Thanks. To review: I am a stroke survivor. I am recovering and re- habilitating. I watch “ZULU” at least once a month, and “ ZULU Dawn”, if I feel up to it. Still, I believe this is well told. Cheers!
@@DiD86Of course, there would be a few pages around the Napoleonic Wars that wouldn't be blank. However, I got a real kick out of the reference, and I am American. You have a way of engaging your viewers that is very compelling. I look forward to your videos. Thank you for your research and effort in producing your videos.
Just one last comment on why the Zulus didn't pursue the rest of the British Centre column, I think it's important to remember that the Zulus had marched around 65 miles from Ulundi the previous day, then ran 5 miles to surprise the British at the foot of Isandlwana before fighting a 3 hour battle in 40°C heat, most of which was hand to hand combat. So they were probably quite tired, hungry and thirsty!
I believe that part of the reason that the british moved so far from the camp was that there was dead ground created by their original line therefore moving forward to the next rise removed this but put them too far from the camp and increasing the gap between troops. Also right horn went unmentioned as that circumnavigated the camp entering the rear of the camp unopposed .
The British line moved forward because Durnford rode out to attack the Zulus and he pressured Pulleine to support him. Durnford also sent the rocket battery out miles. Pulleine had to extend his line to support this forward troop movement in case of their withdrawal. Before the arrival of Durnford at around 10.00 am there was a false alarm after thousands of Zulus were seen manoeuvering in the hills. Pulleine had the 24th stood to right in front of the tents. He didn't disperse them out. Durnford completely altered the situation and turned a strictly defensive position into an attack.
This is an excellent video. However, I do have an observation to make. When Chelmsford decided, in the late-night period of 21st-22nd January, to move half the 24th Regiment forwards in order to reinforce Major Dartnell's irregulars (who were sent forward on a scouting mission and sent back increasingly alarmist messages calling for help), he ordered Colonel Anthony Durford's No. 2 Column up from Rorke's Drift to reinforce the camp as Isandlwana, without giving either Durnford or Pulleine clear instructions as to who would be in command at the camp. This resulted in Pulleine - a lieutenant colonel - attempting to pass command to Durnford - a full colonel - while Durnford, operating an independent column, wasn't interested in taking command. This resulted in serious confusion. Durnford then decided to operate on the intelligence Chelmsford had already received re Zulus in the hills where Dartnell was encamped, and he left Pulleine in command of the static camp. Durnford made it clear before he left that if he got into difficulties, he expected Pulleine to reinforce him. This left Pulleine in a real bind, because Chelmsford had ordered him to remain on the defensive and to hold the camp, but Durnford was advancing and demanded support. This element of confusion was compounded when Durnford DID get into difficulties when he ran headlong into the Zulu Left Horn and Charles Pope's G Company, 2nd Battalion, tried to relieve him. But instead of linking up with Pope and strengthening the right flank of the British firing line, Durnford and his men mounted their horses and retreated at full speed. In doing so, Durnford abandoned both his own rocket battery and Pope, leaving the latter high and dry, alone and separated from the rest of the firing line. This was the moment when the British flank was turned and the collapse began.
When Durnford arrived he acted as if he was in command. He firstly stood down the 24th Foot then later ordered forces out including some NNC under Pulleine's command. He tried to get two companies of the 24th Foot to follow him out but Pulleine and Melville protested so he didnt push the matter. He also told one of the Natal Carbineers that he was Pulleine's senior and must do as he tells him. There is little indication that Durnford didnt act as though he was in charge, particularly when he rode off and declared to Pulleine that he expected him to support him. There should have been no confusion in tactical matters, regardless of who was in charge. Pulleine was ordered by Chelmsford to keep his forces drawn in and act only on the defensive, while Durnford was ordered up to the camp, and nowhere else, as it was short of numbers. Durnford took it upon himself to ignore both his and Pulleine's clearly defined orders.
As always you told us another ripping yarn. Never a dull moment. Already looking forward to your next bit of Darkness. I love that story & you told it well.
I've been studying Isandlwana for about 30 years and in April this year was lucky enough to finally visit the battlefield. An incredible experience. I thought you did a great job in your video by the way! For what it's worth, this is my telling of that day (short version!): The events that unfolded at Isandlwana on 22nd January 1879 signalled the beginning of one of the most remarkable days in British history. It was a day of tragedy for both of the armies in Zululand, with at least 4,000 men in total dying before the sun had set, as well as many more being seriously wounded and maimed at a time when medical science could offer little more than a bandage and a cup of water. Quite unusually in military history, it is not only a day commemorated by both the British and the Zulus for the sacrifices made by their young men, but it also sees both their armies heralding great victories. However, unsavoury though it is to speak of any winners in warfare, there was in reality only one army that triumphed that day a little over 144 years ago. On the 11th January, the British Army, with approximately 16,000 men, invaded Zululand because, well, they wanted it for themselves. Around 4,000 of those men, the centre of three columns which had advanced into Zululand, set up camp at Isandlwana on the 20th January 1879, approximately 10 miles along the track from the border post at Rorke's Drift. The violence which occurred at that infamous river crossing in the late afternoon and evening of the 22nd January would see it make its own indelible mark on history but unquestionably the most important story of that fateful day was written at Isandlwana, some hours prior. Very early in the morning of the 22nd January, at 4am, Lord Chelmsford, the commander of the British forces in Zululand who had attached himself to the centre column, broke one of the most important rules of military strategy; when you're in enemy territory and you don't know where the enemy is, never divide your forces. This rule becomes even more pertinent when you know you're going to be outnumbered and you're relying on a heavy concentration of firepower to win any battles that may take place. So why did Chelmsford make this fatal error? Many a chapter has been written about this but it can be fairly summarised as a selfish pursuit of glory, a total lack of respect and understanding of the enemy, doubtless inspired by racism and British exceptionalism, and an utter disregard for the welfare of the men he was responsible for. Alas, Chelmsford chose to lead a march of around 2,500 of the men from Isandlwana 12 miles to the east, based on reconnaissance reports of Zulu activity in that region the previous evening. But the main Zulu army was not, in fact, 12 miles east and running away, as Chelmsford had relentlessly implied they surely would. Instead, the Zulus had skilfully manoeuvred around 23,000 warriors, eager to defend their homes and families, into a valley about four and a half miles north of Isandlwana totally unseen and now they were readying themselves to attack the depleted British camp which had only a little over 1,400 men left to protect it. Before the fighting got underway, 300 more men came up from Rorke's Drift to bolster the British ranks but this would prove nowhere near enough. Ironically, though they were the last to arrive, they were among the first to die. Despite multiple reports from lookouts between 8am and 10am of Zulus spotted in the area, the senior officer left in charge of the camp at Isandlwana ordered no substantial preparations to be made for a potential engagement with the enemy. In fact, the men were essentially told to stand down, albeit to keep their tunics on. With the thermometer racing toward 40°C, I'm sure they were grateful for that. It does seem like the British were preparing for disaster. They were soon to get it. It's difficult to be too precise on timings because watches were quite unreliable back in 1879 due to standardised time zones not yet being established and almost everyone who would have been in a position to provide timings died. But it seems that at around midday 11,000 Zulus, the centre, appeared on the ridge a couple of miles to the north of the camp and a further 4,000 Zulus, the left horn, could be seen approaching from the north east. The British met them with a murderous hail of bullets from hastily constructed firing lines somewhere between a quarter of a mile and half a mile out from the camp, inflicting horrendous casualties among the Zulus. Zulu survivors later spoke of their comrades’ limbs being ripped clean off and skulls being blown in half as a result of the extremely large calibre rounds from the Martini-Henry rifles used by the British at the time. Regardless, the Zulus kept on, showing remarkable bravery, and soon the British were executing a fighting retreat back to the camp. When they got there the desperate nature of their predictament became clear as now, for the first time, they could see an additional 4,000 Zulus approaching from their rear, surrounding them, with many already in the camp, making access to their ammunition impossible. These Zulus, the right horn, had swung around the western face of Isandlwana, the blindside to the camp, unnoticed, while the British were trying to hold off the enemy to the north and east. With only a handful of rounds left in the poaches of the British soldiers, the battle was set to descend into the knife fight of your worst nightmares. In this scenario, of course, numbers are always decisive, and the Zulus had the upper hand by a count of 12 to one. Needless to say, it didn’t last long, with 1,300 from the British invading force quickly overwhelmed and killed. It’s hard to know how many Zulus died. Most estimates put it between 1,500 and 2,000 but I've long since suspected it was probably a bit higher. Having recently visited the battlefield site in South Africa and spoken to local Zulu historians, they are in profound agreement that the estimates usually cited in British history books are way too low. Approximately 400 of the British invading force did escape, many having fled early on in the engagement before all routes out were cut off. Most of these were the black natives recruited in South Africa by the British. Of course, at the time (and sadly in some quarters even to this day), this added another layer of racism to the reporting of the battle. The British lost because their black soldiers ran away, so the story went. But the vast majority of these men were not given rifles by the British, so it’s difficult to argue that they could have made any difference to the outcome. And in any case, why should they die for Queen Victoria? Only 58 white soldiers were able to successfully flee the carnage, all of them on horseback. Not a single white man on foot got away. Even those on foot who left early enough to avoid the encirclement were hunted down by the Zulus in one of the most terrifying chases you’ll ever read about. By 3pm, most of the killing was done. The Zulus had outwitted and outfought the pride of the British army. They manoeuvred a huge body of men close to a British encampment undetected and then perfectly executed their infamous pincer assault tactic, the horns of the buffalo. The brilliance of this should not be underestimated. The Zulus synchronised the deployment of 19,000 men across a five-mile front without modern radio communications. So complete was the victory that the 4,000 men the Zulus had in reserve, the loins of the buffalo, did not even break sweat. Against the wishes of their King, they peeled away seeking their own slice of glory by attacking the British supply base at Rorke’s Drift later in the day. We can certainly have some sympathy for the average British Tommy at Isandlwana. Many at the time were recruited from Victorian workhouses and had a straight choice between poverty or a life in the British army. They were also, of course, badly let down on the day in question by incompetent officers, all of whom came from the upper-classes of British society, essentially having purchased their rank. The entitlement and bigotry of rich, white men permeates the story of Isandlwana and lies behind much of the poor decision-making that day. In my view, nowhere near enough has been written about that and nowhere near enough of the lessons have been learnt. We can’t say with a straight face that the British soldiers at Isandlwana died for Britain or for freedom in the same way we can of those who perished on the beaches of Normandy 65 years later, but we could honour their memory by finally being honest with ourselves about why they really died. It’s time for historians to stop obfuscating and making excuses for what the British did in South Africa and elsewhere. I’m sure the Zulus would appreciate that too.
Chelmsford went out because the recon patrol made a mistake, had to spend the night in the hills and requested assistance. He didn't go out on a whim. He was asked to send troops. The recon patrol encountered circa 2,000 Zulus the afternoon before and unwisely decided to engage late on and to stay the night there. It was a terrifying night by all accounts including a mass panic by the Natal Native Contingent. The recon patrol fully expected to be attacked by the main impi. A rider was sent back to Chelmsford for assistance. Chelmsford was in a quandary. He couldn't ignore their request for help. There were over a thousand men out there mostly NNC. Nor could he send out a half hearted token force on foot over ten miles deeper into Zulu territory and through dangerous broken ground. Instead, Chelmsford sent a strong force out and kept a strong force back. The force kept back was ordered to act strictly on the defensive and to protect the camp. This would be reinforced by Durnfords 260 Mounted riflemen. This was actually a sound and reasonable decision given the situation. Had Durnford did as he was ordered and just got to the camp and acted in unison with Pulleine instead of wanting to fight his own offensive action then the camp probably would have held out. There were around 1,000 rifles. If they had defended right at the camp, as Pulleine did that morning when the alarm came in, this more concentrated firepower with close access to ammunition would have been too much for the Zulus to get through.
@lyndoncmp5751 Hey, thanks for the informed response. A great read. So I would say your assessment of Chelmsford is somewhat generous! Here's why: Whilst it is possible Chelmsford ONLY left to save the reconnaissance party, I think this is unlikely given his previous behaviour and musings. In any case, it's irrelevant because of course he sent out the 'reconnaissance in force' patrol in the first place, thus subsequently putting himself in the very quandary to which you refer. It's a pretty hard and fast rule that you never split your forces in the situation he was in and I think it's fairly unanimously agreed among all experts on the battle that this was a terrible mistake. I certainly agree that Durnford was reckless and a far better option would have been a tighter firing line closer to the camp. All that said, and this is just an opinion, but I'm doubtful whether any tactic could have saved them. I'm not sure enough firepower was left at the camp to hold off that particularly determined and well orchestrated assault. I realise the British at Rorke's Drift were at an even greater deficit numerically but the nature of your enemy matters too and at Isandlwana the British were facing the elite of the Zulu army who were well led and highly motivated. Thus I'm inclined to think the 23,000 Zulus at Isandlwana would have eventually overwhelmed the 800 or so rifles (I know you said 1,000 but I think it was slightly less) regardless of tactics. Ironically, if Chelmsford had stayed, he would have gotten the swift victory he so badly wanted and needed.
Cheers. No worries. Yes it's such an interesting discussion. You are entitled to your view of Chelmsford on this point of course but it doesn't alter the fact that Chelmsford absolutely WAS asked to assist by the recon patrol and he had few options. Without that, he almost certainly wouldn't have taken half the force out that day. The next intended major move was to march to the next camp site at Siphezi Hill. The 'recon in force' on the 21st was supposed to return that day, not spend the night in the hills. That was never in Chelmsford's plans. Dartnell of the Natal Mounted Police encounted a few hundred Zulus late in the afternoon of the 21st and asked Lonsdale and his Natal Native Contingent for support. This was around the time they should have all been turning back towards camp. Hamilton-Browne and Captain Duncombe of the NNC tried to convince Lonsdale to turn back instead of getting involved in action so late on but Lonsdale decided to support Dartnell. As Mike Snook writes in How Can Man Die Better: ""It was a decisive moment. Had Lonsdale listened to his subordinates and sent a message politely declining to become embroiled so close to nightfall, then the first invasion may not have ended in disaster."" Dartnell got his way and made the decision to stay out in the hills, some ten miles southeast of camp. A rider was sent back with a message to Chelmsford and allegedly Chelmsford was very irrritated by this decision by Dartnell. In the meantime, more Zulus were encountered by Dartnells forces (nearly 2,000) and Dartnell sent a further message back to Chelmsford asking for assistance. I believe two companies of the 24th were asked for. This was the largest number of Zulus seen since the invasion began. It was assumed by all what had been encountered was the vanguard of the main Zulu impi. This second message reached Chelmsford just after 1.00 am. This is what Chelmsford acted on. As I said before, Chelmsford didn't have many options. Ignoring the request for help was out of the question and if it WAS the Zulu impi heading towards the recon patrol then two companies of the 24th Foot, out there ten miles away, would not have been enough. Wisely, Chelmsford sent a strong force out, strong enough to make a difference. I've not heard any practical alternative by any modern experts. I also don't really agree he split his force in the classic sense, as in sending both halves out blindly on the attack like General Custer. Chelmsford left one half back, acting on the defensive and to be reinforced by Durnfords men. Sounds to me as though Chelmsford was actually exercising some caution there, not being blasé. He told Pulleine to keep his forces drawn in. Yes there were definitely around a thousand rifles there. Circa 600 in the 24th Foot, 250 in Durnfords Natal Native Mounted Contingent, around 120 in the combined Imperial Mounted Infantry, Natal Carbineers, Natal Mounted Police etc, plus whatever rifles were in the NNC. Also 70 or so men in the Royal Artillery with 2 cannon. The Zulus had no answer to concentrated firepower. The 24th Foot stopped the 12,000 strong Zulu chest until the right flank collapsed and they were forced to withdraw back to camp, and the circa 200 men on the right flank out with Durnford stopped the 4,000 strong Zulu left horn while they still had ammo. The Zulus couldn't get through them. Had the defensive line been tighter and right in front of the camp, I don't believe the Zulus could have got through it. The 24th could have covered the left and front, and the Colonials and Durnford the right, and the small gap at the rear when the Zulu right horn appeared. As I said, even with its dispersed nature the firing line was still holding the Zulus. It was Durnford running out of ammo that turned the battle. Yes he was beginning to be out flanked to his south, but if he was back at the camp he wouldn't have been. The hill of Malahbamkhosi was there. Being right at the camp to begin with, the later threat of the Zulu right horn could have been quickly addressed by men on horses. On top of that, seeing the Zulu chest and left horn taking far more punishment and not breaking through to the camp, the later arriving right horn might not have pressed it's attack as much. They would have been met with disappointment. The Zulus weren't supermen. Taking a heavier toll of bullets would have been a major factor. Apologies for the long reply.
@@lyndoncmp5751 The British thought it was going to be a cakewalk, zululand did not fall so easily. Then the British got their behind handed to them through most of the anglo-boer war.
@lyndoncmp5751 the hubris lays more with the whites because they thought that the battle was going to be won merely by their presence and their whiteness
I'm extremely excited to watch this upload on a topic I'm unfamiliar with. Especially told by you DiD because you always do such a good job with your content.
This was the first video of yours that my parter (military veteran) watched. He enjoyed it and gave it thumbs up. He hopes you will make a video of the Battle of Balaclava. Thank you once again for taking the time to make excellent videos.
Apparently the "iklua" short spear was so named by the Zulus because of the noise it made as they pull it out after stabbing you 😱 And the black shields for young and white shields for more experienced warriors could be to do with your hair going white as you get older. Fascinating. Another great video, your humourous injections make me literally laugh out loud (French history books 😂😂). Thank you 👍
Thank you for bringing to light one of the darkest days of British history, I think you summed it up best with the comment of hubris by the British government officials which led to the stunning victory by the Zulus. Bravo and kudos to you, amigo y nos vemos pronto.
Could you also put Custer's last stand on your list as that's a great story with Sitting Bull predicting the whole saga while doing a Sun dance as it's a brilliant story. Keep up the great work bud.@@DiD86
If I were to hold anything back, I’d feel that I’d cheated you all. I believe in always telling the whole story, no matter how long it takes to research and make. Rorke’s Drift might be a while coming though as I have quite a bit of other stuff that I have been promising myself for ages!
I believe that the US PBS Series NOVA or the other series on Historical Mysteries had an episode years ago on the Battle and the Effects of the mushrooms.🇺🇸🇬🇧🇺🇸🇬🇧
I am really hoping that the content will never end, just greedy I guess. I'm ashamed at how little I knew about this awful element of history. I've been meaning to read the river war, but Churchill is a bit too Victorian in his views of "lesser civilizations. Similar in the worst ways of victorious and the heroic defenders, to the us army and virtually every Indian tribe...the Sioux come to mind....thanks for sharing your work!
I agree the Zulu should have pushed the initiative after the battle and not diverged to Rouke's Drift. I don't think it would have changed the outcome of the war but would have made the war last longer and perhaps given the Zulu a better negotiating position. Then again I could be totally wrong!
The Zulus were exhausted though and had suffered a great mauling. They were in no fit state to take on even more powerful forces with Chelmsford. This force could have formed square pretty quickly.
Battle of Blood River and what lead up to that. Would be a good couterpart to this exceptional work. Might help explain the Boer hatred of the Zulus...
As being part Indian, thank you for breaking down the Shields and what the Warriors War that people tend to forget those things are very important to us thank you
If you like history and are fortunate to travel to South Africa you should visit Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift. Although the latter is better known Isandlewana has a similar feel to Culloden or Gettysburg. You are not that far away from where Nelson Mandela was captured and the new visitor centre with its very special sculpture. It’s a very special country with wonderful people.
'Assegai': the South African tree from which the spear was made. (ref. Collins Dictionary) A single round of that weight and which could penetrate 8 inches of oak at 500 yards, could surely deal severe wounds and death to several men at a time. The same superior attitude toward native populations was seen at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in June, 1876, with similar results.
Actually the worst colonial defeat in British history was when you guys lost the American Revolutionary war. Me being American in Massachusetts the history here is really fascinating. Maybe you should make a video of the battles of Lexington and Concord.
Not so. In every loss of the revolution, the British force was still intact afterwards. At Isandlwana, it was completely wiped out. Hence why it is considered the worst colonial defeat. But yes, I’ll happily look into battles from the revolution in the future.
I became a lifelong fan of Micheal Caine when I saw the movie "Zulu". Never could watch Zululand for more than a few minutes. Burt Lancaster was totally miscast and the script was boring.
If Durnford didn't turn the defensive position into an attack by chasing after Zulus and pressuring Pulleine to support him in his far flung venture then the camp would likely have held out. Chelmsford ordered Pulleine to keep his forces drawn in and act strictly on the defensive. This is exactly what Pulleine did do initially. Pulleine defended right in front of the tents during the morning false alarm which came in around 8.00 am. Then Durnford arrived around 10.00 and on hearing of Zulus retiring he decided to chase after them. Well even prior to this, Durnford let it be known to Pulleine that he wasn't going to remain in the camp. Durnford totally flouted the orders Pulleine was given, and his own orders, and engaged in an offensive action. He tried to get 2 companies of the 24th Foot to follow him out but Pulleine and Melville protested so Durnford relented on that issue. However, Durnford did order the rocket battery out, as well as 4 of his 5 troops of the Natal Native Mounted Contingent (the 5th was still escorting Durnfords wagons to Isandlwana). As he rode out, Durnford told Pulleine he expected to be supported in case of difficulties. This compromised Pulleine. Pulleine could no longer keep his forces drawn in when there were friendly troops, including the rocket battery, out there. This is the reason Pulleine deployed the 24th Foot further out, to keep open Durnfords line of withdrawal. If Durnford didn't go on the attack there is no way Pulleine would have then sent the 24th out. Pulleine's morning defensive positions prove that.
the number of unearned VCs awarded at rorkes drift was entirely to offset the absolute unmitigated disaster of isandlwana, a battle lost because of hubris, panic and arrogance. Chelmsford believed that whilst he was off glory hunting ,the column at isandlwana was big enough well armed and with sufficient supplies and ammunition to hold off any threat. on this occasion Chelmsford stupidity made general custer look competent.
I wouldn’t have said the VCs at Rorke’s Drift were unearned. But certainly the conflict was completely unnecessary. Completely agree about the character assessment of Chelmsford, though.
Chelmsford was right. There was enough there to have held the Zulus off, particularly with the reinforcements from Durnford's Number 2 Column that he sent for. If Durnford had followed his orders (get his men to the camp at once) and didnt interfere with the orders Pulleine was given (keep the forces drawn in and act only on the defensive) then with 1,000 rifles defending right at the camp in a much tighter and more compact firing line the camp likely would have held out. Instead, Durnford went maverick and sought action. He went out to attack the Zulus and pressured Pulleine into supporting his misguided and rash venture. It was Durnford who made the tactical blunders at Isandlwana. Not Chelmsford. Chelmsford's orders were sound.
I always fealt that Zulu Dawn was a political reaction in the movie industry to Zulu. The battle of Isandkwana is very much over rated, it was not fought against a British army, only the baggage train of the third column. Chelmsford's actual army remained in the field after the battle until April 1889, inflicting over 4,000 dead on the Zulu army. It resupplied and returned in June, inflicting a decisive defeat on the Zulu army at Ulundi, 4 July 1889 ending the Zulu war. British casualties including Isandlwana were 1,056 regular soldiers and around 740 colonial and levy. The Zulu figures are unknown but at least 7,000 dead on the battlefield.
@@lyndoncmp5751 The 24th were veterans and I never said they were "baggage troops". There were only 750 British regulars at Isandlwana, the 1,700 troops often quoted were mostly none-military Ox-drivers and laborers. It amazes me some on here can't tell the difference between a baggage train and an Army or an Ox-driver and an Infantryman!
@@billballbuster7186 I was replying to what you wrote here: "it was not fought against a British army, only the baggage train of the third Column" It was fought against the British Army. As I said, 6 companies of the 24th Foot. Also over 150 in the Royal Artillery, some Imperial Mounted Infantry. Then there were some good troops in the Natal Carbineers and Natal Mounted Police etc I argued it wasn't a baggage train. Cheers.
@@billballbuster7186 Im not saying that at all. I'm saying it wasn't only a "baggage train" that was defeated. There was the best part of a thousand professional British troops there, not only a baggage train.
Splitting your force is sometimes not a good idea Custers Last Stand shows that though I doubt he had enough men to begin with. Shame the men did not have Gatling Guns which were used in that war. They certainly would have made an impact in the event of a massed attack by the Zulu's.
It is often said that one should never divide forces. Although it worked for Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) in India and for General Lee in the US civil war. It’s a calculated risk that should only be taken with good knowledge of the disposition of the enemy. Chelmsford did not have that and he paid the price.
@@DiD86 Yes no doubt. Both were exceptional generals with intelligence and experience. Of course Lee was offered command of the Union Army at the outbreak of the Civil War but declined as he was a southerner. We can only wonder what would have happened had he accepted. It took the North a long time to find a General (Grant) who could take the fight to the Confederates with some success.
He didnt really split his force as in sending both halfs on the attack. He ordered the other half to remain in a defensive position and protect the camp, with forces kept drawn in. Ironically, in contrast to Chelmsford, it was actually Durnford who split his own 2nd Column in half, sending both halfs on the attack. Chelmsford never did that. Durnford did.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Whatever, another British blunder, one of many no doubt. My point was actually the impact that gatling guns which were in use might have made to help the defenders fight off the Zulus.
@@arunta5 It wouldn't even have needed Gatling guns. If Durnford didn't disperse forces out they probably would have won. 1,000 rifles defending a tighter more compact perimeter likely would have been too much for the Zulus. After all, they didnt need Gatling guns at Rorkes Drift, right?
Much respect to the couragous Zulu army ! They won bc of a great tactic manoeuvre called" the horns of the buffalo" . and they threw the evil invaders out of their land.
Most likely the QM was simply not provided with enough men on the TOE to keep up with the ammunition resupply, and ended up having to throw down boxes to the troops who lacked proper tools to open them efficiently. Short-shrift your logistics, this is what you get.
The 24th didnt run out of ammo on the firing line. They even kept up a firing withdrawal all the way back to the camp and Saddle area. Only Durnfords men ran out of ammo on the firing line and that was precisely due to Durnford not organising where his ammo wagon would be located when it arrived. Durnford rode out to attack the Zulus before his ammo wagon arrived at Isandlwana thus he didnt know where it was when his men ran low on ammo. A fatal oversight. The 24th Foot likely didn't even use up their original 70 rounds a man on the firing line.
The camp was way too large to laager and there was no panic that morning. A tighter defensive firing line probably would have been enough, but Durnford wanted to take the fight to the Zulus.
@@bloodrave9578 Yes but nobody realised it was a battle for survival until it was too late. Pulleine was ordered to protect the camp. As far as he knew he was managing to do that......until Durnfords retreat collapsed the right flank.
Another canarven?? Jesus you really need to do a deep dive into the family , seems they were on the wrong side of every bad brittish military decision 😮😮😮😮
DiD86 Yes, around 30 Tigers were sent to Tunisia, starring in late November 1942. A handful of Tigers were deployed around Leningrad in Russia in September, and got stuck in a swamp, but Tunisia was the first proper deployment. 👍
Brits: "don't worry lads, these are savages - they'll be uncoordinated and disorganised! Unlike us! Our guns will be no match for their inferior shouting, posturing and tantrums!" Zulu Princes: "Bison head"
Thanks. To review: I am a stroke survivor. I am recovering and re- habilitating. I watch “ZULU” at least once a month, and “ ZULU Dawn”, if I feel up to it. Still, I believe this is well told. Cheers!
I hope you recover fully❤❤❤❤❤ such a great movie
Hope the re-hab went well. 🙏
Chelmsford: It’s alright lads, we got this. In and out, 20 minute battle. They don’t have a chance.
Custer: First time?
Chelmsford wasn't even there and his tactical arrangements were ignored by Durnford.
Love the French history book comment... bloody priceless!
I knew that would get laughs. 😂
@@DiD86Of course, there would be a few pages around the Napoleonic Wars that wouldn't be blank. However, I got a real kick out of the reference, and I am American.
You have a way of engaging your viewers that is very compelling. I look forward to your videos. Thank you for your research and effort in producing your videos.
@@DiD86 oh ! that blooded but freaking hilarious!!!😂😂😂😂😂😂what a burn!
For a small joke? Bit of an overreaction. But, hey ho. Tatty bye, flower.
@@pathirtlelighten up Francis 🙄
Okay. Definitely a fan of your "posh" accent. I instantly felt the urge to take my hat in my hands and say "Aye, sir."
Thank you for such quality research and complete recounting of history
Just one last comment on why the Zulus didn't pursue the rest of the British Centre column, I think it's important to remember that the Zulus had marched around 65 miles from Ulundi the previous day, then ran 5 miles to surprise the British at the foot of Isandlwana before fighting a 3 hour battle in 40°C heat, most of which was hand to hand combat. So they were probably quite tired, hungry and thirsty!
Yes, that’s a very good point
@@DiD86 Giving a backhand to the Dutch soldier statement in "Zulu" "A Zulu warrior can run for 50 miles and fight at the end,"
I believe that part of the reason that the british moved so far from the camp was that there was dead ground created by their original line therefore moving forward to the next rise removed this but put them too far from the camp and increasing the gap between troops. Also right horn went unmentioned as that circumnavigated the camp entering the rear of the camp unopposed .
The British line moved forward because Durnford rode out to attack the Zulus and he pressured Pulleine to support him. Durnford also sent the rocket battery out miles. Pulleine had to extend his line to support this forward troop movement in case of their withdrawal.
Before the arrival of Durnford at around 10.00 am there was a false alarm after thousands of Zulus were seen manoeuvering in the hills. Pulleine had the 24th stood to right in front of the tents. He didn't disperse them out.
Durnford completely altered the situation and turned a strictly defensive position into an attack.
This is an excellent video. However, I do have an observation to make. When Chelmsford decided, in the late-night period of 21st-22nd January, to move half the 24th Regiment forwards in order to reinforce Major Dartnell's irregulars (who were sent forward on a scouting mission and sent back increasingly alarmist messages calling for help), he ordered Colonel Anthony Durford's No. 2 Column up from Rorke's Drift to reinforce the camp as Isandlwana, without giving either Durnford or Pulleine clear instructions as to who would be in command at the camp. This resulted in Pulleine - a lieutenant colonel - attempting to pass command to Durnford - a full colonel - while Durnford, operating an independent column, wasn't interested in taking command. This resulted in serious confusion. Durnford then decided to operate on the intelligence Chelmsford had already received re Zulus in the hills where Dartnell was encamped, and he left Pulleine in command of the static camp. Durnford made it clear before he left that if he got into difficulties, he expected Pulleine to reinforce him. This left Pulleine in a real bind, because Chelmsford had ordered him to remain on the defensive and to hold the camp, but Durnford was advancing and demanded support. This element of confusion was compounded when Durnford DID get into difficulties when he ran headlong into the Zulu Left Horn and Charles Pope's G Company, 2nd Battalion, tried to relieve him. But instead of linking up with Pope and strengthening the right flank of the British firing line, Durnford and his men mounted their horses and retreated at full speed. In doing so, Durnford abandoned both his own rocket battery and Pope, leaving the latter high and dry, alone and separated from the rest of the firing line. This was the moment when the British flank was turned and the collapse began.
Thank you for the extra info. Highly interesting stuff! 👌🏻
When Durnford arrived he acted as if he was in command. He firstly stood down the 24th Foot then later ordered forces out including some NNC under Pulleine's command. He tried to get two companies of the 24th Foot to follow him out but Pulleine and Melville protested so he didnt push the matter. He also told one of the Natal Carbineers that he was Pulleine's senior and must do as he tells him. There is little indication that Durnford didnt act as though he was in charge, particularly when he rode off and declared to Pulleine that he expected him to support him.
There should have been no confusion in tactical matters, regardless of who was in charge. Pulleine was ordered by Chelmsford to keep his forces drawn in and act only on the defensive, while Durnford was ordered up to the camp, and nowhere else, as it was short of numbers.
Durnford took it upon himself to ignore both his and Pulleine's clearly defined orders.
Always nice to get the notification that another DiD vid is awaiting. As for the music thing, give it a go!
I'm going to have to watch this twice (as per) in order to do it justice. Nice work DiD x
As always you told us another ripping yarn. Never a dull moment. Already looking forward to your next bit of Darkness. I love that story & you told it well.
Excellent, many thanks.
Great channel! I’m definitely subscribed and watching!🤩
I've been studying Isandlwana for about 30 years and in April this year was lucky enough to finally visit the battlefield. An incredible experience. I thought you did a great job in your video by the way!
For what it's worth, this is my telling of that day (short version!):
The events that unfolded at Isandlwana on 22nd January 1879 signalled the beginning of one of the most remarkable days in British history.
It was a day of tragedy for both of the armies in Zululand, with at least 4,000 men in total dying before the sun had set, as well as many more being seriously wounded and maimed at a time when medical science could offer little more than a bandage and a cup of water.
Quite unusually in military history, it is not only a day commemorated by both the British and the Zulus for the sacrifices made by their young men, but it also sees both their armies heralding great victories.
However, unsavoury though it is to speak of any winners in warfare, there was in reality only one army that triumphed that day a little over 144 years ago.
On the 11th January, the British Army, with approximately 16,000 men, invaded Zululand because, well, they wanted it for themselves.
Around 4,000 of those men, the centre of three columns which had advanced into Zululand, set up camp at Isandlwana on the 20th January 1879, approximately 10 miles along the track from the border post at Rorke's Drift.
The violence which occurred at that infamous river crossing in the late afternoon and evening of the 22nd January would see it make its own indelible mark on history but unquestionably the most important story of that fateful day was written at Isandlwana, some hours prior.
Very early in the morning of the 22nd January, at 4am, Lord Chelmsford, the commander of the British forces in Zululand who had attached himself to the centre column, broke one of the most important rules of military strategy; when you're in enemy territory and you don't know where the enemy is, never divide your forces. This rule becomes even more pertinent when you know you're going to be outnumbered and you're relying on a heavy concentration of firepower to win any battles that may take place.
So why did Chelmsford make this fatal error? Many a chapter has been written about this but it can be fairly summarised as a selfish pursuit of glory, a total lack of respect and understanding of the enemy, doubtless inspired by racism and British exceptionalism, and an utter disregard for the welfare of the men he was responsible for.
Alas, Chelmsford chose to lead a march of around 2,500 of the men from Isandlwana 12 miles to the east, based on reconnaissance reports of Zulu activity in that region the previous evening.
But the main Zulu army was not, in fact, 12 miles east and running away, as Chelmsford had relentlessly implied they surely would.
Instead, the Zulus had skilfully manoeuvred around 23,000 warriors, eager to defend their homes and families, into a valley about four and a half miles north of Isandlwana totally unseen and now they were readying themselves to attack the depleted British camp which had only a little over 1,400 men left to protect it.
Before the fighting got underway, 300 more men came up from Rorke's Drift to bolster the British ranks but this would prove nowhere near enough. Ironically, though they were the last to arrive, they were among the first to die.
Despite multiple reports from lookouts between 8am and 10am of Zulus spotted in the area, the senior officer left in charge of the camp at Isandlwana ordered no substantial preparations to be made for a potential engagement with the enemy.
In fact, the men were essentially told to stand down, albeit to keep their tunics on. With the thermometer racing toward 40°C, I'm sure they were grateful for that. It does seem like the British were preparing for disaster. They were soon to get it.
It's difficult to be too precise on timings because watches were quite unreliable back in 1879 due to standardised time zones not yet being established and almost everyone who would have been in a position to provide timings died. But it seems that at around midday 11,000 Zulus, the centre, appeared on the ridge a couple of miles to the north of the camp and a further 4,000 Zulus, the left horn, could be seen approaching from the north east.
The British met them with a murderous hail of bullets from hastily constructed firing lines somewhere between a quarter of a mile and half a mile out from the camp, inflicting horrendous casualties among the Zulus.
Zulu survivors later spoke of their comrades’ limbs being ripped clean off and skulls being blown in half as a result of the extremely large calibre rounds from the Martini-Henry rifles used by the British at the time.
Regardless, the Zulus kept on, showing remarkable bravery, and soon the British were executing a fighting retreat back to the camp.
When they got there the desperate nature of their predictament became clear as now, for the first time, they could see an additional 4,000 Zulus approaching from their rear, surrounding them, with many already in the camp, making access to their ammunition impossible.
These Zulus, the right horn, had swung around the western face of Isandlwana, the blindside to the camp, unnoticed, while the British were trying to hold off the enemy to the north and east.
With only a handful of rounds left in the poaches of the British soldiers, the battle was set to descend into the knife fight of your worst nightmares.
In this scenario, of course, numbers are always decisive, and the Zulus had the upper hand by a count of 12 to one. Needless to say, it didn’t last long, with 1,300 from the British invading force quickly overwhelmed and killed.
It’s hard to know how many Zulus died. Most estimates put it between 1,500 and 2,000 but I've long since suspected it was probably a bit higher. Having recently visited the battlefield site in South Africa and spoken to local Zulu historians, they are in profound agreement that the estimates usually cited in British history books are way too low.
Approximately 400 of the British invading force did escape, many having fled early on in the engagement before all routes out were cut off. Most of these were the black natives recruited in South Africa by the British.
Of course, at the time (and sadly in some quarters even to this day), this added another layer of racism to the reporting of the battle. The British lost because their black soldiers ran away, so the story went. But the vast majority of these men were not given rifles by the British, so it’s difficult to argue that they could have made any difference to the outcome. And in any case, why should they die for Queen Victoria?
Only 58 white soldiers were able to successfully flee the carnage, all of them on horseback. Not a single white man on foot got away. Even those on foot who left early enough to avoid the encirclement were hunted down by the Zulus in one of the most terrifying chases you’ll ever read about.
By 3pm, most of the killing was done. The Zulus had outwitted and outfought the pride of the British army. They manoeuvred a huge body of men close to a British encampment undetected and then perfectly executed their infamous pincer assault tactic, the horns of the buffalo.
The brilliance of this should not be underestimated. The Zulus synchronised the deployment of 19,000 men across a five-mile front without modern radio communications.
So complete was the victory that the 4,000 men the Zulus had in reserve, the loins of the buffalo, did not even break sweat. Against the wishes of their King, they peeled away seeking their own slice of glory by attacking the British supply base at Rorke’s Drift later in the day.
We can certainly have some sympathy for the average British Tommy at Isandlwana. Many at the time were recruited from Victorian workhouses and had a straight choice between poverty or a life in the British army.
They were also, of course, badly let down on the day in question by incompetent officers, all of whom came from the upper-classes of British society, essentially having purchased their rank.
The entitlement and bigotry of rich, white men permeates the story of Isandlwana and lies behind much of the poor decision-making that day. In my view, nowhere near enough has been written about that and nowhere near enough of the lessons have been learnt.
We can’t say with a straight face that the British soldiers at Isandlwana died for Britain or for freedom in the same way we can of those who perished on the beaches of Normandy 65 years later, but we could honour their memory by finally being honest with ourselves about why they really died.
It’s time for historians to stop obfuscating and making excuses for what the British did in South Africa and elsewhere. I’m sure the Zulus would appreciate that too.
Great comment. Insightful and distinct ending thoughts.
@@salmanovitch6702Cheers
Chelmsford went out because the recon patrol made a mistake, had to spend the night in the hills and requested assistance. He didn't go out on a whim. He was asked to send troops. The recon patrol encountered circa 2,000 Zulus the afternoon before and unwisely decided to engage late on and to stay the night there. It was a terrifying night by all accounts including a mass panic by the Natal Native Contingent. The recon patrol fully expected to be attacked by the main impi. A rider was sent back to Chelmsford for assistance.
Chelmsford was in a quandary. He couldn't ignore their request for help. There were over a thousand men out there mostly NNC. Nor could he send out a half hearted token force on foot over ten miles deeper into Zulu territory and through dangerous broken ground.
Instead, Chelmsford sent a strong force out and kept a strong force back. The force kept back was ordered to act strictly on the defensive and to protect the camp. This would be reinforced by Durnfords 260 Mounted riflemen.
This was actually a sound and reasonable decision given the situation. Had Durnford did as he was ordered and just got to the camp and acted in unison with Pulleine instead of wanting to fight his own offensive action then the camp probably would have held out. There were around 1,000 rifles. If they had defended right at the camp, as Pulleine did that morning when the alarm came in, this more concentrated firepower with close access to ammunition would have been too much for the Zulus to get through.
@lyndoncmp5751 Hey, thanks for the informed response. A great read.
So I would say your assessment of Chelmsford is somewhat generous! Here's why:
Whilst it is possible Chelmsford ONLY left to save the reconnaissance party, I think this is unlikely given his previous behaviour and musings. In any case, it's irrelevant because of course he sent out the 'reconnaissance in force' patrol in the first place, thus subsequently putting himself in the very quandary to which you refer.
It's a pretty hard and fast rule that you never split your forces in the situation he was in and I think it's fairly unanimously agreed among all experts on the battle that this was a terrible mistake.
I certainly agree that Durnford was reckless and a far better option would have been a tighter firing line closer to the camp.
All that said, and this is just an opinion, but I'm doubtful whether any tactic could have saved them. I'm not sure enough firepower was left at the camp to hold off that particularly determined and well orchestrated assault. I realise the British at Rorke's Drift were at an even greater deficit numerically but the nature of your enemy matters too and at Isandlwana the British were facing the elite of the Zulu army who were well led and highly motivated. Thus I'm inclined to think the 23,000 Zulus at Isandlwana would have eventually overwhelmed the 800 or so rifles (I know you said 1,000 but I think it was slightly less) regardless of tactics.
Ironically, if Chelmsford had stayed, he would have gotten the swift victory he so badly wanted and needed.
Cheers. No worries. Yes it's such an interesting discussion.
You are entitled to your view of Chelmsford on this point of course but it doesn't alter the fact that Chelmsford absolutely WAS asked to assist by the recon patrol and he had few options. Without that, he almost certainly wouldn't have taken half the force out that day. The next intended major move was to march to the next camp site at Siphezi Hill.
The 'recon in force' on the 21st was supposed to return that day, not spend the night in the hills. That was never in Chelmsford's plans. Dartnell of the Natal Mounted Police encounted a few hundred Zulus late in the afternoon of the 21st and asked Lonsdale and his Natal Native Contingent for support. This was around the time they should have all been turning back towards camp. Hamilton-Browne and Captain Duncombe of the NNC tried to convince Lonsdale to turn back instead of getting involved in action so late on but Lonsdale decided to support Dartnell. As Mike Snook writes in How Can Man Die Better:
""It was a decisive moment. Had Lonsdale listened to his subordinates and sent a message politely declining to become embroiled so close to nightfall, then the first invasion may not have ended in disaster.""
Dartnell got his way and made the decision to stay out in the hills, some ten miles southeast of camp. A rider was sent back with a message to Chelmsford and allegedly Chelmsford was very irrritated by this decision by Dartnell. In the meantime, more Zulus were encountered by Dartnells forces (nearly 2,000) and Dartnell sent a further message back to Chelmsford asking for assistance. I believe two companies of the 24th were asked for. This was the largest number of Zulus seen since the invasion began. It was assumed by all what had been encountered was the vanguard of the main Zulu impi. This second message reached Chelmsford just after 1.00 am. This is what Chelmsford acted on.
As I said before, Chelmsford didn't have many options. Ignoring the request for help was out of the question and if it WAS the Zulu impi heading towards the recon patrol then two companies of the 24th Foot, out there ten miles away, would not have been enough. Wisely, Chelmsford sent a strong force out, strong enough to make a difference. I've not heard any practical alternative by any modern experts. I also don't really agree he split his force in the classic sense, as in sending both halves out blindly on the attack like General Custer. Chelmsford left one half back, acting on the defensive and to be reinforced by Durnfords men. Sounds to me as though Chelmsford was actually exercising some caution there, not being blasé. He told Pulleine to keep his forces drawn in.
Yes there were definitely around a thousand rifles there. Circa 600 in the 24th Foot, 250 in Durnfords Natal Native Mounted Contingent, around 120 in the combined Imperial Mounted Infantry, Natal Carbineers, Natal Mounted Police etc, plus whatever rifles were in the NNC. Also 70 or so men in the Royal Artillery with 2 cannon.
The Zulus had no answer to concentrated firepower. The 24th Foot stopped the 12,000 strong Zulu chest until the right flank collapsed and they were forced to withdraw back to camp, and the circa 200 men on the right flank out with Durnford stopped the 4,000 strong Zulu left horn while they still had ammo. The Zulus couldn't get through them. Had the defensive line been tighter and right in front of the camp, I don't believe the Zulus could have got through it. The 24th could have covered the left and front, and the Colonials and Durnford the right, and the small gap at the rear when the Zulu right horn appeared. As I said, even with its dispersed nature the firing line was still holding the Zulus. It was Durnford running out of ammo that turned the battle. Yes he was beginning to be out flanked to his south, but if he was back at the camp he wouldn't have been. The hill of Malahbamkhosi was there. Being right at the camp to begin with, the later threat of the Zulu right horn could have been quickly addressed by men on horses. On top of that, seeing the Zulu chest and left horn taking far more punishment and not breaking through to the camp, the later arriving right horn might not have pressed it's attack as much. They would have been met with disappointment. The Zulus weren't supermen. Taking a heavier toll of bullets would have been a major factor.
Apologies for the long reply.
Brilliant as usual..
Your videos on military history are my favorites on your channel. Well researched and well told!
Yet again watching your excellent interpretation of this epic story. I’ve been patiently waiting for your next gripping upload. Keep them coming.👍
I most certainly. New video coming on Wednesday.
This battle is the very definition of this is what happens when you underestimate your opponent.
That's what the Zulus did at Rorkes Drift. The Zulus thought it would be easy pickings and a chance to 'wash their spears'.
Hubris all around.
@@lyndoncmp5751 The British thought it was going to be a cakewalk, zululand did not fall so easily. Then the British got their behind handed to them through most of the anglo-boer war.
@@grapeshot
You do know that the Zulus lost two other battles on the same day, right?
The point is, there was hubris all around.
@lyndoncmp5751 the hubris lays more with the whites because they thought that the battle was going to be won merely by their presence and their whiteness
@@grapeshot
Are so you are a racist.
Love the story can't wait for the other parts of it. Hope you have a great weekend you and yours
Thank you! You too!
I'm extremely excited to watch this upload on a topic I'm unfamiliar with. Especially told by you DiD because you always do such a good job with your content.
This was the first video of yours that my parter (military veteran) watched. He enjoyed it and gave it thumbs up. He hopes you will make a video of the Battle of Balaclava. Thank you once again for taking the time to make excellent videos.
Love the humour mixed in with the historical content
It’s my speciality. 😂👍🏻
Apparently the "iklua" short spear was so named by the Zulus because of the noise it made as they pull it out after stabbing you 😱
And the black shields for young and white shields for more experienced warriors could be to do with your hair going white as you get older. Fascinating.
Another great video, your humourous injections make me literally laugh out loud (French history books 😂😂).
Thank you 👍
Thanks DiD for another great video ❤
Very interesting and it's always best to hear more than one opinion of a historical event. Well done.
As far as I'm concerned Zulu Dawn is the best movie ever created, you can find it right here on youtube!
Zulu is a far better film.
Thank you for bringing to light one of the darkest days of British history, I think you summed it up best with the comment of hubris by the British government officials which led to the stunning victory by the Zulus. Bravo and kudos to you, amigo y nos vemos pronto.
Love your channel, you gotta do Rourke's Drift soon, as you're research and style of delivery kicks arse!
I will do, for sure.
Could you also put Custer's last stand on your list as that's a great story with Sitting Bull predicting the whole saga while doing a Sun dance as it's a brilliant story. Keep up the great work bud.@@DiD86
I hope you do rocksdrift. I enjoy your take on history, no holding back on the details the way it should be.
If I were to hold anything back, I’d feel that I’d cheated you all.
I believe in always telling the whole story, no matter how long it takes to research and make.
Rorke’s Drift might be a while coming though as I have quite a bit of other stuff that I have been promising myself for ages!
I believe that the US PBS Series NOVA or the other series on Historical Mysteries had an episode years ago on the Battle and the Effects of the mushrooms.🇺🇸🇬🇧🇺🇸🇬🇧
I am really hoping that the content will never end, just greedy I guess. I'm ashamed at how little I knew about this awful element of history. I've been meaning to read the river war, but Churchill is a bit too Victorian in his views of "lesser civilizations. Similar in the worst ways of victorious and the heroic defenders, to the us army and virtually every Indian tribe...the Sioux come to mind....thanks for sharing your work!
I agree the Zulu should have pushed the initiative after the battle and not diverged to Rouke's Drift. I don't think it would have changed the outcome of the war but would have made the war last longer and perhaps given the Zulu a better negotiating position. Then again I could be totally wrong!
The Zulus were exhausted though and had suffered a great mauling. They were in no fit state to take on even more powerful forces with Chelmsford. This force could have formed square pretty quickly.
The force that attacked Rorke's Drift were disobeying orders in doing so.
Oop, DiD has uploaded! Time to put the kettle on!
Excellent video,thank yoi.
Thank you too!
Bravo...very interesting.
😊
Battle of Blood River and what lead up to that. Would be a good couterpart to this exceptional work. Might help explain the Boer hatred of the Zulus...
That burn against the French was absolutely beautiful! 😂
"Zulus to the Southwest - thousands of 'em"
I have one complaint about your channel. We the viewer's need more to watch.
My heartfelt apologies. I will have a new video uploaded this very evening! In approximately two hours. 👌🏻
Let's hear it boys! Three cheers for the Zulus!
Only a Zulu would say such an foolish thing.
As being part Indian, thank you for breaking down the Shields and what the Warriors War that people tend to forget those things are very important to us thank you
If you like history and are fortunate to travel to South Africa you should visit Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift. Although the latter is better known Isandlewana has a similar feel to Culloden or Gettysburg.
You are not that far away from where Nelson Mandela was captured and the new visitor centre with its very special sculpture.
It’s a very special country with wonderful people.
The ultimate "fuck around and find out."
Can’t argue.
First comment, woot woot!
Well done! 😂👍🏻
Another great video!
Love the accents used.
'Assegai': the South African tree from which the spear was made.
(ref. Collins Dictionary)
A single round of that weight and which could penetrate 8 inches of oak at 500 yards, could surely deal severe wounds and death to several men at a time.
The same superior attitude toward native populations was seen at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in June, 1876, with similar results.
Actually the worst colonial defeat in British history was when you guys lost the American Revolutionary war.
Me being American in Massachusetts the history here is really fascinating. Maybe you should make a video of the battles of Lexington and Concord.
Not so. In every loss of the revolution, the British force was still intact afterwards.
At Isandlwana, it was completely wiped out. Hence why it is considered the worst colonial defeat.
But yes, I’ll happily look into battles from the revolution in the future.
I became a lifelong fan of Micheal Caine when I saw the movie "Zulu". Never could watch Zululand for more than a few minutes. Burt Lancaster was totally miscast and the script was boring.
If Durnford didn't turn the defensive position into an attack by chasing after Zulus and pressuring Pulleine to support him in his far flung venture then the camp would likely have held out. Chelmsford ordered Pulleine to keep his forces drawn in and act strictly on the defensive. This is exactly what Pulleine did do initially. Pulleine defended right in front of the tents during the morning false alarm which came in around 8.00 am. Then Durnford arrived around 10.00 and on hearing of Zulus retiring he decided to chase after them. Well even prior to this, Durnford let it be known to Pulleine that he wasn't going to remain in the camp. Durnford totally flouted the orders Pulleine was given, and his own orders, and engaged in an offensive action. He tried to get 2 companies of the 24th Foot to follow him out but Pulleine and Melville protested so Durnford relented on that issue. However, Durnford did order the rocket battery out, as well as 4 of his 5 troops of the Natal Native Mounted Contingent (the 5th was still escorting Durnfords wagons to Isandlwana). As he rode out, Durnford told Pulleine he expected to be supported in case of difficulties. This compromised Pulleine. Pulleine could no longer keep his forces drawn in when there were friendly troops, including the rocket battery, out there. This is the reason Pulleine deployed the 24th Foot further out, to keep open Durnfords line of withdrawal. If Durnford didn't go on the attack there is no way Pulleine would have then sent the 24th out. Pulleine's morning defensive positions prove that.
A music channel? Could be interesting!
There will be a song included in the next video. I shall make it a stand alone addition as well.
the number of unearned VCs awarded at rorkes drift was entirely to offset the absolute unmitigated disaster of isandlwana, a battle lost because of hubris, panic and arrogance. Chelmsford believed that whilst he was off glory hunting ,the column at isandlwana was big enough well armed and with sufficient supplies and ammunition to hold off any threat. on this occasion Chelmsford stupidity made general custer look competent.
I wouldn’t have said the VCs at Rorke’s Drift were unearned. But certainly the conflict was completely unnecessary.
Completely agree about the character assessment of Chelmsford, though.
Chelmsford was right. There was enough there to have held the Zulus off, particularly with the reinforcements from Durnford's Number 2 Column that he sent for.
If Durnford had followed his orders (get his men to the camp at once) and didnt interfere with the orders Pulleine was given (keep the forces drawn in and act only on the defensive) then with 1,000 rifles defending right at the camp in a much tighter and more compact firing line the camp likely would have held out.
Instead, Durnford went maverick and sought action. He went out to attack the Zulus and pressured Pulleine into supporting his misguided and rash venture.
It was Durnford who made the tactical blunders at Isandlwana. Not Chelmsford. Chelmsford's orders were sound.
A gem of a story.
Brilliantly articulated!
Good show!👍
You may be interested in a French rifle surplus sale.
"Never fired.
Only dropped once."
Classic! 😂
I always fealt that Zulu Dawn was a political reaction in the movie industry to Zulu. The battle of Isandkwana is very much over rated, it was not fought against a British army, only the baggage train of the third column. Chelmsford's actual army remained in the field after the battle until April 1889, inflicting over 4,000 dead on the Zulu army. It resupplied and returned in June, inflicting a decisive defeat on the Zulu army at Ulundi, 4 July 1889 ending the Zulu war. British casualties including Isandlwana were 1,056 regular soldiers and around 740 colonial and levy. The Zulu figures are unknown but at least 7,000 dead on the battlefield.
The 6 companies of the 24th Foot lost at Isandlwana were anything but baggage troops. They were among the best British troops in South Africa.
@@lyndoncmp5751 The 24th were veterans and I never said they were "baggage troops". There were only 750 British regulars at Isandlwana, the 1,700 troops often quoted were mostly none-military Ox-drivers and laborers. It amazes me some on here can't tell the difference between a baggage train and an Army or an Ox-driver and an Infantryman!
@@billballbuster7186
I was replying to what you wrote here:
"it was not fought against a British army, only the baggage train of the third Column"
It was fought against the British Army. As I said, 6 companies of the 24th Foot. Also over 150 in the Royal Artillery, some Imperial Mounted Infantry. Then there were some good troops in the Natal Carbineers and Natal Mounted Police etc
I argued it wasn't a baggage train.
Cheers.
@@lyndoncmp5751 So are you saying because those defending the baggage train were defeated, then the whole army was defeated.
@@billballbuster7186
Im not saying that at all. I'm saying it wasn't only a "baggage train" that was defeated. There was the best part of a thousand professional British troops there, not only a baggage train.
Seems a redeux of the battle of the Little Bighorn.
Mushrooms, Khat, Coca leaves......ain't mother nature great? 👍🍻
Joe rogan talked about the same red and spotted mushroom , ,,,evidently that's how Santa came to be ,the red and white theme all imaging history
Splitting your force is sometimes not a good idea Custers Last Stand shows that though I doubt he had enough men to begin with. Shame the men did not have Gatling Guns which were used in that war. They certainly would have made an impact in the event of a massed attack by the Zulu's.
It is often said that one should never divide forces. Although it worked for Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) in India and for General Lee in the US civil war.
It’s a calculated risk that should only be taken with good knowledge of the disposition of the enemy. Chelmsford did not have that and he paid the price.
@@DiD86 Yes no doubt. Both were exceptional generals with intelligence and experience. Of course Lee was offered command of the Union Army at the outbreak of the Civil War but declined as he was a southerner. We can only wonder what would have happened had he accepted. It took the North a long time to find a General (Grant) who could take the fight to the Confederates with some success.
He didnt really split his force as in sending both halfs on the attack. He ordered the other half to remain in a defensive position and protect the camp, with forces kept drawn in.
Ironically, in contrast to Chelmsford, it was actually Durnford who split his own 2nd Column in half, sending both halfs on the attack. Chelmsford never did that. Durnford did.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Whatever, another British blunder, one of many no doubt. My point was actually the impact that gatling guns which were in use might have made to help the defenders fight off the Zulus.
@@arunta5
It wouldn't even have needed Gatling guns. If Durnford didn't disperse forces out they probably would have won. 1,000 rifles defending a tighter more compact perimeter likely would have been too much for the Zulus. After all, they didnt need Gatling guns at Rorkes Drift, right?
Much respect to the couragous Zulu army ! They won bc of a great tactic manoeuvre called" the horns of the buffalo" . and they threw the evil invaders out of their land.
Not for long…
Most likely the QM was simply not provided with enough men on the TOE to keep up with the ammunition resupply, and ended up having to throw down boxes to the troops who lacked proper tools to open them efficiently. Short-shrift your logistics, this is what you get.
Yes, that wouldn’t surprise me.
The 24th didnt run out of ammo on the firing line. They even kept up a firing withdrawal all the way back to the camp and Saddle area.
Only Durnfords men ran out of ammo on the firing line and that was precisely due to Durnford not organising where his ammo wagon would be located when it arrived. Durnford rode out to attack the Zulus before his ammo wagon arrived at Isandlwana thus he didnt know where it was when his men ran low on ammo. A fatal oversight.
The 24th Foot likely didn't even use up their original 70 rounds a man on the firing line.
Red coats invented red tape hahaha.
My only criticism is that most of the maps are uselessly detailed and unreadable.
Older maps tend to be like that.
Nobody ever talks about the third battle that occurred on the same day.
Which one is that? Can’t think off the top of my head…🤔
@@DiD86 Pearson's fight on the Inyezane.
Ah! I must admit that is a new one on me. I will have a look into it. Thanks for the info. 👍🏻
I vote in favour of the music channel.
If only the British had formed a Laager around their camp, that would have saved them
The camp was way too large to laager and there was no panic that morning.
A tighter defensive firing line probably would have been enough, but Durnford wanted to take the fight to the Zulus.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Infantry square on the high ground would have done it, Durnford underestimated the Zulu when he chose to engage them in the Dongas.
@@bloodrave9578
Yes but nobody realised it was a battle for survival until it was too late. Pulleine was ordered to protect the camp. As far as he knew he was managing to do that......until Durnfords retreat collapsed the right flank.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Chelmsford had been advised by the Boers to have his wagons laagered about the camp but the advice was ignored
@@bloodrave9578
No that was only in a film. Not in real life. You can't laager a one kilometre wide camp.
I would of drank petrol and made a human flamethrower😮😅
👍...........🇦🇺
We need Zulu Brand security Kensington model Pennsylvania could use them and the border is open..... scales are closed let's roll 🥐......
It is weird how someone who is not south african thinks they know anything about south african history. And it is pronounced tu-ge-la, not to-gay-la
I’m not a nuclear scientist either but I know how a reactor works.
Because I can read….
Lots of Zoo and plenty of Lou.
Another canarven?? Jesus you really need to do a deep dive into the family , seems they were on the wrong side of every bad brittish military decision 😮😮😮😮
Sadly yes.
Tigers, in africa?
Have they got my leg?
There were Tigers in Africa. Tiger tanks.
Yes indeed. I believe that the North Africa campaign was the first major engagement that they were used in.
DiD86
Yes, around 30 Tigers were sent to Tunisia, starring in late November 1942. A handful of Tigers were deployed around Leningrad in Russia in September, and got stuck in a swamp, but Tunisia was the first proper deployment. 👍
Brits: "don't worry lads, these are savages - they'll be uncoordinated and disorganised! Unlike us! Our guns will be no match for their inferior shouting, posturing and tantrums!"
Zulu Princes: "Bison head"
Also: the poor Frenchies 😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😂
Oof
French history books are blank "GOLD" 😂
But Bitchy
😂
LMAO...French history books...!!!
Good pitchman like and scribed... Sterling Mate prime cut video perciate it Hombre and always Carry a large caliber revolver for safety 🦺.
"Their History." A book of blank pages.... Well statted.
😏
Damnnnnn burned the French haha love the channel! Keep up the great work