It should be noted that the leading figure of the British idealist movement, F. H. Bradley, made this point more or less in the late 19th century. This seems to have been forgotten; and I can't help but notice here that the development of Analytic Philosophy is historically regarded as partly dependent on its rejection of or distancing from British Idealism. Bradley's _Principles of Logic_ on p. 95 states: "It is a very common and most ruinous superstition to suppose that analysis is no alteration, and that, whenever we distinguish, we have at once to do with divisible existence. It is an immense assumption to conclude, when a fact comes to us as a whole, that some parts of it may exist without any sort of regard for the rest. Such naïve assurance of the outward reality of all mental distinctions, such touching confidence in the crudest identity of thought and existence, is worthy of the school which so loudly appeals to the name of Experience."
What does this have to do with making knowledge basic? Bradley is here saying that analysis of facts necessarily fails because it is premised on purely mental distinctions. Not only is this obviously false, but even if it were true, it would have nothing to do with whether knowledge is basic.
As someone who has studied Williamson’s work for years, I can second this (obviously somewhat simplified and missing a lot of other stuff he talks about) explanation for whoever does not know the author. Awesome job with so little time! Only detail I may disagree with: as far as I know, the first edition of KaIT is from 2000, and it is commonly cited as Williamson (2000) in journals. OUP online does list it as published in 2002, but my copy of the book says 2000 as well.
I've always found the reaction to Gettier cases very overblown, in the sense that epistemologists tend to make it seem like a much bigger issue than it actually is. Both the no false lemma condition and the defeasibility condition seem like excellent solutions to Gettier cases to me, so basically you just have JTB with a very minor addition instead of a completely new epistemology. The knowledge first view is pretty absurd to me, but your video is well made.
I mean if knowledge requires something indefensible (deductive) that makes sense. But a lot of the axioms we use to get to these cases tends to be defensible still. Im honestly more interested in why you think this is an absurd framing, I think it’s rather coherent
0:55 that's actually just not true. The definition of knowledge as "δόξα αληθής κατά λόγου" (true belief / opinion according to an explanation/justification) is explicitly rejected at the end of Theaitetos, I don't know how you can refer to Plato for this, it's really something that only happened later (idk exactly when, but I can't see Plato himself adopting it as true)
Thanks for the challenge! I don't think we disagree here, just a difference in emphasis. We both agree something like the JTB account of knowledge can be found in the _Theatetus_ : true belief with an account ( _meta logou alêthê doxan_ ). As a contrast to Williamson's approach, I was just pointing to JTB as a long-standing favorite view "since the time of Plato". You, on the other hand, want to point out that JTB _was not Plato's actual view_ . Fair enough. But in contemporary analytic philosophy, the JTB account is called the Traditional Account of Knowledge (TAK), and it _does_ trace back to Plato's Theatetus, even if Plato did not endorse the view. Happy to have some philosophically informed viewers out there! I'm sure some will appreciate the extra detail your comment adds.
It should be noted that the leading figure of the British idealist movement, F. H. Bradley, made this point more or less in the late 19th century. This seems to have been forgotten; and I can't help but notice here that the development of Analytic Philosophy is historically regarded as partly dependent on its rejection of or distancing from British Idealism. Bradley's _Principles of Logic_ on p. 95 states:
"It is a very common and most ruinous superstition to suppose that analysis is no alteration, and that, whenever we distinguish, we have at once to do with divisible existence. It is an immense assumption to conclude, when a fact comes to us as a whole, that some parts of it may exist without any sort of regard for the rest. Such naïve assurance of the outward reality of all mental distinctions, such touching confidence in the crudest identity of thought and existence, is worthy of the school which so loudly appeals to the name of Experience."
The Bradley quotation is new to me. Thank you! Pinning your comment to the top.
What does this have to do with making knowledge basic?
Bradley is here saying that analysis of facts necessarily fails because it is premised on purely mental distinctions. Not only is this obviously false, but even if it were true, it would have nothing to do with whether knowledge is basic.
@@LetsGetLogicalHello. I'm new to this channel and new to these types of discussions. I would like to ask you some questions. Is it possible?
Hello. I'm new to this channel and new to these types of discussions. I would like to ask you some questions. Is it possible?
Ask away! My time is limited but I'll try to be helpful.
As someone who has studied Williamson’s work for years, I can second this (obviously somewhat simplified and missing a lot of other stuff he talks about) explanation for whoever does not know the author. Awesome job with so little time!
Only detail I may disagree with: as far as I know, the first edition of KaIT is from 2000, and it is commonly cited as Williamson (2000) in journals. OUP online does list it as published in 2002, but my copy of the book says 2000 as well.
Thanks for the detail about the publishing date. I probably pulled it from OUP like you guessed!
I've always found the reaction to Gettier cases very overblown, in the sense that epistemologists tend to make it seem like a much bigger issue than it actually is. Both the no false lemma condition and the defeasibility condition seem like excellent solutions to Gettier cases to me, so basically you just have JTB with a very minor addition instead of a completely new epistemology.
The knowledge first view is pretty absurd to me, but your video is well made.
I mean if knowledge requires something indefensible (deductive) that makes sense. But a lot of the axioms we use to get to these cases tends to be defensible still.
Im honestly more interested in why you think this is an absurd framing, I think it’s rather coherent
0:55 that's actually just not true. The definition of knowledge as "δόξα αληθής κατά λόγου" (true belief / opinion according to an explanation/justification) is explicitly rejected at the end of Theaitetos, I don't know how you can refer to Plato for this, it's really something that only happened later (idk exactly when, but I can't see Plato himself adopting it as true)
Thanks for the challenge! I don't think we disagree here, just a difference in emphasis.
We both agree something like the JTB account of knowledge can be found in the _Theatetus_ : true belief with an account ( _meta logou alêthê doxan_ ). As a contrast to Williamson's approach, I was just pointing to JTB as a long-standing favorite view "since the time of Plato". You, on the other hand, want to point out that JTB _was not Plato's actual view_ . Fair enough. But in contemporary analytic philosophy, the JTB account is called the Traditional Account of Knowledge (TAK), and it _does_ trace back to Plato's Theatetus, even if Plato did not endorse the view.
Happy to have some philosophically informed viewers out there! I'm sure some will appreciate the extra detail your comment adds.
@@LetsGetLogicalHello. I'm new to this channel and new to these types of discussions. I would like to ask you some questions. Is it possible?
Where is this guy... he should be recognized by the world
Unexpected Costanza!