ไม่สามารถเล่นวิดีโอนี้
ขออภัยในความไม่สะดวก
An Explanation of Terminology used in Metaethics
ความคิดเห็น • 96
ต่อไป
เล่นอัตโนมัติ
What is a Counterexample? (and why philosophers use fictional examples)Jeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 36K
An argument against objective morality that defeats itselfJeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 41K
Is Moral Skepticism Self-Refuting? (No, but it has other problems)Jeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 25K
นายกฯ ต่อจาก "เศรษฐา" ใครมีโอกาสได้ตำแหน่งมากที่สุด? | Thai PBS NewsThaiPBSNews
มุมมอง 329K
ยอดนักสืบจิ๋วโคนัน vs จอมโจรคิดDEXclub
มุมมอง 172K
เหนื่อยหน่อยนะ (SOMEONE LIKE ME) - GEMINI Prod. by URBOYTJ [ OFFICIAL MV ]RISER MUSIC
มุมมอง 242K
Does your RED look the same as my RED?Jeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 101K
Does Moral Error prove that there are Objective Moral Laws?Jeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 27K
The Utilitarian Theory of PunishmentJeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 44K
Plato's Euthyphro - Which comes first: God or Morality?Jeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 882K
Two possible arguments against the existence of objective morality (and possible responses)Jeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 39K
The fallacious move from different perspectives to relativism about truthJeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 21K
I Took an IQ Test to Find Out What it Actually MeasuresVeritasium
มุมมอง 8M
Moral Realism and Metaethics | Dr. Russ Shafer-Landau and @KaneBMajesty of Reason
มุมมอง 17K
The Hard Problem of ConsciousnessJeffrey Kaplan
มุมมอง 120K
เหตุผลที่ลาออกจากงาน #การ์ตูน #tamzen #แต้มเซน #shortvideoTAMZEN
มุมมอง 40K
LIVE🔥 “คุณหญิงสุดารัตน์” นัดประชุมด่วน หลัง สส.ไทยสร้างไทย โหวตนายกฯ “อิ๊งค์” | 16 ส.ค.67THAIRATH Online Originals
มุมมอง 186K
The Real Process of Harvesting Honey 🐝🍯 #funnycats #funnyvideo #reaction #honeyMeowtropolis
มุมมอง 4.4M
คุยกับคุณปลื้ม! 5-4 เศรษฐาหลุดนายก! ประชาธิปไตยแบบใดเอาปากกามาวงDaily Topics
มุมมอง 214K
Not a boring lecture at all. Very entertaining and illuminating as usual.
Besides that, he once again shows how good he is at writing backwards so that we can read what he writes well
Best ethics lesson I’ve ever had. Help me get a big picture of the ethics landscape in 20 minutes. Unbelievable! Thank you so much!
I guess I'm a bit strange 'cause I was really excited to watch this kind of terminology lesson. Like omg a lot of terms to understand and categorize 😂
Yeah, me too. It lets me figure out what I am, why I should or shouldn't be that, and get a name for it.
sry hawks
Kaplan set up a straw man by saying that it was dull. He tried to trick us for some reason! Maybe he thought it would help our learning.
@@kellysmith7357 do you say that to every people who likes to learn or you're just here to spread some negative vibes?
@@anaiscarrichon6409 ???
The more videos I watch from you the more I appreciate your facility to make things clear. Thanks
It would not matter if it was boring or not as this discourse and knowledge of these terms is what will help us progress as a modern, democratic, and pluralistic society.
I appreciate how you clearly laid out all of these diverse perspectives to the question of morality.
Thank you for the video. I am not convinced by your (or Shafer-Landau's?) categorisation of consequentialism and non-consequentialism. As you say, they are normative theories, not meta-ethical ones. I see no contradiction between the claims "I believe that actions ought to be morally judged on the basis of their consequences" and "I do not believe that consequentialism is an objective moral truth". I may believe in consequentialism and still acknowledge that it is just a subjective belief of mine. For instance, Richard Joyce argues for fictionalism in meta-ethics, according to which the denial of the existence of objective moral truths is totally compatible with the adoption of a specific normative framework insofar as it is a useful fiction.
This is a semantic argument. You're essentially begging the question "Is this video about how I believe the world IS, or is this video about how I believe the world SHOULD BE?". It's entirely coherent to acknowledge that the world isn't, in fact, as we might ideally wish it to be.
Davide, I was thinking the same thing, but I suppose that's to be expected in an overview. Even the yes/no answer to whether or not there are objective moral facts seems somewhat limiting: In my view (which I recently learned seems quite similar to 'moral pragmatism') objective moral 'facts' can be developed and discovered in much the same way as objective mathematical or logical 'facts' are developed and discovered. They're all conceptual systems developed by humanity as abstractions from real-world needs and phenomena, which can obviously be objective inasmuch as they are collaborative (mitigating or removing individual, cultural and perhaps eventually species biases), rational (developed using coherent and consistent thinking) and empirically consistent (making use of and not contradicting real-world data).
So the answer to the question "Are there objective moral truths" IMO is something along the lines of "kind of" or "we're getting there" or "some species could develop them eventually."
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_ethics
Its actually really interesting to learn what my own theory and idelogy is called and how they work in opposition to different ideologies. I would have never known that i was a moral subjetivist ol
How I would love to know a philosopher personally and be able to engage in a discussion about these topics. I think that would be time well spent.
1) Subjective facts are a subset of Objective facts.
2) I am a moral Objectivist-> Consequentialist, and so is everyone. Disputes arise from ignorance.
3) Consequentialism gets a bad rap because people look at it superficially. A sufficient consequentialist view requires many reiterations.
4) Ontological morals are only derived from a sufficiently iterated Consequentialist analysis.
I realized towards the end that I am impressed by your ability to write backwards such that it is forward facing, though no doubt you get a lot of practice.
Great lecture. Absolutely necessary to make your meaning of terms as clear as possible first in order to avoid confusion later.
@jeffreyKaplan Just found your channel. I appreciate your enthusiasm, and that glass board thing? Excellent. I've always preferred the terms deontological and teleological, when discussing ethics. Thank you
I just recently found these videos and I think they're great - this one was not boring at all.
One thing about the error theory pertaining to flat earth: the analogy doesn't seem to hold up. The error theory for morality is that statements like "murder is wrong" and "murder is not wrong" are both false, but for flat earth a statement like "Antarctica is an ice wall" is false while "Antarctica is not an ice wall" is true. In other words, flat earth propositions do have truth values (they can be true or false, not just only ever false).
Edit: I suppose if there were two flat-earthers arguing about whether the ice wall was 1,000 km tall or 2,000 km tall, both would be making false claims. But if we assume that everyone in the world is a flat-earther, with some believing the ice wall to be 1,000 km tall while others believe it to be 2,000 km tall, there would still be a true proposition "Antarctica is not an ice wall" even if nobody in the world holds that proposition in their mind. Error theory, on the other hand, claims that there are no true propositions about some subject, i.e., if this pertained to flat earth theory, then neither the claim "Antarctica is an ice wall" nor "Antarctica is not an ice wall" would be true (both propositions would be false).
I don't know that you were necessarily attacking the error theory, but I believe error theory does pertain to flat earth because any statement about the earth necessarily assumes its flat. Statements like "Antarctica is an ice wall" are really saying "the earth is flat AND Antarctica is an ice wall." If a statement truly doesn't say the earth is flat, then it isn't about flat earth. The equivalent for morality would be "you ought to do/not do things that are right/wrong AND X is right/wrong." It doesn't make sense to say something is right/wrong if you aren't first assuming objective morality, you might as well claim to see a color that doesn't exist. So I guess error theory is just saying that claiming a false thing and some other thing simultaneously makes the whole claim false, go figure.
@@geoluread3436 That's an interesting take. Then this would mean that a flat-earther saying "Antarctica is not an ice wall" is saying something false since we are to assume that we should take their proposition as an implicit conjunction "the earth is flat and Antarctica is not an ice wall"? Should we then take all propositions that a person says as the proposition as part of a conjunction of everything else they believe? This would seem to make most propositions that people utter incorrect since most people likely believe at least one false proposition.
@@TheCynicalPhilosopher I think in my argument, I was trying to make the word "and" do multiple things at once which it can't. A better explanation would be that "Antarctica is an ice wall" translates to "I KNOW Antarctica is an ice wall (because the earth is flat)." Antarctica may or may not be an ice wall, but a premise being false means the person doesn't actually KNOW it. Someone might be correct in saying that one should not kill, but they cannot be correct in saying they are justified in believing so as long as they use untrue premises (that killing is objectively wrong). I don't know if this is still considered error theory but if it isn't, then error theory cannot be correct as absolute knowledge is (functionally) impossible.
Maybe the answer you were looking for is that the error theory of morality suffers the same issue you proposed. "Killing is NOT wrong" is not equal to saying that it's right, which took me a while to realize. So it's true that killing is not wrong, because nothing is wrong and nothing is right. But if you say "giving to charity is right," you would also agree with "giving to charity is not wrong," even though only one of those is true. I think this is where it goes back to being about justified belief or knowing.
@@geoluread3436 Ah. So it is more about the analysis of knowledge (i.e., justified true belief). It's certainly an interesting question: if a person looks at a clock that is stopped at 6:00 but the person doesn't know the clock is stopped, but it also just so happens to actually be 6:00, then does the person have knowledge about what time it is?
I would still say that lack of justification for belief doesn't work as an example of error theory. It seems like it would be closer to non-cognitivism. Even without justification, the person saying "it is 6:00" is not saying something untrue; similarly for the flat-earther who says "Antarctica is not an ice wall" is not saying something untrue. If we add the implied qualification that there is an unspoken sentiment such as "I have good reason to believe that Antarctica is not an ice wall because of (by virtue of) the flat-earth model that I endorse" then the untrue part of the statement pertains to their grounding the belief in something untrue (they have a true belief, it is just not a justified true belief), not that the fact asserted (that Antarctica is not an ice wall) is untrue.
Maybe I’m wrong, but I think an error theorist would not say that the claim “Murder is not wrong” is false. They would say that the claim “Murder is morally permissible” is false. You are, I think, assuming that the negation of wrongness is exactly the same as moral permissibility, and for some moral theories that may be accurate, but the error theorist rejects this. Instead, for the error theorist, the negation of wrongness could also mean that murder lacks of ANY moral property, and as for him, moral properties do not exist, the statement is true. Negations of any moral property such as wrongness are not, in and of themselves, a moral claim, as the negation can also include the negation of moral properties themselves, thus they can be, and indeed are true, under error theory.
Thus, it is, in fact, not different from the flat earth example, as saying that “Antártica is not a wall” includes all that antártica could be that is not a wall, which includes the truth about antártica, and that is why the statement is true. So when I say “murder is not wrong” I am not saying that murder is morally permissible, but that it lacks the property of wrongness, which does include moral permissibility but also the lack of moral properties in general, which makes the statement true for the moral error theorist.
Far from boring. I felt motivated to take notes!
I don't know about calling people who believe in non-objective moral facts relativists. I'm glad you didn't write that down. It would make Plato a relativist and Plato is usually seen as opposing relativism of the sophists.
The following is meant as a thought experiment, rough sketch of an idea and is therefore underdeveloped and simply meant for fun.
A mystical meta moral-realism system, coined MAM.
Multidimensional Adaptive Morality or MAM is a conceptual meta-morality-framework that seeks to bridge various individual and collective moral understandings into a cohesive, overarching metaphysical structure, grounded in moral realism.
MAM suggests that the diversity of moral frameworks humans operate within actually are expressions of a deeper more complex meta-moral system that exists beyond our full comprehension.
This system is envisioned as a dynamic, multidimensional space where different moral perspectives and values interact, negotiate, and sometimes compete for precedence in determining what is considered right or morally superior in any given situation.
In MAM, the meta-moral framework is not static but highly adaptive, capable of contextual adjustments to integrate diverse values and priorities. It's as if the meta-moral space hosts a continuous dialogue among various moral positions, with the outcome of this dialogue shifting based on the specifics of each situation and the relevant variables at play. This process acknowledges the existence of multiple valid moral stances that coexist and sometimes converge to form a consensus on what is morally right for a particular moment and context, reflecting a complex interplay of factors both within and beyond human understanding.
MAM posits that the true extent and nature of this meta-moral framework are ultimately unfathomable, encompassing an infinite array of variables and potential interactions that far exceed human cognitive capacities.
MAM in essence is a combination of moral pluralism, Non-Reductive Moral Realism and mystical realism.
We did invent planets though. Whether or not Pluto is a planet or it deserves to be in a dwarf planet category is entirely up to us and what things we care about. There is no inherent planetness.
We invented what classifies a planet as being a planet. The actual object exists regardless of how we classify it or call it.
@@colinwithrow1083 The singular object of a planet? No. Does the object of a planet include the atmosphere? Why or why not? The answer to this can only be because of what we value from a human perspective. Even just the rock that makes up pluto is just atoms arranged in a way, not a singular object at all. Even atoms are composed of quarks and we don't even know if those are fundamentally indivisible. The only thing we seem to be able to objectively describe is that there is some "stuff".
Spot on! Good for you and God bless 🙌
Thank you for clarifying that you did not invent the table
SO very late to this, sounds really good so far.
Does Landau end up giving his grounding for this objective morality?
I'm a Moral Subjectivist, but I'm also an a**hole, so I don't care what your moral beliefs are or how you arrived at them. I'm going to judge you based on my moral code. I also recognize that there are laws and rules set by society, or just people in power, that I need to follow or not follow at my own peril.
please continue these online lectures!
Near the end of the video: I think it's nice to think that we made the words "good" and "bad", but that there's actual good or bad that we simply discovered and we didn't create the actual good or bad. The problem is that Venus is definitely a real planet, but it might be harder to show how good & bad are real things and not simply Platonic Forms like a triangle.
Hopefully the next lectures bring this up.
It's difficult to show because it can't be shown. If good/bad and good/evil were objective, then it would be pretty likely they would apply to non humans as well. And in the case of good/evil, you would need Snakes and Lions and Dinosaurs to have had a framework for good and evil, rather than stimulus response, evolutionary responses etc.
In the case of good/bad, (vs good/evil) you can sort of recover useful definitions, but it's hard to think of "good" as anything other than "I like that" vs "bad" as "ouch". One of the tools a human has (the animal equivalent of claws/teeth/venom) is a big brain which allows a lot of forecasting/predicting of the future. "Good" in this case can take on a meaning of "I think I will like the outcome sometime in the future of experiencing X", but that's not a moral claim, that's just a claim about something being favorable vs unfavorable.
I have not encountered a moral claim that can't be reduced to a claim about evolutionary fitness. "Murder is wrong" -> "We are a cooperative species so helping each other vs hurting, increases my own survival most of the time."
Good or bad is not a "thing". Venus is one. Good or bad is a judgment.
@@fifikusz last I checked a judgment IS a "thing"
Definitive not boring at all!
I am a moral hierarchical subjectivist.
We all have a personal moral code, but an infinitely powerful being’s moral code is the only one that matters because He would be the ultimate arbiter of punishment and reward
Never heard of this. Doesn't that mean than that if a powerful being's moral code is valid that it does not matter at all what YOU think or your subjective opinion on morality is, you could be born a psychopath who just does not have any normal moral stances at all but it wouldn't matter since it's all relative to that being's moral code and not yours.
presumably, in many cultures that practice human sacrifice, only certain members of those societies, priests, maybe, are allowed to do it, and only under certain circumstances.
What is my label if I both believe there are objective moral facts AND that there are also individual moral facts?
As an example, not everyone can do what spider man can do, yet spidey’s entire argument is “I have power, I must act”
The obvious question is what do we even mean by the word moral. What do we mean by right and wrong.
Wait…if we go back to everyone having their own morals and how they are right in their own ways. Would that mean if my morals are that murder and stealing is good and not wrong, would it make it right?
I’d say our discourse is 80-90 percent moral discourse. Not 2 percent moral discourse. Am I wrong? 🤣
Vultures. The birds you're thinking of are vultures.
How do we read along with his students?
Don't call this a boring lecture. Some of the hardest errors to overcome are those that are baked into the terminology.
I think the only tenable position on moral relativism is that there are moral truths, but they refer to characteristics of the situation. Moral objectivism specifically about swinging one's arm, for example, is untenable: it fails to distinguish between punching a person and punching a punching bag, let alone between punching a person in self-defense and punching a person in a boxing match. Similar conclusions apply, very pervasively, to many aspects of almost any situation, including cultural ones, for almost any action we might want to evaluate. But that's not the same as saying that no matter what any culture believes, their answer is right for them. It's not even close.
"Error theory" as described is a complete non-starter. If a flat-earth "theorist" points to a photograph and says 'the horizon in this photograph is a straight line, to within the precision of the camera's optics', that's true if the horizon in the photo is straight, and fals if it isn't, regardless of whether the statement is embedded in a bunch of word salad purporting to argue that the earth is flat. The word salad, by contrast, is typically neither true nor false. It's just word salad.
Then there's non-cognitivism. It's mostly true: most putative moral statements do not express moral propositions. They express a mish-mash of group affiliation, emotion, and social-desirability bias. That doesn't mean that there aren't genuine moral statements.
I skipped a point earlier: it's probably worth distinguishing between facts and propositions here. Within any formal axiomatic system, we have lots of propositions. But no matters of fact can follow from that, without the additional premise that the axiomatic system is applicable to the description of something we include in our ontology. I think there are moral facts, not just moral truths. But it may be tenable to classify moral truths in the same category with the formal truths of axiomatic theories, and facts as another pure category, so that putative moral facts belong in some hybrid category rather than being strictly factual.
The video doesn't do a good job describing error theory. A better comparison would be this: Atheists believe every single statement about God is wrong because there's no such thing as God. Ethical error theorists believe every single statement about ethics is wrong because there's no such thing as ethics.
To an error theorist, attributes such as "good" and "evil" simply doesn't exist in this world. It is an error to speak as if they do.
The flat earth example is a pretty great example. It's also pretty easy to imagine that 5000 years ago, a lot more people (as a %) would have made statements consistent with flat earth, so maybe the volume of moral statements made today isn't really an issue.
5000 years ago the earth was just celebrating its 1000th birthday probably with Noah and all his peeps at his private zoo. They probably just asked God and He would've told 'em the earth is actually the shape of a hotdog. Probably...
21:00 There is huge error in this. It assumes that because there is a word describing the fact/entity, this fact/entity exists. It's not true in many cases, e.g. "unicorn". The word has been invented, but unicorns aren't true. Some people treat word "good" or "evil" as such unicorns.
How do you write backwards?
What about a different spin on moral subjectivism? Whether an action is morally right or wrong is determined not just by the person who performs the action, but subjectively by each spectator. I think that is closest to reality. Everyone judges everyone according to their own moral code and I will always claim the right to hold everyone accountable to my personal moral standards. If different moral codes clash on the most fundamental level, then perhaps neither is objectively wrong. It is just very difficult to form a society or maybe even coexist peacefully. That is why most have a similar idea of what is right or wrong, at least for the most important things.
Or perhaps that is a form of non-cognitivism.
Does he write backwards ?
Fun story
I was suspended from working as a substitute teacher because I “challenged their core beliefs”
I was using flat earth to teach critical thinking skills and have them apply those skills to their beliefs - all of them, even the ones they think are 100% true 😅 I got Socrate’d
Are there other common terms for moral skeptics within the same branch as moral subjectivism and moral relativism? Neither satisfies my intuitions as i believe both the impact of an action on a group and the individual is relevant to determining the moral good. For instance the right to bodily autonomy/ the right to consent is a very individual dependent moral principle one that is nowadays widely held to varying degrees. Usually this principle holds true so long as negative societally consequences are not believed to be imminent/ of consequence. Thus societal impact has a role in moral truths through the evolutionarily selected trait of shame and guilt by members of our group.
Ethics justified solely by intentions are deontological justifications (out of duty, God, I was just following orders, etc.). Justifications based solely on outcomes is a teleological justification. Both deontological and teleological justifications have their own moral/ ethical hazards - If you only care about outcomes, well then the end justifies the means right? However if you only care about your intentions, you're probably won't like many or most of the inevitable outcomes you get; plus society may give you a one way trip to Nuremburg, for 'just following orders.'
One glaring omission here seems to be any distinction between particular moral facts, vs. abstract moral facts. It's objectively true that there is a computer on my desk. But that is not a universal truth, but rather a particular truth. It's certainly conceivable that moral facts, if such exist, exist as particular facts, rather than abstract facts. But objective here is equated with universal, But that makes the Aristotle view (that morality is a kind of relation between the nature of an act and the nature of the person doing the act) into ... well, it claims to be an objective statement about a fact, but it's not universal as it varies from the nature of one thing to the nature of another what is moral.
Particularism is the view that there are only particular moral truths, not general or universal truths that can take the form of a principle. So, "you should not litter" can not be a moral fact, but "You should not throw this empty coke can on the floor here and now!" can.
I'm not sure if it classifies as invention but more so our nature towards morality. The very real virtually universal emotions of guilt, and shame are foundational to that truth. Though you could argue that these emotions are nurtured within us towards or against certain actions, however I think the primal nature of it could be well traced to something as ironic as spilling milk. In a survival situation where everyone's lives are at stake in a tribe or small group even, if one person is definitively at fault for the loss of vital resources, there is no doubt in my mind for there to at least be serious mental ramifications that include shame and guilt, or if there are none in the individual there would be fingers pointed at them from the group they are from as a result.
Something like that indicates to me that although we all instinctually have associated these feelings like righteousness and guilt or shame to morality in essence, to question the objectivity of morality is to first question what you are instinctually driven to defend or condemn. Those actions determined by your instinct are then reinforced throughout your life as a consequence of the decisions you've made to apply them to other situations. The way our brain works these emotions into reasoning is through the association of memories and consequences as well as survival. We don't learn empathy so much as we experience it, or acknowledge it. Similarly, morality is inherently apart of our instinctual nature, but our complexity overrules or replaces the conditions to which morals are applied due to social experiences and our own perception over time.
cringe but red-pilled: non-cognitivism
based but blue-pilled: moral subjectivism
based and red-pilled: consequentialism
cringe and blue-pilled: moral relativism
Is there an objectivist camp that are non-consequentialist when the act is virtuous and consequentialist when the act is not? Like, you get credit for taking the virtuous risk regardless of the outcome and you don't get charged with a the gravest possible "sin" (for lack of a better word) when your immoral actions have no meaningful consequences just by chance alone? There would have to be a name for that since all legal systems (for the latter) are set up that way... Well all but white collar crime because our system is corrupt.
I like how much time was dedicated to Flat Earth
Wait wait...does he have to write this, backwards?
Maybe, some people can do it, but I think he could also have flipped the footage.
Thank you!
This guy looks like Jake Gyllenhal and his expressions also look like him and that’s one reason I watch this guy. I like to imagine he’s explaining philosophy to me after he just murdered someone
Don't know the point yet Jeffrey is trying to make.
It seems to me that moral relativism is unexplored.
Lets say human sacrifice is done in society A
Then, society B doesn’t accept it.
If society A conducts human sacrifice with unwilling members of society B, that means they are transgressing, and what does the more relativist say here? He can say that it’s moral, because it’s their society, or, he can say that it is immoral, because it may be their society, but they are spilling over into another society, which makes it immoral.
Transgressions = immoral
However, the latter moral relativist does acknowledge that taking someone’s life is a transgression, which means, even within society A, he still recognizes that as “globally immoral” but, at the same time, “locally moral” within society A.
I reckon you get a lot of students hitting on you
This analysis is confused by presuming that "moral truths", "moral facts," and "moral laws" are synonymous. They are three different categories of thinking about morality.
Morality is a proud selfish expression of one’s own ignorance for the importance of desired social behavior.
Pride and ignorance
Pride is ignorance boasting.
ignorance is life’s greatest adversary and denial is ignorance’s strongest ally.
An opinion is a deep seeded selfish desire to express one’s own ignorance. A desire so selfish that even ignorance wants to be alone.
ignorance miss uses the power of persuasion by transforming
little knowledge into as if it were a greater knowing.
Pressing one’s nescience point of view by oneself over another person. A willful disregard for the limitation of one’s own reference, and ignoring the evidence to the contrary. Pride is ignorance boasting.
G. B.- Garcia (cc)2019
◦
It's not true that Venus was a planet long before we got here. The reason it's not true is that "planet" is not just a word, but a scientific category that has not always been defined the way it is now defined. We know that because Pluto was a planet from 1930, when it was discovered by Clyde W. Tombaugh, until 2006 when it was demoted to dwarf planet. Categories are not always unchangeable. When they are changeable, things that fit into those categories only fit temporarily. If they fit only temporarily, we cannot say that they were always the thing that is the category. That is, nothing was a planet before the category was defined. There may be undiscovered objects that fit the "planet" category now, but that doesn't mean they will still fit the category when they are discovered since the category may be redefined by that time. Were they always planets? No. Nothing is a planet until it fits the definition and is only a planet as long as it continues to fit the definition. They were objects of some kind before then, but they were not "planets" until the term was defined.
❤
We have not invented anything...we are not Gods we cannot create or destroy only remix what is already here.
Moral Subjectivism is the closet answer. Humans have a social instinct to be with others. The group decides what is good for society, usually based upon knowledge. We call these rules "morals". They will vary between societies based upon that societies knowledge. None of these are objective except the original instinct. The results may repeat or conflict between societies.
Replace "moral" with "legal" and it becomes clear. So Kaplan's question "is something universally legal" is obviously no.
Morality is a human construct so I just pick between all of them.
It's wrong to say that something is wrong.
Amazing lecture, not boring at all thank you for sharing! @jeffreykaplan1 Still curious if good an bad exist regardless of our invention of the words to define such facts? And even more curious if we can ever answer that question?
Audio is low, Jeffrey.