Just began wading through After Virtue (for those who haven't read it: it's great). These talks are v helpful for getting my head around the main themes/issues!
Well, I really appropriate the feedback and the time you took give it. I'm really glad to have stumbled upon your lectures, they're some of the best I've found online.
There's quite a bit of discussion of that in the secondary literature -- and Mac addresses some of those concerns in After Virtue (and a number of other works). The short answer is that some perspectives are more adequate because they can provide a solid account not only of their own position, what sort of development it calls for, what practical reason looks like, etc. but also of where the other rival positions are less adequate, and why that is the case
We've been boosting sound on videos for over a year or so. For videos that are uploaded, until TH-cam adds that to their editing options, we're stuck with them "as is".
Well, that would seem to be how it would look, until you start reading more of Sartre's stuff, including this essay. He does himself stress consistency, and the responsibility imposed by "choosing for all human beings" -- now, if you pressed him why these values ought to apply, be respected, etc, he'd ultimately be forced to say "I choose those as good" and "if you don't see them as good, well. . . . " So, there's clearly a tension in his work -- but he also doesn't think just anything goes
@AdversusHaereses Well, nothing on the docket right now. I suppose it could be interesting to produce a series on phenomenological thinkers, in which I'd discuss Husserl, who frankly I find very dry. Heidegger I find much more interesting, and I could see producing some videos discussing a few of his key ideas. Max Scheler, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Gabriel Marcel -- those are phenomenologists I find even more interesting. Your query gives me an idea. . .
I really enjoyed the part of this lecture on narratives and on how it is implied in everyday life. Sometimes not in the correct manner if something can not be explained find a narrative for it. But I liked the narrative concept in terms of how ones stance changes over time there was this narrative originally and now a new narrative takes it place due to changes in one life.
Well. . . if you mean in the sense of entirely agreeing with, I have to admit the answer is no. But, if you mean agreeing with on many points, Yes, there's quite a few who I'm in a good bit of agreement with -- though there are some places I thought they're quite wrong: Aristotle, Epictetus, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, G.W.F. Hegel, Maurice Blondel, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Jacques Lacan. A bit of an eclectic list
@xOnimpulsex It's a bit of rough going at first, I'd say, because Sartre is more or less locating himself in relation to some other important philosophers, and using their terminology, mainly Husserl, Heidegger, Bergson, and Hegel -- he also coins a few new terms of his own, but there should be some explanation of them in the introduction for you. The book itself is indeed pretty great -- my favorite as an undergrad
Well, what Chesterton is doing there -- and I'm a big fan of his, btw -- is not what you'd want to take as an adequate conception of the will as such -- Augustine and Anselm raise similar problems at key points, when they're trying to determine how the will could be inconsistent with itself (after all, the will ought to simply be able to will itself, right? Well. . . actually not) Again, Sartre doesn't actually say simply "anything goes", when one reads the rest of the essay or his works
@AdversusHaereses I'd say, if by "find[ing] their ideas good", you mean as a whole, as a system, I too don't find them good. If by it, you mean something more like thinking they have some good ideas, which can be extricated from their larger philosophical commitments, then I think there's quite a lot to learn from Heidegger, perhaps less from Husserl
I couldn't help but recall a passage from Chesterton's Orthodoxy, "...you cannot praise an action because it shows will; for to say that is merely to say that it is an action. By this praise of will you cannot really choose one course as better than another. And yet choosing one course as better than another is the very definition of the will you are praising. The worship of will is the negation of will. To admire mere choice is to refuse to choose." I wonder how Sartre might respond.
I have a question. I want to know how MacIntyre escapes a kind of relativism given the importance he gives to the historical context of moral concepts? If moral concepts are dependent on the practices, etc., of social life, how do we determine which practices are right and wrong?
Really enjoyed the lectures i've watch on you channel. Is there a plan to do any René Descartes and his work, Meditation on First Philosophy or Discourse on Method, or both.
Definitely an interesting list. A couple Catholic philosophers in there, I see. But Whitehead, Peirce, Hartshorne don't make the list? Might be too technical sort of question for the venue. Actualities and all that.
I am interested in how we should look at the Sartrian 'choosing' here. Obviously, we do not condone all of our choices. We can sometimes break our low-fat diet when a friend offers us a nice ice cream. Some of our actions and attitudes do not get the same respect as other actions and attitudes. Recognizing the multitude of forces that want to have a say within our embodiment, would certain choices not be considered bugs rather than features of our idealized self? Thank you.
@@GregoryBSadler I see - putting it in that way would not be in the line of his project. Let me try again. We might have freedom (however limited), but is it not the case that we do not respect or identify with all 'kinds' of decisions we take and all 'methods' of decision making' (e.g. impulsive or when we are enraged). We might be addicted to smoking, but at the same time not respect or identify with that side of ourselves. Do we then 'choose' to smoke everytime we smoke, such that we assert it as a higher value than other courses of action in our hierarchy. of values Or does such and similar acts of 'choosing' not assert our values? If choosing is used here to talk about all choices we make, does Sartre not erroneously describe us as a unified whole?
@@GregoryBSadler I am not assuming that. My strong intuition is that the kinds of choices/decisions we make have different statuses to us - we respect some and despise others, we identify with some and describe others almost as external (e.g. "I was so enraged I did not know what happened to me"). Whenever we make such decisions we do not respect or identify with, will these acts/decisions/choices still fall into the same category of ''choosing'' as described in this quote - you think - according to Sartre?
@@Fatihkilic075 If you're not assuming that, the problem goes away. People can make choices they regret. People can be conflicted. People can be a mess. Sartre knows that. You might want to actually take a look at the analyses he provides in his writings. That'll help clear that us as well
Well, I like Pierce, but I think he can be awfully naive in a kind of Enlightenment-derived kind of way, as you see, for example, in the "Fixation of Belief" essay. Whitehead and Hartshorne I just never really got into enough to be able to appreciate and evaluate well
@xOnimpulsex Well, I'd say with Sartre, its rather ontology driving ethics -- he never did formulate anything he felt to be a successful articulation of Existentialist Ethics -- that fell to Simone de Beauvoir, in the Ethics of Ambiguity
As an emotivist myself, I believe that there is no such thing as an objective right and wrong, that these are constructs drawn from a structural context which are representative of the power existent within these contexts, and that attempting to judge others in terms of right and wrong puts them in a box and totalises them as Other - the emphasis placed by virtue ethics on character makes no sense to me, for I do not believe that there is such a thing as the continuity of the self. However, since one appears to one's consciousness as a continuous self, and it can never be known whether or not continuous selfhood is existent or merely apparent, I consider it necessary for there to be a grounding for one's own - not others' - action. Thus, I ground my action to restrain a murderer in the empathy I feel for the victim, not because there is a 'wrong' that the murderer is committing, and to not help the victim would be in bad faith. At the end of the day, one must act, one way or the other, and empathy is my recourse because it is the ground for action with the least risk of totalisation; it involves making an effort to understand the Other in a way which doesn't judge them, but respects them as an agent capable of making their own choices which are as morally valid as one's own. To pass moral judgement with any degree of responsibility would require full knowledge of all the related causes, which is something nobody can have.
Gregory B. Sadler I'm going over my notes from this video again, and I don't know how fair it is to call emotivism 'just following your desires'. That sounds more like a specific moral theory like egoism rather than being a way of looking at morality, which emotivism - or rather, non-cognitivism - is. One can attempt (and I do) to act in a good way/a justifiable way - and indeed, the worst crime that one can perpetuate against someone is to not play devil's advocate on their behalf - but as a tool which gives perspective, non-cognitivism is priceless to ethics, just like scepticism is priceless to philosophy in general. Emotivists don't say 'Hey, follow your desires,' but rather, 'Your desires are what inform your moral choices - moral discourse is merely a defence/justification of beliefs you already hold/social norms you're a part of'. I'm leaving this here not to be pernicious or to start an argument, mind you, but I thought a different perspective on emotivism might be useful for anybody reading. Thanks for the video.
I think you probably don't want to take single quotes from a lecture session, in a class for non-majors, as the very last word on what counts as a rigorous portrayal of emotivism. That said -- you probably want to read the MacIntyre discussions on this. Some emotivists do say: "hey follow your desires" You know, if your goal is really to offer a different perspective on the topic for anyone reading. . . I'd suggest you shoot a video lecture of your own, and post it as a response
Gregory B. Sadler "I think you probably don't want to take single quotes from a lecture session, in a class for non-majors, as the very last word on what counts as a rigorous portrayal of emotivism." I agree fully, it's just that that line struck me in particular, because I've had conversations with emotivists who do hold that position (like you say), and to my mind they themselves do an injustice to a storied body of theory. Too often, emotivism and relativism are used as 'ways out' of acting responsibly, and MacIntyre is right on this point. I came to emotivism through Hume, and Hume in ECHU does mention the fact that just because certain knowledge is unattainable, it doesn't mean that one shouldn't strive for it. I take the same view when it comes to morality - even though one knows there is no objective right thing to do, one should still strive towards one. But I'm rambling again. Frankly, I'd like to, but I don't have the confidence in myself or what I can offer to do a video lecture, certainly not to do something of the quality that your lectures are. I just thought I'd comment by way of giving something back to the community that you have created through your dedication and effort, and I'm sorry if I seem arrogant or unappreciative in any way - that's not my intention.
I liked your hypothetical question about going back in time to kill Hitler (prior to his rise). It might sink the knife deeper and twist it a bit if you phrase it as "go back in time and kill Hitler as a baby" or "kill Hitler's parents before he is born," or the like. Also, though utilitarianism is usually distinguished from emotivism, it increasingly seems to me that utilitarianism is basically emotivism writ large, or aggregated. Utilitarianism (classical) conflates happiness, pleasure, right and good. But for the utilitarian, that which is good is not merely what brings me happiness (individual emotivism), but what brings happiness to the greatest number of people, which just social or collective emotivism. No?
Those Hitler-spin-offs get prettttty dark! No, Utilitarianism isn't a kind of emotivism writ large. It thinks moral judgements are more than mere expressions of preference -- they are genuinely meaningful for Bentham or Mill. Keep in mind that emotivism is not the same thing as hedonism
@@GregoryBSadler hahahah, maybe a bit off, with the date, for sure. Really good vids btw. Great thing you are doing here - to share. Makes a massive difference and a good gateway to further reading.
@gbisadler Oh by no means do I find their ideas good! I just think its interesting to learn them. Heidegger is someone who I still haven't made my mind up much of, but Husserl I tend to have an open opposition to his ideas. But I still nevertheless find them interesting.
Perhaps I got the definition of emotivism wrong. My point was that I tend at least at the first glance to agree with the claim, that ethical decisions are based on how one feels towards something, however I think that in my emotivist attitude i think utilitarianism is the true ethics. I mean ethics are just an invention not eternal. And that it is just a Meta view of ethics. Perhaps I should watch more of your stuff
It seems that Sartre ultimately reduces the morality of a choice to a mere tautological reiteration of what is chosen. He can't even say "the choice is good because it is chosen," since that would bar the possibility of bad choices, thus rendering claims about the "goodness" of choice incoherent.
I don't get how an atheist (which I am) could justify anything but emotivism. It seems like even holding a utilitarian ethic is really just one person's ethic. Also I find it interesting that the only rebuttal to relativism was saying if someone believes it then you will initiate force over them. No offence but this seems like a weak argument.
Yeah. . . the only response to relativism isn't to threaten force against them. There's plenty of others, including pointing out the lack of consistency, pointing out how self-serving it often turns out to be in practice. . . and seriously, you weren't able to hear a classic joke about relativism as a joke? Now, on to the more serious issue. There's no reason an atheist can't endorse all sorts of other moral theories -- and in fact, many of them do. Utilitarianism is - at least if you look at the classic texts in which it is set out (Bentham, Mill, etc.) - pretty far from just "one person's ethic". I've actually got some Core Concept videos you might find useful, along with reading the key texts, discussing how Utilitarians view other moral theories, and the arguments they provide for it undergirding other moral theories. (Btw, I'm not a Utilitarian)
The original Utilitarian, Mill, was himself an atheist. Well, that's an oversimplification. He was a cultural christian but his own belief moved towards deism. His belief was described (by others) as 'an atheism of a nonatheistic nature'.
Just began wading through After Virtue (for those who haven't read it: it's great). These talks are v helpful for getting my head around the main themes/issues!
Glad they’re useful for you
Well, I really appropriate the feedback and the time you took give it. I'm really glad to have stumbled upon your lectures, they're some of the best I've found online.
There's quite a bit of discussion of that in the secondary literature -- and Mac addresses some of those concerns in After Virtue (and a number of other works).
The short answer is that some perspectives are more adequate because they can provide a solid account not only of their own position, what sort of development it calls for, what practical reason looks like, etc. but also of where the other rival positions are less adequate, and why that is the case
We've been boosting sound on videos for over a year or so. For videos that are uploaded, until TH-cam adds that to their editing options, we're stuck with them "as is".
Well, that would seem to be how it would look, until you start reading more of Sartre's stuff, including this essay.
He does himself stress consistency, and the responsibility imposed by "choosing for all human beings" -- now, if you pressed him why these values ought to apply, be respected, etc, he'd ultimately be forced to say "I choose those as good" and "if you don't see them as good, well. . . . "
So, there's clearly a tension in his work -- but he also doesn't think just anything goes
@AdversusHaereses Well, nothing on the docket right now. I suppose it could be interesting to produce a series on phenomenological thinkers, in which I'd discuss Husserl, who frankly I find very dry. Heidegger I find much more interesting, and I could see producing some videos discussing a few of his key ideas. Max Scheler, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Gabriel Marcel -- those are phenomenologists I find even more interesting.
Your query gives me an idea. . .
I really enjoyed the part of this lecture on narratives and on how it is implied in everyday life.
Sometimes not in the correct manner if something can not be explained find a narrative for it.
But I liked the narrative concept in terms of how ones stance changes over time there was this narrative originally and now a new narrative takes it place due to changes in one life.
Great over view of ethics.
Thanks! Glad it was useful for you
Yep, it's pretty much irreplaceable as an approach if we want to make sense out of moral theory as it fits into actual lives
Well. . . if you mean in the sense of entirely agreeing with, I have to admit the answer is no.
But, if you mean agreeing with on many points, Yes, there's quite a few who I'm in a good bit of agreement with -- though there are some places I thought they're quite wrong: Aristotle, Epictetus, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, G.W.F. Hegel, Maurice Blondel, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Jacques Lacan.
A bit of an eclectic list
@xOnimpulsex It's a bit of rough going at first, I'd say, because Sartre is more or less locating himself in relation to some other important philosophers, and using their terminology, mainly Husserl, Heidegger, Bergson, and Hegel -- he also coins a few new terms of his own, but there should be some explanation of them in the introduction for you. The book itself is indeed pretty great -- my favorite as an undergrad
Well, what Chesterton is doing there -- and I'm a big fan of his, btw -- is not what you'd want to take as an adequate conception of the will as such -- Augustine and Anselm raise similar problems at key points, when they're trying to determine how the will could be inconsistent with itself (after all, the will ought to simply be able to will itself, right? Well. . . actually not)
Again, Sartre doesn't actually say simply "anything goes", when one reads the rest of the essay or his works
@AdversusHaereses I'd say, if by "find[ing] their ideas good", you mean as a whole, as a system, I too don't find them good. If by it, you mean something more like thinking they have some good ideas, which can be extricated from their larger philosophical commitments, then I think there's quite a lot to learn from Heidegger, perhaps less from Husserl
I couldn't help but recall a passage from Chesterton's Orthodoxy, "...you cannot praise an action because it shows will; for to say that is merely to say that it is an action. By this praise of will you cannot really choose one course as better than another. And yet choosing one course as better than another is the very definition of the will you are praising. The worship of will is the negation of will. To admire mere choice is to refuse to choose."
I wonder how Sartre might respond.
I have a question. I want to know how MacIntyre escapes a kind of relativism given the importance he gives to the historical context of moral concepts? If moral concepts are dependent on the practices, etc., of social life, how do we determine which practices are right and wrong?
If you go to the channel, and look in playlists, you'll find a Descartes playlist
@gbisadler Do you have any lecture on Husserl and Heidegger coming soon?
Really enjoyed the lectures i've watch on you channel. Is there a plan to do any René Descartes and his work, Meditation on First Philosophy or Discourse on Method, or both.
Definitely an interesting list. A couple Catholic philosophers in there, I see. But Whitehead, Peirce, Hartshorne don't make the list? Might be too technical sort of question for the venue. Actualities and all that.
I am interested in how we should look at the Sartrian 'choosing' here. Obviously, we do not condone all of our choices. We can sometimes break our low-fat diet when a friend offers us a nice ice cream. Some of our actions and attitudes do not get the same respect as other actions and attitudes. Recognizing the multitude of forces that want to have a say within our embodiment, would certain choices not be considered bugs rather than features of our idealized self? Thank you.
I'm not sure bugs and features is the model you want to make sense of choices, since both of those operate without freedom
@@GregoryBSadler I see - putting it in that way would not be in the line of his project. Let me try again. We might have freedom (however limited), but is it not the case that we do not respect or identify with all 'kinds' of decisions we take and all 'methods' of decision making' (e.g. impulsive or when we are enraged). We might be addicted to smoking, but at the same time not respect or identify with that side of ourselves. Do we then 'choose' to smoke everytime we smoke, such that we assert it as a higher value than other courses of action in our hierarchy. of values Or does such and similar acts of 'choosing' not assert our values? If choosing is used here to talk about all choices we make, does Sartre not erroneously describe us as a unified whole?
Fatih Kilic Why assume that Sartre thinks we’re a unified whole?
@@GregoryBSadler I am not assuming that. My strong intuition is that the kinds of choices/decisions we make have different statuses to us - we respect some and despise others, we identify with some and describe others almost as external (e.g. "I was so enraged I did not know what happened to me"). Whenever we make such decisions we do not respect or identify with, will these acts/decisions/choices still fall into the same category of ''choosing'' as described in this quote - you think - according to Sartre?
@@Fatihkilic075 If you're not assuming that, the problem goes away. People can make choices they regret. People can be conflicted. People can be a mess. Sartre knows that.
You might want to actually take a look at the analyses he provides in his writings. That'll help clear that us as well
Are there any thinkers whose ideas you do find good as a whole?
Well, I like Pierce, but I think he can be awfully naive in a kind of Enlightenment-derived kind of way, as you see, for example, in the "Fixation of Belief" essay.
Whitehead and Hartshorne I just never really got into enough to be able to appreciate and evaluate well
@xOnimpulsex Well, I'd say with Sartre, its rather ontology driving ethics -- he never did formulate anything he felt to be a successful articulation of Existentialist Ethics -- that fell to Simone de Beauvoir, in the Ethics of Ambiguity
As an emotivist myself, I believe that there is no such thing as an objective right and wrong, that these are constructs drawn from a structural context which are representative of the power existent within these contexts, and that attempting to judge others in terms of right and wrong puts them in a box and totalises them as Other - the emphasis placed by virtue ethics on character makes no sense to me, for I do not believe that there is such a thing as the continuity of the self. However, since one appears to one's consciousness as a continuous self, and it can never be known whether or not continuous selfhood is existent or merely apparent, I consider it necessary for there to be a grounding for one's own - not others' - action. Thus, I ground my action to restrain a murderer in the empathy I feel for the victim, not because there is a 'wrong' that the murderer is committing, and to not help the victim would be in bad faith.
At the end of the day, one must act, one way or the other, and empathy is my recourse because it is the ground for action with the least risk of totalisation; it involves making an effort to understand the Other in a way which doesn't judge them, but respects them as an agent capable of making their own choices which are as morally valid as one's own. To pass moral judgement with any degree of responsibility would require full knowledge of all the related causes, which is something nobody can have.
Well, then, this probably isn't for you
Gregory B. Sadler
On the contrary, there is some worth in every perspective, and you do a very good job of presenting the worth in this perspective.
Gregory B. Sadler I'm going over my notes from this video again, and I don't know how fair it is to call emotivism 'just following your desires'. That sounds more like a specific moral theory like egoism rather than being a way of looking at morality, which emotivism - or rather, non-cognitivism - is. One can attempt (and I do) to act in a good way/a justifiable way - and indeed, the worst crime that one can perpetuate against someone is to not play devil's advocate on their behalf - but as a tool which gives perspective, non-cognitivism is priceless to ethics, just like scepticism is priceless to philosophy in general. Emotivists don't say 'Hey, follow your desires,' but rather, 'Your desires are what inform your moral choices - moral discourse is merely a defence/justification of beliefs you already hold/social norms you're a part of'. I'm leaving this here not to be pernicious or to start an argument, mind you, but I thought a different perspective on emotivism might be useful for anybody reading. Thanks for the video.
I think you probably don't want to take single quotes from a lecture session, in a class for non-majors, as the very last word on what counts as a rigorous portrayal of emotivism.
That said -- you probably want to read the MacIntyre discussions on this. Some emotivists do say: "hey follow your desires"
You know, if your goal is really to offer a different perspective on the topic for anyone reading. . . I'd suggest you shoot a video lecture of your own, and post it as a response
Gregory B. Sadler "I think you probably don't want to take single quotes from a lecture session, in a class for non-majors, as the very last word on what counts as a rigorous portrayal of emotivism." I agree fully, it's just that that line struck me in particular, because I've had conversations with emotivists who do hold that position (like you say), and to my mind they themselves do an injustice to a storied body of theory. Too often, emotivism and relativism are used as 'ways out' of acting responsibly, and MacIntyre is right on this point. I came to emotivism through Hume, and Hume in ECHU does mention the fact that just because certain knowledge is unattainable, it doesn't mean that one shouldn't strive for it. I take the same view when it comes to morality - even though one knows there is no objective right thing to do, one should still strive towards one. But I'm rambling again.
Frankly, I'd like to, but I don't have the confidence in myself or what I can offer to do a video lecture, certainly not to do something of the quality that your lectures are. I just thought I'd comment by way of giving something back to the community that you have created through your dedication and effort, and I'm sorry if I seem arrogant or unappreciative in any way - that's not my intention.
I liked your hypothetical question about going back in time to kill Hitler (prior to his rise). It might sink the knife deeper and twist it a bit if you phrase it as "go back in time and kill Hitler as a baby" or "kill Hitler's parents before he is born," or the like.
Also, though utilitarianism is usually distinguished from emotivism, it increasingly seems to me that utilitarianism is basically emotivism writ large, or aggregated. Utilitarianism (classical) conflates happiness, pleasure, right and good. But for the utilitarian, that which is good is not merely what brings me happiness (individual emotivism), but what brings happiness to the greatest number of people, which just social or collective emotivism. No?
Those Hitler-spin-offs get prettttty dark!
No, Utilitarianism isn't a kind of emotivism writ large. It thinks moral judgements are more than mere expressions of preference -- they are genuinely meaningful for Bentham or Mill. Keep in mind that emotivism is not the same thing as hedonism
Great video. Apart from the first recorded case of covid-19 coughing in the class.
Yeah. . . what's the date?
@@GregoryBSadler hahahah, maybe a bit off, with the date, for sure. Really good vids btw. Great thing you are doing here - to share. Makes a massive difference and a good gateway to further reading.
@@jonathanmoore5619 Glad you enjoy the videos
i'd rather watch your videos instead of attending my philosophy classes. :D
@gbisadler Oh by no means do I find their ideas good! I just think its interesting to learn them. Heidegger is someone who I still haven't made my mind up much of, but Husserl I tend to have an open opposition to his ideas. But I still nevertheless find them interesting.
But what if emotism often is the pretext of utilitarianism, because people want to be good, or even kantian ethics
No idea what you're saying here
Perhaps I got the definition of emotivism wrong. My point was that I tend at least at the first glance to agree with the claim, that ethical decisions are based on how one feels towards something, however I think that in my emotivist attitude i think utilitarianism is the true ethics. I mean ethics are just an invention not eternal. And that it is just a Meta view of ethics. Perhaps I should watch more of your stuff
Ideally, you'd get something out of doing both
It seems that Sartre ultimately reduces the morality of a choice to a mere tautological reiteration of what is chosen. He can't even say "the choice is good because it is chosen," since that would bar the possibility of bad choices, thus rendering claims about the "goodness" of choice incoherent.
Wait what are you then? neither deontologist nor utilitarian, I am kind of the minimizing pain utilitarian.
I am a virtue ethicist myself
Gregory B. Sadler I am not sure what that means but I will learn
I don't get how an atheist (which I am) could justify anything but emotivism. It seems like even holding a utilitarian ethic is really just one person's ethic. Also I find it interesting that the only rebuttal to relativism was saying if someone believes it then you will initiate force over them. No offence but this seems like a weak argument.
Yeah. . . the only response to relativism isn't to threaten force against them. There's plenty of others, including pointing out the lack of consistency, pointing out how self-serving it often turns out to be in practice. . . and seriously, you weren't able to hear a classic joke about relativism as a joke?
Now, on to the more serious issue. There's no reason an atheist can't endorse all sorts of other moral theories -- and in fact, many of them do. Utilitarianism is - at least if you look at the classic texts in which it is set out (Bentham, Mill, etc.) - pretty far from just "one person's ethic". I've actually got some Core Concept videos you might find useful, along with reading the key texts, discussing how Utilitarians view other moral theories, and the arguments they provide for it undergirding other moral theories.
(Btw, I'm not a Utilitarian)
If it is just a joke then fair enough. I will have to watch you're videos on utilitarianism.
Better yet, watch them in conjunction with reading those classic Utilitarian texts. Videos aren't meant to substitute entirely for reading
Yes that's why I haven't gotten to them yet. I am reading about Seneca right now.
The original Utilitarian, Mill, was himself an atheist. Well, that's an oversimplification. He was a cultural christian but his own belief moved towards deism. His belief was described (by others) as 'an atheism of a nonatheistic nature'.