bomber crew died because of some officers more concerned about their career path than fighting the war.
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb ~30,000 people died on average every day during ww2. Including many commanders who maliciously sent their men to their deaths. The bomber mafia were arrogant and incorrect in their thinking, but its nowhere near the worst injustice of military conduct of the war I'd say.
_It's a shame the issue with provisioning drop tanks for the P47 and P51 was purposely ignored by the Bomber Mafia_ Ah, this old falsehood raises its head again.
As the Luftwaffe encountered more Allied heavy bomber raids, it became apparent that great increases in defensive fighter firepower were needed, especially against the even more heavily armed American bombers. This dynamic led to the development of ever more heavily armed sub-types of fighters, including some Focke-Wulf 190s with six 20 mm cannon, the most ever mounted in a German single-engine fighter (Dill 2015, 50-4). This sub-type entered service concurrently with the most powerful weapon used by German fighters during the war, the 210 mm rocket mortar, which was used in significant numbers from July 1943 onwards both on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean, but not in the East (Forsyth 2016b, 53-7). The ultimate result of these developments, focused on the needs of defence against strategic bombing, was that the aircraft types retained on the Eastern front were ever more poorly armed in comparison to those in the West. Just 15% of Luftwaffe aircraft guns were allocated to the East by January 1944 (Table 4), a much lower proportion that the 34% of combat aircraft allocated to this theatre (Table 2). While the desperate German attempts to develop technology to confront Allied pressure have been noted in the literature (van Creveld 2011, 116-7), as has the German tendency to use older aircraft in the East (O’Brien 2015: 65, 291). What has not been sufficiently emphasised is that these aircraft possessed considerably less firepower, on average, as demonstrated here. page 15 How were German air force resources distributed between different fronts in the years 1941 to 1943 pdf
The Merlin-engined P-51's showed up in large numbers after most of the expert Luftwaffe pilots were gone and their new pilot training had been cut way back. They did shoot a lot of Germans down but the P-47's had already decided it.
Thunderbolts shot down more Luftwaffe aircraft-3,572-than any other Allied fighter. And they eliminated the Luftwaffes best pilots before the Mustangs showed up. So, it is accurate.@@ME-xh7zp
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb USAAF losses as a proportion of combat sorties was relatively consistent through April 1944. After that, there is a major drop in losses. If you graph losses against sorties, the difference after April 1944 is striking.
"As against a total loss of 314 fighters and bombers, we thought we had destroyed at least 205 of the machines which came up to meet us; but in fact the Germans lost only 90. The balance of casualties thus swung in favour of the enemy even more markedly than in 1941, doubtless because he took care to deploy his latest and fastest fighters--the F.W.190's--on this front. Even so the offensive had the cardinal merits not only of keeping two of Germany's best fighter Geschwader at full stretch but also of preserving for us in Western Europe all the moral and other advantages of the initiative." -141-- Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol. II
The US didn’t fail to develop long range fighters. One of the best attributes of the P38 was its long range. What the USAAC did, or at least the 8th Air Force, was to mandate that no drop tanks could be used on fighters. Procurement of drop tanks was not the issue, the intentional decision to not procure them in the first place was the issue. The P47 had a very nice 200 gallon drop tank developed for it from the very beginning, but it was not used.
_What the USAAC did, or at least the 8th Air Force, was to mandate that no drop tanks could be used on fighters._ Feel free to cite the order stating that and the date of such order. _The P47 had a very nice 200 gallon drop tank developed for it from the very beginning, but it was not used_ Unpressurized ferry tanks make for poor combat drop tanks.
That mandate is a myth based on an early 1939 memo. Things changed not long after that and there was no intentional decision not to procure drops tanks during the war. That is complete misinformation that you probably got on TH-cam. At the beginning of 1942 Hap Arnold ordered the air staff to do whatever it took to get drop tanks on fighters as soon as possible. Later in 1942 he ordered development of a long-range fighter that could escort bombers to Poland and back, which is what led to fitting the P-51 with the auxiliary fuselage tank.
After building the entire P47, I don’t think building a drop tank for high altitude would have been a problem. It wasn’t, because as soon as the USAAC finally wanted drop tanks they got them right away.
It’s not a myth. Hap Arnold, as CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR CORPS said “no tactical aircraft will be equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks”. That sounds like, we’ll, exactly what it says. True, the USACC wasn’t going to stop the private development of drop tanks, but they weren’t going to use them.
@@josephzelch7397 _After building the entire P47, I don’t think building a drop tank for high altitude would have been a problem._ A drop tank rated for combat operations had four conditions to be satisfied: (1) it had to be pressurized so that fuel could be drawn from it at higher altitudes; (2) it had to be able to be jettisoned quickly and cleanly from the aircraft; (3) the aircraft carrying it had to have the necessary racks and sway braces to carry the tank; and (4) the aircraft had to have the necessary fuel plumbing internally. Regarding that last point, the P-47 lacked the racks and plumbing needed to carry drop tanks under the wings until modification kits were received from Republic in November 1943, which were then fitted to the aircraft over the subsequent months. The P-47 had a low ground clearance which considerably restricted the size and shape of drop tank that could be carried under the fuselage. The P-38 and P-51 did not have this problem as both could carry drop tanks or bombs under the wings.
But it required A LOT more fuel to do so. P-47N = 557 gallons of internal fuel + 440 gallons of drop tank fuel (997 gallons total) had a combat radius of 920 miles P-51H = 260 gallons of internal fuel + 220 gallons of drop tank fuel (480 gallons total) had a combat radius of 886 miles The P-51H had a combat radius 96% of that of the P-47N while using 48% the fuel. P-47N = 1,840 miles total / 997 gallons total = 1.85 air miles per gallon P-51H = 1,772 miles total / 480 gallons total = 3.69 air miles per gallon Combine the above with the P-51 being significantly cheaper to build, and that's why the P-47 left active service quickly after the war while the P-51 stayed.
"As a measure of this defence, when the so-called Battle of Berlin started in November 1943, Bomber Command had a daily average of 890 aircraft with crews. At the conclusion of that battle four months later in March 1944, Bomber Command had lost 1,047 bombers and well over 7,000 aircrew. In addition, 1,682 bombers were damaged of which more than 100 were totally destroyed on landing back in Britain. New inexperienced aircrews replacing those killed over European air space had to learn the hard way in the most ferocious air battle in history. Bomber aircrews were well aware that only 29% of them would survive a single tour of 30 operations and that only 9% could except to survive 2 tours." BBC Battle of Berlin by AgeConcernShropshire
Harris' campaign against Berlin was a mistake. If he had instead kept hitting the Ruhr, German war production would have been significantly impacted. (As it was, the Ruhr campaign caused German military production to stagnate for seven months.)
Sort of. There was knowledge that Luftwaffe fighters (and most modern fighters) could easily intercept B17s by 1941. They also knew that armament on fighters had increased both in volume and importantly, range. 20/30mm cannons were in play, not only small numbers of rifle caliber or mere .50 calibur guns in small quantity. They assumed B17s own .50 caliber armaments would be sufficient to attrit attackers and would outrange most of their gunnery. Neither proved true in reality, though the attrition of fighters was pretty high especially early days.
The P-38 could have saved the day as it did have drop tanks available but several problems in the design that should have been corrected prewar kept it from fame and saw it shot down in large numbers by the Luftwaffe. The first problem was it did not have a pressurized cockpit to make up for it being so large, instantly recognizable, and even having blind spots due to the nacelles on either side. If it could have always been above the Luftwaffe that was probably the advantage it needed. There had been a fatality prewar in the pressurized cockpit program and it was dropped. A critical mistake but not the only one. It could fly fairly high even without pressurization but if you pointed the nose down at any appreciable angle the plane hit compressibility and went out of control. A huge disadvantage that could have been fixed easily enough with dive brakes but did not happen till very late in the war. So even if it had an altitude advantage it was impossible to use energy tactics by diving from a high altitude. And finally, while it could actually turn really well it could not roll worth a darn which was another huge disadvantage. Especially against the FW-190 which had a phenomenal roll rate. Again, boosted controls that allowed it to match the superior roll rates of most single engine fighters were fitted very late in the war. There were also other problems...a long list of them. But even with all the disadvantages it was still a lethal fighter as it was deadly in the pacific at lower altitudes against zeros. It is actually my favorite fighter not because it was great but because it could have been. So interesting.
My understanding is that the lack of more advanced superchargers with the Allison engines was a major drawback for the P38 in the European theater. The dogfighting was done at higher altitudes in Europe than in the Pacific Theater.
Actually...no. You might be confusing it with the early P-51 before it was fitted with the Merlin. The P-38 had turbo-chargers that allowed it to fly at high altitude with plenty of performance up there. The problem was, as I commented, if you pointed the nose down a little too steeply at high altitude at high speed the plane would go into an uncontrollable dive that could not be pulled out of until at a much lower altitude that occasionally destroyed the aircraft. It also had a poor heater, which sounds ridiculous but was true. The pilots suffered from the cold and the engine systems were complicated, controls poorly placed, and a constant distraction. Planes like the P-47 and the FW-190 had several automatic engine control features but the P-38 did not and the Allison engines were also not so great. @@disphoto
the US even converted a few Spitfires into long range escort fighters and tried to convince the RAF to do it by flying them to england across the Atlantic, but the RAF was wholly uninterested.
I believe if you look at the size of the spitfire you will see that there was no room for the fuel it needed to return home after dropping it's tanks and fighting. The Mustang was slightly longer and bigger and this allowed a big tank behind the pilot- which also made it one of the most dangerous fighters to fly because if you pulled back on the stick just a little too far on takeoff and for the first half hour of flight the plane would stall and fall out of the sky. @@SoloRenegade
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb the US modified their example Spitfires to add more fuel in the wings and fuselage, and used the same drop tanks as the P-51. They actually achieved 1600mi range with tie example spitfires. Another strange thing people don't seem to know. the Allison V12 was more fuel efficient than the Merlin V12, which means it had greater range potential than the Merlin Mustangs and Spitfires. And P-51A in RAF service did fly to Berlin and back at low altitude (less efficient than high altitude cruising) even before the P-47 ever saw combat. The Allison V12 also had a smaller frontal profile, making the P-51A a lower drag airplane than the P-51B/C/D models. Thus further increasing both speed and range potential. The Allison V12 also was 300lb lighter than the Merlin, thus giving still greater range, speed, climb rate, and service ceiling performance than P-51C/B/D models. The Allison V12 was also more powerful, producing 1750HP at 70" MAP in 1942, with pilots pushing the engine to 72-75" in combat in North Africa without damage to the engine. Late-war engine variants were putting out 2,200HP at 70" MAP, with pilots still pushing the engines to over 70" MAP in combat. Allison's own testing proved that sustained operation of their engines at 70" MAP resulted in no damage to the engine. The Merlin could never achieve those same HP numbers at equivalent periods in the war. The P-51A did 415mph at 5000ft on only 1400HP. She was never officially tested at 70"+ MAP, but we can extrapolate what the P-51A would be capable of. The XP-40 was only 10mph slower than the XP-47B at 5000ft flying on only 1000HP (335mph vs 344mph). And P-40N at high manifold pressures (2200HP) were reaching 410mph at low altitudes. Imagine what a P-51A would have been capable of had North American and Allison gotten their wish to develop a high altitude 2-stage supercharger for the Allison. We'd have gotten a faster, higher flying, faster climbing, lighter, higher HP, lower drag, longer ranged P-51 than what we got with the Merlin.
I love the memo line, "Whether you use an existing type or start from scratch is your problem." Having served in the USAF 23 years (12 at groups HQ logistics), the tone of that one sentence alone jumps right out at you like an angry snapping dog ready to bite. I'm sure that lit a fire under Giles and his logistics staff! Wow!
Interesting and a excellent stab at gleaning the answer from the avaiable data. However, there was no mention of the likely decreasing numbers of German fighters over that time frame. The declining numbers of fighters and/or good pilots would also lead to lower bomber losses. Lots to consider.
The Luftwaffe was able to inflict losses on U.S. forces commensurate with the number of U.S. combat sorties up through April 1944. After that, however, losses drop sharply relative to the number of combat sorties, meaning the Luftwaffe's daytime fighter force effectiveness fell dramatically.
The P38, using cruise control techniques, created by Charle Lindberg with the 5th airforce, they had the range. As for the Mustang it designed to British specific requirements. It was supposed to supplement the P40 in the ground attack, rhubarb attacks. The variant purchased by Army Airforce was the A36. There was change in fighter tactics. The fighters went in ahead of the bombers in a large fighter sweep. Attacking fighters on the ground and while forming up.
_The P38, using cruise control techniques, created by Charle Lindberg with the 5th airforce, they had the range._ There is a huge difference between the Pacific and European theaters: in the Pacific there were vast stretches of ocean over which enemy aircraft would not be encountered, thus allowing for maximum fuel efficient techniques. In Europe, however, encountering enemy aircraft was a possibility as soon as crossing the coast over the continent, thus requiring higher cruise speeds. Those higher cruise speeds lowered fuel efficiency as compared to the Pacific. P-38s operating in Europe also had trouble with the cold air over the continent which blunted their effectiveness.
Lindberg developed those fuel saving techniques in the Pacific theater in the summer of 1944. I don't think they were ever used in Europe. The P-38's were already being withdrawn from Europe by then, anyway. Most of the P47's were capable of using drop tanks to significantly extend their fighting radius, but those drop tanks were not supplied until about the time the P51's were in theater. In other words, a longer-range escort was available earlier, but the powers-that-be did not consider it a high enough priority to order the drop tanks.
@@jfess1911 The P-47 was simply nowhere near as fuel efficient as the P-51 as an aircraft design. This is amply demonstrated by looking at the cruise charts in the respective operating manuals --- the P-51 achieved far higher air miles per gallon. The P-47 was a great aircraft, but its R-2800 engine and considerable weight (thanks to its turbosupercharger installation) made it a fuel hog, and it required a lot more fuel to go the same distance as the P-51.
@@jfess1911 Agreed on the P47 issue. Greg's Airplanes has commented have speculated that the P47s were not used more after the arrival of the P51, at least in part, due to help hide the failure to use drop tanks earlier (th-cam.com/video/aCLa078v69k/w-d-xo.html). However, the long-term reasons the P51s were used were because P51s were significantly less expensive than the P47s and had better fuel economy, which was better for both cost and logistics.
P38's, P47's and P51's had all already been going on deep penetration mission's by the time Lindbergh toured around the Pacific in the summer of 44 teaching P38 units there how to extend their range, the crucial missing element in Europe before the first months of 1944 was the US made all metal pressurized drop tanks, not Lindbergh's range extending techniques or P51's. But most importantly when it comes to the ranges of the fighter's in Europe and another thing that catches the 1945 USAAF fighter range report lying about fighter ranges is the fact that not only was the P38 over Berlin before the P51 was it was actually over Berlin before B17's were. A little known and often forgotten part of the USAAF's bombing history in Europe was what was called the "Droop Snoot" missions involving P38's that were modified to work as medium bombers, they bombed Berlin in late 43 before any other USAAF aircraft did which made them the first USAAF aircraft over Berlin with the exception of photo recon planes which by the way were also P38's, some of the Droop Snoot P38's even had Norden bombsights in them that acted as the lead bombers, and they even had regular P38's flying along with them as escorts, everyone always misses this point when talking about fighter ranges in Europe because when doing the research they only ever look under "fighter's" for the history of all the USAAF fighter aircraft in Europe. Even so when it does come to fighter escorts after the fighter's finally got the necessary type of drop tanks for long range escort it was the P47 that broke the Luftwaffe's back in the first half of 1944 shooting down 570 of the 893 German fighter's in the first six months of 44, the P51 started to be used as escorts at the same time the US made all metal drop tanks became available but there wasn't that many of them yet, the P47 units qualified to fly escort missions outnumbered them at that time, it really wasn't until the later half of 44 is when large number's of P51 units had been formed and got qualified to fly escort.
And the failure to develop, in a timely fashion, long range drop tanks and their associated plumbing, for the P-47 Thunderbolt. Also, the failure to bring a second source for P-38 production on line until the war was almost over. And, once the Merlin engined P-51 came into service, the first group was sent to the 9th AF! The second group was also slated to go to the 9th, but it was "traded" for a P-47 group. Another factor was that in early 1944 GENS Spaatz and Hunter were kicked upstairs and replaced by General Doolittle and General Kepner.
the crazy part is the RAF was operating P-51A in combat over Europe a full 12 months before the first P-47 combat sortie was flown over Europe. And in those 12months, RAF P-51s even flew to Berlin and back on recon missions. And RAF P-51s were the first allied fighters to fly combat sorties over Germany in WW2 (and on the RAF's first combat patrol using P-51s no less).
The P-51A (Mustang II) had the Allison engine. The P-51B/C (Mustang III) had the Packard-built Merlin engine, which is what allowed the aircraft to have the high altitude performance necessary for the escort fighter role.
Usually you can't compare a photo recon plane to an actual fighter. Haven't checked on this Recon version of teh P-51A but usually photo reconaissance planes have improved high-altitude performance, more fuel, no guns and even removed armour. They are designed to run away from opposition, not fight it.
@@thomaskositzki9424 the British Recon was done at low altitude from what I read, far less fuel efficient flying. But the Allison V12 was more fuel efficient than the Merlin as well. And the P-51A were lower drag designs than the P-51B/C/D due to the Allison engine being smaller frontal profile than the Merlin. The Allisons were 300lb lighter than the Merlin as well. All of these things boost range. But yes, typically the recon flies unarmed and light. But the very first ever combat mission of a P-51 was an Allison powered A model, British MkI. Flight of 8 entered Germany low level attacking numerous ground targets, and then outran all pursuing fighters back to England all at low level. The P-51A variants were the fastest airplanes in Europe at low level, even with armor and guns and armed for low level ground attack.
@@primmakinsofis614 the Allison was 300lb lighter, more fuel efficient, higher HP, more reliable, and lower drag than the Merlin. All of that made the Allison powered Mustangs longer ranged and faster. Had North American gotten their way, they would have installed a 2 stage supercharger on the Allison same as the Merlin, and produced a vastly superior high altitude long rage escort fighter to the Merlin powered Mustangs. With a proper high altitude forced induction system, like the P-38 had, the Allsion produced far more HP at high altitude than the Merlins were capable of. North American never wanted to use the Merlin, but due to lack of time and US gov support to develop the 2 Stage supercharger, they went with the Merlin on the P-51B/C/D/H.
@@SoloRenegade _All of that made the Allison powered Mustangs longer ranged and faster._ But without the necessary high altitude performance which is what was necessary for bomber escort --- you can't be a successful escort if your best performance is at 15,000 feet while the bombers are at 20,000 to 25,000 feet.
They could have greatly increased the range of the P47 much earlier if they'd tried harder and obtained/developed suitable drop tanks for high altitude. The command persisted in the belief that their bombers could get through unescorted much too long.
They could get through and did get through. The question was how to achieve a sustainable loss rate while doing it. The command did not persist in a belief that escort was unnecessary. The myth is propagated here on TH-cam and it has gone viral. The Greg acolytes are the worst, calling anyone does not admit an outdate memo from 1939 as evidence of malicious intent is a troll. Hap Arnold gets much of the blame, and though after the U.S. entered the war he ordered drop tanks developed for fighters as soon as possible, and soon after the 8th began bombing missions he ordered development of a long range escort fighter that could go to the Polish border and back.
Yes they were idiots! Craigs airplanes shows that the P 47 had the range to go to Germany in early 1943 but the stupid Army Air Force did not acquire the already qualified and tested high altitude drop tanks. Anybody that has been in the military understand how stupid the brass is.
@@gort8203: Established policy will typically stay in place until proved counterproductive. It was a mere 4 years from that memo till reality showed the flaws in it. And the 8th was in combat for only about 17 months of that.
@@charlesjames1442 Yes, but it didn't even take 4 years. That memo was based on the squabbles of the 1930s. Even so, it was not planned that bombers would always operate without fighter escort. Even then it was foreseen that bombers would be supported by fighters when the mission indicated a need for it and allowed for it, but that deep penetrations would necessarily have to go beyond the range of fighter support. They would have to defend themselves and accept more losses for important targets because there was no alternative. By the time the U.S, entered the war both the Spanish Civil War and the Battle of Britain indicated that unescorted bombers were even more vulnerable to fighters than previously thought. Foreseeing what daylight precision bombing would be up against, at the beginning of 1942 Hap Arnold directed the air staff to do whatever it took to get drop tanks on fighters as soon as possible. Before the year was out experience indicated that current fighters would not be enough even with drop tanks, and he ordered immediate development of a long-range fighter that could escort bombers all the way to Poland and back.
@@steveperreira5850 _Yes they were idiots! Craigs airplanes shows that the P 47 had the range to go to Germany in early 1943_ How far into Germany? That is the question. The P-51 was inherently a much more fuel efficient aircraft than the P-47.
The message was clear to me already so pointing it out several times was a bit repetetive. But hey, I guess you had to say something whilst showing all the interesting data charts. 😉 Those were great, as always! And thanks for the advice! 😂
Every military at the start of the war was that the bomber would always get thru, and that heavily armed bomberrs could protect themselves. The British finally figured out that this belief was wrong, and switched to night operations. When the Americans showed up, they believed that the American bombers were so well armed that the B17 and B24 could hold their own. When they finally figured out that the British were right, the long range escort fighter was quickly built. It's easy to see that the long range fighter was needed, after the war. Hind sight is always 100%.
The fighters were there. The P-47s were there since Nov '42. What neither the P-51 or P-47 had were the drop tanks required to give them the range. Hap Arnold had forbidden the installation of drop tanks on fighters because 'Battleships of the Air", y'know? The British were supplying their Mustangs in the Med with drop tanks very early on.
Greg's airplanes did a great video on the drop tank scandal and was excoriated for it by a horde of trolls. They will be here soon enough. Exactly why they so vehemently deny the obvious facts is a mystery. Just something for contrarian nags and malicious naysayers to do I guess. I think it is P-47 hate since it was really that plane that destroyed the Luftwaffe and the Mustang mopped up by shooting down a bunch of new pilots with little training. P-51 fanboys go crazy over that.
_Hap Arnold had forbidden the installation of drop tanks on fighters because 'Battleships of the Air", y'know?_ Feel free to cite the document in which Arnold stated that and the date of such document.
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb _Exactly why they so vehemently deny the obvious facts is a mystery._ Something which Greg himself does when confronted with facts he doesn't like. His video about the B-17 being able to carry as big a bomb load as the Lancaster by using its external racks is a fine example. He claims it wasn't done because reasons. When it was pointed out to him the drag and handling penalties associated with lugging big bombs on the external racks is why they were only used a few times, he just ignored this. I suggest instead of just slavishly believing whatever some TH-camr claims, perhaps you can do some research of your own. A great many wartime documents have been digitized and made available online greatly easing such research. In regards to long-range fighters, I'd suggest starting with "Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter" a 333-page study which details the USAAF's attempts to extend fighter range in both the European and Pacific theaters and the problems encountered. It contains an extensive list of end notes for the citations used.
There is a video of a pilot that flew both the p51 and p47. He states clearly the 47 could go anywhere with the bombers. It was also a great ground attacks aircraft and much better then the 51. So the 51 got to escort and the 47s went on to more ground attack.
It was really the powerplants that were the main factors. At high to very high altitude the P-47's giant turbocharged radial might have had an edge over the P-51 but at medium to high altitude the Merlin engine was pretty awesome.
_There is a video of a pilot that flew both the p51 and p47. He states clearly the 47 could go anywhere with the bombers._ If you could hang enough fuel on the P-47, yes. Keep in mind the P-51 was inherently a much more fuel efficient design, as it was able to achieve far better air miles per gallon than the P-47.
Toward the end of the war in the Pacific the B29s had more fighter escorts. The Army Air force also worked with the Navy mining Japanese shipping routes near the home islands
2 issues: The bomber command were arrogant in thinking “the bomber will always get through” without testing or war gaming the scenario. The isolationist American mind set up until 7 December 1941 was bomber centric in its thinking due to only thinking about continental defence with heavy bombers. The fighter designers, aviation industry and fighter command did not know what was possible. Both fighter & bomber command structures did not see the future until they were in it. Why was the P38 & P47 not modified and pushed into longer range escort sooner is the question?
_The bomber command were arrogant in thinking “the bomber will always get through” without testing or war gaming the scenario._ The bomber DID always get through. The problem was that losses taken in getting through proved to be unsustainable. _Why was the P38 & P47 not modified and pushed into longer range escort sooner is the question?_ Because it was believed the heavily armed U.S bombers flying in tight formations would be self-defending. And to some extent they were, at least initially. But exposing a bomber stream to hours of potential interception by enemy fighters is another matter entirely, as it turned out.
It wasn't arrogance, it was the best plan they could come up with at the time, and it was true. The bombers always did get through, and the question was how to maintain a sustainable loss rate. That continental defense doctrine was simply a ploy to get long range bombers into development. The Army knew they were trying to build a strategic bombing capability that would be needed for the next war.
Thanks, your comments and historical data, ends the discussion/debate about which Fighter of the era was the best battlefield implement of War 2,, 🎤⬇️ P-51 is the 🐐❤
Greg's Airplanes and Autos channels provided evidence that the bomber mafia withheld distribution of long range drop tanks for the P-47. The British had these available and had they been used earlier on the P-47, longer range escort would have been possible. But this was not done in order to "prove" the concept of the self escorting bomber. Given how the US Air Corps forced out Billy Mitchell and Claire Chennault for having unwelcome ideas and proving them, I think it is a valid hypothesis.
Refreshingly unusual to have factual information presented as part of a discussion of the US in WW2. Showing both failure & success as well as successful reaction to failures. Most simply portray US involvement in WW2 as a constant success and mostly the only country that took part. Fully expect Masters of the Air to do this. Thanks, keep it up. Though why, other than, "not thought of here", the US did not use the Mosquito in numbers is truly bizarre.
If the Mossie was the be all and end all of twin engine bombers why did Britain need 807 Lend Lease B25's, 510 LL B26's and 3,697 LL light bombers ? Hyperwar Lend Lease shipments Army Air Forces
Considering he cites contemporary documentation, yes. But you feel free to provide your contradictory evidence once you've finished your smugness.@@primmakinsofis614
@@mattwilliams3456 I see you aren't aware that Greg ignored the many documents which contradicted the story he wanted to tell. Feel free to go through "Development of the Long Range Escort Fighter" and point out what it gets wrong. It lays out the story in full with extensive citations.
Toward the end of WW1, large biplane bombers were able to fight off biplane fighters, and I believe that may have stalled concentration on long-range fighters. In the mid 1930’s, when the B-17 was developed, it easily outflew the then-current fighters, which were still biplanes. A fighter would get one chance only, and with, say, two .30 caliber guns, would not do much damage. Of course, things had changed completely by 1941. By then,though, the British had 2 years of experience. That this was ignored shows what mental inertia (and not trusting an ally?) can do.
It should also be noted that by Jan. 1944 the German war machine was beginning to be a spent force! They had been at total war for 5 yrs., and against two (U.S. Russia) industrial giants (yeah, I know U.S. didn't enter the war until Dec. 41) it became impossible to keep up with demand! By 44 they started to husband their fighters (due to severe losses on the eastern front) to protect Germany proper! Manpower (pilots and maint. crews) and resources were in short supply! The fact that they were able to hold on as long as they did is a testament to their resilience!
Super video, not to argue. “The Bomber will alway get through.” Wasn’t this the mantra of the ‘air corps’ in the ‘20s? Then usa bombers were superior machines to the pursuit planes? Who preached this? Arnold, Spatz, Mitchel, Doolittle? Thinking this is a missing aspect of you video? * Are we calculating 800 heavy casualties in total from this mishap? Seems too low a number. * The best US fighters (usaaf/usn) were not available until after mid war? Didn’t it take usa industry time to catch up to the military needs from the battle experience?
"The bomber will always get through" was a phrase used by Stanley Baldwin in a 1932 speech "A Fear for the Future" given to the British Parliament. THINGS TO COME 1936 th-cam.com/video/knOd-BhRuCE/w-d-xo.html
That's the Army Air Corp malfeasance. Also the Navy subjected their submarines to danger because the magnetic exploders and constant exploders didn't work well
". . . can considered a travesty." Travesty is defined as 1) An absurd or grotesque misrepresentation. for 2) An appalling version of something. As in the following example, "travesty" is often followed by "of" as represented in definition 2) by "something" as shown in the following example "It is a travesty of justice that these four people have been incarcerated while the real perpetrator is walking..."
Nothing new here but still interesting. One topic I would like to address is the attrition of German pilots and planes. Even setting aside the eastern front which was a black hole that swallowed men and material at 3 times the rate of the west this is not a small factor. Yes the 2 schwinford raids were bad for the 8th but it was no picnic for the luftwaffe either. They lost a lot of pilots and planes intercepting those raids and like Japan those pilots were basically irreplaceable. Its notable that when the P51 showed up at the start of 1944 and started escorting the bombers their orders were to "get the fighters" not "protect the bombers." Those are not the same thing. The bombers were the bait to draw the luftwaffe out. The purpose was to gain air dominance ahead of D-day. It would be interesting to see a chart showing luftwaffe fighter casualties vs US bomber casualties up until January 1944. If you want to make it real interesting some how (color coding????) Indicate the experience level of the German pilots lost (ex: germany lost 25 fighters intercepting this raid of which 10 were veteran pilots and 15 were green. This amounts to xx percent of german veteran pilots in the west.) We'll obviously never know but I suspect between transfers to the east and attrition of experienced pilots (including production rate of aircraft) even without the P-51 the Germans couldnt maintain the kill ratio against the ever growing number of increasingly better armed bombers. Obvious bomber loss rate wouldnt have dropped off as rapidly but, again, I suspect it still would have dropped off as the reich exhausted itself.
Not many countries could afford a long range bomber program in any numbers. Both Japan & Germany did not have the resources to build enough 4 engined long range bombers, crew them, maintain them, supply them and use them. Only 2 countries could do it and one went broke after the war.
If you graph the losses of U.S. aircraft and the number of combat sorties, USAAF losses increased in roughly the same proportion that combat sorties increased. This held true even as the number of sorties greatly increased in the fall of 1943. This relationship continued through April 1944. After that, however, losses fell dramatically compared to sorties. The difference is striking. The Luftwaffe's effectiveness as a daytime fighter force plunged after April 1944 and never really recovered.
The saddest thing was that the two Swhenford raids were ineffective and based on false intelligence that they would wipe out all of Germany's ball bearings (which they barely affected). What they should have focused on were the synthetic oil refineries (which they eventually did, but not until May 1944). Additionally, the Nordon bombsight was a crock and corrupt. Many a bomber crew die flying straight and level into heave flak so a worthless bombsight could miss by miles.
@@disphoto "Ball-bearings were, however, vital to the war machines of all the belligerents. if the supply of them to Germany or if their manufacture could be reduced or cut off completely, it would be impossible for her to continue the struggle. As early as November, 1942, the Ministry of Economic Warfare had estimated that more than half the ball bearings made in Germany came from the V.R.F. factories and the Fischer factory at Schweinfurt. there was also a factory at Stuttgart and others at Leipzig, Berlin and Elberfeld. France too possessed a number of small establishments. Operation 'SELFRIDGE', an assault on Schweinfurt, was therefore planned, but month after month passed and it was not executed: the technical difficulties were too great. The Air Ministry, however was determined that it should be as soon as they had been overcome." page 25 Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol III
The major qualification for the data presented in this video is the lack of information about German fighter strength. Hence, we cannot assume that all of the reduction in loss rates to US bombers was due to an increase in Allied fighter cover, rather than to a decrease in enemy fighter strength, and nor can we assume that any reduction in German fighter strength in the West was due solely to the introduction of Allied escorts shooting down German fighters. Likewise, we cannot evaluate the claim that daylight bombing operations secured air superiority for Overlord without considering German fighter strength and losses. As for evaluating the effectiveness of escorted daylight bombing tactics; it is obvious that escorts were necessary for daylight bombing, and clearly this should have been equally obvious to the USAAF in 1943, thanks to early RAF experience. However, the effectiveness of the chosen solution - providing long range fighter escort - must be judged against the alternative selected by the RAF and by the 20th AF in the Pacific - a switch to night bombing. Retraining the crews would have taken time, but so did waiting for escorts; and we can naturally assume that the retraining would have been easier than it was for the RAF in the first place, because the RAF had already figured out the best practices and could have provided training support. It is often blindly assumed that one of the primary benefits of the CBO was the destruction of German fighter strength, which in turn secured air superiority for Overlord. Evidently, there was hardly any other benefit in 1943, given the comparatively low numbers of bomber sorties and bombs dropped in that year. This 'benefit' must also be judged against the alternative, which was to take all of the resources expended in bomber production in 1943 and put them into producing more fighters, since the degree of air superiority depends not only on German fighter losses, but on the ratio of Allied fighter strength to German fighter strength. Since the Allies produced more fighters than Germany in 1943, some degree of air superiority would have been achieved regardless of whether or not there was a bomber offensive. Furthermore, any long - range fighter which was capable of escorting bombers into Germany was also capable of attacking German aircraft on the ground in Germany.
"this should have been equally obvious to the USAAF in 1943, thanks to early RAF experience." RAF heavies were flying unescorted daylight ops as late as July 1942, so hardly "early".
@@primmakinsofis614 Good observation. I always think it strange how some Brits can sardonically lambaste the USAAF for not joining the RAF in more wisely bombing at night, while out the other side of their mouths they proclaim heroism against dreadful odds over the high loss rate experienced by night bombers of RAF bomber command.
I thought this was very well presented. And the data seems unrefutable. Hubris, ego and defending turf and naive assumptions about the bomber led to the unnecessary loss of lives.
"If you are flying escort, do not point your nose toward the bomber formation." Good advice!
I’ll remember that!
Like 1 of the 4 gun rules: "Never allow your muzzle to cover anything you're not willing to destroy."
Same rule definitely applies to air combat.
Thanks, I love the way you use stats to get the message across! These videos must take a lot of hard work to do, and I appreciate it.
I'd read in the past that the P-38, once all the kinks were finally worked out, was a superb long range escort by the time of the L model, and with hydraulic boosted ailerons could maneuver with single engine fighters at high speed where pilot physical strength limited roll rate, BUT it was about 50% more expensive per unit than a P-51 and this was a major motivation to withdraw it from Europe even after its problems were resolved.
It was never a great fighter in Europe. Doolittle used it for bomber support in the Med because it had the range and nothing else did, but its loss rate was very high. However, losses among the bombers were kept very low and that was his criterion for success. There were no P-38 fighter groups in 8th AF from Torch until Oct 1943, and this grew to 3 or 4 FGs by Feb 1944. They were all equipped with the J series, which is usually said to have solved the engine reliability problems. That doesn't seem to be true, though. The 8th AF had fuel pump & leakage issues through Feb & Mar 1944, and 9th AF grounded their entire P-38 fleet in early April 1944 while they sorted out engine problems. These were ALL J series planes. By July 1944 Doolittle was describing the P-38 to General Arnold as 'second rate' compared to the P-47 and P-51.
@@Splattle101 Also, like the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain they hadn't worked out the right tactics in the early days and tried closely escorting the bombers. A P38 escorting bombers at about 200 mph needed considerable time to wind up to 400mph to deal with enemy fighters. Turbochargers were in their early days without the modern electronic controls and needed care and inputs from the pilot to build up to speed. Not easy when you're suddenly being attacked.
Another issue with the P38 while a great interceptor the FW-190 could out dog fight it at medium and low altitudes. They could out turn and were faster in short bursts of speed. The P38 was faster but it took a bit for it to get up to speed.
@@earlhuff7847 The J series was a little faster than the FW-190A, but the first P-38s in Europe were the F series sent to the Med. They were power limited because of cooling issues and their top speed was only (only!) 390 mph. The G & H models got that up to about 405 mph. There's no speed advantage there for the P-38.
I think the main limitation for the P-38 in a high-altitude escort role is its dive speed. It would be easy for a German fighter to escape, they could just dive away.
The P-38 was developed earlier than the others, and didn't benefit from as many NACA aerodynamics studies. The machine gun fairings (compare them to the P-51's) and exposed turbos (compare to the P-47) are examples of this. It could have used a drag cleanup, but I don't think a change that interrupted production would have been accepted (like the P-38K).
I read a quote by a German pilot somewhere that one reason the long range fighters helped so much is it put the Germans in a quandary. They had been putting more and more cannon on their fighters so they could knock down the tough heavy bombers, which worked until escort fighters turned up and made good work against the over weight German bomber attack fighters. Lightening the fighters would have made them competitive against the escorts but degraded their ability to shoot down bombers. So the escorts had an impact on the weapons configuration of the German fighters in a way that helped the bombers. The answer for Germany was aircraft specialised for the bomber attack or fighter role aircraft, but they didn’t have enough planes and pilots to make that work, as evidenced by the losses sustained by German night fighters desperate enough to be flown in the day bomber attack role.
The performance of the Messerschmitt BF109 was particularly degraded by adding extra cannons. The BF109E version used in the Battle of Britain had two 20mm wing cannons but only 60 rounds ammunition for each, not enough for bringing down heavy bombers. The 109F generally had a single 20mm firing through the nose - plenty of ammunition but not enough firepower. In the 109G version. in order to get 2 x 20 mm cannons and enough ammunition they went to two heavy underwing pods containing both guns and ammunition which reduced the agility/handling (weight in the wrong places) and reduced the speed (a lot of extra drag).
Also once the bombing of German synthetic fuel plants occurred and the lost of Polesti oil fields made training new pilots nearly impossible.
I can't tell you how much I appreciate you sharing your sources.
"Constituted one of the most serious errors in America's pre-war planning." The bomber will always get thru was a bizarre belief. Right up there for worst pre-war decision exacerbated by bureaucratic malfeasance is the Type 14 torpedo.
Fairly different than the mark 14, simply because it didn't encounter the same bureaucratic resistance to fix, but quite the opposite when evidence began to show it didn't work.
@@ME-xh7zp just pointing out we made other mistakes and that they didn't have a single point of command failure in common.
_The bomber will always get thru was a bizarre belief._
Not really. The bomber DID always get through --- the problem was that without fighter escort the bomber losses would be prohibitive and unsustainable.
The idea of the B-17 combat box, with lots of .50 cal guns covering the formation was too blinding. That strategy got stood on its head towards the end of the war, with lower-altitude heavier loads, and losing guns to lighten them.
To be fair, there was a time in the 20s-30s, before radar, when large, high-flying, multi-engine bombers probably DID have the performance to out-pace single-engine interceptors launched after the bombers had penetrated enemy airspace. The bomber doctrine didn't change fast enough once fighters could be launched and given intercept vectors while the bombers were still over their own territory.
Fascinating document, Development of the Long Range Escort Fighter. It's somebody's thesis paper. I found it really interesting the way it touches on parallel developments in thinking on 'bomber support' in different parts of the US army air force/air corps, and gives the strong impression the left hand didn't know what the right was doing. Some of it is mentioned only in passing, like the range extension program begun in Oct 1940 (!!) and applied to the P-38 & P-47 even though the '47 wasn't even flying. Or the way the Pratt & Whitney reps met with officers of the 56 FG in Jan 1943 and noted their P-47s were designed and equipped to use long range tanks but that the tanks themselves hadn't been delivered. And lots more. Fascinating read.
_P-47s were designed and equipped to use long range tanks but that the tanks themselves hadn't been delivered_
That appears to have been more of an issue with Republic than the USAAF.
The quote is a bit out of context - using ferry tanks they could theoretically get 200 miles further inland but the FGs themselves refused as it rendered them dangerously vulnerable. Only when Lt. Col. Cass Hough and VIIIFC ATS had developed a fuel pressurization system for the external tanks and had Republic begin producing kits was it useful (included in the birds after D-15). Sadly it didn't fix the internal fuel issue; which remained the Jug's Achilles Heel until after the P-51 arrived.
Recommend looking up Achtung Indianer if you like that one; history of VIIIFC. May have already read it.
@@ME-xh7zp Yes, you're right. Cass Hough was critical to the successful introduction of the P-47. I noted that incident (and the others) to highlight the confusion of the situation. History is usually written as a narrative - it has to be readable, after all - but it doesn't happen that way to the people involved. The paper I was referring to conveys the confusion really well, drawing out contradictory initiatives, parallel but seemingly disconnected programs, and sometimes plain old pig ignorance. Another issue it shows (inadvertently or otherwise) is the way the senior figures crafted their message to their audience. For example, in public Eaker would say the bombers would fight their way to the target. In private, he would write about the Germans probably taking 3-6 months to 'work out' the high altitude bomber, which is a much more nuanced position. There's a lot of this sort of material in that paper. The author obviously had access to the corro of Eaker, Arnold, Spaatz, Doolittle, Anderson, et als, and it makes for an interesting but very messy read.
@@Splattle101
Just trying to fight against a certain incorrect narrative pushed by a different TH-camr that's become prevalent. Needed to add the required nuance about the early P-47's tank limitations.
@@ME-xh7zp Yeah, fair enough. I believe I know of whom you speak. It's exhausting dealing with fans, regardless of how well informed they are.
Thank-you. Another superb presentation.
Thank you.
An excellent video regarding one of the most important issues of WWII.
In the larger context; probably the major - decisive - benefit of the US daylight bomber raids was not the bombs dropped, but that the Luftwaffe had been very substantially weakened, many of their aces killed, and their air superiority was lost by May 1944 (this tremendous feat was done largely by P-47 Thunderbolts equipped with drop-tanks, and before the P-51 Mustangs had arrived in significant numbers!). It was vital that the allies had air superiority by May 44 - so that the D-Day invasion could safely be ventured the next month.
Those months of late 1943 and early 1944 - and in the air over occupied Europe, when superiority switched from Germany to Allies (essentially the work of the US air force) - was when the tide of war turned decisively on the Western front.
US conducted "Get Yamamoto" operation in April 1943, they employed 18 P38s with drop tanks attached and flew a 1000 miles round trip mission.
This proved that the means for long range escort missions were in place as early as April 1943 and bomber command choose to ignore the means and criminally kept on sending bombers to perform missions without escort.
During the 2 disastrous ball bearing factory bombing missions, had there been long range fighter escort, 80 out of the 120 total lost bombers were most likely could have been saved.
_US conducted "Get Yamamoto" operation in April 1943, they employed 18 P38s with drop tanks attached and flew a 1000 miles round trip mission._
Using Pacific cruise techniques, designed for use across vast stretches of open uncontested ocean, over the contested European continental airspace would have been suicidal. There were enormous operational differences between the theaters you are overlooking.
The Yamamoto mission was possible because of input from Charles Limburg. He showed with different throttle settings much fuel could be saved.
Escorting bombers is way different than economically cruising in a straight line for an intercept and then cruising home in a straight line. Escorting bombers involves a lot of weaving and consumes a lot more gas.
@@gort8203
Later the weaving tactics were dropped in favor of agressively seeking out the enemy and relays where new fighter squadrons would fly out and take over for a previous squadron every 2 hours
@@fazole Yes, I know. That does not disprove my point that flying in straight line to intercept Yamamoto took less fuel it would take to escort bombers over the same distance, which would not have been possible.
The bomber escorts had to use relays on long range missions even before they were allowed to pursue enemy fighters. Later when fighter groups went ahead of the bombers on sweeps they used less fuel for a given distance, but by then the critical period of bomber vulnerability was passing because drop tanks and the longer-range fighters were available. With the bombers becoming less vulnerable to interceptors the role of allied fighters expanded to destroying the Luftwaffe as quickly as possible rather than just protecting the bombers.
another great video, thanks good sir !
Gregs airplanes and automobiles has a video on how the p47 could have had long range drop tanks much sooner, good topic coverage.
Unfortunately, Greg is wrong, and ignores the numerous historical documents which contradicts his narrative. He also seems to think an unpressurized 200 gallon ferry tank would have worked fine as a combat drop tank. (It wouldn't have.)
Greg is not wrong ... the P47 could have been used for escort duty if the air force thought they needed a long range escort.. they didn't and neglected development of extending the range ..
What is the difference between a ferry drop tank and combat drop tank? Pressurization?
@@keithdubose2150 Yes Greg is wrong. Yes, carrying an unpressurized ferry tank while escorting did not extend combat radius much because most of the fuel was unusable.
@@keithdubose2150 _What is the difference between a ferry drop tank and combat drop tank? Pressurization?_
In order to draw fuel from an external tank at higher altitudes, the tank must be pressurized. Furthermore, a combat drop tank must be able to separate quickly and cleanly from the fighter. A combat tank should also have a shape which is relatively aerodynamic so as to reduce drag thus improving fuel efficiency. The 200 gallon ferry tank for the P-47 was none of these things. That shouldn't be surprising, since it was designed for ferry missions, not combat.
As it happened, the ferry tank was used for some combat operations. It was filled with 50-100 gallons (it leaked too much to store fuel in it for more than a few hours) and used to cover much of the fuel expended in climbing to high altitude and then jettisoned. That allowed a bit more fuel to be available for cruising, extending the combat radius slightly. But this was a temporary measure until a more appropriate combat drop tank was available.
@@primmakinsofis614 He does mention pressurized tanks in service in late 43, plus you are ignoring his main point, which is that the lack of tanks was a fully political issue and not a technical issue with the P-47. From early '43, a effective drop tank for the Thunderbolt could have been put in service in a matter of weeks if the USAAF leadership had chosen to do so.
Another great and informative presentation. Thank you.
Another concise logical presentation. Is it true that Goering said when he saw Mustangs over Berlin, he knew "the jig was up"?
Another great one. I can't get enough of your content. I think I am officially/clinically addicted.😢
Bless the Little Friends.
They're being a bit hard on themselves.
Fighters have to be light, and *superior* at the same time. There's extra fuel, and navigational issues. That's not easy.
I've always been curious about how comfortable the seats were in the long-range escort fighters. Are you sitting on a park bench or a Lay-Z-Boy? I know you'd be sitting on your parachute but is that all anyone ever used? I'm no longer 20 years old but ouch!
As usual, a great job of research. In this case I have an issue with the conclusion of the presentation: “the neglect of developing a long-range fighter escort can be considered a travesty”.
First of all, this use of the word travesty does not comport with the actual definition of the word. The word is not stand alone and is used in ways such as “it is a travesty of justice”. So, of what is this particular failure a travesty? A travesty of military technological or doctrinal development? I can guess at that meaning, but the word has an emotional connotation that can imply deceptive or malicious intent, and it oversimplifies how this “failure” evolved.
The statement that nobody believed long range escort fighters (as we now think of them) were possible was quite true for a long time. Anyone reading the primary source document to this video can see this was the case. Yes, if people had a crystal ball they would have known what to work on to achieve this capability sooner, but there were barriers both technical and bureaucratic that had to be overcome. But to call it a travesty implies an intentional design to pretend that a thing was something it was not, and I think that is an unjust charge.
Use of this word can imply support of the absurd myth that the so called “bomber mafia” continued to actively and maliciously inhibit long range escort to in order to prove outdated prewar assumptions about bomber self-defense. By 1942 they knew escort fighters would reduce the loss rate, and Hap Arnold took steps to address the issue. In the meantime they still had a war to wage, and continued to develop tactics to make bombardment successful. They never expected a low loss rate, just a sustainable one.
Keith,
I very much enjoy every one of your videos. I particularly appreciate the factual content you put together as well as your delivery. Thanks and keep up the good work.
I have an opinion regarding the assumption by the USAAF that the heavy bombers could defend themselves. The B-17, a fine airplane, was designed in the early 1930s and first flew in the mid 1930s. At this time the B-17 is reported to have been faster than the USAAF’s fighters at that time. It’s quite understandable that bomber gunners were thought capable of an adequate defense. During the next 7 years aviation experienced great advancements, multiplying the capabilities of aircraft, particularly fighters. Apparently the USAAF decision makers maintained their same strategy even as increases in fighter speed made them harder to hit from a bomber’s guns.
This situation was made worse by the austerity of the depression years. The USAAC promoted the turbocharger over the supercharger. Aircraft numbers were meager, and testing minimal. In short, the US was inadequately prepared for the conflict. Thank goodness we caught up fast. Greg’s Airplanes and Automobiles has a series on the P-47, which with the correct drop tanks would have had the range for bomber escort in 1944.
Greg's video on the P-47 and range is incorrect, let me know if you'd like the extended explanation. He's not a good source, and suppresses critique.
Also the critical factor was never fighter speed, it was the development of radar allowing anticipation of direction and target easing interception.
_Greg’s Airplanes and Automobiles has a series on the P-47, which with the correct drop tanks would have had the range for bomber escort in 1944._
Greg unfortunately and incorrectly thinks unpressurized 200 gallon ferry drop tanks would have been perfectly fine for combat missions.
Wow, this is the first time I have encountered Greg being contradicted. He certainly uses good sources and shows on screen where the information comes from. No one is infallible. I appreciate your mentioning this.
@@ME-xh7zp The fighter speed comment was meant in the targeting difficulty from a bomber gun position. The faster the fighter, the less time it is in range, and the quicker it streaks across your gun position. The one exception is the tail gun position, where an astern attack closing speed is much less and the fighter is coming straight at the tail position.
@@markam306 He *appears* to - but does not. He's overall a poor source. If you'd like a full accounting let me know. If you need some proof to get started, watch his P-47 Range and Deceit video for the page from the P-47 flight manual that supposedly shows the 200 gallon ferry tank could operate up to 30,000'. Very clearly, that page is for the tank empty, not feeding fuel. It could not feed fuel above ~18k, partially because the P-47 couldn't even receive pressurized external fuel until modified (developed by LTC Cass Hough at VIIIFC ATS). Republic didn't create the capability when requested like the other companies.
I always wondered what became of the drop tanks when the long-range escorts encountered enemy fighters early in the mission. I have listened to many accounts of bomber crew saying this happened, and it was always a bummer as it meant they were alone for the remainder of the journey. I imagine loads fell away and caused no issues, but some must have landed on innocent folk, property etc.
I do love your videos, no fancy guff, just facts and decent presentation. 👌
Once enough fighters were available, the relay system alleviated this. As even if one leg of the fighter cover was forced to turn around early, the next leg of coverage would be on station in 20 ish mins
Early on the Luftwaffe had its fighters deployed in a belt nearer the coast, I assume because they did not know the targets and didn't want the fighters based too far inland where the bombers might not go on any given mission. Once the bombers penetrated this belt with the help of fighter escort they were better able to defend themselves against the smaller numbers of fighters over Germany.
The Luftwaffe learned their lesson, and as the bombers began flying to deeper targets their improved their strategy by redeploying more fighters to the interior, beyond the reach of the escorts. This was the critical period for the 8th Air Force and losses to fighters threatened sustainability.
One the drop tanks became more prevalent on fighters allowing deeper escort, some believed the Luftwaffe should have intercepted the escorts to force them to drop their tanks early. But they did not do this as a routine because they did not believe they had enough fighters. They wanted the fighters to focus on attacking the bombers, and they did not want to lose those fighters in combat with superior numbers of allied fighters in a war of attrition they could not win. Even so some considered that decision questionable, and later they did employ a portion of their fighters to try to disrupt escorts while the rest focused on the bombers.
“A typical interception in the fall of 1942 has been described by Johannes Naumann, at that time the an Oberleutnant in II/JG 26. The Gruppe was ordered to attack the bombers on their return flight as there was no chance of reaching them on their bomb run. The B-17’s were flying in a staggered formation at about 26,000 feet. The Focke Wulfs finally struggled up to 27,000 feet, only to see the American formation receding into the distance. The speed of the FW 190’s at that altitude was only a little greater than that of the bombers…No bombers were downed; none had even suffered visible damage.”
Attacking a B-17 formation from the German side! page
Another great video. Pre-war articles plus mistaken lessons from the Spanish Civil War repeated the myth: "The bomber will always get through." This thinking didn't foresee newer fighters with higher performance and heavier armament, radar, and fighting an enemy with a sophisticated air defense.
It wasn't a myth --- the bomber DID always get through. The problem was that it could suffer unsustainable losses in getting through.
Wait… so why did did the luftwaffes change in tactics, from attacking escorts first to ignoring them, result in having a disastrous effect on the luftwaffe?
Was it the distance at which they were ordered to engage 400M?
Or the fact they had to attack from the rear?
Idk why but that part was confusing for me, especially bc you just said it had disastrous effect but didn’t say to who until a little later.
But regardless it’s unclear what was catastrophic in the change in tactics
Keep up the good work!
It's a shame the issue with provisioning drop tanks for the P47 and P51 was purposely ignored by the Bomber Mafia, but I'm sure we can all relate to the tendancy of holding on too long to an idea out of stubbornness.
"It's a shame" and "we can all relate" does not cut it. Thousands of bomber crew died because of some officers more concerned about their career path than fighting the war.
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb ~30,000 people died on average every day during ww2. Including many commanders who maliciously sent their men to their deaths. The bomber mafia were arrogant and incorrect in their thinking, but its nowhere near the worst injustice of military conduct of the war I'd say.
_It's a shame the issue with provisioning drop tanks for the P47 and P51 was purposely ignored by the Bomber Mafia_
Ah, this old falsehood raises its head again.
It is true...and you are just here to lie. It is what gets you off, obviously. Freak. @@primmakinsofis614
Yes, so the "ignored" narrative is incorrect - let me know if you'd like the extended explanation.
These details are brilliant
As the Luftwaffe encountered more Allied heavy bomber raids, it became apparent that great increases in defensive fighter firepower were needed, especially against the even more heavily armed American bombers. This dynamic led to the development of ever more heavily armed sub-types of fighters, including some Focke-Wulf 190s with six 20 mm cannon, the most ever mounted in a German single-engine fighter (Dill 2015, 50-4). This sub-type entered service concurrently with the most powerful weapon used by German fighters during the war, the 210 mm rocket mortar, which was used in significant numbers from July 1943 onwards both on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean, but not in the East (Forsyth 2016b, 53-7). The ultimate result of these developments, focused on the needs of defence against strategic bombing, was that the aircraft types retained on the Eastern front were ever more poorly armed in comparison to those in the West. Just 15% of Luftwaffe aircraft guns were allocated to the East by January 1944 (Table 4), a much lower proportion that the 34% of combat aircraft allocated to this theatre (Table 2). While the desperate German attempts to develop technology to confront Allied pressure have been noted in the literature (van Creveld 2011, 116-7), as has the German tendency to use older aircraft in the East (O’Brien 2015: 65, 291). What has not been sufficiently emphasised is that these aircraft possessed considerably less firepower, on average, as demonstrated here. page 15
How were German air force resources distributed between different fronts in the years 1941 to 1943 pdf
Great video, interesting to see that the P-51 wasn't dominant until May 1944. I always figured it a little earlier.
The Merlin-engined P-51's showed up in large numbers after most of the expert Luftwaffe pilots were gone and their new pilot training had been cut way back. They did shoot a lot of Germans down but the P-47's had already decided it.
That's not particularly accurate, the numbers shot down by the P-47 prior to the Mustang's arrival were not high.
Thunderbolts shot down more Luftwaffe aircraft-3,572-than any other Allied fighter. And they eliminated the Luftwaffes best pilots before the Mustangs showed up. So, it is accurate.@@ME-xh7zp
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb USAAF losses as a proportion of combat sorties was relatively consistent through April 1944. After that, there is a major drop in losses. If you graph losses against sorties, the difference after April 1944 is striking.
So what is your point? You don't have one. @@primmakinsofis614
"As against a total loss of 314 fighters and bombers, we thought we had destroyed at least 205 of the machines which came up to meet us; but in fact the Germans lost only 90. The balance of casualties thus swung in favour of the enemy even more markedly than in 1941, doubtless because he took care to deploy his latest and fastest fighters--the F.W.190's--on this front. Even so the offensive had the cardinal merits not only of keeping two of Germany's best fighter Geschwader at full stretch but also of preserving for us in Western Europe all the moral and other advantages of the initiative."
-141--
Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol. II
The US didn’t fail to develop long range fighters. One of the best attributes of the P38 was its long range. What the USAAC did, or at least the 8th Air Force, was to mandate that no drop tanks could be used on fighters. Procurement of drop tanks was not the issue, the intentional decision to not procure them in the first place was the issue. The P47 had a very nice 200 gallon drop tank developed for it from the very beginning, but it was not used.
_What the USAAC did, or at least the 8th Air Force, was to mandate that no drop tanks could be used on fighters._
Feel free to cite the order stating that and the date of such order.
_The P47 had a very nice 200 gallon drop tank developed for it from the very beginning, but it was not used_
Unpressurized ferry tanks make for poor combat drop tanks.
That mandate is a myth based on an early 1939 memo. Things changed not long after that and there was no intentional decision not to procure drops tanks during the war. That is complete misinformation that you probably got on TH-cam. At the beginning of 1942 Hap Arnold ordered the air staff to do whatever it took to get drop tanks on fighters as soon as possible. Later in 1942 he ordered development of a long-range fighter that could escort bombers to Poland and back, which is what led to fitting the P-51 with the auxiliary fuselage tank.
After building the entire P47, I don’t think building a drop tank for high altitude would have been a problem. It wasn’t, because as soon as the USAAC finally wanted drop tanks they got them right away.
It’s not a myth. Hap Arnold, as CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR CORPS said “no tactical aircraft will be equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks”. That sounds like, we’ll, exactly what it says. True, the USACC wasn’t going to stop the private development of drop tanks, but they weren’t going to use them.
@@josephzelch7397 _After building the entire P47, I don’t think building a drop tank for high altitude would have been a problem._
A drop tank rated for combat operations had four conditions to be satisfied: (1) it had to be pressurized so that fuel could be drawn from it at higher altitudes; (2) it had to be able to be jettisoned quickly and cleanly from the aircraft; (3) the aircraft carrying it had to have the necessary racks and sway braces to carry the tank; and (4) the aircraft had to have the necessary fuel plumbing internally.
Regarding that last point, the P-47 lacked the racks and plumbing needed to carry drop tanks under the wings until modification kits were received from Republic in November 1943, which were then fitted to the aircraft over the subsequent months. The P-47 had a low ground clearance which considerably restricted the size and shape of drop tank that could be carried under the fuselage. The P-38 and P-51 did not have this problem as both could carry drop tanks or bombs under the wings.
P47N had a longer combat radius than the P51D-H!
But it required A LOT more fuel to do so.
P-47N = 557 gallons of internal fuel + 440 gallons of drop tank fuel (997 gallons total) had a combat radius of 920 miles
P-51H = 260 gallons of internal fuel + 220 gallons of drop tank fuel (480 gallons total) had a combat radius of 886 miles
The P-51H had a combat radius 96% of that of the P-47N while using 48% the fuel.
P-47N = 1,840 miles total / 997 gallons total = 1.85 air miles per gallon
P-51H = 1,772 miles total / 480 gallons total = 3.69 air miles per gallon
Combine the above with the P-51 being significantly cheaper to build, and that's why the P-47 left active service quickly after the war while the P-51 stayed.
"As a measure of this defence, when the so-called Battle of Berlin started in November 1943, Bomber Command had a daily average of 890 aircraft with crews. At the conclusion of that battle four months later in March 1944, Bomber Command had lost 1,047 bombers and well over 7,000 aircrew. In addition, 1,682 bombers were damaged of which more than 100 were totally destroyed on landing back in Britain. New inexperienced aircrews replacing those killed over European air space had to learn the hard way in the most ferocious air battle in history. Bomber aircrews were well aware that only 29% of them would survive a single tour of 30 operations and that only 9% could except to survive 2 tours."
BBC Battle of Berlin by AgeConcernShropshire
Harris' campaign against Berlin was a mistake. If he had instead kept hitting the Ruhr, German war production would have been significantly impacted. (As it was, the Ruhr campaign caused German military production to stagnate for seven months.)
They did not KNOW that the bombers could not properly defend themselves was not confirmed until the
Summer of 1943.
Sort of. There was knowledge that Luftwaffe fighters (and most modern fighters) could easily intercept B17s by 1941. They also knew that armament on fighters had increased both in volume and importantly, range. 20/30mm cannons were in play, not only small numbers of rifle caliber or mere .50 calibur guns in small quantity. They assumed B17s own .50 caliber armaments would be sufficient to attrit attackers and would outrange most of their gunnery. Neither proved true in reality, though the attrition of fighters was pretty high especially early days.
The P-38 could have saved the day as it did have drop tanks available but several problems in the design that should have been corrected prewar kept it from fame and saw it shot down in large numbers by the Luftwaffe. The first problem was it did not have a pressurized cockpit to make up for it being so large, instantly recognizable, and even having blind spots due to the nacelles on either side. If it could have always been above the Luftwaffe that was probably the advantage it needed. There had been a fatality prewar in the pressurized cockpit program and it was dropped. A critical mistake but not the only one. It could fly fairly high even without pressurization but if you pointed the nose down at any appreciable angle the plane hit compressibility and went out of control. A huge disadvantage that could have been fixed easily enough with dive brakes but did not happen till very late in the war. So even if it had an altitude advantage it was impossible to use energy tactics by diving from a high altitude. And finally, while it could actually turn really well it could not roll worth a darn which was another huge disadvantage. Especially against the FW-190 which had a phenomenal roll rate. Again, boosted controls that allowed it to match the superior roll rates of most single engine fighters were fitted very late in the war. There were also other problems...a long list of them. But even with all the disadvantages it was still a lethal fighter as it was deadly in the pacific at lower altitudes against zeros. It is actually my favorite fighter not because it was great but because it could have been. So interesting.
My understanding is that the lack of more advanced superchargers with the Allison engines was a major drawback for the P38 in the European theater. The dogfighting was done at higher altitudes in Europe than in the Pacific Theater.
Actually...no. You might be confusing it with the early P-51 before it was fitted with the Merlin. The P-38 had turbo-chargers that allowed it to fly at high altitude with plenty of performance up there. The problem was, as I commented, if you pointed the nose down a little too steeply at high altitude at high speed the plane would go into an uncontrollable dive that could not be pulled out of until at a much lower altitude that occasionally destroyed the aircraft. It also had a poor heater, which sounds ridiculous but was true. The pilots suffered from the cold and the engine systems were complicated, controls poorly placed, and a constant distraction. Planes like the P-47 and the FW-190 had several automatic engine control features but the P-38 did not and the Allison engines were also not so great. @@disphoto
the US even converted a few Spitfires into long range escort fighters and tried to convince the RAF to do it by flying them to england across the Atlantic, but the RAF was wholly uninterested.
I believe if you look at the size of the spitfire you will see that there was no room for the fuel it needed to return home after dropping it's tanks and fighting. The Mustang was slightly longer and bigger and this allowed a big tank behind the pilot- which also made it one of the most dangerous fighters to fly because if you pulled back on the stick just a little too far on takeoff and for the first half hour of flight the plane would stall and fall out of the sky. @@SoloRenegade
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb the US modified their example Spitfires to add more fuel in the wings and fuselage, and used the same drop tanks as the P-51. They actually achieved 1600mi range with tie example spitfires.
Another strange thing people don't seem to know. the Allison V12 was more fuel efficient than the Merlin V12, which means it had greater range potential than the Merlin Mustangs and Spitfires. And P-51A in RAF service did fly to Berlin and back at low altitude (less efficient than high altitude cruising) even before the P-47 ever saw combat.
The Allison V12 also had a smaller frontal profile, making the P-51A a lower drag airplane than the P-51B/C/D models. Thus further increasing both speed and range potential.
The Allison V12 also was 300lb lighter than the Merlin, thus giving still greater range, speed, climb rate, and service ceiling performance than P-51C/B/D models.
The Allison V12 was also more powerful, producing 1750HP at 70" MAP in 1942, with pilots pushing the engine to 72-75" in combat in North Africa without damage to the engine. Late-war engine variants were putting out 2,200HP at 70" MAP, with pilots still pushing the engines to over 70" MAP in combat. Allison's own testing proved that sustained operation of their engines at 70" MAP resulted in no damage to the engine. The Merlin could never achieve those same HP numbers at equivalent periods in the war. The P-51A did 415mph at 5000ft on only 1400HP. She was never officially tested at 70"+ MAP, but we can extrapolate what the P-51A would be capable of. The XP-40 was only 10mph slower than the XP-47B at 5000ft flying on only 1000HP (335mph vs 344mph). And P-40N at high manifold pressures (2200HP) were reaching 410mph at low altitudes.
Imagine what a P-51A would have been capable of had North American and Allison gotten their wish to develop a high altitude 2-stage supercharger for the Allison. We'd have gotten a faster, higher flying, faster climbing, lighter, higher HP, lower drag, longer ranged P-51 than what we got with the Merlin.
Great video...👍
What were the long range escort planes of the cold war? Who was supposed to fly in with the B36 through the B52?
No one. Those bombers were to fly on their own, using electronic countermeasures and the vastness of the Soviet airspace for protection
I love the memo line, "Whether you use an existing type or start from scratch is your problem." Having served in the USAF 23 years (12 at groups HQ logistics), the tone of that one sentence alone jumps right out at you like an angry snapping dog ready to bite. I'm sure that lit a fire under Giles and his logistics staff! Wow!
Great stuff yet again WW2 USB. Can't top the use of the period sources and analysis.
Any chance you could post a link to your data?
Excellent - Thanks !
😎👍
Interesting and a excellent stab at gleaning the answer from the avaiable data. However, there was no mention of the likely decreasing numbers of German fighters over that time frame. The declining numbers of fighters and/or good pilots would also lead to lower bomber losses. Lots to consider.
The Luftwaffe was able to inflict losses on U.S. forces commensurate with the number of U.S. combat sorties up through April 1944. After that, however, losses drop sharply relative to the number of combat sorties, meaning the Luftwaffe's daytime fighter force effectiveness fell dramatically.
The P38, using cruise control techniques, created by Charle Lindberg with the 5th airforce, they had the range. As for the Mustang it designed to British specific requirements. It was supposed to supplement the P40 in the ground attack, rhubarb attacks. The variant purchased by Army Airforce was the A36. There was change in fighter tactics. The fighters went in ahead of the bombers in a large fighter sweep. Attacking fighters on the ground and while forming up.
_The P38, using cruise control techniques, created by Charle Lindberg with the 5th airforce, they had the range._
There is a huge difference between the Pacific and European theaters: in the Pacific there were vast stretches of ocean over which enemy aircraft would not be encountered, thus allowing for maximum fuel efficient techniques. In Europe, however, encountering enemy aircraft was a possibility as soon as crossing the coast over the continent, thus requiring higher cruise speeds. Those higher cruise speeds lowered fuel efficiency as compared to the Pacific.
P-38s operating in Europe also had trouble with the cold air over the continent which blunted their effectiveness.
Lindberg developed those fuel saving techniques in the Pacific theater in the summer of 1944. I don't think they were ever used in Europe. The P-38's were already being withdrawn from Europe by then, anyway.
Most of the P47's were capable of using drop tanks to significantly extend their fighting radius, but those drop tanks were not supplied until about the time the P51's were in theater. In other words, a longer-range escort was available earlier, but the powers-that-be did not consider it a high enough priority to order the drop tanks.
@@jfess1911 The P-47 was simply nowhere near as fuel efficient as the P-51 as an aircraft design. This is amply demonstrated by looking at the cruise charts in the respective operating manuals --- the P-51 achieved far higher air miles per gallon.
The P-47 was a great aircraft, but its R-2800 engine and considerable weight (thanks to its turbosupercharger installation) made it a fuel hog, and it required a lot more fuel to go the same distance as the P-51.
@@jfess1911 Agreed on the P47 issue. Greg's Airplanes has commented have speculated that the P47s were not used more after the arrival of the P51, at least in part, due to help hide the failure to use drop tanks earlier (th-cam.com/video/aCLa078v69k/w-d-xo.html). However, the long-term reasons the P51s were used were because P51s were significantly less expensive than the P47s and had better fuel economy, which was better for both cost and logistics.
P38's, P47's and P51's had all already been going on deep penetration mission's by the time Lindbergh toured around the Pacific in the summer of 44 teaching P38 units there how to extend their range, the crucial missing element in Europe before the first months of 1944 was the US made all metal pressurized drop tanks, not Lindbergh's range extending techniques or P51's.
But most importantly when it comes to the ranges of the fighter's in Europe and another thing that catches the 1945 USAAF fighter range report lying about fighter ranges is the fact that not only was the P38 over Berlin before the P51 was it was actually over Berlin before B17's were.
A little known and often forgotten part of the USAAF's bombing history in Europe was what was called the "Droop Snoot" missions involving P38's that were modified to work as medium bombers, they bombed Berlin in late 43 before any other USAAF aircraft did which made them the first USAAF aircraft over Berlin with the exception of photo recon planes which by the way were also P38's, some of the Droop Snoot P38's even had Norden bombsights in them that acted as the lead bombers, and they even had regular P38's flying along with them as escorts, everyone always misses this point when talking about fighter ranges in Europe because when doing the research they only ever look under "fighter's" for the history of all the USAAF fighter aircraft in Europe.
Even so when it does come to fighter escorts after the fighter's finally got the necessary type of drop tanks for long range escort it was the P47 that broke the Luftwaffe's back in the first half of 1944 shooting down 570 of the 893 German fighter's in the first six months of 44, the P51 started to be used as escorts at the same time the US made all metal drop tanks became available but there wasn't that many of them yet, the P47 units qualified to fly escort missions outnumbered them at that time, it really wasn't until the later half of 44 is when large number's of P51 units had been formed and got qualified to fly escort.
And the failure to develop, in a timely fashion, long range drop tanks and their associated plumbing, for the P-47 Thunderbolt.
Also, the failure to bring a second source for P-38 production on line until the war was almost over.
And, once the Merlin engined P-51 came into service, the first group was sent to the 9th AF! The second group was also slated to go to the 9th, but it was "traded" for a P-47 group.
Another factor was that in early 1944 GENS Spaatz and Hunter were kicked upstairs and replaced by General Doolittle and General Kepner.
the crazy part is the RAF was operating P-51A in combat over Europe a full 12 months before the first P-47 combat sortie was flown over Europe. And in those 12months, RAF P-51s even flew to Berlin and back on recon missions. And RAF P-51s were the first allied fighters to fly combat sorties over Germany in WW2 (and on the RAF's first combat patrol using P-51s no less).
The P-51A (Mustang II) had the Allison engine. The P-51B/C (Mustang III) had the Packard-built Merlin engine, which is what allowed the aircraft to have the high altitude performance necessary for the escort fighter role.
Usually you can't compare a photo recon plane to an actual fighter.
Haven't checked on this Recon version of teh P-51A but usually photo reconaissance planes have improved high-altitude performance, more fuel, no guns and even removed armour. They are designed to run away from opposition, not fight it.
@@thomaskositzki9424 the British Recon was done at low altitude from what I read, far less fuel efficient flying. But the Allison V12 was more fuel efficient than the Merlin as well. And the P-51A were lower drag designs than the P-51B/C/D due to the Allison engine being smaller frontal profile than the Merlin. The Allisons were 300lb lighter than the Merlin as well. All of these things boost range.
But yes, typically the recon flies unarmed and light.
But the very first ever combat mission of a P-51 was an Allison powered A model, British MkI. Flight of 8 entered Germany low level attacking numerous ground targets, and then outran all pursuing fighters back to England all at low level. The P-51A variants were the fastest airplanes in Europe at low level, even with armor and guns and armed for low level ground attack.
@@primmakinsofis614 the Allison was 300lb lighter, more fuel efficient, higher HP, more reliable, and lower drag than the Merlin. All of that made the Allison powered Mustangs longer ranged and faster.
Had North American gotten their way, they would have installed a 2 stage supercharger on the Allison same as the Merlin, and produced a vastly superior high altitude long rage escort fighter to the Merlin powered Mustangs.
With a proper high altitude forced induction system, like the P-38 had, the Allsion produced far more HP at high altitude than the Merlins were capable of.
North American never wanted to use the Merlin, but due to lack of time and US gov support to develop the 2 Stage supercharger, they went with the Merlin on the P-51B/C/D/H.
@@SoloRenegade _All of that made the Allison powered Mustangs longer ranged and faster._
But without the necessary high altitude performance which is what was necessary for bomber escort --- you can't be a successful escort if your best performance is at 15,000 feet while the bombers are at 20,000 to 25,000 feet.
another great vid
They could have greatly increased the range of the P47 much earlier if they'd tried harder and obtained/developed suitable drop tanks for high altitude. The command persisted in the belief that their bombers could get through unescorted much too long.
They could get through and did get through. The question was how to achieve a sustainable loss rate while doing it. The command did not persist in a belief that escort was unnecessary. The myth is propagated here on TH-cam and it has gone viral. The Greg acolytes are the worst, calling anyone does not admit an outdate memo from 1939 as evidence of malicious intent is a troll. Hap Arnold gets much of the blame, and though after the U.S. entered the war he ordered drop tanks developed for fighters as soon as possible, and soon after the 8th began bombing missions he ordered development of a long range escort fighter that could go to the Polish border and back.
Yes they were idiots! Craigs airplanes shows that the P 47 had the range to go to Germany in early 1943 but the stupid Army Air Force did not acquire the already qualified and tested high altitude drop tanks. Anybody that has been in the military understand how stupid the brass is.
@@gort8203: Established policy will typically stay in place until proved counterproductive. It was a mere 4 years from that memo till reality showed the flaws in it. And the 8th was in combat for only about 17 months of that.
@@charlesjames1442 Yes, but it didn't even take 4 years. That memo was based on the squabbles of the 1930s. Even so, it was not planned that bombers would always operate without fighter escort. Even then it was foreseen that bombers would be supported by fighters when the mission indicated a need for it and allowed for it, but that deep penetrations would necessarily have to go beyond the range of fighter support. They would have to defend themselves and accept more losses for important targets because there was no alternative.
By the time the U.S, entered the war both the Spanish Civil War and the Battle of Britain indicated that unescorted bombers were even more vulnerable to fighters than previously thought. Foreseeing what daylight precision bombing would be up against, at the beginning of 1942 Hap Arnold directed the air staff to do whatever it took to get drop tanks on fighters as soon as possible. Before the year was out experience indicated that current fighters would not be enough even with drop tanks, and he ordered immediate development of a long-range fighter that could escort bombers all the way to Poland and back.
@@steveperreira5850 _Yes they were idiots! Craigs airplanes shows that the P 47 had the range to go to Germany in early 1943_
How far into Germany? That is the question. The P-51 was inherently a much more fuel efficient aircraft than the P-47.
The message was clear to me already so pointing it out several times was a bit repetetive.
But hey, I guess you had to say something whilst showing all the interesting data charts. 😉
Those were great, as always!
And thanks for the advice! 😂
Every military at the start of the war was that the bomber would always get thru, and that heavily armed bomberrs could protect themselves. The British finally figured out that this belief was wrong, and switched to night operations. When the Americans showed up, they believed that the American bombers were so well armed that the B17 and B24 could hold their own. When they finally figured out that the British were right, the long range escort fighter was quickly built. It's easy to see that the long range fighter was needed, after the war. Hind sight is always 100%.
Look up the losses for Dambusters.
On your chart, bomber losses went up the last few months of the war. What caused that?
Jets
The fighters were there. The P-47s were there since Nov '42. What neither the P-51 or P-47 had were the drop tanks required to give them the range. Hap Arnold had forbidden the installation of drop tanks on fighters because 'Battleships of the Air", y'know? The British were supplying their Mustangs in the Med with drop tanks very early on.
Greg's airplanes did a great video on the drop tank scandal and was excoriated for it by a horde of trolls. They will be here soon enough. Exactly why they so vehemently deny the obvious facts is a mystery. Just something for contrarian nags and malicious naysayers to do I guess. I think it is P-47 hate since it was really that plane that destroyed the Luftwaffe and the Mustang mopped up by shooting down a bunch of new pilots with little training. P-51 fanboys go crazy over that.
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb Greg is wrong and ignores the numerous historical documents which contradict his narrative.
_Hap Arnold had forbidden the installation of drop tanks on fighters because 'Battleships of the Air", y'know?_
Feel free to cite the document in which Arnold stated that and the date of such document.
B.S.!
The first creep has arrived. Why are there a bunch of trolls so F-ing crazy about this? @@primmakinsofis614
@@GaryChurch-hi8kb _Exactly why they so vehemently deny the obvious facts is a mystery._
Something which Greg himself does when confronted with facts he doesn't like. His video about the B-17 being able to carry as big a bomb load as the Lancaster by using its external racks is a fine example. He claims it wasn't done because reasons. When it was pointed out to him the drag and handling penalties associated with lugging big bombs on the external racks is why they were only used a few times, he just ignored this.
I suggest instead of just slavishly believing whatever some TH-camr claims, perhaps you can do some research of your own. A great many wartime documents have been digitized and made available online greatly easing such research.
In regards to long-range fighters, I'd suggest starting with "Development of the Long-Range Escort Fighter" a 333-page study which details the USAAF's attempts to extend fighter range in both the European and Pacific theaters and the problems encountered. It contains an extensive list of end notes for the citations used.
I like the analytical side of these reports 👍
top little article. 👍👍
10:49 [correction] "When long range -bombers- (fighters) appeared over Berlin, ..."
There is a video of a pilot that flew both the p51 and p47. He states clearly the 47 could go anywhere with the bombers. It was also a great ground attacks aircraft and much better then the 51. So the 51 got to escort and the 47s went on to more ground attack.
It was really the powerplants that were the main factors. At high to very high altitude the P-47's giant turbocharged radial might have had an edge over the P-51 but at medium to high altitude the Merlin engine was pretty awesome.
_There is a video of a pilot that flew both the p51 and p47. He states clearly the 47 could go anywhere with the bombers._
If you could hang enough fuel on the P-47, yes. Keep in mind the P-51 was inherently a much more fuel efficient design, as it was able to achieve far better air miles per gallon than the P-47.
Damn fine work.
Toward the end of the war in the Pacific the B29s had more fighter escorts. The Army Air force also worked with the Navy mining Japanese shipping routes near the home islands
2 issues:
The bomber command were arrogant in thinking “the bomber will always get through” without testing or war gaming the scenario. The isolationist American mind set up until 7 December 1941 was bomber centric in its thinking due to only thinking about continental defence with heavy bombers.
The fighter designers, aviation industry and fighter command did not know what was possible.
Both fighter & bomber command structures did not see the future until they were in it.
Why was the P38 & P47 not modified and pushed into longer range escort sooner is the question?
_The bomber command were arrogant in thinking “the bomber will always get through” without testing or war gaming the scenario._
The bomber DID always get through. The problem was that losses taken in getting through proved to be unsustainable.
_Why was the P38 & P47 not modified and pushed into longer range escort sooner is the question?_
Because it was believed the heavily armed U.S bombers flying in tight formations would be self-defending. And to some extent they were, at least initially. But exposing a bomber stream to hours of potential interception by enemy fighters is another matter entirely, as it turned out.
It wasn't arrogance, it was the best plan they could come up with at the time, and it was true. The bombers always did get through, and the question was how to maintain a sustainable loss rate.
That continental defense doctrine was simply a ploy to get long range bombers into development. The Army knew they were trying to build a strategic bombing capability that would be needed for the next war.
Thanks, your comments and historical data, ends the discussion/debate about which Fighter of the era was the best battlefield implement of War 2,, 🎤⬇️ P-51 is the 🐐❤
Greg's Airplanes and Autos channels provided evidence that the bomber mafia withheld distribution of long range drop tanks for the P-47. The British had these available and had they been used earlier on the P-47, longer range escort would have been possible. But this was not done in order to "prove" the concept of the self escorting bomber. Given how the US Air Corps forced out Billy Mitchell and Claire Chennault for having unwelcome ideas and proving them, I think it is a valid hypothesis.
Refreshingly unusual to have factual information presented as part of a discussion of the US in WW2. Showing both failure & success as well as successful reaction to failures. Most simply portray US involvement in WW2 as a constant success and mostly the only country that took part. Fully expect Masters of the Air to do this.
Thanks, keep it up.
Though why, other than, "not thought of here", the US did not use the Mosquito in numbers is truly bizarre.
If the Mossie was the be all and end all of twin engine bombers why did Britain need 807 Lend Lease B25's, 510 LL B26's and 3,697 LL light bombers ?
Hyperwar Lend Lease shipments Army Air Forces
I would think given the distances in the Pacific that the US covered in the 1930s the Army Air Corps would have wanted a long range fighter.
The decision not to utilize P47s with drop tanks early on was practically criminal. Neither of the Schweinfurt massacres needed to happen.
Ah, another Greg believer, it seems.
Considering he cites contemporary documentation, yes. But you feel free to provide your contradictory evidence once you've finished your smugness.@@primmakinsofis614
@@mattwilliams3456 I see you aren't aware that Greg ignored the many documents which contradicted the story he wanted to tell.
Feel free to go through "Development of the Long Range Escort Fighter" and point out what it gets wrong. It lays out the story in full with extensive citations.
Toward the end of WW1, large biplane bombers were able to fight off biplane fighters, and I believe that may have stalled concentration on long-range fighters. In the mid 1930’s, when the B-17 was developed, it easily outflew the then-current fighters, which were still biplanes. A fighter would get one chance only, and with, say, two .30 caliber guns, would not do much damage. Of course, things had changed completely by 1941. By then,though, the British had 2 years of experience. That this was ignored shows what mental inertia (and not trusting an ally?) can do.
RAF heavies were flying unescorted daylight ops as late as July 1942.
It should also be noted that by Jan. 1944 the German war machine was beginning to be a spent force! They had been at total war for 5 yrs., and against two (U.S. Russia) industrial giants (yeah, I know U.S. didn't enter the war until Dec. 41) it became impossible to keep up with demand! By 44 they started to husband their fighters (due to severe losses on the eastern front) to protect Germany proper! Manpower (pilots and maint. crews) and resources were in short supply! The fact that they were able to hold on as long as they did is a testament to their resilience!
Eastern vs. Western Front - WW2 Air War
th-cam.com/video/f1akJPwwbTk/w-d-xo.html
Super video, not to argue. “The Bomber will alway get through.” Wasn’t this the mantra of the ‘air corps’ in the ‘20s? Then usa bombers were superior machines to the pursuit planes? Who preached this? Arnold, Spatz, Mitchel, Doolittle? Thinking this is a missing aspect of you video? * Are we calculating 800 heavy casualties in total from this mishap? Seems too low a number. * The best US fighters (usaaf/usn) were not available until after mid war? Didn’t it take usa industry time to catch up to the military needs from the battle experience?
"The bomber will always get through" was a phrase used by Stanley Baldwin in a 1932 speech "A Fear for the Future" given to the British Parliament.
THINGS TO COME 1936
th-cam.com/video/knOd-BhRuCE/w-d-xo.html
That's the Army Air Corp malfeasance. Also the Navy subjected their submarines to danger because the magnetic exploders and constant exploders didn't work well
". . . can considered a travesty."
Travesty is defined as 1) An absurd or grotesque misrepresentation. for 2) An appalling version of something.
As in the following example, "travesty" is often followed by "of" as represented in definition 2) by "something" as shown in the following example
"It is a travesty of justice that these four people have been incarcerated while the real perpetrator is walking..."
Interesting
The P-38 had the range why didn’t they use it?
Needed pressured drop tanks. They were just not bought.
Nothing new here but still interesting. One topic I would like to address is the attrition of German pilots and planes. Even setting aside the eastern front which was a black hole that swallowed men and material at 3 times the rate of the west this is not a small factor. Yes the 2 schwinford raids were bad for the 8th but it was no picnic for the luftwaffe either. They lost a lot of pilots and planes intercepting those raids and like Japan those pilots were basically irreplaceable. Its notable that when the P51 showed up at the start of 1944 and started escorting the bombers their orders were to "get the fighters" not "protect the bombers." Those are not the same thing. The bombers were the bait to draw the luftwaffe out. The purpose was to gain air dominance ahead of D-day. It would be interesting to see a chart showing luftwaffe fighter casualties vs US bomber casualties up until January 1944. If you want to make it real interesting some how (color coding????) Indicate the experience level of the German pilots lost (ex: germany lost 25 fighters intercepting this raid of which 10 were veteran pilots and 15 were green. This amounts to xx percent of german veteran pilots in the west.) We'll obviously never know but I suspect between transfers to the east and attrition of experienced pilots (including production rate of aircraft) even without the P-51 the Germans couldnt maintain the kill ratio against the ever growing number of increasingly better armed bombers. Obvious bomber loss rate wouldnt have dropped off as rapidly but, again, I suspect it still would have dropped off as the reich exhausted itself.
Not many countries could afford a long range bomber program in any numbers. Both Japan & Germany did not have the resources to build enough 4 engined long range bombers, crew them, maintain them, supply them and use them. Only 2 countries could do it and one went broke after the war.
If you graph the losses of U.S. aircraft and the number of combat sorties, USAAF losses increased in roughly the same proportion that combat sorties increased. This held true even as the number of sorties greatly increased in the fall of 1943. This relationship continued through April 1944. After that, however, losses fell dramatically compared to sorties. The difference is striking.
The Luftwaffe's effectiveness as a daytime fighter force plunged after April 1944 and never really recovered.
The saddest thing was that the two Swhenford raids were ineffective and based on false intelligence that they would wipe out all of Germany's ball bearings (which they barely affected). What they should have focused on were the synthetic oil refineries (which they eventually did, but not until May 1944). Additionally, the Nordon bombsight was a crock and corrupt. Many a bomber crew die flying straight and level into heave flak so a worthless bombsight could miss by miles.
@@disphoto "Ball-bearings were, however, vital to the war machines of all the belligerents. if the supply of them to Germany or if their manufacture could be reduced or cut off completely, it would be impossible for her to continue the struggle. As early as November, 1942, the Ministry of Economic Warfare had estimated that more than half the ball bearings made in Germany came from the V.R.F. factories and the Fischer factory at Schweinfurt. there was also a factory at Stuttgart and others at Leipzig, Berlin and Elberfeld. France too possessed a number of small establishments. Operation 'SELFRIDGE', an assault on Schweinfurt, was therefore planned, but month after month passed and it was not executed: the technical difficulties were too great. The Air Ministry, however was determined that it should be as soon as they had been overcome."
page 25
Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol III
The major qualification for the data presented in this video is the lack of information about German fighter strength. Hence, we cannot assume that all of the reduction in loss rates to US bombers was due to an increase in Allied fighter cover, rather than to a decrease in enemy fighter strength, and nor can we assume that any reduction in German fighter strength in the West was due solely to the introduction of Allied escorts shooting down German fighters. Likewise, we cannot evaluate the claim that daylight bombing operations secured air superiority for Overlord without considering German fighter strength and losses.
As for evaluating the effectiveness of escorted daylight bombing tactics; it is obvious that escorts were necessary for daylight bombing, and clearly this should have been equally obvious to the USAAF in 1943, thanks to early RAF experience. However, the effectiveness of the chosen solution - providing long range fighter escort - must be judged against the alternative selected by the RAF and by the 20th AF in the Pacific - a switch to night bombing. Retraining the crews would have taken time, but so did waiting for escorts; and we can naturally assume that the retraining would have been easier than it was for the RAF in the first place, because the RAF had already figured out the best practices and could have provided training support.
It is often blindly assumed that one of the primary benefits of the CBO was the destruction of German fighter strength, which in turn secured air superiority for Overlord. Evidently, there was hardly any other benefit in 1943, given the comparatively low numbers of bomber sorties and bombs dropped in that year. This 'benefit' must also be judged against the alternative, which was to take all of the resources expended in bomber production in 1943 and put them into producing more fighters, since the degree of air superiority depends not only on German fighter losses, but on the ratio of Allied fighter strength to German fighter strength. Since the Allies produced more fighters than Germany in 1943, some degree of air superiority would have been achieved regardless of whether or not there was a bomber offensive. Furthermore, any long - range fighter which was capable of escorting bombers into Germany was also capable of attacking German aircraft on the ground in Germany.
"this should have been equally obvious to the USAAF in 1943, thanks to early RAF experience."
RAF heavies were flying unescorted daylight ops as late as July 1942, so hardly "early".
They could easily have flown at night losses would have been far less.
Except they couldn't do daylight precision bombing at night.
It was tried and they couldn't hit shit.
_They could easily have flown at night losses would have been far less._
RAF Bomber Command's losses indicate otherwise.
Lanc loss rate was about 50% higher than B17.
@@primmakinsofis614 Good observation. I always think it strange how some Brits can sardonically lambaste the USAAF for not joining the RAF in more wisely bombing at night, while out the other side of their mouths they proclaim heroism against dreadful odds over the high loss rate experienced by night bombers of RAF bomber command.
Great video. You just need to slow down a little, i.e. some pausing to breathe and to let us absorb what you’ve just related.
You changed your video title no less than 4 times in 2 hours - what gives?
I thought this was very well presented. And the data seems unrefutable. Hubris, ego and defending turf and naive assumptions about the bomber led to the unnecessary loss of lives.
👍👍👍
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