Also, I think one issue I had with your discussion of the extent to which different theories predict your being a possible person is that if Huemer is right that I can’t even conceive of it being impossible that I exist, then it makes no sense to talk of theories predicting different things about that at all. In fact, I think that talk of theories predicting things is misleading here. If instead we talk about what we will predict if we believe the theory, the point becomes clearer. If I can’t even conceive of its being impossible that I exist, then I will predict that it’s possible that I exist whichever theory I believe. And so neither theory gives me a better ability to predict the fact that I possibly exist. Not sure if that’s clear, but I thought that was a source of confusion in the discussion.
Do you think your argument for there being Beth 2 possible people depends on the assumption of haeccity? Or do you think that it works just as well if there are no facts regarding trans-world identity? How about if there are facts about identity across worlds but they have certain specific criteria, as with origin essentialism?
Notice how Matthew keeps yawning and Huemer doesn’t contagious yawn back even once. The dude is just built different.
New Micheal Huemer conversation. I have to watch.
I am extraordinarily confused and I’m about to get hit by a supernova (and a gamma ray burst). 👍
Do you have any thoughts on Joe Schmid's view on Bernadette paradoxes, the unsatisfiable pair diagnosis?
Schmid is clearly correct about that
Also, I think one issue I had with your discussion of the extent to which different theories predict your being a possible person is that if Huemer is right that I can’t even conceive of it being impossible that I exist, then it makes no sense to talk of theories predicting different things about that at all. In fact, I think that talk of theories predicting things is misleading here. If instead we talk about what we will predict if we believe the theory, the point becomes clearer. If I can’t even conceive of its being impossible that I exist, then I will predict that it’s possible that I exist whichever theory I believe. And so neither theory gives me a better ability to predict the fact that I possibly exist. Not sure if that’s clear, but I thought that was a source of confusion in the discussion.
Do you think your argument for there being Beth 2 possible people depends on the assumption of haeccity? Or do you think that it works just as well if there are no facts regarding trans-world identity? How about if there are facts about identity across worlds but they have certain specific criteria, as with origin essentialism?