I was there when that happened. I was on watch on HMAS Vampire. We arrived at first light. Only the stern section was afloat. Very sad stuff. We were a Destroyer. She was a destroyer. God bless em all.
I was onboard a Royal Navy Guided Missile Destroyer on route to Subic Bay Manilla when in the early hours of the morning we got instruction to proceed to assist the other ships after the collision of H.M.A.S. Melbourne and USS Frank .E.Evans which had been cut in two and the f'wrd half had sunk. I was onboard H.M.S. London in the South China Sea. it was an awful thing that happened. I have good recollections of that day, Patrick Allen Lancashire United Kingdom
This video really does bring back memories! I was a surface warfare officer (SWO) aboard a Spruance class destroyer in the 1980's, and stood more bridge watches as a JOOD and OOD than I care to remember. I do recall seeing this movie during class in Surface Warfare Officer's School (SWOS) in Newport, RI in the fall of 1983. As one who stood bridge watches during night time fleet exercises, the number of mistakes made by this watch team still astonishes me. You're never too close for a maneuvering board (mo-board) solution!
The Swiss cheese model of events lining up to an catastrophe . . the captain in his bed asleep on Evans ultimate responsible for a poor trained crew as in poor management in end
I was on HMAS Stuart on this exercise(1969)...just over the horizon from the fateful incident. I was drinking with two of the Yankee sailors the day before in Manila. They were both in the forward section...say no more. Owing to the complacent,disobedient & careless actions of the two OOD's on Evan's bridge...Evans crossed Melbourne's bow once, and the on the second time...BANG. Resdes' always are to turn outboard of the carrier to assume Resdes position aft. Ignore, or stuff up "rules of the searoad"and this can happen. Just ask my my old mates on HMAS Voyager, Feb'1964. And somehow, our Melborne captain copped it in the arse...crikey!! Signed: ex-CPO, R.A.N 1964-1976.
Commander of HMAS Melbourne, John Stevenson was completely fucked over by this incident. He was demoted from commodoore to captain and given a desk job. He wasn't vindicated until a few years ago when he was in his nineties. He only died in February of this year.
I was on Eisenhower in the 80’s this video was still being shown to sailors at that time. Sadly, the US Navy’s Admirals are a political group first and foremost. Only in wartime do we find the best warrior admirals being promoted after catastrophic events drive selection based out actual abilities. Life isn’t fair, never has and never will be. Sadly this unfairness and “political correctness” destroyed the career of the one man who did all he could to avoid the accident. In additon, the action of the US admiral ultimately gave political ammunition to the liberal Politicians in Australia who wanted to shrink the Australian Navy. This accident ultimately ended Australian carrier aviation and subsequently saw a massive reduction in overall capabilities.
And EXACTLY THE SAME THING had happened to Capt. John Robertson after Melbourne collided with HMAS Voyager five years before. Seems like a hidden clause in the job description for being Master of HMAS Melbourne read "You must be prepared to act as a scapegoat and get thrown to the wolves by Command and the government of the day". I have the greatest respect for our ADF personnel and the greatest disgust at those who would readily sacrifice those people's careers and reputations for political expediency.
I read about thst in a book about the HMAS MELBORNE and was shocked they COULD. Bring charges against the Capt! From the book and this vidio it was the culpable inefficiency of the bridge watch on the USS EVANS. Cant read it any other way. Raw deal for the carriers skipper!!
@@jerrymccrae7202 it was terrible.... life isn’t fair at all. But at least in his lifetime he was finally exonerated. I’ve seen similar things happen to US Skippers and Military commanders in the US. Today, just being associated with an accident even if your cleared of any wrong doing can end a career. My personal opinion is even if a Captain or officer makes a mistake.... I wouldn’t fire or demote him/her unless their actions were purposeful, or if they are unable to learn from their mistakes. When I look at some of the best leaders in history..... they are often individuals who have made monumental mistakes and then overcome them to flourished.
Its such a travesty that the Melbourne's captain was still obliquely blamed for this Incident. He was not court martialled but obliquely demoted and chose to leave the navy. As quoted "The Navy board stood silently by, and for the sake of political expediency watched the wilful destruction of the career of one of its most loyal and competent officers" - from the book HMAS Melbourne by Timothy Hall
He was a trained navigator and 'pilot'. He saw it coming and took the incorrect actions. Though he wasn't the source of the mishap he was culpable due to his incorrect judgements. He was partially responsible, get real. Its like this: Whenever something terrible happens in your life ask this question: "Who is always there?". (YOU are). People should stop shirking responsibility for what occurs in their lives no matter what, short of being hit by a meteorite and even then some still say so. Accept responsibility for yourself and what you create.
@@CRSolarice Absolute ill informed rubbish you've asserted there, I'm an admin for the Melbourne's crew members & I have been for many years. Apart from serving on her myself almost ANYONE with a modicum of nautical knowledge & associated physics will tell you that there are NO brakes on an aircraft carrier & every vessel that works with one will confirm that she had zero chance of either stopping or swerving to avoid that or the Voyagers collision. Congratulations you've insulted the IQ of many sailors who served on both ships!
@@MegaNiteowl What? You can't have a debate without couching insults in the point that you are making. That's how children argue. Are you an adult with a mind that is stuck at the age of 12 years or are you 12 years old? You don't even know me and you start off with attempts to humiliate and insult. I'm very sympathetic to these fol;ks, all of them. Nevertheless you are a perfect example of the point that I was making: Many people just don't have the guts or ethical fortitude to accept responsibility for their actions. Now, we speak of insults to intelligence, you make it sound like I think Aircraft carriers have brakes when that is obvious. However, they can change the pitch or rotation direction of the propellers which would be as close to brakes as one could get, really so there is that. But the captain of the Aus AC had ample time and clear distance to do whatever possible to avoid the collision but instead 'banked' on someone else doing the maneuvers and stayed on his course for whatever reason. He absolutely could have avoided the whole thing by DOING SOMETHING! Understand? DO! His inaction ultimately led to an avoidable accident, even though the source of the accident was another person that doesn't give others involved a free ticket to avoid RESPONSIBILITY! I have a difficult time understanding why 'younger' people have such a difficult time with the word RESPONSIBLE! The world would be a better place if everyone could just grasp the simple concept of "total responsibility". But you and they may never 'get it' because it is likely that you were brought up to give 'considerations' and 'excuses' rather than realize that YOU create everything that happens in your life. Everything. Its true even if you can't accept it. You likely will understand one day, and hopefully before its too late to make a positive difference in your life. The Captain of the Aircraft carrier should have acted to avoid the mishap rather than rely on someone else to do it. I will agree that the punishment did not fit and, in my opinion, was extreme. That's how Navy's operate. Other than that I'm sure that he is a good and decent person and I wasn't trying to say that he isn't. All that being said, about your insults, I will go toe to toe with you and we'll take IQ tests any time you want but I'm confident that the results will be less than pleasant for you.
I was at Surface Warfare Officer School--Basic during the summer of 1979 before reporting to my ship. We saw this film and discussed it in great detail. The complacency of virtually all of the watch standers of the Evans was unbelievable. A grease pencil plot on the SPS-10 surface search repeater would've shown that they were on a constant bearing with decreasing range (CBDR), the plot in CIC should've told them they were in a CBDR situation, and it is never ever too close for a maneuvering board solution.
@paulkilllins954 Haven't read every single post. Yet yours is the only one that raises "Recommendations to the Bridge" requirements so far. Hats off to you Sir. Though I understand @ Countries, Navies, Commands & Politics, Feelings level, things get quelched far to easily, when lives then, now & future should be more important than any one or even a few. Isn't what all thay training is about after all? =☆= Which is always (carrier group operations/plane guard) the only reason CIC exists under those operating conditions @ that specific time. =☆= Bridge & CIC w/multiple individuals writing & comparing radio & solutions. Scribble, scribble, faster, faster people. JOOD to SM what on God's green earth? Bounce against CIC solutions (or flag why not), which in fast action, their job is to be Johnny on the spot, keep up, keep up. I'm aware of all the U.S. Navy schools that it's required viewing from deck plates up. The only thing is, (maybe I'm dull atm) I didn’t see or hear a single thing about radio backup or Recommendations for changes from CIC thru the entire video? Maybe it just got buried as part of the minutia? Isn't the poor or lack of training all part of the same minutia though too? I read many other incidents that lacked foundation basics just to clean up tragedy, but Isn't that minutia what is all about spotlighting corrections for future situations 🤔 1. CIC should raise the flag for: A. BASE COURSE B. ANY CHANGES FOR IT. C. All radio orders unencrypted correctly. D. Spa operator visually see contact CBDR. E. Plotters on stat boards (POUNDING & POINTING FURIOUSLY) F. Table plotters ripping sound powered phones off cic/bridge talker to get the message importance clear. G. Watch Sup. Storming the bridge access for a talk with ood/jood/qm. H. CICWO beating Surf Watch Sup to them. I. Only after that & much more, last but not least, the entire bridge refuses outside input they're required to at least listen for the sake of we're all human & sometimes we all need to see the Red Flags raised & to be on the same page. =☆= BTW: Was the 3-2-1 rule not a hard & fast thing back then. I don't know, because I never been to school for that. I just read alot. Meh, may not even existed, b/c like who'd a thought to consider running over ants with a semi, am I right?
Although he was a few years older, I remember Larry Allan Gracely, (Lima, OH) Shawnee HS Class of 1965. Larry was one of those who didn't survive this tragic compilation of errors! There will soon be a new memorial, placed in Harrod, Ohio, to commemorate those lost from the USS Frank E. Evans!
My late uncle was a senior chief petty officer onboard the Evans at time of this mishap. He was thrown into the water by the force of the collision and had to hang on to a tangled mess of piping and wreckage that was dangling from the portion of ship that didn’t initially sink after the collision. He spent around 45 minutes hanging on before they found him and pulled him back out of the water.
I served aboard the Evans from 1964 to 1966. We were always doing carrier screen duty and changing to aircraft guard was a normal action. I was a radarman stationed in the CIC and my berth was almost directly below. The men in those areas had little chance to survive.
My grandfather was on board the Melbourne when it struck the Frank E. Evans, he was off-duty towards the front of the ship and was thrown from his rack when the collision occurred. He says the deck of the area he slept in was buckled for quite a while. Definitely something he wont ever forget. I'm very saddened to hear of the incidents with the Fitzgerald and John S. McCain this year, they have eery similarity to this incident.
@@dayzdailypress799 My classmate's father was killed on the Evans. I don't understand why they let him go to school that morning, we were in 4th grade.
Watching this with my father who was on the hmas Melbourne at this tragic moment in history and seeing him in tears is hart breaking the nightmares and the effect it still has on him to this day!!!
Both incidences of collisions with the Melbourne, left our Navies traumatised. As is the norm, innocent people were blamed, compensation a long time coming, if at all and lots of money made by the legal profession in both countries no doubt. But I do suspect that a lot of good came out of the devastation in the way of improved resources and training. I met a Barrister in Sydney who said he represented men from the Melbourne. When I asked, why were they affected, he responded, the blood in the water. God bless them all, I hope those who survived can one-day find peace in the knowledge that they are in a better place.
@@georgepantazis141 he had just finished a 16 hour shift jumped in his bunk and bang he seen things us sivies cant comprehend ans didn't sleep for another 2 days while the half of the evans was tied to the Melbourne he can remember that but not what the current day is sad
Many of the lessons learned here are directly applicable to watchstanders on civilian sailboat, particularly when in shipping lanes. The level of complexity is less, admittedly, but the habit of showing up early for one's watch to hear a recap of the retiring watchstander's shift, plus any advice on developing situations of weather or commercial/naval traffic and CPAs, is an excellent, life-preserving one. AIS transceivers are a huge boon to private boats offshore for this reason.
Thats what you get when the US Captain leaves Juniors in charge. And before anyone jumps down my throat over what I said, I have served in the Royal Australian Navy for 12 years and yes I was on board Melbourne this happened. Not a nice sight to be watching. The Melbourne was never at fault although after watching this it seems the US Navy did lay blame on Melbourne as well. Just in case they dont understand a Carrier always has right of way at sea when at flying stations. Get it guys
I retired from the US Navy with 22+years as a Quartermaster Senior Chief (E8), which is Navigation on the Bridge. From what I've read, the OOD did not follow the C.O.'s Night Orders, or even the Standing Orders with regards to navigation and safe movement of the ship. Onboard every ship I've served on, it very clearly states in the Night Orders- "other than minor course changes to maintain navigation plot, wake me and notify me of any course change over __ degrees." Also, while keeping station, maintain assigned bearing and range to the guide (carrier,etc.). Also and MOST IMPORTANTLY- call me when there is ANY DOUBT of action, intentions, or to clarify any instructions I have given you. I've seen it first hand, standing watch on the Bridge, the discussion between OOD and Conning Officer, trying to decide whether or not to call the Skipper. You have to err on the side of safety. I think nearly every time I watched the Captain come up in the middle of the night, they were
@@trentbaugher60 Agreed, I have been a CO in the RAN and was never concerned about being called by the OOW. Better many times unnecessarily than once late ....
and if memory serves, it was the Americans who came up with the 'carrier at flying stations has right of way' thing. At least the Captain of the Melbourne finally got an official apology, however late.
I think this is an eloquent narration, full of sensitivity given the circumstances in relation to to men lost, survivors, family and the inevitable "ducking for cover" amongst Senior Ranks within the 2 Navy's of America and Australia and their respective Governments. I truly hope and I do suspect, that as tragic as these 2 tragedies were, that in the long-term, they have lead to improvements to training, operations, equipment and exposed the absolute need for due diligence etc.
I was the computer operator on duty in the Subic Bay Naval Communications Center when the flash message arrived notifying Subic Bay command of the accident. A few days later I visited the dry dock containing the aft section of the Frank E Evans. It looked like someone had taken a huge meat cleaver mid ship. This was the only flash message I experienced in my 18 months in the Philippines. Such a tragic loss of life! Thanks for posting this video!!
What makes this especially painful is that apparently, one of the watch officers was on his first sea duty, and the other had previously failed their watch-standing exam. Not a good pairing for a "darken ship" close-quarters formation transit, even if the night orders include a "call me if things get weird" clause.
I was an ABRP on the Melbourne at the time and my part of ship was the quartedeck where we had to secure the stern section of the Evans, it was the sailors from the Melbourne that went through the stern section and roused the crew of the Evans. It was something that I will never forget as at the time I was sleeping in the port after boat space and when I was woken I watched the bow section come past the port side turn turtle and sink
My Dad said, like the incident with HMAS Voyager a few years earlier which my brother was on when it collided known as Bernie, Bernard Manning, also colliding with HMAS Melbourne, that Psychologically nobody was prepared because it happened in peace time!
What BS. Get your sea story right. I was in the stern and we rolled 90°. Fully on our side before righting. People were thrown from their bunks inside a steel ship with lots of injuries. Some fell or were thrown as much as 35'. Many confused the collision with an explosion. There was a concussion like wave that went through the ship. Nobody was asleep after the bang. I was one of the last to leave the stern half. Melbourne rigged a cargo net from their flight deck that the uninjured used to climb aboard. No Melbourne crewman had been aboard before I left the Evans. But the Melbourne crew was very professional. They had their boats in the water and helos launched in moments. Their quick action saved many lives. At the time the Melbourne held the peace time tonnage record.
@@oceanmariner , I suspect that "roused" doesn't mean "to awaken", but gather and point in the right direction, like steering traumatised farm animals toa hole in the fence, to a way out. Not comparing people with animals, but just giving an analogy to describe what I mean. Painting a picture.
@@markanthony1920 My point was, I was one of the last 2 people to go thru the stern, looking for anybody missed and shutting WT doors. Neither there or on deck did I see or hear of any non Evans crewman before leaving the ship. And there was nobody that slept thru the collision.
Someone reciently wrote a book about the HMAS MELBORNE. Itw was interesting difnt know if you'd be interested. Im from IOWA USA best of everything to you sir! My Dad was USN ww2 !
A few years later, as JOOD on a can in the Med, we were ordered to proceed to picket station well ahead of the carrier. We were left of the carrier's heading, ordered to station to the right, far enough ahead to cause us to have to go to 4 boilers. We notified our CO immediately. He was fully dressed, and on the bridge in what seemed like mere seconds. Concern for collision at sea will do that. Everything went without incident, though 30 kts on 4 boilers is dramatic. Yes, we were fully cognizant of what happened to the USS Evans.
I was aboard the USS WADDELL DDG24 the night this occurred. We were returning from gunline duty and headed to Singapore. The MELBOURNE was tied up to the pier as we arrived. All hands were admonished not to take photos of the damage. I recall the damaged looked like a smile as we passed her. A very somber moment. Capped a few cold ones with a some AUSIES there. I turned 19 while in Singapore.
Whenever a coded signal is received CIC breaks the signal too and reports it to the OOD. This would have caught the corpen error of the carrier. Don't know if this was standard in 69. It is now. And always make huge course changes if risk of collision is possible. Turning on your running lights and calling the CO to the bridge when the picture just doesn't look right helps too. I've had a few close calls, always at night. And always step out to the bridge wing prior to ordering a turn.
The CO and two OOD got smacks on te bottom. CO MELBOURNE not guilty of anything lost his ship and was downgraded as a Captain. A highly respected and competent CO and veteran of WW2 and Korea. He had more experience in his left toe than Evans watch team. Oh, and in all of this. Where the hell were the CIC?
At the end of days, following this incident I have cross decked to many USN hulls from CV to DE and have always been impressed with their dedication and professionalism. 😊
I was a destroyer sailor out of Mayport, FL when this happened. With the checks and balances that normally go on between the bridge and CIC and surely went on with the Aussie carrier, as well, I could not fathom how this could happen. For months afterwards, I frequently carried a Mae West lifejacket with me about the ship and slept with it tucked behind the pipes in proximity to my bunk. Had I been a radarman in CIC, I'd have gone to the bridge to see the OOD, recognizing an imminent collision.
One of my uncles served on HMAS Sydney, sister ship of HMAS Melbourne at the time. My uncle also served on the Melbourne during Vietnam, only for a short time.
I hope you would agree that you and I as trained Bridge officers, this was 110% avoidable and disgustingly gross negligence bordering on flat out stupidity!!!!
I was on board USS NOA DD-841 when this tragedy happened. We were initially assigned to work with Melbourne. However, we had just completed an ammo loadout and so were sent back to the gunline while Evans sailed with Melbourne.
Important to look out of the bridge windows or go onto the bridge wings and look astern before altering course. Lesson learnt from more experienced OOWs.
It’s interesting that the names of the officers were changed,. This seems unnecessary as the names are is a matter of public record and their reputation should not none protected as they were found guilty.
Those of us of a certain age will remember some television shows starting with: “The story you are about to see is true. The names have been changed to protect the innocent.” You need to remember that movie was intended as a “lessons learned” training aid for naval officers and not necessary as a documentary for wider distribution. By the time it was produced the court-martials were over and all three officers had left active duty, so it wasn’t about protecting them. The problem would be that people might assume, if they came across another officer with the same name as any of the three court-martialed officers, that they were in fact talking to one of the officers actually involved in the collision.
I worked with a PO from the Voyager, and he was in the PO's mess when it happened. There were 2 of the 5 in the mess who were on the ship for the 1st time. The emergency lighting only came on for a fraction, but for Bruce and 2 others they knew where the bulkhead was and they got out. The other 2 did not. I don't think he ever got over it. RIP to them all. Still a complete disgrace that compensation came too late for many of the crew.
@@michaeljackson2838, indeed, mid 80s wasn't it, before a paltry sum was paid? And it took a Judge who told the Lawyers and Barristers that enough money has been made on this tragedy South of Sydney New South Wales and forced the Australian Government to settle.
@@michaeljackson2838 , Bernard Manning, affectionailty known as Bernie, had just exited the gally moments before the collision course was sounded, it had not been practised before! When I was 8, the Navy had a day out for families through the Heads of Port Philip Bay in Victoria. During a display to lower a lifeboat, it got caught mid air at one end! Most embarrassing for everyone, especially the Officers. I think that this incident was only a matter of months before the collision.
@@markanthony1920 By any standards it was insulting. There was even talk that it was just an accident and as they were sailors it was part of the package when you signed on! Kept hidden from public view for years. Typical non-accountable senior officers and pollies!
I was aboard the USS Schofield DEG-3 at the time of the accident. It was around midnight when the Captain over the 1MC said the ASW Exercise was which Evans was part of... is over. And we where heading to search for survivors from the Evans. He continued to say the Evan was hit by the Melbourne and the entire front half of the ship had sunk. I am sad now and I was sad than...about losing sailors from our Squadron. I am also sad to say this. During the exercise all ships were at "Darken Ship." That means we were all out there steaming at various speeds with "no port or starboard running lights." No Mast Lights." It was pitch black out there. The stars did not light up anything. The moon was no where to be seen. That is where I have much heart burn. What happened to the lookouts? They should have been at their stations. Above the bridge or on the wings, with their look out gear. What happened to the watch in CIC? Were the radar men a sleep at the consoles? What about the bridge watch and the Officer of the Deck? And last. What about the Sonar men? If they were pinging active? They should have pinged off the Carrier? And been able to give a bearing and range. And a closing range rate. If they were is listen mod? They should have seen one of the largest noise spokes ever. And been able to give a bearing and noise intensity. Especially as the range rate closed.This accident was no accident. What was it? Professional Sailors asleep at the "Helm." And because of the errors.....74 of our counties Finest are dead. Because of the lack of Professionalism. I believe in my heart of hearts. That the Evans and her crew. Should not be rewarded by having the names on that Black Granite Wall. I am a Navy Combat Veteran of the Vietnam War. The Evans was a far distance from the Legal Combat Zone.
I served on the USS Schofield (DEG-3) from March 23, 1969 to March 24, 1970 when I was transferred to the USS DeHaven (DD-727). I did not remember you (with a girl's name, no less) as a member of the crew. Therefore, I can assure you all that I was aboard Schofield as an E-3 Seaman when DesRon 23 participated in the SEATO operation. I was, in fact, assigned to the radio-net midwatch (2345 to 0345) to log every ship-to-ship transmission I heard on my headphones. This was a special watch, and I assumed I was selected because my handwriting was no doubt 100% legible. When I heard this over my headphones, I immediately contacted the midwatch CIC officer, who then awakened the captain. They reviewed my logged radio-net entries; Schofield was between 3 and 6 miles away from the collision. For me, that was the conclusion of my watch. I checked my personal copy of the cruise book for Schofield's 1969 first WestPac cruise, and no one named Willsey was a member of the crew at that time...period. I don't know who you are, but I'm confident that you are NOT who you say you are.
I sailed on the de-commissioning cruise on Melbourne in 1981. My rack (bunk) was on the fwd bulkhead of 4C Stbd and there was a large ripple in the deck adjacent; due, I was told, to the collision with Evans. I remember being on exercise in JB when the collision alarm sounded, PO “Phantom” Walker tore into our mess like a banshee ordering evacuation, I believe he had been in an earlier incident.
I was on the Melbourne’s flight deck when this happened. I watched Evans come in on us from near the bow on the flightdeck. When the collision was inevitable I ran aft and got to the forward lift when we hit. There was debris all over the flightdeck, and I could hear a cry for help up forward. Here was a USN signalman sitting in the folds of what was Evans bridge. He was in a bad way. We organised a stretcher and transported him to the sickbay.
My dad a retired BTC told me as I was reporting to my first DD to never sleep below decks during close maneuvering and ASW sweeps. As a result I was topside when my ship turned across the bow of Coral Sea the skipper who had just left the Bridge knew the turn was off time and returned to the bridge and ordered Hard right rudder and set the engine order telegraph to emergency astern on the starboard screws and flank ahead on the port screws heeling us over where we only lost radar and antennas from the mast. other than soiled underwear on the bridge there were only minor injuries from unsecured gear set adrift on the decks and falls.
@@markanthony1920 First movie (if he's referring to the aircraft carrier). The second movie was released in 2000 - 15 years after the carrier Melbourne was sold for scrap. It's possible that the FFG Melbourne was in On The Beach, but it was set in Melbourne (the city). The FFG Melbourne was based in Sydney.
Also.. who last signed the maintenance inspection for correct bolting down of that ladder... made me feel sick watching that and I know it's just a training film.. but once you have had seawater in your lungs you never quite get rid of the taste
I don't understand how the bridge commanders on Evans could be so incompetent as to make such a string of mistakes, not even following standing orders to wake the capt. They didn't know where they were in relation to the carrier, they incorrectly decoded a message, just one error after another and compounding each other. What was the underlying reason for these failings - Poor training? Poor operational procedures? Were the Evans officers incompetent and had somehow slipped through the net and promoted beyond their ability? Was the Evans a ship where poor operational procedures had been allowed to become practice? It seems mystifying to me that this could happen.
U. S. Navy sideburns and beards courtesy CNO Admiral Zumwalt, a man who realized that with long sideburns and beards and the seamen's utility blue work shirts and bell bottom trousers were what the hippies of the day wore. Pretty shrewd old guy!
What a crock. This is a white wash by the USN. Lots of untruths in this movie. I was a QM3 on the Evans when this collision happened. My job was on the bridge. I was in berthing at the time. The names were changed to protect the guilty? Never heard of the OD and JOD or other names in this movie. Also filmed in the wrong style bridge. Probably a modernized Gearing. Wheel and sailors were separated in the original pilothouse. Officers were in the open bridge and communicated thru an open porthole or from the bridge winds thru the pilothouse side doors. Both sections rolled 90° to st'bd, but the stern recovered. We were in a SEATO exercise simulating war time. There were NO running lights, NO radar. Part of my job was to operate the running lights and operate the pilothouse radar. CIC was blind. It was a dark night, at times difficult to determine the direction the carrier was pointing. The OD lost track of the zigzag pattern and turned the wrong way. There wasn't much the Melbourne's captain could have done. The Evans was probably traveling at 27 knots as usual when changing station. I always double checked my officers after this. Sometimes it's like babysitting spoiled children. I'm a captain with 50 years at sea behind me.
Thanks for your clarification! I am RAN and so much of this did not make sense. Can’t believe they were pitch black and RADAR silent in close escort operations, just an accident waiting to happen. The fact they never contacted the CO just baffled me. I was also wondering why there was no mention of CIC giving CPA but you explained it through RADAR silence. Tragic!
I was a JOOD when my OOD made the infamous statement about "too close for a mo board solution, we will have to eyeball it ". The CO was on the bridge and totally LOST his cool. I QUICKLY learned NEVER to even think these words!
I was a Radarman on USS Oriskany (CVA 34) in the Tonkin Gulf at this time. "Plane Guard" DD's are so close to the a/c carriers that they don't often show up on the radar screens. Forward and aft lookout watches report to CIC any anomalies they see; there's a Radarman watch stander on the Bridge. You have to find a way to maintain military discipline while telling officers they're about to screw themselves and everyone else. Deck Watch Officers should go to CIC before every watch, but don't.
A-fuckin-men, Bubba. I never think of this disaster without thinking about the piss-poor relationship between the bridge and Combat here, where I used to stand watches before they sent me to college and turned me into an officer. You can bet I never made that mistake.
Can anyone answer please... should she not have been challenged when she entered another ships patrol station as she was in violation of formation.. or did they assume it was something to do with her being the designated plane guard..
She likely should have been challenged if the other navigation plots were being maintained, but as I'm not a Navy line officer, I don't know if the patrol sectors are intended to overlap slightly; my money's on them being strictly separated, though.
The Melbourne rammed one of its own Destroyers 5 years before this event. Wonder if that created the bias? My father was on the Evans and survived the incident. He never spoke about this incident, I only learnt about it researching his USN career to write his eulogy.
The Captain of HMAS Melbourne even hosted a dinner for all the Commanding Officers the night before the EX began and went into detail about how the previous collision occurred and stressed them to brief their respective Officers back on their ships that no turns were to be made towards the carrier. The message obviously wasn't received or it was ignored.
Yes, the RAN didnt want the Americans to feel their officers were entirely to blame - it was felt they would feel quite bad towards the Australian navy - so they court martialed the captain of the HMAS Melbourne and reassigned him to a junior desk, he promptly took early retirement.
@@freddywarren69, he's not here to defend himself, it's easy to put the blame onto a dead person. But my brother swore that his Captain never drank on duty. I believe he had an ulcer and that was probably caused by his heavy drinking, or, he drank heavily because he had an ulcer. The outcome concluded that because there were no confirmations of course corrections because they were running on silent, that the new course neglected to recall Melbourne's previous change in course which now placed Voyager across Melbourne's bow!
@Cap Gamer 10 They collided because the officers on the bridge of the EVANS had their heads up their asses (and the MELBOURNE CO didn't try hard enough to compensate for their erratic maneuvers). Maybe you should try joining the Navy and learning something instead of just playing stupid computer games and then pretending you know something.
@Carlos songs with lyrics FYI, the Melbourne Captain actually had the various Captains of his escorts repair on board the Melbourne before the exercises began and instructed them "under no circumstances was anyone to turn in front of the Melbourne but steer away before taking up plane guard duties". They were also told what ships and the time they were to be on guard. At the allotted time for the Frank E Evans her Captain was in his bunk sleeping, leaving an OOW who had failed his watchkeeping certificate and a more junior officer who had passed, leading to confusion on the bridge.The communications officer of the Melbourne told the inquiry the replies to messages from the Melbourne to Evans were very slow in being acknowledged and acted upon. Despite the fact that the biased US Admiral in charge of the naval inquiry allowed lawyers to aid the officers and ratings of the Evans when being questioned under oath, the same right was denied to the Melbourne's officers and crew. In fact two senior Barristers from the RAN simply there to observe the proceedings were ordered out of the room. Despite the bias, the best the Board could come up with were a couple of minor errors of navigation by the Melbourne's Captain but even these were considered bullshit by independent international naval boards later as to having to follow them would have resulted in major breaches of rules at sea. The accident was 100% the fault of the Captain of the Evans and the watchkeeping team on the bridge of the Evans. The only "mistake" made by the Aussies was to agree to the appointment of the biased Admiral in charge of the inquiry as he was the Fleet Officer to which the Evans was attached and as such that any adverse finding could reflect on him. Sad day for everyone involved and their families.
@@Estes705 Theoretically, they could, but 1000 gets the point across, and if you're gonna reprimand someone for that blunder, 2 or 3 places in line doesn't really convey the Navy's displeasure adequately, y'know?
I've never heard of it being done. I don't think the court has the authority to remove commissions since they are granted by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Following the court martial, the senior officers in the convicted officer's chain of command can always make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy that they be "ordered home" and discharged, ending their commission. p.s. Don't confuse commission, with an officers' rank. Finally, the UCMJ, Uniform Code of Military Justice sets the maximum punishments that may be awarded for each infraction and sets limits also by the type of court martial and and rank of the officer officiating. I never dealt with any officer prosecutions during my time as a squadron legal officer or during my 26 yr. career.
I was also on board of the USS Everett F.Larson DD 830 when this tragic incident happened, a very sad moment for everyone especially for the familiesand friends of all the sailors died on board of the USS Robert F. Evans....
You were both lucky. USS Larson was involved in a narrow 'near miss' with Melbourne under similar circumstances two nights before, at a similar hour of night. As a result minimum distance between Plane Guard and Carrier was increased from 2,000yd to 3,000yd and all ships reminded of the procedures to follow.
The OOD & Conning Officer on Evans received a slap on the wrist. Their actions cost the Navy a ship and killed sailors. They should still be sitting in Leavenworth.
I vaguely remember this incident from news reports about the tragic aftermath shortly before I joined the United Kingdom military, I can’t begin to imagine the terror, shock and helplessness that those seamen endured and are still enduring today. Obviously an Accident Investigation Board (A.I.B) had to be convened and it must have been extremely difficult for the investigators to hear the details of individuals and of the way that fellow mariners died, that alone must have caused emotional and mental scars that might never or will not heal. RIP all those who lost their lives that day, and may the sea protect their final resting place. Even in 1969 the radar systems on both vessels surely would have picked up on the proximity and relatively poor positioning and alerted the bridge officers, or is that over simplifying the events?, also why didn’t lookouts raise the alarm? Surely that is what they are there for, and as was stated the sea was calm with excellent visibility, not being a mariner I don’t know how those conditions would have helped or hindered the crews, but, and there is always a but, knowing what visibility is like in open countryside with no cloud cover and a near or full moon I would surmise that they should have been able to distinctly see each other’s vessels. One last point, is someone who holds the Rank of Lt (JG) experienced enough for the position they were in on that night? I ask because in my experience the rank of Lt (JG), or the equivalent off that in different branches and nations is akin to being a novice a still ‘learning on the job’, they have the knowledge but not the experience in my opinion. The two officers on the bridge that night were quite rightly punished, although I think their sentences were not exactly harsh, they both, in my humble opinion, should have been discharged from the navy, as for the commander, he left orders to the effect that he should have been notified of various actions and events, those orders were not carried out, so, how could he be derelict in his duties, if the two Lt (JG’s) had followed those orders, which they both should have read and initialled, I would not be typing this much, how can you find someone guilty of an action that they had NO CONTROL OVER OR KNOWLEDGE OF????, the commander might as well have resigned his commission as his naval career was “dead in the water” his hopes of promotion reduced to zero. The narration at the end of this episode is pure hindsight, and stating the bleeding obvious, of course lessons need to be learned and remedial actions taken, however, again from my experience, the changes to procedures are NOT always the right way to go, sometimes it is more about ensuring that the procedure in place is adhered to, and that a sensible amount of latitude is available to the people following the procedure, latitude that give options without inducing a danger, the old saying that rules are “for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men” is often true, especially in the military where blind obedience has and does lead to serious consequences, commanders need to know the difference between strict orders and their ability to make command decisions within those orders, no commander will ever be able to command with one hand tied behind their back
Refers to the seniority for line officers (officers eligible for ship or other major command). Effectively says "you will not be eligible for ship command *ever*, unless some catastrophe happens and an unholy number of qualified officers die in short order."
I was on USS Ault DD698 71 to 73. We were anchored in Houston ship channel as shaft bearings had to be replaced. Wind picked up overnight. Empty grain freighter was dragging anchor. Headed straight toward us. We were able to slip anchor chain and received glancing blow to bow that bent bull nose back. Seaman who had bow anchor watch wound up on fantasy with life jack on. He was a sur
Now Nov 2021, I know an old sailor just turned 90 a few months ago by the name of Rex that was on the Melbourne when it collide with HMAS Voyager, this is 5 years earlier in 1964, I have never asked him about that incident, It would make a great video for him to talk about it now, there would be few men still alive to to tell there story about being onboard when it happened
CIC and the bridge. We always reported to the Ops Room even as OUT to get the picture. Once on the bridge, the incoming Ops Room team would update us with the local picture including skunks ivo. That is standard practice. ALSO, we kept each other updated during manoeuvres or changes to the plot. Watchkeeping 101. I fail to understand why the USN did apparently not do likewise back then. Also, look at the SHP our cans have. I always prepared to drive mine like a sports car and use a seaman's eye plus mindset Relvel to carry out manoeuvres. Then worry about true course and speed.
The one funny out of this. Before Melbourne set the after section, a senior sailor went back aboard to check all hands were evacuated. He had to wake a sailor who had slept through the whole thing. Another. Next day all the escorts formed line abreast to sweep the waters for more survivors
There it is..... Attending ships were ordered to never turn into the carrier. Had that first mistake been avoided the collision would have never happened.
Sad thing is the had been briefed by the CO of HMAS Melbourne about the collision with HMAS Voyager 5 years prior which was due to turning into the carrier. Voyager got cut in half and 82 men killed in the exact same circumstances.
It's funny to watch the os's write backwards on the skunk board. For the same officer to the deck and conn is not encouraged. In fact I don't think it's allowed any longer
I was on the Uss Leyte Gulf 55 a guided missile cruiser. We crashed in to the Uss Roosevelt an aircraft carrier. It was around 0245 also conducting fight ops in the dark... We collided and our ship did a 43 degree lisp. If it would've done a 45 degree it would've done a complete roll over killing most of us.... There were multiple injuries including myself.. It was a bad night in October of 1997. Anyone was on the Leyte gulf cg55? Please contact me..
Working in Shipyard, started on USS Vinson, during PSA operations. Moved to USS Roosevelt and began construction from the keel up. 34 years later, I assisted for several months on USS Lincoln to finish up this last overhaul. Last Carrier I worked on, the one now under construction JFK. Retired.
i only realised that the Evans aft section sunk, and that the fore section is pictured, i thought it was some kind of weird looking oiler pictured at first.
The way the Yanks handled this was despicable. Their guy fucks up, but they demand the Australian captain's scalp and pressured the RAN to make it happen. I'm not sure who's worse here: the US admiralty actions in covering up the cause, or the RAN's admiralty for throwing one of their own to the wolves. Just terrible all round.
The worst one here is you, there's nothing more despicable than someone who spreads gossip, and that's all you're doing is gossiping. I suggest you watch the entire video, it's a USN production from after the event and they state that the blame is to be squarely placed on the officer's of the USS Evans, they say absolutely nothing about the Melbourne or anyone of it's crew doing anything wrong. If you're repeating something you heard before in life then you're just being a purveyor of gossip, like a woman does.
@@goodshipkaraboudjan He didn't, not that it changes much, he received a full apology for being scapegoated a few years before he died. He accepted the apology like a gentleman... in a much more graceful way than I would have.
My brother was one of those lost in this incident. It's the first detailed account of it that I've seen. Thank you for posting it.
I was there when that happened. I was on watch on HMAS Vampire. We arrived at first light. Only the stern section was afloat. Very sad stuff. We were a Destroyer. She was a destroyer. God bless em all.
I was onboard a Royal Navy Guided Missile Destroyer on route to Subic Bay Manilla when in the early hours of the morning we got instruction to proceed to assist the other ships after the collision of H.M.A.S. Melbourne and USS Frank .E.Evans which had been cut in two and the f'wrd half had sunk. I was onboard H.M.S. London in the South China Sea. it was an awful thing that happened. I have good recollections of that day, Patrick Allen Lancashire United Kingdom
This video really does bring back memories! I was a surface warfare officer (SWO) aboard a Spruance class destroyer in the 1980's, and stood more bridge watches as a JOOD and OOD than I care to remember. I do recall seeing this movie during class in Surface Warfare Officer's School (SWOS) in Newport, RI in the fall of 1983. As one who stood bridge watches during night time fleet exercises, the number of mistakes made by this watch team still astonishes me. You're never too close for a maneuvering board (mo-board) solution!
The Swiss cheese model of events lining up to an catastrophe . . the captain in his bed asleep on Evans ultimate responsible for a poor trained crew as in poor management in end
On the mark! ....(I started SWOS Basic Newport Dec'83)
I was on HMAS Stuart on this exercise(1969)...just over the horizon from the fateful incident. I was drinking with two of the Yankee sailors the day before in Manila. They were both in the forward section...say no more. Owing to the complacent,disobedient & careless actions of the two OOD's on Evan's bridge...Evans crossed Melbourne's bow once, and the on the second time...BANG. Resdes' always are to turn outboard of the carrier to assume Resdes position aft. Ignore, or stuff up "rules of the searoad"and this can happen. Just ask my my old mates on HMAS Voyager, Feb'1964. And somehow, our Melborne captain copped it in the arse...crikey!! Signed: ex-CPO, R.A.N 1964-1976.
Commander of HMAS Melbourne, John Stevenson was completely fucked over by this incident. He was demoted from commodoore to captain and given a desk job. He wasn't vindicated until a few years ago when he was in his nineties. He only died in February of this year.
I was on Eisenhower in the 80’s this video was still being shown to sailors at that time. Sadly, the US Navy’s Admirals are a political group first and foremost. Only in wartime do we find the best warrior admirals being promoted after catastrophic events drive selection based out actual abilities.
Life isn’t fair, never has and never will be. Sadly this unfairness and “political correctness” destroyed the career of the one man who did all he could to avoid the accident. In additon, the action of the US admiral ultimately gave political ammunition to the liberal
Politicians in Australia who wanted to shrink the Australian Navy. This accident ultimately ended Australian carrier aviation and subsequently saw a massive reduction in overall capabilities.
And EXACTLY THE SAME THING had happened to Capt. John Robertson after Melbourne collided with HMAS Voyager five years before. Seems like a hidden clause in the job description for being Master of HMAS Melbourne read "You must be prepared to act as a scapegoat and get thrown to the wolves by Command and the government of the day".
I have the greatest respect for our ADF personnel and the greatest disgust at those who would readily sacrifice those people's careers and reputations for political expediency.
@@sixstringedthing agreed
I read about thst in a book about the HMAS MELBORNE and was shocked they COULD. Bring charges against the Capt! From the book and this vidio it was the culpable inefficiency of the bridge watch on the USS EVANS. Cant read it any other way. Raw deal for the carriers skipper!!
@@jerrymccrae7202 it was terrible.... life isn’t fair at all. But at least in his lifetime he was finally exonerated. I’ve seen similar things happen to US Skippers and Military commanders in the US. Today, just being associated with an accident even if your cleared of any wrong doing can end a career.
My personal opinion is even if a Captain or officer makes a mistake.... I wouldn’t fire or demote him/her unless their actions were purposeful, or if they are unable to learn from their mistakes.
When I look at some of the best leaders in history..... they are often individuals who have made monumental mistakes and then overcome them to flourished.
Its such a travesty that the Melbourne's captain was still obliquely blamed for this Incident. He was not court martialled but obliquely demoted and chose to leave the navy. As quoted "The Navy board stood silently by, and for the sake of political expediency watched the wilful destruction of the career of one of its most loyal and competent officers" - from the book HMAS Melbourne by Timothy Hall
He was a trained navigator and 'pilot'. He saw it coming and took the incorrect actions. Though he wasn't the source of the mishap he was culpable due to his incorrect judgements. He was partially responsible, get real. Its like this: Whenever something terrible happens in your life ask this question: "Who is always there?". (YOU are). People should stop shirking responsibility for what occurs in their lives no matter what, short of being hit by a meteorite and even then some still say so. Accept responsibility for yourself and what you create.
😊😊
Somebody saying it doesn’t make it true. I bet there was more to it than that either way.
@@CRSolarice Absolute ill informed rubbish you've asserted there, I'm an admin for the Melbourne's crew members & I have been for many years. Apart from serving on her myself almost ANYONE with a modicum of nautical knowledge & associated physics will tell you that there are NO brakes on an aircraft carrier & every vessel that works with one will confirm that she had zero chance of either stopping or swerving to avoid that or the Voyagers collision. Congratulations you've insulted the IQ of many sailors who served on both ships!
@@MegaNiteowl What? You can't have a debate without couching insults in the point that you are making. That's how children argue. Are you an adult with a mind that is stuck at the age of 12 years or are you 12 years old? You don't even know me and you start off with attempts to humiliate and insult. I'm very sympathetic to these fol;ks, all of them. Nevertheless you are a perfect example of the point that I was making: Many people just don't have the guts or ethical fortitude to accept responsibility for their actions. Now, we speak of insults to intelligence, you make it sound like I think Aircraft carriers have brakes when that is obvious. However, they can change the pitch or rotation direction of the propellers which would be as close to brakes as one could get, really so there is that. But the captain of the Aus AC had ample time and clear distance to do whatever possible to avoid the collision but instead 'banked' on someone else doing the maneuvers and stayed on his course for whatever reason. He absolutely could have avoided the whole thing by DOING SOMETHING! Understand? DO! His inaction ultimately led to an avoidable accident, even though the source of the accident was another person that doesn't give others involved a free ticket to avoid RESPONSIBILITY! I have a difficult time understanding why 'younger' people have such a difficult time with the word RESPONSIBLE! The world would be a better place if everyone could just grasp the simple concept of "total responsibility". But you and they may never 'get it' because it is likely that you were brought up to give 'considerations' and 'excuses' rather than realize that YOU create everything that happens in your life. Everything. Its true even if you can't accept it. You likely will understand one day, and hopefully before its too late to make a positive difference in your life. The Captain of the Aircraft carrier should have acted to avoid the mishap rather than rely on someone else to do it. I will agree that the punishment did not fit and, in my opinion, was extreme. That's how Navy's operate. Other than that I'm sure that he is a good and decent person and I wasn't trying to say that he isn't. All that being said, about your insults, I will go toe to toe with you and we'll take IQ tests any time you want but I'm confident that the results will be less than pleasant for you.
I was at Surface Warfare Officer School--Basic during the summer of 1979 before reporting to my ship. We saw this film and discussed it in great detail. The complacency of virtually all of the watch standers of the Evans was unbelievable. A grease pencil plot on the SPS-10 surface search repeater would've shown that they were on a constant bearing with decreasing range (CBDR), the plot in CIC should've told them they were in a CBDR situation, and it is never ever too close for a maneuvering board solution.
@paulkilllins954 Haven't read every single post. Yet yours is the only one that raises "Recommendations to the Bridge" requirements so far. Hats off to you Sir. Though I understand @ Countries, Navies, Commands & Politics, Feelings level, things get quelched far to easily, when lives then, now & future should be more important than any one or even a few. Isn't what all thay training is about after all? =☆= Which is always (carrier group operations/plane guard) the only reason CIC exists under those operating conditions @ that specific time. =☆= Bridge & CIC w/multiple individuals writing & comparing radio & solutions. Scribble, scribble, faster, faster people. JOOD to SM what on God's green earth? Bounce against CIC solutions (or flag why not), which in fast action, their job is to be Johnny on the spot, keep up, keep up. I'm aware of all the U.S. Navy schools that it's required viewing from deck plates up. The only thing is, (maybe I'm dull atm) I didn’t see or hear a single thing about radio backup or Recommendations for changes from CIC thru the entire video? Maybe it just got buried as part of the minutia? Isn't the poor or lack of training all part of the same minutia though too? I read many other incidents that lacked foundation basics just to clean up tragedy, but Isn't that minutia what is all about spotlighting corrections for future situations 🤔 1. CIC should raise the flag for: A. BASE COURSE B. ANY CHANGES FOR IT. C. All radio orders unencrypted correctly. D. Spa operator visually see contact CBDR. E. Plotters on stat boards (POUNDING & POINTING FURIOUSLY) F. Table plotters ripping sound powered phones off cic/bridge talker to get the message importance clear. G. Watch Sup. Storming the bridge access for a talk with ood/jood/qm. H. CICWO beating Surf Watch Sup to them. I. Only after that & much more, last but not least, the entire bridge refuses outside input they're required to at least listen for the sake of we're all human & sometimes we all need to see the Red Flags raised & to be on the same page. =☆= BTW: Was the 3-2-1 rule not a hard & fast thing back then. I don't know, because I never been to school for that. I just read alot. Meh, may not even existed, b/c like who'd a thought to consider running over ants with a semi, am I right?
Fundementally correct, sir. If the CICWO isn't getting through to the OOD, then he should call the Captain.@@artimustrieste1480
Although he was a few years older, I remember Larry Allan Gracely, (Lima, OH) Shawnee HS Class of 1965. Larry was one of those who didn't survive this tragic compilation of errors! There will soon be a new memorial, placed in Harrod, Ohio, to commemorate those lost from the USS Frank E. Evans!
My late uncle was a senior chief petty officer onboard the Evans at time of this mishap. He was thrown into the water by the force of the collision and had to hang on to a tangled mess of piping and wreckage that was dangling from the portion of ship that didn’t initially sink after the collision.
He spent around 45 minutes hanging on before they found him and pulled him back out of the water.
I served aboard the Evans from 1964 to 1966. We were always doing carrier screen duty and changing to aircraft guard was a normal action. I was a radarman stationed in the CIC and my berth was almost directly below. The men in those areas had little chance to survive.
My grandfather was on board the Melbourne when it struck the Frank E. Evans, he was off-duty towards the front of the ship and was thrown from his rack when the collision occurred. He says the deck of the area he slept in was buckled for quite a while. Definitely something he wont ever forget. I'm very saddened to hear of the incidents with the Fitzgerald and John S. McCain this year, they have eery similarity to this incident.
@@dayzdailypress799 My classmate's father was killed on the Evans. I don't understand why they let him go to school that morning, we were in 4th grade.
Bet the rude awakening of Evans CO was lots worse.
Watching this with my father who was on the hmas Melbourne at this tragic moment in history and seeing him in tears is hart breaking the nightmares and the effect it still has on him to this day!!!
Both incidences of collisions with the Melbourne, left our Navies traumatised. As is the norm, innocent people were blamed, compensation a long time coming, if at all and lots of money made by the legal profession in both countries no doubt. But I do suspect that a lot of good came out of the devastation in the way of improved resources and training. I met a Barrister in Sydney who said he represented men from the Melbourne. When I asked, why were they affected, he responded, the blood in the water. God bless them all, I hope those who survived can one-day find peace in the knowledge that they are in a better place.
Hope ya dad is well.
@@georgepantazis141 sadly dementur kicking in but remembers that night like it was yesterday it's haunted him for year's.
@@georgepantazis141 he had just finished a 16 hour shift jumped in his bunk and bang he seen things us sivies cant comprehend ans didn't sleep for another 2 days while the half of the evans was tied to the Melbourne he can remember that but not what the current day is sad
Many of the lessons learned here are directly applicable to watchstanders on civilian sailboat, particularly when in shipping lanes. The level of complexity is less, admittedly, but the habit of showing up early for one's watch to hear a recap of the retiring watchstander's shift, plus any advice on developing situations of weather or commercial/naval traffic and CPAs, is an excellent, life-preserving one.
AIS transceivers are a huge boon to private boats offshore for this reason.
It's SOP in the Navy. Never done any other way.
I was on board the USS PLATTE AO24 when it pulled into Subic Bay in October. We saw the aft section of the Evans. That memory has always been with me.
I was there also, it was gut wrenching seeing the wreckage. Hardly anything left. Navasota AO 106...
Thats what you get when the US Captain leaves Juniors in charge.
And before anyone jumps down my throat over what I said, I have served in the Royal Australian Navy for 12 years and yes I was on board Melbourne this happened. Not a nice sight to be watching. The Melbourne was never at fault although after watching this it seems the US Navy did lay blame on Melbourne as well. Just in case they dont understand a Carrier always has right of way at sea when at flying stations. Get it guys
The American captain eventually acknowledged he was at fault and he made the exact mistake you describe
I've served aboard 2 US Navy aircraft carriers. When in a formation with an allied carrier, the carrier has right of way.
I retired from the US Navy with 22+years as a Quartermaster Senior Chief (E8), which is Navigation on the Bridge. From what I've read, the OOD did not follow the C.O.'s Night Orders, or even the Standing Orders with regards to navigation and safe movement of the ship. Onboard every ship I've served on, it very clearly states in the Night Orders- "other than minor course changes to maintain navigation plot, wake me and notify me of any course change over __ degrees." Also, while keeping station, maintain assigned bearing and range to the guide (carrier,etc.). Also and MOST IMPORTANTLY- call me when there is ANY DOUBT of action, intentions, or to clarify any instructions I have given you. I've seen it first hand, standing watch on the Bridge, the discussion between OOD and Conning Officer, trying to decide whether or not to call the Skipper. You have to err on the side of safety. I think nearly every time I watched the Captain come up in the middle of the night, they were
Appreciative to be notified. Once they had a grasp on the situation had a cup of coffee, they never scolded the OOD for calling them up.
@@trentbaugher60 Agreed, I have been a CO in the RAN and was never concerned about being called by the OOW. Better many times unnecessarily than once late ....
39 years since I last saw this film. Still good lessons and advice.
and if memory serves, it was the Americans who came up with the 'carrier at flying stations has right of way' thing. At least the Captain of the Melbourne finally got an official apology, however late.
I think this is an eloquent narration, full of sensitivity given the circumstances in relation to to men lost, survivors, family and the inevitable "ducking for cover" amongst Senior Ranks within the 2 Navy's of America and Australia and their respective Governments. I truly hope and I do suspect, that as tragic as these 2 tragedies were, that in the long-term, they have lead to improvements to training, operations, equipment and exposed the absolute need for due diligence etc.
I was the computer operator on duty in the Subic Bay Naval Communications Center when the flash message arrived notifying Subic Bay command of the accident. A few days later I visited the dry dock containing the aft section of the Frank E Evans. It looked like someone had taken a huge meat cleaver mid ship. This was the only flash message I experienced in my 18 months in the Philippines. Such a tragic loss of life! Thanks for posting this video!!
What makes this especially painful is that apparently, one of the watch officers was on his first sea duty, and the other had previously failed their watch-standing exam. Not a good pairing for a "darken ship" close-quarters formation transit, even if the night orders include a "call me if things get weird" clause.
I was an ABRP on the Melbourne at the time and my part of ship was the quartedeck where we had to secure the stern section of the Evans, it was the sailors from the Melbourne that went through the stern section and roused the crew of the Evans. It was something that I will never forget as at the time I was sleeping in the port after boat space and when I was woken I watched the bow section come past the port side turn turtle and sink
My Dad said, like the incident with HMAS Voyager a few years earlier which my brother was on when it collided known as Bernie, Bernard Manning, also colliding with HMAS Melbourne, that Psychologically nobody was prepared because it happened in peace time!
What BS. Get your sea story right. I was in the stern and we rolled 90°. Fully on our side before righting. People were thrown from their bunks inside a steel ship with lots of injuries. Some fell or were thrown as much as 35'. Many confused the collision with an explosion. There was a concussion like wave that went through the ship. Nobody was asleep after the bang. I was one of the last to leave the stern half. Melbourne rigged a cargo net from their flight deck that the uninjured used to climb aboard. No Melbourne crewman had been aboard before I left the Evans.
But the Melbourne crew was very professional. They had their boats in the water and helos launched in moments. Their quick action saved many lives. At the time the Melbourne held the peace time tonnage record.
@@oceanmariner , I suspect that "roused" doesn't mean "to awaken", but gather and point in the right direction, like steering traumatised farm animals toa hole in the fence, to a way out. Not comparing people with animals, but just giving an analogy to describe what I mean. Painting a picture.
@@markanthony1920 My point was, I was one of the last 2 people to go thru the stern, looking for anybody missed and shutting WT doors. Neither there or on deck did I see or hear of any non Evans crewman before leaving the ship. And there was nobody that slept thru the collision.
Someone reciently wrote a book about the HMAS MELBORNE. Itw was interesting difnt know if you'd be interested. Im from IOWA USA best of everything to you sir! My Dad was USN ww2 !
A few years later, as JOOD on a can in the Med, we were ordered to proceed to picket station well ahead of the carrier. We were left of the carrier's heading, ordered to station to the right, far enough ahead to cause us to have to go to 4 boilers. We notified our CO immediately. He was fully dressed, and on the bridge in what seemed like mere seconds. Concern for collision at sea will do that. Everything went without incident, though 30 kts on 4 boilers is dramatic. Yes, we were fully cognizant of what happened to the USS Evans.
I was aboard the USS WADDELL DDG24 the night this occurred. We were returning from gunline duty and headed to Singapore. The MELBOURNE was tied up to the pier as we arrived. All hands were admonished not to take photos of the damage. I recall the damaged looked like a smile as we passed her. A very somber moment. Capped a few cold ones with a some AUSIES there. I turned 19 while in Singapore.
I remember that incident , I was in R Division I remember the looks on the faces of the survivors.Also I remember how still the seas were that day.
Wow
I was a supply officer on the USS Bon Homme Richard when this happened. CDR Mitchell was our previous Engineering Officer.
My grandad was on board the HMAS Melbourne when it collided with the Evans, he wrote a song about it.
50 years ago today.
Not forgotten shipmates.
A dangerous business.
Whenever a coded signal is received CIC breaks the signal too and reports it to the OOD. This would have caught the corpen error of the carrier. Don't know if this was standard in 69. It is now. And always make huge course changes if risk of collision is possible. Turning on your running lights and calling the CO to the bridge when the picture just doesn't look right helps too. I've had a few close calls, always at night. And always step out to the bridge wing prior to ordering a turn.
The CO and two OOD got smacks on te bottom. CO MELBOURNE not guilty of anything lost his ship and was downgraded as a Captain. A highly respected and competent CO and veteran of WW2 and Korea. He had more experience in his left toe than Evans watch team. Oh, and in all of this. Where the hell were the CIC?
At the end of days, following this incident I have cross decked to many USN hulls from CV to DE and have always been impressed with their dedication and professionalism. 😊
I was a destroyer sailor out of Mayport, FL when this happened. With the checks and balances that normally go on between the bridge and CIC and surely went on with the Aussie carrier, as well, I could not fathom how this could happen. For months afterwards, I frequently carried a Mae West lifejacket with me about the ship and slept with it tucked behind the pipes in proximity to my bunk. Had I been a radarman in CIC, I'd have gone to the bridge to see the OOD, recognizing an imminent collision.
One of my uncles served on HMAS Sydney, sister ship of HMAS Melbourne at the time. My uncle also served on the Melbourne during Vietnam, only for a short time.
I first saw this at SWOS Coronado in 1979/80. Never forgot it...esp. when on the bridge.
I hope you would agree that you and I as trained Bridge officers, this was 110% avoidable and disgustingly gross negligence bordering on flat out stupidity!!!!
Yeah,
I remember watching this as a MIDN 1/C in 81' before commissioning in 82'. Tragic and sobering! R.I.P., shipmates!
Glynn "WARDOG" Jacobs
My uncle served on HMNZS Blackpool New Zealand 🇳🇿 light cruiser back in the day
I was on board USS NOA DD-841 when this tragedy happened. We were initially assigned to work with Melbourne. However, we had just completed an ammo loadout and so were sent back to the gunline while Evans sailed with Melbourne.
Important to look out of the bridge windows or go onto the bridge wings and look astern before altering course. Lesson learnt from more experienced OOWs.
It’s interesting that the names of the officers were changed,. This seems unnecessary as the names are is a matter of public record and their reputation should not none protected as they were found guilty.
How about the names of those who covered up the actual events and assigned blame to the wrong people?
Those of us of a certain age will remember some television shows starting with: “The story you are about to see is true. The names have been changed to protect the innocent.”
You need to remember that movie was intended as a “lessons learned” training aid for naval officers and not necessary as a documentary for wider distribution. By the time it was produced the court-martials were over and all three officers had left active duty, so it wasn’t about protecting them. The problem would be that people might assume, if they came across another officer with the same name as any of the three court-martialed officers, that they were in fact talking to one of the officers actually involved in the collision.
This was the second deadly collision involving the Melbourne and a destroyer.
My brother was on the Voyager when it got hit, he survived! Very sad for all involved in both collisions.
I worked with a PO from the Voyager, and he was in the PO's mess when it happened. There were 2 of the 5 in the mess who were on the ship for the 1st time. The emergency lighting only came on for a fraction, but for Bruce and 2 others they knew where the bulkhead was and they got out. The other 2 did not. I don't think he ever got over it. RIP to them all. Still a complete disgrace that compensation came too late for many of the crew.
@@michaeljackson2838, indeed, mid 80s wasn't it, before a paltry sum was paid? And it took a Judge who told the Lawyers and Barristers that enough money has been made on this tragedy South of Sydney New South Wales and forced the Australian Government to settle.
@@michaeljackson2838 , Bernard Manning, affectionailty known as Bernie, had just exited the gally moments before the collision course was sounded, it had not been practised before! When I was 8, the Navy had a day out for families through the Heads of Port Philip Bay in Victoria. During a display to lower a lifeboat, it got caught mid air at one end! Most embarrassing for everyone, especially the Officers. I think that this incident was only a matter of months before the collision.
@@markanthony1920 By any standards it was insulting. There was even talk that it was just an accident and as they were sailors it was part of the package when you signed on! Kept hidden from public view for years. Typical non-accountable senior officers and pollies!
@@michaeljackson2838 , nothing's changed. I think the insurance industry runs the show.
I remember watching this movie when I was at OCS and then SWOS. Quite sobering.
Too bad the OOD of the USS Fitzgerald hadn't seen it.
Very interesting. Well done. I was on board USS FOX (DLG-33) off Vietnam at this time. I didn't know things like this were happening.
I was aboard the USS Schofield DEG-3 at the time of the accident. It was around midnight when the Captain over the 1MC said the ASW Exercise was which Evans was part of... is over. And we where heading to search for survivors from the Evans. He continued to say the Evan was hit by the Melbourne and the entire front half of the ship had sunk. I am sad now and I was sad than...about losing sailors from our Squadron. I am also sad to say this. During the exercise all ships were at "Darken Ship." That means we were all out there steaming at various speeds with "no port or starboard running lights." No Mast Lights." It was pitch black out there. The stars did not light up anything. The moon was no where to be seen. That is where I have much heart burn. What happened to the lookouts? They should have been at their stations. Above the bridge or on the wings, with their look out gear. What happened to the watch in CIC? Were the radar men a sleep at the consoles? What about the bridge watch and the Officer of the Deck? And last. What about the Sonar men? If they were pinging active? They should have pinged off the Carrier? And been able to give a bearing and range. And a closing range rate. If they were is listen mod? They should have seen one of the largest noise spokes ever. And been able to give a bearing and noise intensity. Especially as the range rate closed.This accident was no accident. What was it? Professional Sailors asleep at the "Helm." And because of the errors.....74 of our counties Finest are dead. Because of the lack of Professionalism. I believe in my heart of hearts. That the Evans and her crew. Should not be rewarded by having the names on that Black Granite Wall. I am a Navy Combat Veteran of the Vietnam War. The Evans was a far distance from the Legal Combat Zone.
I served on the USS Schofield (DEG-3) from March 23, 1969 to March 24, 1970 when I was transferred to the USS DeHaven (DD-727). I did not remember you (with a girl's name, no less) as a member of the crew. Therefore, I can assure you all that I was aboard Schofield as an E-3 Seaman when DesRon 23 participated in the SEATO operation. I was, in fact, assigned to the radio-net midwatch (2345 to 0345) to log every ship-to-ship transmission I heard on my headphones. This was a special watch, and I assumed I was selected because my handwriting was no doubt 100% legible. When I heard this over my headphones, I immediately contacted the midwatch CIC officer, who then awakened the captain. They reviewed my logged radio-net entries; Schofield was between 3 and 6 miles away from the collision. For me, that was the conclusion of my watch.
I checked my personal copy of the cruise book for Schofield's 1969 first WestPac cruise, and no one named Willsey was a member of the crew at that time...period. I don't know who you are, but I'm confident that you are NOT who you say you are.
@@daynefrary1572 She is an imposter
I sailed on the de-commissioning cruise on Melbourne in 1981.
My rack (bunk) was on the fwd bulkhead of 4C Stbd and there was a large ripple in the deck adjacent; due, I was told, to the collision with Evans.
I remember being on exercise in JB when the collision alarm sounded, PO “Phantom” Walker tore into our mess like a banshee ordering evacuation, I believe he had been in an earlier incident.
I was on the Melbourne’s flight deck when this happened. I watched Evans come in on us from near the bow on the flightdeck. When the collision was inevitable I ran aft and got to the forward lift when we hit. There was debris all over the flightdeck, and I could hear a cry for help up forward. Here was a USN signalman sitting in the folds of what was Evans bridge. He was in a bad way. We organised a stretcher and transported him to the sickbay.
My dad a retired BTC told me as I was reporting to my first DD to never sleep below decks during close maneuvering and ASW sweeps. As a result I was topside when my ship turned across the bow of Coral Sea the skipper who had just left the Bridge knew the turn was off time and returned to the bridge and ordered Hard right rudder and set the engine order telegraph to emergency astern on the starboard screws and flank ahead on the port screws heeling us over where we only lost radar and antennas from the mast. other than soiled underwear on the bridge there were only minor injuries from unsecured gear set adrift on the decks and falls.
Was on the Coral Sea CV-43 81-85., Made the world Cruise.
HMAS Melbourne appeared in "On the Beach" as a backdrop in the naval dockyard scenes.
First movie or 2nd?
@@markanthony1920 First movie (if he's referring to the aircraft carrier). The second movie was released in 2000 - 15 years after the carrier Melbourne was sold for scrap. It's possible that the FFG Melbourne was in On The Beach, but it was set in Melbourne (the city). The FFG Melbourne was based in Sydney.
In the 2000 film, the ship beside USS Charleston is HMAS Warramunga - which is ironic because their territory was a Stage 2 at the start of the movie.
@@sheriff0017 , I auditioned for the 2000 in a Cafe in Childhood, Sydney Australia! Unfortunately I didn't get the role.
I was referencing the original movie with Gregory Peck.
What does "loose 1000 numbers of the unrestricted line" mean?
He got moved down in the promotion seniority 1000 places. This would've effectively killed any further advancement in his career.
Also.. who last signed the maintenance inspection for correct bolting down of that ladder... made me feel sick watching that and I know it's just a training film.. but once you have had seawater in your lungs you never quite get rid of the taste
I don't understand how the bridge commanders on Evans could be so incompetent as to make such a string of mistakes, not even following standing orders to wake the capt. They didn't know where they were in relation to the carrier, they incorrectly decoded a message, just one error after another and compounding each other. What was the underlying reason for these failings - Poor training? Poor operational procedures? Were the Evans officers incompetent and had somehow slipped through the net and promoted beyond their ability? Was the Evans a ship where poor operational procedures had been allowed to become practice? It seems mystifying to me that this could happen.
They were Jr officers didn’t know what they were doing
I was on the USS KEARSARGE CVS 33 when this happened on the way to Vietnam
I saw the section that was left, tied up to a pier in Subic Bay. Sad image indeed.
U. S. Navy sideburns and beards courtesy CNO Admiral Zumwalt, a man who realized that with long sideburns and beards and the seamen's utility blue work shirts and bell bottom trousers were what the hippies of the day wore.
Pretty shrewd old guy!
My dad sailed with him m aboard Phelps during WWII...I met him at reunions a n the 70s and 80s...
What a crock. This is a white wash by the USN. Lots of untruths in this movie. I was a QM3 on the Evans when this collision happened. My job was on the bridge. I was in berthing at the time. The names were changed to protect the guilty? Never heard of the OD and JOD or other names in this movie. Also filmed in the wrong style bridge. Probably a modernized Gearing. Wheel and sailors were separated in the original pilothouse. Officers were in the open bridge and communicated thru an open porthole or from the bridge winds thru the pilothouse side doors.
Both sections rolled 90° to st'bd, but the stern recovered. We were in a SEATO exercise simulating war time. There were NO running lights, NO radar. Part of my job was to operate the running lights and operate the pilothouse radar. CIC was blind. It was a dark night, at times difficult to determine the direction the carrier was pointing. The OD lost track of the zigzag pattern and turned the wrong way. There wasn't much the Melbourne's captain could have done. The Evans was probably traveling at 27 knots as usual when changing station. I always double checked my officers after this. Sometimes it's like babysitting spoiled children. I'm a captain with 50 years at sea behind me.
Just now saw the movie. Lots of BS in it. I was on the Kearsarge when it happened standing cold iron watch #1 FR still have problems with it
Thanks for your clarification!
I am RAN and so much of this did not make sense.
Can’t believe they were pitch black and RADAR silent in close escort operations, just an accident waiting to happen.
The fact they never contacted the CO just baffled me.
I was also wondering why there was no mention of CIC giving CPA but you explained it through RADAR silence.
Tragic!
I was a JOOD when my OOD made the infamous statement about "too close for a mo board solution, we will have to eyeball it ". The CO was on the bridge and totally LOST his cool. I QUICKLY learned NEVER to even think these words!
I feel like I just watched the first Seconds From Disaster.
I was a Radarman on USS Oriskany (CVA 34) in the Tonkin Gulf at this time. "Plane Guard" DD's are so close to the a/c carriers that they don't often show up on the radar screens. Forward and aft lookout watches report to CIC any anomalies they see; there's a Radarman watch stander on the Bridge. You have to find a way to maintain military discipline while telling officers they're about to screw themselves and everyone else. Deck Watch Officers should go to CIC before every watch, but don't.
You served on the same vessel my grandfather did in 1950. I served on CVN73.
A-fuckin-men, Bubba. I never think of this disaster without thinking about the piss-poor relationship between the bridge and Combat here, where I used to stand watches before they sent me to college and turned me into an officer. You can bet I never made that mistake.
Can anyone answer please... should she not have been challenged when she entered another ships patrol station as she was in violation of formation.. or did they assume it was something to do with her being the designated plane guard..
She likely should have been challenged if the other navigation plots were being maintained, but as I'm not a Navy line officer, I don't know if the patrol sectors are intended to overlap slightly; my money's on them being strictly separated, though.
I was on USS England in Subic Bay when the Evans wreck was pulled into port
I saw this when I attended OCS in Newport, RI in 1992.
The Melbourne rammed one of its own Destroyers 5 years before this event. Wonder if that created the bias? My father was on the Evans and survived the incident. He never spoke about this incident, I only learnt about it researching his USN career to write his eulogy.
The Captain of HMAS Melbourne even hosted a dinner for all the Commanding Officers the night before the EX began and went into detail about how the previous collision occurred and stressed them to brief their respective Officers back on their ships that no turns were to be made towards the carrier. The message obviously wasn't received or it was ignored.
Was this the accident where the Melbourne's Captain was shafted by one or both Governments?
+neddy laddy Yes by both.
+neddy laddy Yep, the Captain only just received an apology recently. He was not at fault but an easy target.
gnarkillkicksass
Poor bastard could well be dead by now though.
Yes, the RAN didnt want the Americans to feel their officers were entirely to blame - it was felt they would feel quite bad towards the Australian navy - so they court martialed the captain of the HMAS Melbourne and reassigned him to a junior desk, he promptly took early retirement.
Ah, the military, fighting for the people, peace and justice.
Not the first destroyer cut in half and sunk by Melbourne. HMAS voyager went the same way.
Voyagers Captain was drunk.
Both destroyers captains at fault
@@freddywarren69, he's not here to defend himself, it's easy to put the blame onto a dead person. But my brother swore that his Captain never drank on duty. I believe he had an ulcer and that was probably caused by his heavy drinking, or, he drank heavily because he had an ulcer. The outcome concluded that because there were no confirmations of course corrections because they were running on silent, that the new course neglected to recall Melbourne's previous change in course which now placed Voyager across Melbourne's bow!
My cousin Joe Clark survived this incident.
Wow
@Cap Gamer 10 They collided because the officers on the bridge of the EVANS had their heads up their asses (and the MELBOURNE CO didn't try hard enough to compensate for their erratic maneuvers). Maybe you should try joining the Navy and learning something instead of just playing stupid computer games and then pretending you know something.
@Carlos songs with lyrics FYI, the Melbourne Captain actually had the various Captains of his escorts repair on board the Melbourne before the exercises began and instructed them "under no circumstances was anyone to turn in front of the Melbourne but steer away before taking up plane guard duties". They were also told what ships and the time they were to be on guard. At the allotted time for the Frank E Evans her Captain was in his bunk sleeping, leaving an OOW who had failed his watchkeeping certificate and a more junior officer who had passed, leading to confusion on the bridge.The communications officer of the Melbourne told the inquiry the replies to messages from the Melbourne to Evans were very slow in being acknowledged and acted upon. Despite the fact that the biased US Admiral in charge of the naval inquiry allowed lawyers to aid the officers and ratings of the Evans when being questioned under oath, the same right was denied to the Melbourne's officers and crew. In fact two senior Barristers from the RAN simply there to observe the proceedings were ordered out of the room. Despite the bias, the best the Board could come up with were a couple of minor errors of navigation by the Melbourne's Captain but even these were considered bullshit by independent international naval boards later as to having to follow them would have resulted in major breaches of rules at sea. The accident was 100% the fault of the Captain of the Evans and the watchkeeping team on the bridge of the Evans. The only "mistake" made by the Aussies was to agree to the appointment of the biased Admiral in charge of the inquiry as he was the Fleet Officer to which the Evans was attached and as such that any adverse finding could reflect on him. Sad day for everyone involved and their families.
Was the aft section salvaged with a new forward section attached?
No, it was eventually towed out to sea and used for target practice.
I was on HMAS Parramatta , 40 KM away when this tragedy happened.....I was 20 years old.
Anybody know what the punishment of "lose 1000 numbers of the unrestricted line" means?
The officer in question fell back 1000 places in the seniority for ship command. Effectively, his career would never recover from the incident.
@@eddievhfan1984 WOW! Is 1000 an automatic amount, or could they assign a different amount?
@@Estes705 Theoretically, they could, but 1000 gets the point across, and if you're gonna reprimand someone for that blunder, 2 or 3 places in line doesn't really convey the Navy's displeasure adequately, y'know?
I was on the Larson never forget we went to GQ I was a boiler man we tied up to what was left of the Evans terrible way to die
I know the reprimands essentially end your career, but why didn't the officers lose their commissions during the court martial?
I've never heard of it being done. I don't think the court has the authority to remove commissions since they are granted by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Following the court martial, the senior officers in the convicted officer's chain of command can always make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy that they be "ordered home" and discharged, ending their commission. p.s. Don't confuse commission, with an officers' rank.
Finally, the UCMJ, Uniform Code of Military Justice sets the maximum punishments that may be awarded for each infraction and sets limits also by the type of court martial and and rank of the officer officiating. I never dealt with any officer prosecutions during my time as a squadron legal officer or during my 26 yr. career.
The Captain of the Melbourne was dragged over legal coals and subsequently lost command and reprimanded. It wasn't until recently he was exonerated.
I came here for knowledge but stayed for the acting.
I was on the Uss Everett F. Larson DD 830. We were the first to get to the Evans and we were the ship that tied up to her aft half.
I was also on board of the USS Everett F.Larson DD 830 when this tragic incident happened, a very sad moment for everyone especially for the familiesand friends of all the sailors died on board of the USS Robert F. Evans....
You were both lucky.
USS Larson was involved in a narrow 'near miss' with Melbourne under similar circumstances two nights before, at a similar hour of night.
As a result minimum distance between Plane Guard and Carrier was increased from 2,000yd to 3,000yd and all ships reminded of the procedures to follow.
The OOD & Conning Officer on Evans received a slap on the wrist. Their actions cost the Navy a ship and killed sailors. They should still be sitting in Leavenworth.
I vaguely remember this incident from news reports about the tragic aftermath shortly before I joined the United Kingdom military, I can’t begin to imagine the terror, shock and helplessness that those seamen endured and are still enduring today. Obviously an Accident Investigation Board (A.I.B) had to be convened and it must have been extremely difficult for the investigators to hear the details of individuals and of the way that fellow mariners died, that alone must have caused emotional and mental scars that might never or will not heal. RIP all those who lost their lives that day, and may the sea protect their final resting place.
Even in 1969 the radar systems on both vessels surely would have picked up on the proximity and relatively poor positioning and alerted the bridge officers, or is that over simplifying the events?, also why didn’t lookouts raise the alarm? Surely that is what they are there for, and as was stated the sea was calm with excellent visibility, not being a mariner I don’t know how those conditions would have helped or hindered the crews, but, and there is always a but, knowing what visibility is like in open countryside with no cloud cover and a near or full moon I would surmise that they should have been able to distinctly see each other’s vessels. One last point, is someone who holds the Rank of Lt (JG) experienced enough for the position they were in on that night? I ask because in my experience the rank of Lt (JG), or the equivalent off that in different branches and nations is akin to being a novice a still ‘learning on the job’, they have the knowledge but not the experience in my opinion. The two officers on the bridge that night were quite rightly punished, although I think their sentences were not exactly harsh, they both, in my humble opinion, should have been discharged from the navy, as for the commander, he left orders to the effect that he should have been notified of various actions and events, those orders were not carried out, so, how could he be derelict in his duties, if the two Lt (JG’s) had followed those orders, which they both should have read and initialled, I would not be typing this much, how can you find someone guilty of an action that they had NO CONTROL OVER OR KNOWLEDGE OF????, the commander might as well have resigned his commission as his naval career was “dead in the water” his hopes of promotion reduced to zero. The narration at the end of this episode is pure hindsight, and stating the bleeding obvious, of course lessons need to be learned and remedial actions taken, however, again from my experience, the changes to procedures are NOT always the right way to go, sometimes it is more about ensuring that the procedure in place is adhered to, and that a sensible amount of latitude is available to the people following the procedure, latitude that give options without inducing a danger, the old saying that rules are “for the obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men” is often true, especially in the military where blind obedience has and does lead to serious consequences, commanders need to know the difference between strict orders and their ability to make command decisions within those orders, no commander will ever be able to command with one hand tied behind their back
i was not in the immediate area, but close....the next morning there were ships everywhere and such calm sea.....nothing moving.
Whats 1000 numbers of the unrestricted line mean?
Refers to the seniority for line officers (officers eligible for ship or other major command). Effectively says "you will not be eligible for ship command *ever*, unless some catastrophe happens and an unholy number of qualified officers die in short order."
“1000 numbers of the unrestricting line”?
I was on USS Ault DD698 71 to 73. We were anchored in Houston ship channel as shaft bearings had to be replaced. Wind picked up overnight. Empty grain freighter was dragging anchor. Headed straight toward us. We were able to slip anchor chain and received glancing blow to bow that bent bull nose back. Seaman who had bow anchor watch wound up on fantasy with life jack on. He was a sur
He was an Evans survivor!
HMAS Melbourne sunk 2 destroyers in peacetime and none in conflict and was not responsible for either.
Now Nov 2021, I know an old sailor just turned 90 a few months ago by the name of Rex that was on the Melbourne when it collide with HMAS Voyager, this is 5 years earlier in 1964, I have never asked him about that incident, It would make a great video for him to talk about it now, there would be few men still alive to to tell there story about being onboard when it happened
CIC and the bridge. We always reported to the Ops Room even as OUT to get the picture. Once on the bridge, the incoming Ops Room team would update us with the local picture including skunks ivo. That is standard practice.
ALSO, we kept each other updated during manoeuvres or changes to the plot. Watchkeeping 101.
I fail to understand why the USN did apparently not do likewise back then.
Also, look at the SHP our cans have. I always prepared to drive mine like a sports car and use a seaman's eye plus mindset Relvel to carry out manoeuvres. Then worry about true course and speed.
End of days. Get your arse off the bridge and get out onto the wings
The one funny out of this. Before Melbourne set the after section, a senior sailor went back aboard to check all hands were evacuated. He had to wake a sailor who had slept through the whole thing. Another. Next day all the escorts formed line abreast to sweep the waters for more survivors
Sad but true😔
13:07 You can clearly hear the director yelling “CUT!” I shit you not.
I was on a destroyer and would plane guard from time to time. We NEVER did any zig zagging while plane guarding
Brothers are NOT posted together on the same vessel !!
There it is..... Attending ships were ordered to never turn into the carrier. Had that first mistake been avoided the collision would have never happened.
Sad thing is the had been briefed by the CO of HMAS Melbourne about the collision with HMAS Voyager 5 years prior which was due to turning into the carrier. Voyager got cut in half and 82 men killed in the exact same circumstances.
I saw the Aft section of the Evans in Subic Bay after this happened.
One would have thought that they would know how to pronounce "Melbourne" after all this time.
It's funny to watch the os's write backwards on the skunk board. For the same officer to the deck and conn is not encouraged. In fact I don't think it's allowed any longer
I was on the Uss Leyte Gulf 55 a guided missile cruiser. We crashed in to the Uss Roosevelt an aircraft carrier. It was around 0245 also conducting fight ops in the dark... We collided and our ship did a 43 degree lisp. If it would've done a 45 degree it would've done a complete roll over killing most of us.... There were multiple injuries including myself.. It was a bad night in October of 1997. Anyone was on the Leyte gulf cg55? Please contact me..
Working in Shipyard, started on USS Vinson, during PSA operations. Moved to USS Roosevelt and began construction from the keel up. 34 years later, I assisted for several months on USS Lincoln to finish up this last overhaul. Last Carrier I worked on, the one now under construction JFK. Retired.
@Frogman Smith LOL
If everyone has eyes and the ships involved all have navigation radar, how the hell does a collision occur?? 🤔
i only realised that the Evans aft section sunk, and that the fore section is pictured, i thought it was some kind of weird looking oiler pictured at first.
The stern remained afloat
Those who were there still live the horror
I was on the USS KEARSARGE CVS33 when this happened it wasn’t the Melbourne carriers fault
One of my Jr. High teachers was in the navy at this time. Apparently the Navy runs into lots of things. That and soviet trawlers were everywhere.
What class of ship was the Evans?
Allen M. Sumner-class, a late WWII design.
@@mickgilbert910 thanks mate!
Sad Tail! I had night mirrors of such a tragedy at sea!
HMAS Melboune cut 2 friendly escourting destroyers in half during training operations. Did she ever sink an enemy vessel?
The way the Yanks handled this was despicable. Their guy fucks up, but they demand the Australian captain's scalp and pressured the RAN to make it happen. I'm not sure who's worse here: the US admiralty actions in covering up the cause, or the RAN's admiralty for throwing one of their own to the wolves. Just terrible all round.
The worst one here is you, there's nothing more despicable than someone who spreads gossip, and that's all you're doing is gossiping.
I suggest you watch the entire video, it's a USN production from after the event and they state that the blame is to be squarely placed on the officer's of the USS Evans, they say absolutely nothing about the Melbourne or anyone of it's crew doing anything wrong.
If you're repeating something you heard before in life then you're just being a purveyor of gossip, like a woman does.
@@dukecraig2402 So clearly you weren't alive in Australia in the 70s-90s... jog on Yank.
@@dukecraig2402 Sorry ole boy, but men are just as big in the gossip purveyor department as women.
My leading watch NCO OS1 Lehman lost his dad on the Evans
Put Up Their Names, high on the Wall!
Add to that wall the skipper of the Melbourne who, through no fault of his own, died in disgrace,
@@goodshipkaraboudjan
He didn't, not that it changes much, he received a full apology for being scapegoated a few years before he died. He accepted the apology like a gentleman... in a much more graceful way than I would have.