This is such a weird video. For starters, I've never heard a moral naturalist say that our moral knowledge comes from evolution. Why would you spin this as the only explanation available to the naturalist? Furthermore, if you present a naturalist with an evolutionary debunking argument for their moral beliefs, and they find the argument convincing, surely the rational thing to conclude would be "oh, I guess my moral beliefs are false", and not "oh, I guess there must be a god then".
@@fatstrategistIt is less of a "evolution of the gaps" argument and a simplification of observations We observe that certain traits arise in certain types of populations. Like empathy and such in social species. We also observe external and internal selection pressures for such behaviors. There even seem to be some genetic ties although this is still being researched. The last bit may or may not be found to be false but the first bit would describe selection pressures for behaviors. Under most understandings of morality it is most simply put as a set of ideas of what you should or shouldn't do to be a good person. It is "good" to survive. And so it is "good" to be a good person. In the same line of analysis tribalism also seems to frequently arise in social groups. These are obviously very simplified descriptions but it isn't simply not knowing an answer and then concluding it must be evolution. Suggesting as such would be like flat earthers saying "gravity of the gaps" when people try to describe how water can stay on the surface of earth without flying off due to inertia.
Great video! What is your opinion on CS Lewis's argument from moral knowledge, that he provides in part 1 of Mere Christianity? On another note an appeal to intuition is, has never given met much confidence in the support of a premises or argument, since it would appear to me that in the passed some very unintuitive theories about the world has been accepted to be true, for example Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity and not Classical Physics. It would then seem that it is quite possible to for our intuitions about the world to be incorrect. Maybe intuition can be saved by adopting a sort of Reliabilism about intuitions, in that they are assumed to be reliable in the absence of counter evidence. But this creates the problem of having an intuition, J, about some thing which is correct at some time t, before evidence E was discovered, and then false at time t', after E was discovered. The point being that since we don't know what evidence we will discover, it is most likely never a good idea to assume that J is true, but rather that it is thus far not yet been shown to be questionable. More we most likely cannot infer. I guess my main problem with intuition is just that I find it challenging to ground. On what bases can we ground our intuition, it cannot be on any form of logic, because we base our logical axioms on what seems to be intuitive, and logic is assumed for all other disciplines. We therefore have a problem at hand, in that do we trust our intuition or not. If we do, why? Since our intuition has been shown to be false in the past. I guess we can make an argument for God based on intuitions, in that if our intuitions are true, then they are only true because of some intentional action that made it that our general thoughts about reality is correct or something, I'm not a philosopher by discipline. Kind Regards
Three problems: 1. I think the probability of humans obtaining our particular set of moral intuitions via natural processes is a lot higher than you give it credit for. There are many reasons for tis, but the big thing you're missing is that our intuitions are not purely biological; they're in large part the result of centuries of engaging in reasoning about morality leading to a society that instills certain values. 2. By skipping over the part where you justify that our moral intuitions are in fact moral knowledge, you obfuscate a central mechanism of your argument. I suspect if you included that justification, your argument as a whole would become circular because that justification could be applied to any set of moral intuitions we happened to evolve. 3. If the probability of theism is near zero (or actually zero, as I think it is), no Bayesian formula is going to make it more probable than not. Also a "fun" bonus problem that the Christian god would be grotesquely evil by the moral intuitions he supposedly gave us
I think the existence of moral facts would be a problem for theism, given the history of our species. Given theism, we would expect that we always had this moral knowledge would have always been the same. But like regular knowledge, looking at our history, we see that this is false. Over time we learnt and our believes gradually approached more and more "correct" believes. One example is the golden rule. While it is a good aproach to "treat people how you would like to be treated", it is an improvement to "treat people how they would like to be treated" and recognizing that we all are different and might not like to be treated the exact same way. This can still be improved, but it illustrates the point that our moral believes were never the same as moral facts. They gradually approach them as our knowledge grows. This is perfectly compatible with naturalism, even expected, but it goes against what you outlined what we would expect of theism.
I would say that you can readily derive "treat people how they would like to be treated" from "treat people how you would like to be treated" - assuming that you would like to be treated the way that you personally would like to be treated. Unless you take the rule too literally, where you end up with people saying "I would like to be given pizza with pineapple on it, so I must give other people pizza with pineapple on it".
@@MatthewFearnley i mean yeah its the extra step. First step would be empathy, to recognize that there are other people who desire to be treated "good" just as you are. This is the golden rule essentially. The second step i think is a bit mor nuanced, to recognize that peoples preferences are different, and what other people see as "good treatment" might be different than yours. But yeah you can derive a better framework from the fundation of the golden rule, thing is, some people stay only at the first step.
@@Finfie Hmm, I think I would say realising the people's preferences are different would be the easier step. Really living out any interpretation of the Golden Rule (even a literalistic "you must give people pineapple pizza whether or not they actually want it" interpretation) is the most challenging part. But I think you've hit upon the main intentions of the Golden Rule. It's kind of a rephrase of "love your neighbour as you love yourself".
@@MatthewFearnley // But I think you've hit upon the main intentions of the Golden Rule. It's kind of a rephrase of "love your neighbour as you love yourself".// I mean, given that the golden rule is a bit older, i think it is more correct to say that "love your neighbour" is a rephrase of the golden rule ^^ //Really living out any interpretation of the Golden Rule (even a literalistic "you must give people pineapple pizza whether or not they actually want it" interpretation) is the most challenging part.// I very much disagree. I remember the grandmother of a friend of mine being quite hurt, any time somebody prefered some food other than her home cooking. The way she talked, she did not seem to realise that other people like different food than her. I think this is much rarer now in younger gerneration, but i remember multiple times in my life, where especially older people could not fathom other people having particular preferences.
@@Finfie I’m ok with either being a rephrase of the other. But the Bible contains both and I don’t think we’ve moved beyond both of them. I’m not entirely sure what you’re claiming about your friend’s grandmother? It sounds like you’re saying she did a good job of fulfilling the principle of “only give people the food you like best”, but not necessarily “always give people food, and make sure it’s the kind you like best”. And it sounds like you’re saying that she isn’t fulfilling the principle of “respect everyone’s food preferences the same way you would want people to respect yours”. And more generally, you’re not really making any claims about how consistently she treated people outside the area of food. Always treating people the exact same way you want to be treated might be slightly easier in some ways (more difficult in others) than treating them how they want to be treated. But either way it’s a challenge that no sinner has ever fulfilled perfectly. Most of us are a long way off.
Hm. The number of check marks on the diagonal is at least potentially infinite and IF it is actually infinite, then the number/cardinality of check marks is the same as the number/cardinality of "X" signs in that matrix of yours regarding moral theories M and beliefs or lack of beliefs there off B. So if _"moral theory"_ is true, then how exactly is _"moral knowledge"_ impossible according to Naturalism, when the amount of scenarios with moral knowledge is at least potentially and maybe actually the same as the amount of scenarios without moral knowledge given Naturalism?!? You know, that according to mathematics there are as many pairs of two intigers as natural numbers, since a *one-to-one* correspondence between those things can be established? Or do you not know that?!?
I think that a) very few naturalists accept all your premises, b) I actually *am* a naturalist who does (or close enough), and c) your argument does not actually go through. To illustrate why, let’s look at another field: mathematics. I expect you agree that there are mathematical facts (there are irrational numbers), that they do not depend on our beliefs (there were irrational numbers even when Pythagorous claimed all numbers could be ratios, if that story is real), and we can know mathematical facts (I know there are irrational numbers). You might (or might not) argue that mathematical facts are only true based on our beliefs about axioms, or that we do not have intuitive knowledge of mathematical facts, but I think the first is false (the existence of irrational numbers follows from our axioms whether or not you believe those are good axioms; you can prove things in ZFC even if you think the Axiom of Choice is nonsense) and the second is irrelevant (people have trouble figuring out their moral intuitions all the time, and have moral disagreements; even if all such disagreements could be resolved by reasoned argument it is clearly not the case that it’s trivial to access all and only true moral facts from moral intuitions). And yet, our mathematical beliefs match mathematical truths by construction. There is debate about what exactly “doing mathematics” (eg. invention or discovery) is and in what sense mathematical truths are true (or if they are), but I don’t think any mathematician believes this process requires God. I have heard some theologians argue that it does, but unlike with moral philosophy, I don’t think any mathematicians take that view seriously.
I think that mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge are disanalogous. Notice I raised two points in the video: i) We would not need to evolve moral knowledge to function as a species. ii) If the moral facts were different, our moral beliefs wouldn't be any different. Do these points hold true regarding mathematical knowledge? Could one hold the following? i') We would not need to evolve mathematical knowledge to function as a species. ii') If the mathematical facts were different, our mathematical beliefs wouldn't be any different. Well, it's hard to see how (i') could be true. Basic mathematical knowledge seems completely indispensable to a species' survival, since it's just an understanding of the nature of quantity. It's necessary for risk assessment (e.g. knowing that two lions is more dangerous than one lion), resource allocation, and future planning in general. I personally don't know what a species would look like that functioned without mathematical knowledge. Analyzing (ii') is a lot harder, since the antecedent in the conditional is logically impossible. It's not clear whether or not it's a meaningful question to ask, "In a world where it was true that 2+2=5, would we believe that 2+2=5?" If that is a meaningful question, then it seems the answer would be yes. If in this world two apples and two apples made five apples, then creatures who understood this fact would have better resource allocation skills and better overall fitness. So, while (i) and (ii) strike me as plausible, (i') and (ii') do not. But this was a good point to raise. Thank you for bringing up this important parallel!
@@ApologeticsSquared Thinking about this more I think you might count me as thinking moral facts come from our beliefs about moral facts. I don’t think that, exactly, but I think something which you might consider relevantly similar. The details of my thoughts here don’t fit in a TH-cam comment and also make how I view the relationship between points (i) and (ii) complicated. Setting that aside, (i') seems not *strictly* true but close enough for intelligent species. Whether or not you have thoughts about mathematics, you need something that causes your behave in a way that seeks out more food instead of less, and avoids the most predators. As for (ii'), I’d make a distinction between the *rules of mathematics* and the which of those rules are relevant to the world. You can’t make a world where 2+2=5 when all of those are defined as we define them; you *can* make a world where when you put one pair of apples next to another pair of apples you have five apples. The inhabitants of that world might discover our concept of “addition” as a mathematical curiosity, the way we have “nimbers” which is a number system where 2+2=0; the actual rules of mathematics are the same. But they wouldn’t have an intuitive grasp of addition or teach it except in weird pure math classes; they’d teach whatever system of numbers and operations made sense in their world. Analogously, your mischievous goblins might write stories involving altruism and do philosophy about morality, but that wouldn’t cause them to actually care about acting in a moral way; moral facts would still be true the way mathematical facts about nimbers are still true mathematics, but they wouldn’t care because, as you point out, morality does not act directly on the universe.
@@ApologeticsSquared If we/you are already at mathematics, then would you be so kind as to explain, according to which probability space (Ω, F, P) you are concluding, that P(no moral knowledge|Naturalism) >> P(moral knowledge| Naturalism), since according to the principle of indifference, which you are using so frequently, it rather should be the case, that P(no moral knowledge|Naturalism) ≈ P(moral knowledge| Naturalism), since the numbers/amount/cardinality of scenarios with moral knowledge is the same as the numbers/amount/cardinality of scenarios without knowledge given Naturalism according to that matrix of yours regarding moral theories M and the beliefs or lack there off B? Or is this question irrelevant and insignificant for you, since also according to you given Naturalism then therefore mathematical knowledge is impossible, since our beliefs most probably will never align to mathematical facts?!? So then yet again Evolution AND Naturalism is _"self defeating" somehow?!?_ Do you know, what actually is self defeating here? Your *ignorance* about the last 300 years of rigorous mathematics, logic and reasoning, that is *self deafeating.* Can you even quantify properly just one probability, that you have ever reasoned with that majestic _"logic"_ of yours? According to mathematics, rigorous mathematics, probabilities are numbers between 0 and 1 inclusively - basically the first axiom for probability, and yet no current apologist or past one like *Alvin Plantinga* has ever be able to quantify one probability, which they have talked and _"reasond"_ about and with. And I'm asking just one such quahtification. If you are not using and talking about probability spaces, then why do you even talk and reason with such probabilities and why do you pretend to have a or THE proper understanding or knowledge of probabilities?!? Or in other words, why are you sooo fallacious?!? Why do you pretend to be something, which you are so obviously not, namely rational?!? I guess, that's because of Evolution and because that's so Natural for you to be - to be irrational and to pretend to be rational. That's simply your Nature, I guess.
@@ApologeticsSquaredWell, there is actually one person quentifying the probability of P(evidence|not atheism): It's *Luke Barnes.* But his argument for that kind and sort of evidence being evidence for theism above anything else is as good as Meadow's argument for Sally Clark's two dead children being evidence for her murdering them above anything else. Both are just ridiculous and out there rational minds.
@ApologeticsSquared While it is an interesting topic, there are several problematic areas. Firstly, theism is simply the idea that a god(s) exists. Now, maybe you can stretch this definition to a more specific type like a creator god, which would mean some level of interaction. But I think you stretch it much too far when you use theism as if it entailed that the god has the knowledge of moral facts and has the capability to assure that these moral facts are known to a subset of creatures that exist. I say this because this argument isn't grounding morality in any god at the moment, just that moral facts exist. Secondly, you did acknowledge that types of possible moralities would make it so that even with your built-in presuppositions about the traits of the theistic god, the god would not necessarily instill creatures with moral knowledge. But you didn't do a good job demonstrating why the "not" portion is so small on the probability space. You took the time showing the diagonal under naturalism. You could've done similarly with theism (under your definition). To expand on the second point, it would seem to suffer a similar set of circumstances. Just like you already acknowledged it is possible in theism for no moral knowledge to be given. Next for theism the god(s) would need to have the exact characteristics such that they will choose to share the correct set of moral facts with beings in their creation and those beings will be humans. This would similarly create a diagonal that doesn't stretch the whole table. If you are unconvinced simply imagine a god who's chosen creature isn't human but any of the other organisms that exist or could possibly exist. On the other side. I have a few issues with how you characterized morals when we accept that moral facts exist and assume we know them. In your example of the goblins you depicted as being completely morally blind but believing that a set of behaviors were good and a set of behaviors bad. How would you consider this morally blind? What does it mean to have moral insights outside believing some behaviors because are good (assuming you are right about which are good and which aren't)? Now obviously simply the knowledge isn't enough unless that was all there is to be moral, but the knowledge is enough to be able to have insights on what you need to do to be moral. To me this seems to be considering morality to be necessarily empathetic. Which I'm fine with. But the evolutionary pathway for empathy in social organisms is extremely strong. And if we assume that, then the probability of empathy and by extension, for humans to be able to ascertain moral facts would increase in naturalism. My main point here is that to determine whether or not something is likely in evolution, you would need to first identify what exactly is being talked about. Similarly, you call knowing moral facts a good and valuable thing. And that it is important to living morally which is good. If I were to steelman it as best as I could, then it would instead say that knowledge of moral facts is helpful for being able to make an informed choice to behave morally or not. This is primarily to address that regardless of the vehicle there would need to be sufficient justification for it to be likely that having an informed choice is a "good" thing. In the theist case this would mean that god(s) want and will make sure it happens. And in the naturalistic case it would mean that the trait is beneficial to survival (if they are saying morals arise from evolution). Lastly, you note as a feature of the argument that moral facts don't have a causal impact on reality. I think this idea needs to be fleshed out a bit more. What does morality describe? I think it is extremely crucial to be aware that words are symbolic of ideas people hold. The fact of the wind doesn't cause me to call it the wind sure. But the fact the wind's existence has a causal impact on me and so will encourage me to call it something. If moral facts have no casual relation on reality, then in what way are they real outside the minds of people? I'll use numbers. It seems that we created the concept of numbers for ourselves as a way to understand reality. The numbers themselves aren't real, but if you wanted to claim that the numbers do exist, then that would be because they are causal in that they map onto objects or sets of objects and have some effect (primarily if you assign the wrong number you'll get the wrong result). If moral facts were to exist, then they would similarly map onto behaviors and have some effect (feel free to define the effect as you see fit). If I were to simplify all the above. You would first need to identify What you mean by morals? What are moral facts? How can something be considered a fact if it has no casual relation to anything in reality (basically if I can in no way verify the veracity of a fact how can it be justified as one)? Justify how the theism side doesn't have the same limiting cases of exact type of god to exact type of moral framework. You are right on one side. Humans aren't truth machines which is something you would expect with naturalism. Our ability to discern true things has to be achieved through effort, by filtering out how much we rely on intuition and using when our intuitions and inferences from observations are tested by reality and demonstrated as accurate. Being sure to acknowledge when they don't.
Why even bother with these complicated mental gymnastics? You can just say " X is fact and theism also says X is fact", it doesn't mean anything because youre just ad-hoc defining things into theism. The Bible is riddled with barbaric, brutal morality, so you don't even buy your own argument either. To me these kinds of videos just feel forced and fake. I doubt anyone is even slightly convinced by them.
@DorperSystems The definition of morality is irrelevant to this argument, you can use any moral system and claim the same "theism claims X morality " statement, because it's just ad hoc adding something under theism.
"P1. There are true moral facts. (This is intuitive.)" Nope. It's actually unintuitive, since moral beliefs vary across time and cultures, which is not to be expected if they are objective facts. "P2. Moral facts are not influenced by our beliefs." This would be true by definition if there are, indeed, moral facts. But you failed to show that there are moral facts. "P3. We know what the moral facts are." Nope. Obviously, we do not. There is great disagreement about morality. If a large number of people believe that there are moral facts, but disagree on what those moral facts are, then you cannot conclude that we know what those moral facts are. So all your premises are weak or counter-intuitive. Your conclusion was "The probability of moral knowledge given theism is very high, therefore God exists." Since you failed to demonstrate the existence of moral knowledge, and since it is unlikely that moral knowledge exists, you just disproved theism. Great job!
Hey Squared, is this argument sound? P1: catholicism (and orthodoxy) uphold many specific doctrines that are largely neglected or denied by protestant thinkers P2: one such doctrine is purgatory P3: if purgatory is true, that changes how a christian should live his or her life (for example you should pray for the deceased so they go through purgatory faster) P4: if a doctrine that affects how to live a holy life is true, God would want you to know it is true, believe in it and act on it C1: if sufficient evidence can be brought forth to convince that purgatory is true, that's evidence for catholicism (or orthodoxy) being overall closer to the truth than protestantism.
How is that argument of yours supposed to be sound, when it's not even valid in the first place? The conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from those premises, at least I don't see, how that's supposed to be the case.
P1: Many protestants Ps neglect catholic's C's doctrines Ds. P2: One C's D is purgatory Pur. P3 If Pur, then something xyz concerning Ps and Cs. P4: If any D, then God bla bla bla. C: If some evidence E confirms Pur, then that's evidence for C over P, since Pur originates from C, I guess. This is, what it sounds like. It's not even close to a proper slipper slope argument: P1: If A, then B. P2: If B, then C. ... If Y, then Z. C: If A, then Z. (by A LOT OF hypothetical syllogisms)
How do you get that conclusion C of yours from those premises P1, P2, P3 and P4 of yours? Does C follow from those premises by *modus pones?* By *modus tolens?* By *hypothetical syllogisms?* Or by *what logical inference* exactly?!?
As a Catholic, this doesn’t work. A Protestant can hold to Purgatory being real. I think Inspiring Philosophy believes in a form of purgatory but he isn’t Catholic
@@DorperSystems I'm not saying it proves catholicism is true, just that it's evidence. Lewis believed in purgatory and praying for the dead too. I need to work on the argument to make these things more clear
![[Full Episode] MasterChef Junior Thailand มาสเตอร์เชฟ จูเนียร์ ประเทศไทย Season 3 Episode 6](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/CVUx09Rx0-M/mqdefault.jpg)
This is a reupload. The original had some editing issues.
6:06 Seems like there are still some editing issues left...
When are you and Joe, from Majesty of Reason, going to have a discussion? I would love to see that lol
Another banger, as usual.
This channel is awesome!! I would pay good money to have you (instead of almost all other apologists) debating prominent atheists.
I’m continuing to get a weird editing issue at around the 6:12 mark, but it’s not major
The rest of the sentence was supposed to be:
"...the evolutionary process that brought about this belief was not truth-tracking."
This is such a weird video. For starters, I've never heard a moral naturalist say that our moral knowledge comes from evolution. Why would you spin this as the only explanation available to the naturalist?
Furthermore, if you present a naturalist with an evolutionary debunking argument for their moral beliefs, and they find the argument convincing, surely the rational thing to conclude would be "oh, I guess my moral beliefs are false", and not "oh, I guess there must be a god then".
A lot of people say that our moral knowledge comes from evolution.
@@DorperSystems If moral knowledge comes from evolution, is moral knowledge then the effect of evolution or the cause for evolution?!?
@@DorperSystemsCan you give me some examples?
“Evolution of the gaps” moment
@@fatstrategistIt is less of a "evolution of the gaps" argument and a simplification of observations
We observe that certain traits arise in certain types of populations. Like empathy and such in social species. We also observe external and internal selection pressures for such behaviors. There even seem to be some genetic ties although this is still being researched. The last bit may or may not be found to be false but the first bit would describe selection pressures for behaviors.
Under most understandings of morality it is most simply put as a set of ideas of what you should or shouldn't do to be a good person. It is "good" to survive. And so it is "good" to be a good person.
In the same line of analysis tribalism also seems to frequently arise in social groups.
These are obviously very simplified descriptions but it isn't simply not knowing an answer and then concluding it must be evolution. Suggesting as such would be like flat earthers saying "gravity of the gaps" when people try to describe how water can stay on the surface of earth without flying off due to inertia.
As a noncognivist, I'm getting very lost trying to understand your perspective.
is there further material for this argument in particular?
PD:Great video
Great video! What is your opinion on CS Lewis's argument from moral knowledge, that he provides in part 1 of Mere Christianity?
On another note an appeal to intuition is, has never given met much confidence in the support of a premises or argument, since it would appear to me that in the passed some very unintuitive theories about the world has been accepted to be true, for example Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity and not Classical Physics. It would then seem that it is quite possible to for our intuitions about the world to be incorrect.
Maybe intuition can be saved by adopting a sort of Reliabilism about intuitions, in that they are assumed to be reliable in the absence of counter evidence. But this creates the problem of having an intuition, J, about some thing which is correct at some time t, before evidence E was discovered, and then false at time t', after E was discovered. The point being that since we don't know what evidence we will discover, it is most likely never a good idea to assume that J is true, but rather that it is thus far not yet been shown to be questionable. More we most likely cannot infer.
I guess my main problem with intuition is just that I find it challenging to ground. On what bases can we ground our intuition, it cannot be on any form of logic, because we base our logical axioms on what seems to be intuitive, and logic is assumed for all other disciplines.
We therefore have a problem at hand, in that do we trust our intuition or not. If we do, why? Since our intuition has been shown to be false in the past.
I guess we can make an argument for God based on intuitions, in that if our intuitions are true, then they are only true because of some intentional action that made it that our general thoughts about reality is correct or something, I'm not a philosopher by discipline.
Kind Regards
Three problems:
1. I think the probability of humans obtaining our particular set of moral intuitions via natural processes is a lot higher than you give it credit for. There are many reasons for tis, but the big thing you're missing is that our intuitions are not purely biological; they're in large part the result of centuries of engaging in reasoning about morality leading to a society that instills certain values.
2. By skipping over the part where you justify that our moral intuitions are in fact moral knowledge, you obfuscate a central mechanism of your argument. I suspect if you included that justification, your argument as a whole would become circular because that justification could be applied to any set of moral intuitions we happened to evolve.
3. If the probability of theism is near zero (or actually zero, as I think it is), no Bayesian formula is going to make it more probable than not.
Also a "fun" bonus problem that the Christian god would be grotesquely evil by the moral intuitions he supposedly gave us
good job
I think the existence of moral facts would be a problem for theism, given the history of our species. Given theism, we would expect that we always had this moral knowledge would have always been the same. But like regular knowledge, looking at our history, we see that this is false. Over time we learnt and our believes gradually approached more and more "correct" believes. One example is the golden rule. While it is a good aproach to "treat people how you would like to be treated", it is an improvement to "treat people how they would like to be treated" and recognizing that we all are different and might not like to be treated the exact same way. This can still be improved, but it illustrates the point that our moral believes were never the same as moral facts. They gradually approach them as our knowledge grows. This is perfectly compatible with naturalism, even expected, but it goes against what you outlined what we would expect of theism.
I would say that you can readily derive "treat people how they would like to be treated" from "treat people how you would like to be treated" - assuming that you would like to be treated the way that you personally would like to be treated.
Unless you take the rule too literally, where you end up with people saying "I would like to be given pizza with pineapple on it, so I must give other people pizza with pineapple on it".
@@MatthewFearnley i mean yeah its the extra step. First step would be empathy, to recognize that there are other people who desire to be treated "good" just as you are. This is the golden rule essentially. The second step i think is a bit mor nuanced, to recognize that peoples preferences are different, and what other people see as "good treatment" might be different than yours.
But yeah you can derive a better framework from the fundation of the golden rule, thing is, some people stay only at the first step.
@@Finfie Hmm, I think I would say realising the people's preferences are different would be the easier step.
Really living out any interpretation of the Golden Rule (even a literalistic "you must give people pineapple pizza whether or not they actually want it" interpretation) is the most challenging part.
But I think you've hit upon the main intentions of the Golden Rule. It's kind of a rephrase of "love your neighbour as you love yourself".
@@MatthewFearnley
// But I think you've hit upon the main intentions of the Golden Rule. It's kind of a rephrase of "love your neighbour as you love yourself".//
I mean, given that the golden rule is a bit older, i think it is more correct to say that "love your neighbour" is a rephrase of the golden rule ^^
//Really living out any interpretation of the Golden Rule (even a literalistic "you must give people pineapple pizza whether or not they actually want it" interpretation) is the most challenging part.//
I very much disagree. I remember the grandmother of a friend of mine being quite hurt, any time somebody prefered some food other than her home cooking. The way she talked, she did not seem to realise that other people like different food than her. I think this is much rarer now in younger gerneration, but i remember multiple times in my life, where especially older people could not fathom other people having particular preferences.
@@Finfie I’m ok with either being a rephrase of the other. But the Bible contains both and I don’t think we’ve moved beyond both of them.
I’m not entirely sure what you’re claiming about your friend’s grandmother?
It sounds like you’re saying she did a good job of fulfilling the principle of “only give people the food you like best”, but not necessarily “always give people food, and make sure it’s the kind you like best”.
And it sounds like you’re saying that she isn’t fulfilling the principle of “respect everyone’s food preferences the same way you would want people to respect yours”.
And more generally, you’re not really making any claims about how consistently she treated people outside the area of food.
Always treating people the exact same way you want to be treated might be slightly easier in some ways (more difficult in others) than treating them how they want to be treated. But either way it’s a challenge that no sinner has ever fulfilled perfectly. Most of us are a long way off.
Hm. The number of check marks on the diagonal is at least potentially infinite and IF it is actually infinite, then the number/cardinality of check marks is the same as the number/cardinality of "X" signs in that matrix of yours regarding moral theories M and beliefs or lack of beliefs there off B.
So if _"moral theory"_ is true, then how exactly is _"moral knowledge"_ impossible according to Naturalism, when the amount of scenarios with moral knowledge is at least potentially and maybe actually the same as the amount of scenarios without moral knowledge given Naturalism?!?
You know, that according to mathematics there are as many pairs of two intigers as natural numbers, since a *one-to-one* correspondence between those things can be established? Or do you not know that?!?
I think that a) very few naturalists accept all your premises, b) I actually *am* a naturalist who does (or close enough), and c) your argument does not actually go through.
To illustrate why, let’s look at another field: mathematics. I expect you agree that there are mathematical facts (there are irrational numbers), that they do not depend on our beliefs (there were irrational numbers even when Pythagorous claimed all numbers could be ratios, if that story is real), and we can know mathematical facts (I know there are irrational numbers). You might (or might not) argue that mathematical facts are only true based on our beliefs about axioms, or that we do not have intuitive knowledge of mathematical facts, but I think the first is false (the existence of irrational numbers follows from our axioms whether or not you believe those are good axioms; you can prove things in ZFC even if you think the Axiom of Choice is nonsense) and the second is irrelevant (people have trouble figuring out their moral intuitions all the time, and have moral disagreements; even if all such disagreements could be resolved by reasoned argument it is clearly not the case that it’s trivial to access all and only true moral facts from moral intuitions).
And yet, our mathematical beliefs match mathematical truths by construction. There is debate about what exactly “doing mathematics” (eg. invention or discovery) is and in what sense mathematical truths are true (or if they are), but I don’t think any mathematician believes this process requires God. I have heard some theologians argue that it does, but unlike with moral philosophy, I don’t think any mathematicians take that view seriously.
I think that mathematical knowledge and moral knowledge are disanalogous. Notice I raised two points in the video:
i) We would not need to evolve moral knowledge to function as a species.
ii) If the moral facts were different, our moral beliefs wouldn't be any different.
Do these points hold true regarding mathematical knowledge? Could one hold the following?
i') We would not need to evolve mathematical knowledge to function as a species.
ii') If the mathematical facts were different, our mathematical beliefs wouldn't be any different.
Well, it's hard to see how (i') could be true. Basic mathematical knowledge seems completely indispensable to a species' survival, since it's just an understanding of the nature of quantity. It's necessary for risk assessment (e.g. knowing that two lions is more dangerous than one lion), resource allocation, and future planning in general. I personally don't know what a species would look like that functioned without mathematical knowledge.
Analyzing (ii') is a lot harder, since the antecedent in the conditional is logically impossible. It's not clear whether or not it's a meaningful question to ask, "In a world where it was true that 2+2=5, would we believe that 2+2=5?" If that is a meaningful question, then it seems the answer would be yes. If in this world two apples and two apples made five apples, then creatures who understood this fact would have better resource allocation skills and better overall fitness.
So, while (i) and (ii) strike me as plausible, (i') and (ii') do not.
But this was a good point to raise. Thank you for bringing up this important parallel!
@@ApologeticsSquared Thinking about this more I think you might count me as thinking moral facts come from our beliefs about moral facts. I don’t think that, exactly, but I think something which you might consider relevantly similar. The details of my thoughts here don’t fit in a TH-cam comment and also make how I view the relationship between points (i) and (ii) complicated.
Setting that aside, (i') seems not *strictly* true but close enough for intelligent species. Whether or not you have thoughts about mathematics, you need something that causes your behave in a way that seeks out more food instead of less, and avoids the most predators.
As for (ii'), I’d make a distinction between the *rules of mathematics* and the which of those rules are relevant to the world. You can’t make a world where 2+2=5 when all of those are defined as we define them; you *can* make a world where when you put one pair of apples next to another pair of apples you have five apples. The inhabitants of that world might discover our concept of “addition” as a mathematical curiosity, the way we have “nimbers” which is a number system where 2+2=0; the actual rules of mathematics are the same. But they wouldn’t have an intuitive grasp of addition or teach it except in weird pure math classes; they’d teach whatever system of numbers and operations made sense in their world.
Analogously, your mischievous goblins might write stories involving altruism and do philosophy about morality, but that wouldn’t cause them to actually care about acting in a moral way; moral facts would still be true the way mathematical facts about nimbers are still true mathematics, but they wouldn’t care because, as you point out, morality does not act directly on the universe.
@@ApologeticsSquared If we/you are already at mathematics, then would you be so kind as to explain, according to which probability space (Ω, F, P) you are concluding, that P(no moral knowledge|Naturalism) >> P(moral knowledge| Naturalism), since according to the principle of indifference, which you are using so frequently, it rather should be the case, that P(no moral knowledge|Naturalism) ≈ P(moral knowledge| Naturalism), since the numbers/amount/cardinality of scenarios with moral knowledge is the same as the numbers/amount/cardinality of scenarios without knowledge given Naturalism according to that matrix of yours regarding moral theories M and the beliefs or lack there off B?
Or is this question irrelevant and insignificant for you, since also according to you given Naturalism then therefore mathematical knowledge is impossible, since our beliefs most probably will never align to mathematical facts?!?
So then yet again Evolution AND Naturalism is _"self defeating" somehow?!?_
Do you know, what actually is self defeating here?
Your *ignorance* about the last 300 years of rigorous mathematics, logic and reasoning, that is *self deafeating.*
Can you even quantify properly just one probability, that you have ever reasoned with that majestic _"logic"_ of yours?
According to mathematics, rigorous mathematics, probabilities are numbers between 0 and 1 inclusively - basically the first axiom for probability, and yet no current apologist or past one like *Alvin Plantinga* has ever be able to quantify one probability, which they have talked and _"reasond"_ about and with.
And I'm asking just one such quahtification.
If you are not using and talking about probability spaces, then why do you even talk and reason with such probabilities and why do you pretend to have a or THE proper understanding or knowledge of probabilities?!?
Or in other words, why are you sooo fallacious?!?
Why do you pretend to be something, which you are so obviously not, namely rational?!?
I guess, that's because of Evolution and because that's so Natural for you to be - to be irrational and to pretend to be rational.
That's simply your Nature, I guess.
@@ApologeticsSquaredWell, there is actually one person quentifying the probability of P(evidence|not atheism):
It's *Luke Barnes.*
But his argument for that kind and sort of evidence being evidence for theism above anything else is as good as Meadow's argument for Sally Clark's two dead children being evidence for her murdering them above anything else. Both are just ridiculous and out there rational minds.
bro im so lost
@ApologeticsSquared
While it is an interesting topic, there are several problematic areas.
Firstly, theism is simply the idea that a god(s) exists. Now, maybe you can stretch this definition to a more specific type like a creator god, which would mean some level of interaction. But I think you stretch it much too far when you use theism as if it entailed that the god has the knowledge of moral facts and has the capability to assure that these moral facts are known to a subset of creatures that exist. I say this because this argument isn't grounding morality in any god at the moment, just that moral facts exist.
Secondly, you did acknowledge that types of possible moralities would make it so that even with your built-in presuppositions about the traits of the theistic god, the god would not necessarily instill creatures with moral knowledge. But you didn't do a good job demonstrating why the "not" portion is so small on the probability space. You took the time showing the diagonal under naturalism. You could've done similarly with theism (under your definition).
To expand on the second point, it would seem to suffer a similar set of circumstances. Just like you already acknowledged it is possible in theism for no moral knowledge to be given. Next for theism the god(s) would need to have the exact characteristics such that they will choose to share the correct set of moral facts with beings in their creation and those beings will be humans. This would similarly create a diagonal that doesn't stretch the whole table. If you are unconvinced simply imagine a god who's chosen creature isn't human but any of the other organisms that exist or could possibly exist.
On the other side. I have a few issues with how you characterized morals when we accept that moral facts exist and assume we know them.
In your example of the goblins you depicted as being completely morally blind but believing that a set of behaviors were good and a set of behaviors bad. How would you consider this morally blind? What does it mean to have moral insights outside believing some behaviors because are good (assuming you are right about which are good and which aren't)? Now obviously simply the knowledge isn't enough unless that was all there is to be moral, but the knowledge is enough to be able to have insights on what you need to do to be moral.
To me this seems to be considering morality to be necessarily empathetic. Which I'm fine with. But the evolutionary pathway for empathy in social organisms is extremely strong. And if we assume that, then the probability of empathy and by extension, for humans to be able to ascertain moral facts would increase in naturalism. My main point here is that to determine whether or not something is likely in evolution, you would need to first identify what exactly is being talked about.
Similarly, you call knowing moral facts a good and valuable thing. And that it is important to living morally which is good. If I were to steelman it as best as I could, then it would instead say that knowledge of moral facts is helpful for being able to make an informed choice to behave morally or not.
This is primarily to address that regardless of the vehicle there would need to be sufficient justification for it to be likely that having an informed choice is a "good" thing. In the theist case this would mean that god(s) want and will make sure it happens. And in the naturalistic case it would mean that the trait is beneficial to survival (if they are saying morals arise from evolution).
Lastly, you note as a feature of the argument that moral facts don't have a causal impact on reality. I think this idea needs to be fleshed out a bit more. What does morality describe? I think it is extremely crucial to be aware that words are symbolic of ideas people hold. The fact of the wind doesn't cause me to call it the wind sure. But the fact the wind's existence has a causal impact on me and so will encourage me to call it something. If moral facts have no casual relation on reality, then in what way are they real outside the minds of people?
I'll use numbers. It seems that we created the concept of numbers for ourselves as a way to understand reality. The numbers themselves aren't real, but if you wanted to claim that the numbers do exist, then that would be because they are causal in that they map onto objects or sets of objects and have some effect (primarily if you assign the wrong number you'll get the wrong result). If moral facts were to exist, then they would similarly map onto behaviors and have some effect (feel free to define the effect as you see fit).
If I were to simplify all the above. You would first need to identify
What you mean by morals? What are moral facts? How can something be considered a fact if it has no casual relation to anything in reality (basically if I can in no way verify the veracity of a fact how can it be justified as one)?
Justify how the theism side doesn't have the same limiting cases of exact type of god to exact type of moral framework.
You are right on one side. Humans aren't truth machines which is something you would expect with naturalism. Our ability to discern true things has to be achieved through effort, by filtering out how much we rely on intuition and using when our intuitions and inferences from observations are tested by reality and demonstrated as accurate. Being sure to acknowledge when they don't.
Why even bother with these complicated mental gymnastics?
You can just say " X is fact and theism also says X is fact", it doesn't mean anything because youre just ad-hoc defining things into theism.
The Bible is riddled with barbaric, brutal morality, so you don't even buy your own argument either.
To me these kinds of videos just feel forced and fake. I doubt anyone is even slightly convinced by them.
How do you show up so quickly with your bad takes? It’s impressive
@@whatsinaname691Ah. There is our _"goblin"._
@@zsoltnagy5654 Goblin these nuts
And you are just ad-hoc defining your morality.
@DorperSystems The definition of morality is irrelevant to this argument, you can use any moral system and claim the same "theism claims X morality " statement, because it's just ad hoc adding something under theism.
'promosm' 😇
"P1. There are true moral facts. (This is intuitive.)"
Nope. It's actually unintuitive, since moral beliefs vary across time and cultures, which is not to be expected if they are objective facts.
"P2. Moral facts are not influenced by our beliefs."
This would be true by definition if there are, indeed, moral facts. But you failed to show that there are moral facts.
"P3. We know what the moral facts are."
Nope. Obviously, we do not. There is great disagreement about morality. If a large number of people believe that there are moral facts, but disagree on what those moral facts are, then you cannot conclude that we know what those moral facts are.
So all your premises are weak or counter-intuitive.
Your conclusion was "The probability of moral knowledge given theism is very high, therefore God exists."
Since you failed to demonstrate the existence of moral knowledge, and since it is unlikely that moral knowledge exists, you just disproved theism. Great job!
Hey Squared, is this argument sound?
P1: catholicism (and orthodoxy) uphold many specific doctrines that are largely neglected or denied by protestant thinkers
P2: one such doctrine is purgatory
P3: if purgatory is true, that changes how a christian should live his or her life (for example you should pray for the deceased so they go through purgatory faster)
P4: if a doctrine that affects how to live a holy life is true, God would want you to know it is true, believe in it and act on it
C1: if sufficient evidence can be brought forth to convince that purgatory is true, that's evidence for catholicism (or orthodoxy) being overall closer to the truth than protestantism.
How is that argument of yours supposed to be sound, when it's not even valid in the first place?
The conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from those premises, at least I don't see, how that's supposed to be the case.
P1: Many protestants Ps neglect catholic's C's doctrines Ds.
P2: One C's D is purgatory Pur.
P3 If Pur, then something xyz concerning Ps and Cs.
P4: If any D, then God bla bla bla.
C: If some evidence E confirms Pur, then that's evidence for C over P, since Pur originates from C, I guess.
This is, what it sounds like.
It's not even close to a proper slipper slope argument:
P1: If A, then B.
P2: If B, then C.
... If Y, then Z.
C: If A, then Z. (by A LOT OF hypothetical syllogisms)
How do you get that conclusion C of yours from those premises P1, P2, P3 and P4 of yours?
Does C follow from those premises by *modus pones?*
By *modus tolens?*
By *hypothetical syllogisms?*
Or by *what logical inference* exactly?!?
As a Catholic, this doesn’t work. A Protestant can hold to Purgatory being real. I think Inspiring Philosophy believes in a form of purgatory but he isn’t Catholic
@@DorperSystems I'm not saying it proves catholicism is true, just that it's evidence.
Lewis believed in purgatory and praying for the dead too.
I need to work on the argument to make these things more clear