German WW1 U-boats were under 900 tons, some under 500 tons (surfaced). They may have strongly influenced the early 1920s S-boats but the mid 20s through mid 30s V-boats were much larger (double or triple the largest U-boats) and reflected the USN's own explorations of technology, size, and roles. The realities of Pacific Ocean distances forced boats to be larger (the small S-boats served in WW2 combat, but their age and size were a great hindrance). There were several evolutionary classes from the Porpoise class to the Tambor class that was the class before the Gato class. The Tambor class pretty much solidified the design that was incrementally improved in the Gato, Balao, and Tench classes.
Outstanding. Can't decide if I prefer topics like this where I know nearly nothing and a window opens on a whole new world or when one of your experts comes on and adds colour and detail to a topic I'm already familiar with. This channel is a jewel.
I was acquainted with a former submariner who served aboard the Guppy Class Boats, which were essentially just upgrades from the GATO Class WWII Boats. Not really very much different internally. Mainly the outer hull was stripped of any deck guns, etc. and a modern sail replaced the old style bridge arrangement. He was a Radioman and told me when they dove deep, as much as 800 feet (the pressure hulls were reinforced) that a string placed tightly between the bulkheads would actually sag as the pressure increased. I asked him if he didn't worry and he told me if anything happened at those depths they would hardly realize it due to the implosion. Amazingly brave fellows.
I knew a WWII German submariner. I said to Hans, "From what I read most of the German subs were sunk." He replied, "Mine got hit and sunk, but we were able to escape."
Knew a submariner who served on 2 boats during the war. One was USS Jack (don't recall the other). He survived at least one extreme depth charging. H was left with lifelong PTSD.
Damn this was a Brilliant Presentation. So much new information, James gives the viewers a lot to think about, as was evidenced by how engaged the sidebar was. Great job James, Paul every show gives and gives some more!
I'm so glad I was able to watch this live. Not only was it an informative presentation by James, but I very much enjoyed the many astute comments and questions in the live chat. There are some very well informed, well read and intelligent viewers that I always learn something I didn't know about many of the subjects Paul brings to the channel. I can't wait to watch the upcoming show about the Royal Navy Submarines so I can make comparisons and ask questions about the differences in doctrine and operations. Thanks for having some authors on a subject truly fascinating to so many of us.
The USN had successive submarine classes, but they were evolutionary steps toward a conceptual goal. They were called "fleet boats" because their surface speed was close the cruising speed of the "Standard" type battleships, and one envisioned use was for submarines to be scouts for the battle fleet. But anti-commerce was another envisioned role. The IJN saw their submarines as pieces in their grand strategy of a decisive battle - scouting, harassing, and attriting the US battle fleet as it headed for Japan. Anti-commerce was a low priority. The IJN proliferated sub classes and specialized capabilities where the USN worked toward a more general purpose goal (except for the small 2 Mackerel class boats, which never did any combat patrols).
The Japanese were so focused on their "Decisive Battle" doctrine that they never put any thought into a "Guerre de Course" approach. Imagine if they had used their Subs to blockade the west coast and Pearl Harbor, especially early in the war when American Tankers and shipping was so lacking in numbers? The "Code of Bushido" also ran deep in the officer class of the Japanese Navy. There was no honor sinking a mere merchant ship in the eyes of many of their Sub skippers.
There were a few sinkings off the West Coast by IJN submarines very early in the war, but they pretty much highlight their rarity. Relative fast oilers were few in the early days, impacting how the USN task forces operated. One or two more being sunk would have had a huge effect. Both navies had strong expectations/cultures, but the USN learned and adjusted faster and to a greater degree. The Germans' WW1 U-boat war was half way around the world from the IJN, but across "The Pond" from the US East Coast. Maybe its lessons were more accessible to the USN being closer to home. Drach just posted th-cam.com/video/ZeIjzvQmfDw/w-d-xo.html and I just started watching.
When the Japanese captured the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia), they captured oil fields and refineries, but the well and refinery equipment were sabotaged. AFAIK these never were fully brought back online, the refineries especially. Consequently, fuel oil scarcity plagued IJN operations, even in 1942. Yamato and Musashi were amazing, but they guzzled fuel oil. Tankers were prime targets for USN submarines. By October 1944, IJN elements were based near the DEI to be near oil, and were burning unrefined oil. Lack of fuel for carriers hindered training pilots to operate on carriers.
There were two refineries on British Borneo and seven facilities in the DEI (Borneo and Sumatra). Britain destroyed its facilities (and also those in Burma). Sarawak Oilfields Ltd engineers in Miri and Lutong were ordered to set in motion predetermined scorched earth procedures when news broke of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and landings at Kota Baru, Borneo on 8 Dec 1941 - Kota Baru was attacked before Pearl Harbor. But the Dutch had mixed results, though this was due in part to the creation of the ABDA force that needed to be fueled. Pladjoe refinery was captured mostly intact while Soengai Gerong was 80% destroyed. But even a site like Tarakan that the Dutch did well to destroy was back in production by June '42. Restoration was delayed somewhat because a Japanese ship carrying its skilled oil technicians was sunk by the USN. (The Americans destroyed the large Pancadan oil storage facility in Manila during the final days of Dec '41.) The American B-24 bombing campaigns beginning in mid-August '43 (target Balikpapan) then reduced East Indies' production once again. Oil production in British Borneo and DEI in 1939 was 65.1 million barrels (its pre-war high point) - DEI produced about 8 barrels of oil for every 1 produced in British Borneo. In 1942, the Japanese managed to produce 25.9 million barrels (40% of '39) in DEI, and in 1943, 49.6 million barrels (76% of '39). It is true that Japan's homeland stockpile was rapidly depleting, yet all the stats I find mention delivery of DEI oil products to the home islands but nothing about delivery from DEI to Japanese forces elsewhere. Why send refined products to Japan only to send it to Rabaul, Bacolod, or Shanghai? Moreover, there were three refineries on Formosa. Prior to the war was Byoritsu oil refinery and Allied air recon later discovered two more at Takao and Toshien. In Indochina were the Tourane refinery (present day Da Nang) and Phu My refinery as well as a few smaller ones. Though neither Singapore nor British (Peninsular) Malaya had refineries, the Shell facility on Pulau Bukom island off of Singapore was one of Asia's most important petroleum tank depots as well as for blending and reshipment. (Note: a few writers mention a Shell refinery on Pulau Bukom and even a chatbot claimed this, but I've found no proof of this and Shell's own website states the refinery was built after the war.) British forces were able to torch 42 of 60 oil storage tanks on Palau Bukom and Palau Sebarok before surrendering Singapore. In '44 and '45 the US launched seven B-29 bombing raids _from India_ on Singapore to destroy the oil and naval facilities - Singapore played an important role in the maintenance and repair of IJN and merchant ships. Japan entered the war with 49 large-capacity, deep-sea oil tankers, but several had already been requisition by the military for its use. (It had many more smaller tankers less than 500 grt for coastal shipping.) It picked up three Dutch tankers that had been scuttled in DEI shallow waters and shifted its 5 tankers supporting the whaling fleet to wartime needs. IIRC, it also added a few Norwegian tankers it had been leasing through confiscation after 7 Dec '41. Prior to Sep '39, Japan, just like many other countries including Britain & Commonwealth, required the service of foreign-flagged tankers (often Dutch and Norwegian). War in Europe threw international merchant shipping into disarray and Britain soon gained the service of Norwegian, Dane, Dutch, some French and Swedish (chartered), and most of the Greek merchant fleets. (Rather than divert all these vessels to Britain's wartime needs including sustaining the Commonwealth, Britain encouraged the Dutch to allow its DEI-based tankers to continue delivering oil to Japan in the hope Tokyo would remain neutral.) Before the crude oil embargo of July '41 (aviation gasoline was '40, but Japan was able to evade this by mixing high octane gasoline with crude and refining at home), Japan was even using dry-bulk vessels to carry oil and petroleum products in 55-gallon (200 litre) drums from the US - it was scrambling to build up its stockpile in preparation for war. Upon its entry into the war Japan converted dry-bulk vessels to carry crude as well as continued to transport these products in 55 gallon drum to locales. It was even using its capital ships to replenish smaller vessels like destroyers. And it built tankers. Japan lost about 4,000 grt and built 197,474 grt of tankers in '42. 1943 was basically a wash, losing 388,018 grt and adding 379,916 grt. In '44 it built 555,386 grt but lost 754,106 grt, wiping out the gains of '42. (America lost 25% of its tankers in the western Atlantic in '42.) The IJN based many vessels in SW Pacific since early '42, which made sense because a lot of combat was in this region. Important IJN bases in the immediate vicinity were Lingga Roads (Malacca Strait), Brunei Bay, Singapore, Pelembang and Sabang (Sumatra), and Tawi Tawi (southernmost Philippines, just off the the coat of Borneo). Further away but still in the region were Penang, Cam Ranh Bay, Samah Harbour (Hainan), Mako (Pescadores), Takao (Formosa) as well as several IJN bases elsewhere in the Philippines. Re unrefined crude oil, given the lightness of Indonesian crude, there was no problem for it to fuel IJN vessels. Steam turbines will pretty much run on anything that burns, but unrefined fuels are much more prone to explode if improperly ignited, as the lighter elements removed by the refining process are the most volatile portion of the fuel mixture. Light crude oil has an API gravity higher than 31.1°. I checked the API and sulphur content of current Indonesian crude grades - could not find info for that of the 1930s. They range from 21.5° to 51°, and the majority of its crude is above 31.1°; 51° is equal to Saudi's Arabia's Arab Super Light. The world's lightest is 55°. All Indonesian oil grades are very low in sulphur. In contrast, bunker is an inferior product; basically it's the remaining sludge after the more valuable products are refined from crude - it's one step above bitumen (asphalt). However, using crude, especially light crude, was more dangerous because it is more combustable than bunker.
Rob Scott's channel has the entire Season One playlist. Robin Spears has the Season Two playlist. I've watched them all. Interesting that you will see young actors in those who later rose to A-list movie stars as well as having their own TV series.
Comment for the algorithm! Man you really don’t miss brother, every video you put out is incredible I learn so much from you and your guests. Thank you for what you do mate, God speed !
@@WW2TV no, thank you man your channels the best. Love your colabs with Drach those are my favorite. I will always do my small part to comment like and share. You’ll be at 100K subs in no time, again thank you and God speed, always!
We have a WW2 sub here in Oklahoma, USS Batfish, that had a stellar combat record. Been in it, no way i could have done 90min much less 90days. These sub sailors had major cajones.
On the Japanese side, Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue anticipated the impact of the US submarine campaign as early as Jan 1941 - 11 months before Pearl Harbor: "The United States will deploy many submarines in the seas adjacent to Japan and across Japan's vital sealanes, blockading Japan and tenaciously destroying its sea commerce jointly with American aircraft. To coninue to exist and carry on the war, Japan must certainly secure its sea routes from attacks by U.S. submarines and aircraft. The securing of sea routes will be one of the most important operations in a war between the United States and Japan." Reference: "A Chess Game with no Checkmate" by Sadao Seno, US Naval War College Review. 1974, vol. 26, p. 26.
The Mark 14 torpedo was a marvel, except it ran too deep, it's magnetic exploder could only work properly by accident, and its contact exploder might or might not work. These three problems only got worked out and fixed by mid-late 1943. BuOrd blamed skippers, as did the commander of submarines operating out of Fremantle, Adm. Ralph Christie who participated in designing the magnetic exploder and defended it until ordered to have it deactivated. USN submarine sinkings were very much diminished in 1942 and the first half of 1943 by the Mark 14 torpedo.
I was simply going to say it was a POS, but that would understate both the problem with the torpedo AND with BuOrd's and Adm. Christie's arrogant pigheadedness. Their arrogance and some terrible experiences by a couple of "aces" (Morton and Daspit, IIRC) to give Adm. Lockwood the cover for carrying out his (= Swede Momsen's) tests that showed the defects of the contact exploder and ways to improve it.
The sayingi goes : "Amateurs speak battle strategy. Pros speak logistics." By far The most cost effective thing we ever did if only arguably the most effective. All the work they did following the first World war the torpedo situation it seems should have been thoroughly tested, cost regardless, but I know to remind myself that hindsight is 20-20.. . Sounds like they were as slow in fully realizing how bad our torpedoes were as we to realize how good their swere. We were blaming Type 93 hits from miles out on undetected IJN subs right up through at least the end of '43. Those Long Lances were just as deadly when you set them off inside their hosting vessels.. This guy is right up their with the likes of Richard Frank and DL Giangreco as an author of illuminating Asian, Pacific War History.
Your author is absolutely correct about Lockwood. He was not, however, the initial commander. He did not get the command at Pearl until February 1943. Morton was one of the submariners who had to tangle with over-cautious captains.
Clay Blair concluded his brilliant 2 volume history of the U-boat campaign by pointing out that the British Admiralty prepared a detailed dossier of incidents to prosecute Dönitz at Nuremburg for war crimes. Once the USN reviewed the document the prosecution was dropped lest US submarine actions in the Pacific were referred to by the defence. Submarine warfare primarily against merchant fleets is necessarily as inhumane as area bombing cities.
Most of those merchant vessels were armed, albeit lightly. That made them legitimate military targets if nothing else. Even trawlers were armed. The Americans had the worst torpedoes of all the navies in the war, Allied and Axis. Had they had torpedoes as good as the Japanese, German, or even British navies, their excellent record of sinkings would have been phenomenal.
Great presentation. I'm lucky to have become interested in submarine warfare at an early age, thanks to my best friend. Both US boats in the Pacific,and U-Boats all over the place. And gremlin season comes earlier each year, what can you do? 8-)
Morton to O'Kane - "Tenacity Dick, stick with the bastards til they're under." And, my favorite radio transmission of the war - Morton to Pearl Harbor "Wahoo engaged in running gun battle with Japanese destroyer. Destroyer gunning, Wahoo running."
Hi Paul - how you keep up with such a high rate of extremely high quality shows is amazing and this one on the U.S submarines did not disappoint!! Hopefully my wife will allow me to spend some time working through the large back catalogue of shows I have missed!! Happy Christmas to yourself and Magali 🎄❄☃ Best wishes for 2024
Howdy there folks! Tremendous overview of US submarine operations in the Pacific. It took too long to fix the torpedo problems but when they were it was curtains for Japanese shipping.
The Japanese realized the danger of US submarines, but the IJN personnel had little regard for merchant vessels. The less capable vessels were slated for convoy duty, they wanted to attack other warships not guard merchant vessels.
I can't believe nothing was said about how Eugene Fluckey kyped a brand new rocket launcher sitting on the dock at Pearl because he wanted to be the first Submarine rocket Ship, he was also the only one to fire directly on the Japanese mainland.P.S.- let's not forget he also sunk a Train
US submarines were very cramped (German U-boats were worse!). A guy taller than 5' 7" or 5' 8" would have found it very difficult. I toured USS Pampanito (Balao class) in San Francisco several years ago, and I'm 6 feet tall. I had to duck and watch what was overhead, a lot.
Ok, in WWII there were two primary theaters, the Pacific and Europe. Presentations on the Pacific theater of war often comment on the immense size of the Pacific. It might be of interest to have a map that would superimpose an overall map of the the European theater on the Pacific theater to get a relative scale. Or the submarine wars in the Atlantic vs. the Pacific.
Just looking at a globe the area of USN operations v German operations is pretty close. There isn’t much going on in the North Pacific and the Caribbean and Brazil to Africa route were active areas of Uboat warfare.
I notice the author says that as early as 1919 the Uhe U.S. Navy began thinking about a new kind of war in the Pacific for the submarines. I think that may be a minority. I might mention that many of the captains at first were way over cautious thinking that safety was the overriding concern. Caution was part of their training. Along with torpedoes, that was a major limiting factor in the first year of the War. The shift to commerce raiding was accelerated because the fleet lost its battle line at Pearl.
Excellent show Woody. BuOrd and their refusal to believe the crew reports about the deficiencies of the Mark XIV torpedo was one of the gravest threats to submarine crews. p.s. Book/author on a WW2 submarines for a future show: "Fatal Dive - Solving the World War II Mystery of the USS Grunion" by Peter F. Stevens
There's footage on yt from "Critical Past" of US submariners shooting Japanese survivors of a sinking with small arms from the deck of the sub. Have often wondered what ship , what sub and why they were doing what they were doing.
They were soldiers. The US commander did not want them to reach shore to reinforce island garrisons. I believe the submarine was the USS Wahoo. The Japanese aircraft carrier Shinano was sunk by the US submarine Archerfish in November of 1944.
German WW1 U-boats were under 900 tons, some under 500 tons (surfaced). They may have strongly influenced the early 1920s S-boats but the mid 20s through mid 30s V-boats were much larger (double or triple the largest U-boats) and reflected the USN's own explorations of technology, size, and roles. The realities of Pacific Ocean distances forced boats to be larger (the small S-boats served in WW2 combat, but their age and size were a great hindrance). There were several evolutionary classes from the Porpoise class to the Tambor class that was the class before the Gato class. The Tambor class pretty much solidified the design that was incrementally improved in the Gato, Balao, and Tench classes.
Outstanding. Can't decide if I prefer topics like this where I know nearly nothing and a window opens on a whole new world or when one of your experts comes on and adds colour and detail to a topic I'm already familiar with. This channel is a jewel.
Thank you james and woody for another brilliant presentation.
Knew a WWII submariner in the Pacific. Can’t begin to imagine what life was like for them. Great show!
I was acquainted with a former submariner who served aboard the Guppy Class Boats, which were essentially just upgrades from the GATO Class WWII Boats. Not really very much different internally. Mainly the outer hull was stripped of any deck guns, etc. and a modern sail replaced the old style bridge arrangement. He was a Radioman and told me when they dove deep, as much as 800 feet (the pressure hulls were reinforced) that a string placed tightly between the bulkheads would actually sag as the pressure increased. I asked him if he didn't worry and he told me if anything happened at those depths they would hardly realize it due to the implosion. Amazingly brave fellows.
I knew a WWII German submariner. I said to Hans, "From what I read most of the German subs were sunk." He replied, "Mine got hit and sunk, but we were able to escape."
Knew a submariner who served on 2 boats during the war. One was USS Jack (don't recall the other). He survived at least one extreme depth charging. H was left with lifelong PTSD.
Damn this was a Brilliant Presentation. So much new information, James gives the viewers a lot to think about, as was evidenced by how engaged the sidebar was. Great job James, Paul every show gives and gives some more!
I'm so glad I was able to watch this live. Not only was it an informative presentation by James, but I very much enjoyed the many astute comments and questions in the live chat. There are some very well informed, well read and intelligent viewers that I always learn something I didn't know about many of the subjects Paul brings to the channel. I can't wait to watch the upcoming show about the Royal Navy Submarines so I can make comparisons and ask questions about the differences in doctrine and operations. Thanks for having some authors on a subject truly fascinating to so many of us.
The USN had successive submarine classes, but they were evolutionary steps toward a conceptual goal. They were called "fleet boats" because their surface speed was close the cruising speed of the "Standard" type battleships, and one envisioned use was for submarines to be scouts for the battle fleet. But anti-commerce was another envisioned role. The IJN saw their submarines as pieces in their grand strategy of a decisive battle - scouting, harassing, and attriting the US battle fleet as it headed for Japan. Anti-commerce was a low priority. The IJN proliferated sub classes and specialized capabilities where the USN worked toward a more general purpose goal (except for the small 2 Mackerel class boats, which never did any combat patrols).
The Japanese were so focused on their "Decisive Battle" doctrine that they never put any thought into a "Guerre de Course" approach. Imagine if they had used their Subs to blockade the west coast and Pearl Harbor, especially early in the war when American Tankers and shipping was so lacking in numbers? The "Code of Bushido" also ran deep in the officer class of the Japanese Navy. There was no honor sinking a mere merchant ship in the eyes of many of their Sub skippers.
There were a few sinkings off the West Coast by IJN submarines very early in the war, but they pretty much highlight their rarity. Relative fast oilers were few in the early days, impacting how the USN task forces operated. One or two more being sunk would have had a huge effect. Both navies had strong expectations/cultures, but the USN learned and adjusted faster and to a greater degree. The Germans' WW1 U-boat war was half way around the world from the IJN, but across "The Pond" from the US East Coast. Maybe its lessons were more accessible to the USN being closer to home. Drach just posted th-cam.com/video/ZeIjzvQmfDw/w-d-xo.html and I just started watching.
When the Japanese captured the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia), they captured oil fields and refineries, but the well and refinery equipment were sabotaged. AFAIK these never were fully brought back online, the refineries especially. Consequently, fuel oil scarcity plagued IJN operations, even in 1942. Yamato and Musashi were amazing, but they guzzled fuel oil. Tankers were prime targets for USN submarines. By October 1944, IJN elements were based near the DEI to be near oil, and were burning unrefined oil. Lack of fuel for carriers hindered training pilots to operate on carriers.
Good point. The unrefined fuel oil caused problems for the IJN boilers having to burn it as well.
There were two refineries on British Borneo and seven facilities in the DEI (Borneo and Sumatra). Britain destroyed its facilities (and also those in Burma). Sarawak Oilfields Ltd engineers in Miri and Lutong were ordered to set in motion predetermined scorched earth procedures when news broke of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and landings at Kota Baru, Borneo on 8 Dec 1941 - Kota Baru was attacked before Pearl Harbor. But the Dutch had mixed results, though this was due in part to the creation of the ABDA force that needed to be fueled. Pladjoe refinery was captured mostly intact while Soengai Gerong was 80% destroyed. But even a site like Tarakan that the Dutch did well to destroy was back in production by June '42. Restoration was delayed somewhat because a Japanese ship carrying its skilled oil technicians was sunk by the USN. (The Americans destroyed the large Pancadan oil storage facility in Manila during the final days of Dec '41.) The American B-24 bombing campaigns beginning in mid-August '43 (target Balikpapan) then reduced East Indies' production once again. Oil production in British Borneo and DEI in 1939 was 65.1 million barrels (its pre-war high point) - DEI produced about 8 barrels of oil for every 1 produced in British Borneo. In 1942, the Japanese managed to produce 25.9 million barrels (40% of '39) in DEI, and in 1943, 49.6 million barrels (76% of '39).
It is true that Japan's homeland stockpile was rapidly depleting, yet all the stats I find mention delivery of DEI oil products to the home islands but nothing about delivery from DEI to Japanese forces elsewhere. Why send refined products to Japan only to send it to Rabaul, Bacolod, or Shanghai? Moreover, there were three refineries on Formosa. Prior to the war was Byoritsu oil refinery and Allied air recon later discovered two more at Takao and Toshien. In Indochina were the Tourane refinery (present day Da Nang) and Phu My refinery as well as a few smaller ones. Though neither Singapore nor British (Peninsular) Malaya had refineries, the Shell facility on Pulau Bukom island off of Singapore was one of Asia's most important petroleum tank depots as well as for blending and reshipment. (Note: a few writers mention a Shell refinery on Pulau Bukom and even a chatbot claimed this, but I've found no proof of this and Shell's own website states the refinery was built after the war.) British forces were able to torch 42 of 60 oil storage tanks on Palau Bukom and Palau Sebarok before surrendering Singapore. In '44 and '45 the US launched seven B-29 bombing raids _from India_ on Singapore to destroy the oil and naval facilities - Singapore played an important role in the maintenance and repair of IJN and merchant ships.
Japan entered the war with 49 large-capacity, deep-sea oil tankers, but several had already been requisition by the military for its use. (It had many more smaller tankers less than 500 grt for coastal shipping.) It picked up three Dutch tankers that had been scuttled in DEI shallow waters and shifted its 5 tankers supporting the whaling fleet to wartime needs. IIRC, it also added a few Norwegian tankers it had been leasing through confiscation after 7 Dec '41. Prior to Sep '39, Japan, just like many other countries including Britain & Commonwealth, required the service of foreign-flagged tankers (often Dutch and Norwegian). War in Europe threw international merchant shipping into disarray and Britain soon gained the service of Norwegian, Dane, Dutch, some French and Swedish (chartered), and most of the Greek merchant fleets. (Rather than divert all these vessels to Britain's wartime needs including sustaining the Commonwealth, Britain encouraged the Dutch to allow its DEI-based tankers to continue delivering oil to Japan in the hope Tokyo would remain neutral.) Before the crude oil embargo of July '41 (aviation gasoline was '40, but Japan was able to evade this by mixing high octane gasoline with crude and refining at home), Japan was even using dry-bulk vessels to carry oil and petroleum products in 55-gallon (200 litre) drums from the US - it was scrambling to build up its stockpile in preparation for war. Upon its entry into the war Japan converted dry-bulk vessels to carry crude as well as continued to transport these products in 55 gallon drum to locales. It was even using its capital ships to replenish smaller vessels like destroyers. And it built tankers.
Japan lost about 4,000 grt and built 197,474 grt of tankers in '42. 1943 was basically a wash, losing 388,018 grt and adding 379,916 grt. In '44 it built 555,386 grt but lost 754,106 grt, wiping out the gains of '42. (America lost 25% of its tankers in the western Atlantic in '42.)
The IJN based many vessels in SW Pacific since early '42, which made sense because a lot of combat was in this region. Important IJN bases in the immediate vicinity were Lingga Roads (Malacca Strait), Brunei Bay, Singapore, Pelembang and Sabang (Sumatra), and Tawi Tawi (southernmost Philippines, just off the the coat of Borneo). Further away but still in the region were Penang, Cam Ranh Bay, Samah Harbour (Hainan), Mako (Pescadores), Takao (Formosa) as well as several IJN bases elsewhere in the Philippines.
Re unrefined crude oil, given the lightness of Indonesian crude, there was no problem for it to fuel IJN vessels. Steam turbines will pretty much run on anything that burns, but unrefined fuels are much more prone to explode if improperly ignited, as the lighter elements removed by the refining process are the most volatile portion of the fuel mixture. Light crude oil has an API gravity higher than 31.1°. I checked the API and sulphur content of current Indonesian crude grades - could not find info for that of the 1930s. They range from 21.5° to 51°, and the majority of its crude is above 31.1°; 51° is equal to Saudi's Arabia's Arab Super Light. The world's lightest is 55°. All Indonesian oil grades are very low in sulphur. In contrast, bunker is an inferior product; basically it's the remaining sludge after the more valuable products are refined from crude - it's one step above bitumen (asphalt). However, using crude, especially light crude, was more dangerous because it is more combustable than bunker.
@@gagamba9198thank you for taking the time and effort to share your knowledge on this key subject
James gave a very interesting talk there - had me spellbound.
Me too Brother Phil. Loved it!
drachinifel has a great series on the US submarine war and video on all the problems with the mk 14. Can't recommend Enough.
I watched it and it was very informative, as his presentations usually are.
Awesome video! Been very much looking forward to this week!
Submarine week was an absolute fantastic presentation. Well done!!!
Thank you kindly!
The old TV show, "The Silent Service", is on yt and it dramatizes submarine stories from the USN and Kriegsmarine.
Rob Scott's channel has the entire Season One playlist. Robin Spears has the Season Two playlist. I've watched them all. Interesting that you will see young actors in those who later rose to A-list movie stars as well as having their own TV series.
I've watched the entire series, and it a good recommendation for sure.
Comment for the algorithm! Man you really don’t miss brother, every video you put out is incredible I learn so much from you and your guests. Thank you for what you do mate, God speed !
Thank you Brian
@@WW2TV no, thank you man your channels the best. Love your colabs with Drach those are my favorite. I will always do my small part to comment like and share. You’ll be at 100K subs in no time, again thank you and God speed, always!
We have a WW2 sub here in Oklahoma, USS Batfish, that had a stellar combat record. Been in it, no way i could have done 90min much less 90days. These sub sailors had major cajones.
On the Japanese side, Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue anticipated the impact of the US submarine campaign as early as Jan 1941 - 11 months before Pearl Harbor:
"The United States will deploy many submarines in the seas adjacent to Japan and across Japan's vital sealanes, blockading Japan and tenaciously destroying its sea commerce jointly with American aircraft. To coninue to exist and carry on the war, Japan must certainly secure its sea routes from attacks by U.S. submarines and aircraft. The securing of sea routes will be one of the most important operations in a war between the United States and Japan."
Reference: "A Chess Game with no Checkmate" by Sadao Seno, US Naval War College Review. 1974, vol. 26, p. 26.
A prophet is without honor in his own land.
He was wrong in one part. It were the Dutch in the beginning of the Pacific war
The Mark 14 torpedo was a marvel, except it ran too deep, it's magnetic exploder could only work properly by accident, and its contact exploder might or might not work. These three problems only got worked out and fixed by mid-late 1943. BuOrd blamed skippers, as did the commander of submarines operating out of Fremantle, Adm. Ralph Christie who participated in designing the magnetic exploder and defended it until ordered to have it deactivated. USN submarine sinkings were very much diminished in 1942 and the first half of 1943 by the Mark 14 torpedo.
Very true unfortunately for the brave crews who had to risk their lives in an effort to do their mission.
Calling the mk14 a scandal is very much understating the crisis
I was simply going to say it was a POS, but that would understate both the problem with the torpedo AND with BuOrd's and Adm. Christie's arrogant pigheadedness. Their arrogance and some terrible experiences by a couple of "aces" (Morton and Daspit, IIRC) to give Adm. Lockwood the cover for carrying out his (= Swede Momsen's) tests that showed the defects of the contact exploder and ways to improve it.
@@petestorz172 …. It took more than that. It took the multiple intervening of Admirals Nimitz and King to force BuOrd to redesign their problem child.
They saw the light when they felt the heat. King was a fairly skilled applier of heat.
Thanks Paul. Great show as always - just wished I had manage to catch it live, had some questions... so looks like you'll have to get him back on :)
The sayingi goes : "Amateurs speak battle strategy. Pros speak logistics."
By far The most cost effective thing we ever did if only arguably the most effective. All the work they did following the first World war the torpedo situation it seems should have been thoroughly tested, cost regardless, but I know to remind myself that hindsight is 20-20..
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Sounds like they were as slow in fully realizing how bad our torpedoes were as we to realize how good their swere. We were blaming Type 93 hits from miles out on undetected IJN subs right up through at least the end of '43. Those Long Lances were just as deadly when you set them off inside their hosting vessels..
This guy is right up their with the likes of Richard Frank and DL Giangreco as an author of illuminating Asian, Pacific War History.
Excellent 👌
Thanks for all your hard work.
Damn. Great show. Gotta read this.
Your author is absolutely correct about Lockwood. He was not, however, the initial commander. He did not get the command at Pearl until February 1943. Morton was one of the submariners who had to tangle with over-cautious captains.
Clay Blair concluded his brilliant 2 volume history of the U-boat campaign by pointing out that the British Admiralty prepared a detailed dossier of incidents to prosecute Dönitz at Nuremburg for war crimes. Once the USN reviewed the document the prosecution was dropped lest US submarine actions in the Pacific were referred to by the defence. Submarine warfare primarily against merchant fleets is necessarily as inhumane as area bombing cities.
Most of those merchant vessels were armed, albeit lightly. That made them legitimate military targets if nothing else. Even trawlers were armed.
The Americans had the worst torpedoes of all the navies in the war, Allied and Axis. Had they had torpedoes as good as the Japanese, German, or even British navies, their excellent record of sinkings would have been phenomenal.
Great presentation. I'm lucky to have become interested in submarine warfare at an early age, thanks to my best friend. Both US boats in the Pacific,and U-Boats all over the place. And gremlin season comes earlier each year, what can you do? 8-)
Great show, thanks guys..
Morton to O'Kane - "Tenacity Dick, stick with the bastards til they're under." And, my favorite radio transmission of the war - Morton to Pearl Harbor "Wahoo engaged in running gun battle with Japanese destroyer. Destroyer gunning, Wahoo running."
Woody/James. Fabulous presentation! I feel that James has only related part of a story and that there is more to tell. Get him back on! Thanks. Bob
Oh there's more to tell, and James can definitely come back
Hi Paul - how you keep up with such a high rate of extremely high quality shows is amazing and this one on the U.S submarines did not disappoint!! Hopefully my wife will allow me to spend some time working through the large back catalogue of shows I have missed!!
Happy Christmas to yourself and Magali 🎄❄☃ Best wishes for 2024
Thanks Steve
great stuff!
Howdy there folks! Tremendous overview of US submarine operations in the Pacific. It took too long to fix the torpedo problems but when they were it was curtains for Japanese shipping.
The Japanese realized the danger of US submarines, but the IJN personnel had little regard for merchant vessels. The less capable vessels were slated for convoy duty, they wanted to attack other warships not guard merchant vessels.
I can't believe nothing was said about how Eugene Fluckey kyped a brand new rocket launcher sitting on the dock at Pearl because he wanted to be the first Submarine rocket Ship, he was also the only one to fire directly on the Japanese mainland.P.S.- let's not forget he also sunk a Train
There's only so much that can be said in one show
US submarines were very cramped (German U-boats were worse!). A guy taller than 5' 7" or 5' 8" would have found it very difficult. I toured USS Pampanito (Balao class) in San Francisco several years ago, and I'm 6 feet tall. I had to duck and watch what was overhead, a lot.
Compared to U505, Pompanito is palatial! And its a type IX the type VII is smaller yet.
Ok, in WWII there were two primary theaters, the Pacific and Europe. Presentations on the Pacific theater of war often comment on the immense size of the Pacific. It might be of interest to have a map that would superimpose an overall map of the the European theater on the Pacific theater to get a relative scale. Or the submarine wars in the Atlantic vs. the Pacific.
Just looking at a globe the area of USN operations v German operations is pretty close. There isn’t much going on in the North Pacific and the Caribbean and Brazil to Africa route were active areas of Uboat warfare.
Thanks Paul.
Great content - can't wait to read this!
Great book!
Interesting Topic
Look up USS ARCHERFISH she got 70,000 tons of carrier in one attack on the Shinano.
I notice the author says that as early as 1919 the Uhe U.S. Navy began thinking about a new kind of war in the Pacific for the submarines. I think that may be a minority. I might mention that many of the captains at first were way over cautious thinking that safety was the overriding concern. Caution was part of their training. Along with torpedoes, that was a major limiting factor in the first year of the War. The shift to commerce raiding was accelerated because the fleet lost its battle line at Pearl.
Brill again paul
Excellent show Woody.
BuOrd and their refusal to believe the crew reports about the deficiencies of the Mark XIV torpedo was one of the gravest threats to submarine crews.
p.s. Book/author on a WW2 submarines for a future show: "Fatal Dive - Solving the World War II Mystery of the USS Grunion" by Peter F. Stevens
There’s a reason submariners are called the “Silent Service”. What happens wasn’t publicized. For security reasons
There's footage on yt from "Critical Past" of US submariners shooting Japanese survivors of a sinking with small arms from the deck of the sub. Have often wondered what ship , what sub and why they were doing what they were doing.
They were soldiers. The US commander did not want them to reach shore to reinforce island garrisons. I believe the submarine was the USS Wahoo. The Japanese aircraft carrier Shinano was sunk by the US submarine Archerfish in November of 1944.
President Bush was a one of the pilots picked up by a US sub in WW2.
What percentage of the Japanese marus were convoyed?
They also sank many ships carrying pows!
How could they have known?
Yeah, gremlins!
You should watch the *Bugs Bunny* cartoon about gremlins.
PS As a computer engineer, I can guarantee that they are still with us!
Where did you get the Houndstooth hat? send me a link, pleas. Thanks a bunch!!!
That one is a Stetson, I bought it in a shop in Paris
War Below..excellant book..52 US subs lost in WW 2. Visit a WW2 sub if you ever get the chance.
Winston S. Churchill started using the S when Winston Churchill, the American novelist, appeard...
Never heard of Winston S Churchill!
Lucky Fluckey is most on my list of bad-a$$'s I want on my dream team, he's right up my alley, if you've a job might as well make it interesting