What you say about the fine-tuning argument confirming "naive intuitions" is very true. That's why I've always said that the contingency argument is my favourite argument for theism - the central premise, the PSR, is intuitively accepted by 7-year old children all around the world, just in less sophisticated words.
Thanks so much Matthew and Gavin! I'm a lay Christian and far from a philosopher but one thing that I don't understand with the multiverse explanation is in what way is it fundamentally different from the argument that essentially we got lucky with the numbers? Even if there are other universes that doesn't seem to actually add much explanatory power to the question of why our universe is finely tuned. But maybe I'm missing something :)
This is actually a very common objection that depends on subtle points in probability theory but I don't think it's ultimately correct benthams.substack.com/p/the-multiverse-and-inverse-gamblers?
Adding a thought. Tim McGrew argues that the naturalism worldview posits the universe and not-God, which is not inherently more simply claim than the universe and yes-God. (A angnostic wordlview couldn't be compared based on parsimony since it doesn't answer the God question, which is a critical aspect commonly expected of a worldview.) Patrick Flynn further argues this is an incorrect framing since classical theism posits only one fundamental entity (a God of pure act).
The Fine Tuning Argument seems to contradict Divine Simplicity. If Divine Simplicity were true, we should expect the apparent fine tuning of the physical constants to eventually be explainable in terms of a very clean "top down" Theory of Everything (eg, Like Newton's three laws, only more basic). A tinkering Deity that monkeys around with physics simply isn't Simple. This would be the God of "Theistic Personalism" (or, as DBH says, "Monopolytheism"). This is the thing with your apologist buddy Ortlund. Out of one corner of his mouth he says Divine Simplicity is an essential doctrine, but out of the other he pushes this Fine Tuning business. "Whatever best suits your purpose at the time" seems to be the Apologist's Special Pleading Creed
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 to illustrate this, let us describe how the created universe "emanates" down Plato's "Divided Line". 1. On the top quadrant, we have our Simple Almighty God pronouncing the "form" of the universe 2. Next quadrant down, which is one level less abstract and one level more concrete, we have the foundational "idea" of the universe (aka, our theoretical physics) 3 Next level down, even more concrete and less abstract, we have the universe, itself, which acts according to the idea/physics from above 4 Bottom quadrant, most concrete and least abstract of all, we have our "image" of the universe, which indeed appears finely tuned We note that if the universe had transitioned from a simple form in 1 to an excessively complex idea in 2, we would have a major discontinuity. If the resulting discontinuity seems unclear, note that we only somewhat arbitrary chose the four quadrants of Plato. We could've subdivided 2 indefinitely, so that the idea at the very top of 2 would need to be of nearly identical simplicity to the form of 1. And since the idea at the "top of 2" must be simple, we infer that it corresponds to a simple "Theory of Everything", which eliminates the issue of fine tuning altogether (Ie, in that case, we would have a very simple theory which explains why the physical constants are what they are, and hence no "fine tuning mystery" would exist) Ultimately, though, trying to pick apart everything Ortlund says is something of a hobby to me, and there's probably no substantial reason to take my argument too seriously. I probably should have mentioned that before shoveling this post upon you. Oh well, apologies, live n learn, etc
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 my reply didn't post under Top Comments, but you can find it under Newest. Also, if you'd like a clear and plain example to complement my reply, I can provide one
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 FWIW, here's a summary of the reply that didn't post: We frame the discussion of a Simple Deity and the sort of universe that would proceed from Him using Plato's Divided Line, where the "top" quadrant of the line corresponds to simple, non-composite forms, the 2nd to ideas (physics/cosmology), the 3rd to things (the universe itself), and the bottom to images (the finely-tuned universe we perceive). We note increasing complexity and concreteness as we move from the top of the line to the bottom, and reason thusly: 1 (Axiom) If Divine Simplicity is true, then everything on the highest parts of the Divided Line is simple 2 (Axiom) If physics/cosmology is simple, then there is a simple explanation for the apparent fine tuning of the universe 3 (Axiom) If there is a simple explanation for the apparent fine tuning of the universe, then the Fine Tuning Argument is not a good argument for the existence of God 4 (Axiom) Physics/cosmology is on the highest parts of the Divided Line THEOREM: If Divine Simplicity is true, then the Fine Tuning Argument is not a good argument for the existence of God PROOF: 5 (Supposition) Divine Simplicity is true 6 (From 1 and 5) Everything on the highest parts of the Divided Line is simple 7 (From 4 and 6) Physics/cosmology is simple 8 (From 2 and 7) There is a simple explanation for the apparent fine tuning of the universe 9 (From 3 and 8) The Fine Tuning Argument is not a good argument for the existence of God 10 (From 5 and 9) THEOREM proved And from THEOREM we infer that it is inconsistent to profess Divine Simplicity while using the Fine Tuning Argument as an argument for God's existence
The response to the designer needing a designer is awful. The point of the objection is that the theist is special pleading by invoking a designer for the universe as an explanation but the designer needs no explanation for its existence. Whether the designer is simple or more complex than the universe is irrelevant, since complexity isn't a valid reason for the buck to stop. To make the tradeoff obvious: if you want parsimony, you agree with the atheist that there are no gods. If you want explanatory power, you invoke an infinite chain of designers designing one another, or offer up a reason for why the buck stops at 1 designer. Parsimony and complexity are not such reasons, and you've already acted against parsimony by rejecting atheism. Just tangling yourself in knots at this point.
I have watched all of your discussions together, it is always amazing seeing you two talk!
Thanks, that's nice to hear!
What you say about the fine-tuning argument confirming "naive intuitions" is very true. That's why I've always said that the contingency argument is my favourite argument for theism - the central premise, the PSR, is intuitively accepted by 7-year old children all around the world, just in less sophisticated words.
Good content👍
Thanks so much Matthew and Gavin! I'm a lay Christian and far from a philosopher but one thing that I don't understand with the multiverse explanation is in what way is it fundamentally different from the argument that essentially we got lucky with the numbers? Even if there are other universes that doesn't seem to actually add much explanatory power to the question of why our universe is finely tuned. But maybe I'm missing something :)
This is actually a very common objection that depends on subtle points in probability theory but I don't think it's ultimately correct benthams.substack.com/p/the-multiverse-and-inverse-gamblers?
Adding a thought. Tim McGrew argues that the naturalism worldview posits the universe and not-God, which is not inherently more simply claim than the universe and yes-God. (A angnostic wordlview couldn't be compared based on parsimony since it doesn't answer the God question, which is a critical aspect commonly expected of a worldview.) Patrick Flynn further argues this is an incorrect framing since classical theism posits only one fundamental entity (a God of pure act).
The Fine Tuning Argument seems to contradict Divine Simplicity. If Divine Simplicity were true, we should expect the apparent fine tuning of the physical constants to eventually be explainable in terms of a very clean "top down" Theory of Everything (eg, Like Newton's three laws, only more basic). A tinkering Deity that monkeys around with physics simply isn't Simple. This would be the God of "Theistic Personalism" (or, as DBH says, "Monopolytheism").
This is the thing with your apologist buddy Ortlund. Out of one corner of his mouth he says Divine Simplicity is an essential doctrine, but out of the other he pushes this Fine Tuning business. "Whatever best suits your purpose at the time" seems to be the Apologist's Special Pleading Creed
Why couldn't a simple entityt finely tune the universe?
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 to illustrate this, let us describe how the created universe "emanates" down Plato's "Divided Line".
1. On the top quadrant, we have our Simple Almighty God pronouncing the "form" of the universe
2. Next quadrant down, which is one level less abstract and one level more concrete, we have the foundational "idea" of the universe (aka, our theoretical physics)
3 Next level down, even more concrete and less abstract, we have the universe, itself, which acts according to the idea/physics from above
4 Bottom quadrant, most concrete and least abstract of all, we have our "image" of the universe, which indeed appears finely tuned
We note that if the universe had transitioned from a simple form in 1 to an excessively complex idea in 2, we would have a major discontinuity. If the resulting discontinuity seems unclear, note that we only somewhat arbitrary chose the four quadrants of Plato. We could've subdivided 2 indefinitely, so that the idea at the very top of 2 would need to be of nearly identical simplicity to the form of 1. And since the idea at the "top of 2" must be simple, we infer that it corresponds to a simple "Theory of Everything", which eliminates the issue of fine tuning altogether
(Ie, in that case, we would have a very simple theory which explains why the physical constants are what they are, and hence no "fine tuning mystery" would exist)
Ultimately, though, trying to pick apart everything Ortlund says is something of a hobby to me, and there's probably no substantial reason to take my argument too seriously. I probably should have mentioned that before shoveling this post upon you. Oh well, apologies, live n learn, etc
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 my reply didn't post under Top Comments, but you can find it under Newest. Also, if you'd like a clear and plain example to complement my reply, I can provide one
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 FWIW, here's a summary of the reply that didn't post:
We frame the discussion of a Simple Deity and the sort of universe that would proceed from Him using Plato's Divided Line, where the "top" quadrant of the line corresponds to simple, non-composite forms, the 2nd to ideas (physics/cosmology), the 3rd to things (the universe itself), and the bottom to images (the finely-tuned universe we perceive). We note increasing complexity and concreteness as we move from the top of the line to the bottom, and reason thusly:
1 (Axiom) If Divine Simplicity is true, then everything on the highest parts of the Divided Line is simple
2 (Axiom) If physics/cosmology is simple, then there is a simple explanation for the apparent fine tuning of the universe
3 (Axiom) If there is a simple explanation for the apparent fine tuning of the universe, then the Fine Tuning Argument is not a good argument for the existence of God
4 (Axiom) Physics/cosmology is on the highest parts of the Divided Line
THEOREM: If Divine Simplicity is true, then the Fine Tuning Argument is not a good argument for the existence of God
PROOF:
5 (Supposition) Divine Simplicity is true
6 (From 1 and 5) Everything on the highest parts of the Divided Line is simple
7 (From 4 and 6) Physics/cosmology is simple
8 (From 2 and 7) There is a simple explanation for the apparent fine tuning of the universe
9 (From 3 and 8) The Fine Tuning Argument is not a good argument for the existence of God
10 (From 5 and 9) THEOREM proved
And from THEOREM we infer that it is inconsistent to profess Divine Simplicity while using the Fine Tuning Argument as an argument for God's existence
@@ShaneShelldriick Huh?
The response to the designer needing a designer is awful. The point of the objection is that the theist is special pleading by invoking a designer for the universe as an explanation but the designer needs no explanation for its existence. Whether the designer is simple or more complex than the universe is irrelevant, since complexity isn't a valid reason for the buck to stop.
To make the tradeoff obvious: if you want parsimony, you agree with the atheist that there are no gods. If you want explanatory power, you invoke an infinite chain of designers designing one another, or offer up a reason for why the buck stops at 1 designer. Parsimony and complexity are not such reasons, and you've already acted against parsimony by rejecting atheism. Just tangling yourself in knots at this point.