Conversation Outline: 00:00 Introduction 00:18 What is special about language? 03:31 How did we (as a species) get linguistic abilities? 05:24 What do people who work in Semantics do? 09:19 How can babies pick up language? 15:07 What is the meaning of words? Aren’t they just dictionary entries? 19:03 On idiolects 27:00 The meanings of sentences 33:43 What are possible worlds? Are they the same as the many-worlds of quantum theory? 39:52 Differences between ‘school’ grammar, syntax and formal logic 49:07 What is the meaning of ‘if’? 01:04:54 Does the research of Semanticists impact the field of Computational Linguistics? 01:07:39 The relationship between thought and language
I’m afraid the possible worlds discussion is incorrect. Please see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on this topic. Possible worlds semantics offer a way to treat modal statements. Necessity would be a condition that holds in all possible worlds. So, for instance, 2 + 2 = 4 in all possible worlds, and 2 + 2 = 5 in NO possible worlds -- contradicting the speaker. Possibility is a condition that holds in at least one possible world. Again, there is no possible world where a priori propositions are undermined. Furthermore, regarding the discussion about the meaning of a sentence, what you meant to say is that “the meaning of a proposition is the condition that must obtain for that proposition to be true.” This is significantly different from what you actually said, and what your interlocutor discussed (he didn’t correct you). Note that some sentences may fail to express propositions or may express inconsistent propositional content (see Michael Huemer on the liar paradox). Good talk otherwise.
Thanks for your comments! I agree with you that mathematical statements are necessary truths and, therefore, they rule out possible worlds in which 2+2=5. However, I reckon that was just a casual error that I didn't wish to draw attention to, for I wanted to hear the rest of the Everettian comparison unfold. Regarding the point concerning semantics of sentences: sentences and propositions are not the same type of entities, so I didn't mean to say 'the meaning of a proposition is (...)', because I am not targeting propositions (on this note, many philosophers reject propositions, e.g. Quine). That section was explicitly meant to touch upon the Fregean denotational value of sentences, not the Davidsonian enterprise of equating meanings with truth-conditions (my bad for using the word 'meaning' in the timestamps, though). As for the Liar, that is one of the most difficult topics in Philosophical Logic and it still awaits for a satisfactory solution; the route of considering what the Liar sentence fails to express doesn't really dissolve the paradox.
Funny how Kai is taking credit for students that moved into the industry. The dogmatic attitude of linguists like him has driven away many students away from linguistics! Not only do computational linguists need to learn more about linguistics, linguists need to give up their fundamentalist attitude and be open to other approaches to working on Language.
I wouldn't blame Professor von Fintel for that. The contemporary NLP is based on stochastic learning, while formal semantics is based on logic and set theory. To reconcile between the two is simply beyond the job of von Fintel.
Conversation Outline:
00:00 Introduction
00:18 What is special about language?
03:31 How did we (as a species) get linguistic abilities?
05:24 What do people who work in Semantics do?
09:19 How can babies pick up language?
15:07 What is the meaning of words? Aren’t they just dictionary entries?
19:03 On idiolects
27:00 The meanings of sentences
33:43 What are possible worlds? Are they the same as the many-worlds of quantum theory?
39:52 Differences between ‘school’ grammar, syntax and formal logic
49:07 What is the meaning of ‘if’?
01:04:54 Does the research of Semanticists impact the field of Computational Linguistics?
01:07:39 The relationship between thought and language
one of the biggest legends in formal semantics! you asked good questions
Thanks!
I’m afraid the possible worlds discussion is incorrect. Please see the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on this topic. Possible worlds semantics offer a way to treat modal statements. Necessity would be a condition that holds in all possible worlds. So, for instance, 2 + 2 = 4 in all possible worlds, and 2 + 2 = 5 in NO possible worlds -- contradicting the speaker. Possibility is a condition that holds in at least one possible world. Again, there is no possible world where a priori propositions are undermined. Furthermore, regarding the discussion about the meaning of a sentence, what you meant to say is that “the meaning of a proposition is the condition that must obtain for that proposition to be true.” This is significantly different from what you actually said, and what your interlocutor discussed (he didn’t correct you). Note that some sentences may fail to express propositions or may express inconsistent propositional content (see Michael Huemer on the liar paradox). Good talk otherwise.
Thanks for your comments!
I agree with you that mathematical statements are necessary truths and, therefore, they rule out possible worlds in which 2+2=5. However, I reckon that was just a casual error that I didn't wish to draw attention to, for I wanted to hear the rest of the Everettian comparison unfold. Regarding the point concerning semantics of sentences: sentences and propositions are not the same type of entities, so I didn't mean to say 'the meaning of a proposition is (...)', because I am not targeting propositions (on this note, many philosophers reject propositions, e.g. Quine). That section was explicitly meant to touch upon the Fregean denotational value of sentences, not the Davidsonian enterprise of equating meanings with truth-conditions (my bad for using the word 'meaning' in the timestamps, though). As for the Liar, that is one of the most difficult topics in Philosophical Logic and it still awaits for a satisfactory solution; the route of considering what the Liar sentence fails to express doesn't really dissolve the paradox.
Funny how Kai is taking credit for students that moved into the industry. The dogmatic attitude of linguists like him has driven away many students away from linguistics! Not only do computational linguists need to learn more about linguistics, linguists need to give up their fundamentalist attitude and be open to other approaches to working on Language.
I wouldn't blame Professor von Fintel for that. The contemporary NLP is based on stochastic learning, while formal semantics is based on logic and set theory. To reconcile between the two is simply beyond the job of von Fintel.