I think your best critique is that the number of items must be finite in order to support a claim. Otherwise yes, the observation of a red fly does support the claim "all ravens are black."
This isn't really a paradox; the trouble comes in a conflation between "confirms that" and "serves as evidence that". Finding a red ant actually *is* evidence that all ravens are black, because if you were to examine everything that isn't black and not find any ravens, that would prove that all ravens are black.
He kind of addresses that at 5:32, but his explanation of why this shouldn't be the case at 6:17 doesn't make much sense to me. Why do they have to be "equally confirmed" like he says?
A sequel to this video would be cool. I'd like to see a video on Nelson Goodman's "Grue" predicate and his so-called, "New Problem of Induction." The set-up is similar to Hempel's Raven Paradox. Great vid, by the way!
+Jose Vera Cruz I already have one (th-cam.com/video/kGE2Ig2dvaE/w-d-xo.html) that I made around the beginning of the channel. Thanks for watching! I'm glad you enjoy.
9:35 I don't see the meaning of this sentence; how it is the same as the previous example with objects moving at the speed of light and abstract ideas. 1:57 Doesn't this imply a distinction between 'confirmation' and 'gradual confidence in a belief with each extra piece of evidence' ? The latter is of Bayesian nature while the first means that finding red flies and crocodiles absolutely 'confirm' that all ravens are black: if this distinction is considered, which of the two are you intellectually criticizing? At the time-stamp of this (1:57) you have in mind the latter but later in the video you talk as if you argue against the former.
+Deconverted Man I have a couple on the original Problem of Induction (th-cam.com/video/sd8cxXfPJU4/w-d-xo.html) and the New Riddle of Induction (th-cam.com/video/kGE2Ig2dvaE/w-d-xo.html).
Carneades.org Maybe you want to answer the question I got for OMS? :D - "Can you prove that induction is reliable?" docs.google.com/document/d/1BUjpiF7ZFKTdBLl-fmfNANzo54y_nB2WCN0nU0ujdu8/edit I guess the theist was thinking that those pesky atheists can't answer this because... ??? Will watch vids ^_^
Asking at the end 'what do you think?' ?, man you read me like a book lol Well the way I look at it, is to essentially say that to confirm that all ravens are black, you would need to either have the set of all ravens and be able to confirm that each of them is black directly, or by proving it indirectly somehow (eg from some sort of biological process, the ravens feathers have a certain amount of pigment in them), or you could do the opposite and check every object to see that if its not black, that it's also not a raven. Weirdly while writing this out, I came to the realisation that the point I just made about checking every object has a subtlety with it. Initially was thinking you just have to check that each object is both not black and not a raven, but I now suppose that what you'd actually need to check is that IF each object is not black, THEN it is not a raven. Note that instead of confirming a conjunction, you're confirming a conditional. so (x)(Rx -> Bx) is materially equivalent to (x)(~Bx -> ~Rx) but not to (x)(~Bx ^ ~Rx) So now I would be assigning my hypothetical self to the immense task of checking ~By -> ~Ry for every object y, so you just have to check By v ~Ry in each case, which could be done in the case where you have knowledge of whether Ry or By are true. For me the unpleasant part is when you realise that you have to check every object, which is not only impossible in practice, but possibly impossible in principle too, I'm not sure now what constitutes an object, this seems to be touching on issues faced by set theory which I don't understand so well yet hehe, anyway great video bro ty if you read this whole thing
So I did a poor job on the previous post. I steal minute to write what I post for these videos and find them inadequate later when I re-read them. So…. The argument presented in the video was that the proposition, “all non-black things are not ravens” is the logical equivalent of “all ravens are black and thus, all objects observed not black support the hypothesis that all ravens are black. But that is not the case. That “all non-black things are not ravens” is “not” the logical equivalent of “all ravens are black”, but rather a proposition, wholly contingent upon it. Consider the argument proposed rather as “If all ravens are black then all non-black objects are not ravens”. By the same logic to which the author of this video and the overall argument appealed, that all non-black things are not ravens is simply the logical conclusion/extension of all ravens are black. The latter proposition is necessarily logically so by the assumption of the first. Therefore, non-black things do not prove the hypothesis that all ravens are black. The problem here as in “all” supposed paradoxes is that the language is manipulated to formulate them and the strictures which allow it to be at all are ignored where convenient. This is not a paradox any more than Russell’s paradox or Hilbert’s hotel. It’s all sophistry.
but if we define ravens as black birds then we have no problem am i right? the problem is that we assume that all ravens color is black but maybe is red blue etc right?
To be honest, I understand the logic, but don't get how it is a paradox. All concrete objects are a pineapple, so I am going to look at this lamp. Is it a pinaple? No. Hence it must not be a concrete object. But I can then test if it is a concrete object, which it is. That forces me to expand the set because I cannot define it to be anything other than a concrete object. With ravens you simply make a new set, but concrete objects already has its own larger sets. So although defining something as a concrete object is the raven paradox expanded, it is a mutually shared set. Which is kinda the saying "reality is the parts of our imagination we agree upon". So all seems in order.... What did I miss?
Are the statements "All ravens are black." and "All objects are either not ravens or black." really logically equivalent? I would rather say, that "All ravens are black." is logically following from "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black." by conjunction elimination. If "All ravens are black." would really be logically equivalent to "All objects are either not ravens or black." and we would simultaneously accept "All ravens are black." as a logical result from "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black.", then that would imply "Some objects are ravens and -all ravens are black- all objects are either not ravens or black." So the finding of a red fly might imply and confirm "All ravens are black." and "All objects are either not ravens or black.", but it doesn't necessarily confirm "Some objects are ravens and all objects are either not ravens or black." since a finding of at least one object as raven is necessary to confirm "Some objects are ravens and all objects are either not ravens or black." specifically to confirm its part "Some objects are ravens.". A finding of a red fly on its own will neither necessarily nor sufficiently confirm the crucial part "Some objects are ravens." since it still might be the case by sololy finding a red fly, that Not-"Some objects are ravens.", but all objects are not ravens. So in the case of finding a red fly it wouldn't make sense to say, that "All ravens are black." since a red fly is a fly and not a raven and it might be the case, that there are no ravens, which certainly wouldn't confirm, that "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black.". On the other hand, finding a red fly and a black raven would confirm, that "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black." and "All ravens are black.".
“ Are the statements "All ravens are black." and "All objects are either not ravens or black." really logically equivalent?”” He never said these two statements are equivalent he said that the statement “all ravens are black” is equivalent to the statement “all things that aren’t black aren’t ravens” or to put it another way “all objects that aren’t black aren’t a raven.” I hope that clears some things up, although I may have missed your point.
@@duder6387 That's not a good point. My claim is that the statement "All ravens are black."/∀x(Rx>Bx) is just a short term for "Some (existing) objects are ravens and all ravens are black."/∃x(Rx)&∀x(Rx>Bx). If so, then an existing red fly/∃x[~Bx&(~Rx)] might confirm the statement ∀x(~Bx>~Rx) and might also confirm the logically equivalent statement ∀x(Rx>Bx). But that existing red fly/∃x[~Bx&(~Rx)] will never confirm the statement ∃x(Rx)&∀x(Rx>Bx), from which the statement ∀x(Rx>Bx) might have originated (in my opinion actually does originate), simply because the existence of a red fly/∃x[~Bx&(~Rx)] doesn't confirm the existence of any or some ravens/∃x(Rx).
@@duder6387 I just have found this recently ( *"Existential fallacy"* en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_fallacy ) and I remembered this comment of mine. Hopefully, that also gives a good explanation, what I have meant by my original comment and reply.
@@zsoltnagy5654 I don't see your point I understand that finding a bug wouldn't confirm the claim that there exist some raven and all ravens are black, but it still confirms that all ravens are black and any logically equivalent claims
@@malteeaser101 I just think, that whoever stutters the term _"All ravens are black."_ also simultaneously and indirectly postulates with that term, that some ravens actually exist in the first place, such that all of them are or could be black. It's like me asking you, where you have hidden the dead body of the person, which you have previously murdered. Sure, finding a dead bug confirms, that _"All ravens are black"_ as it confirmes, that _"There was a dead body somewhere, which you have previously killed."._ But that dead bug doesn't at all confirm the implied postulation of *"there being some ravens"* or *"Specificially and particularly that bug being killed or murdered by specificially and particularly by you".* Or do you think, that finding a dead bug will confirm the hypothesis, that _"There was a dead body somewhere, which you, Controversy Owl, have previously killed."?_ I don't think so. But hey, if you want to be so simple minded with these terms, then please don't wonder about someday waking up behind bars for no good reason or at least no better of a reason than finding a dead bug.
I don't see the paradox. Finding both black ravens and non-black non-ravens both confirm to some degree the claim that all ravens are black. To prove that all ravens are black, you must look at all objects that exist, and determine if they are a raven and verify their black or non-blackness. Since you must go through all objects, each object is equally valuable in the road to getting that proof. Instead, however, if you want to do what most people do to show to a degree of certainty that ravens are black, you use a Bayesian probabilistic approach. This would make it far more efficient to look for ravens to get a reasonable certainty that all ravens are black.
Let's look at a bigger problem. Take the claim, all gods are metaphysically necessary. Any time that I find something that is not metaphysically necessary and not a God, I confirm the claim that all Gods are metaphysically necessary. Or to put it another way, I can gain a huge amount of certainty that all ravens are pink having never seen a raven, but found a lot of blue flies. As for Bayes, I have my concerns: th-cam.com/video/rWb7up_MoZc/w-d-xo.html
I've been trying to figure out why this paradox seems confusing, and I think there are two reasons. The first, is that the problem of finding out if all ravens are black is unbounded. The second, is that the act of observing an object tells you immediately whether an object is a raven, and it's black or non-blackness, so it all seems like one step. But really, you are 1. Finding an object, 2. Determining the properties of that object (including the two we are testing). When you find a blue fly, what you are really doing, is finding one of the objects that exist that could be a non-black raven, but finding out that it is instead a blue fly, hence confirming the positive by dis-confirming the negative. Instead, let's use an analogy of jellybeans in a bag. If I say, "All black jellybeans in this bag, are licorice flavored." At first, it may seem that finding a green lime-flavored jellybean in the bag does nothing to lend evidence to that statement. However, that is because the act of observing the jellybean tells you its color, lending it's taste unnecessary for additional evidence if the color isn't black. If I restate this action as, pulling out 1 of the 20 jellybeans from the bag, and determining that it is a green lime-flavored jellybean, it becomes easier to see how it lends evidence to the claim that all black jellybeans, in the bag, are licorice flavored. The confusion is, that you know that a jellybean is black or non-black on observation, where as to determine it's flavor you will need to taste it. So, an even easier way to see this is to reverse the statement to, "All licorice-flavored jellybeans in this bag, are black." If you pull one of the 20 jellybeans out of the bag, and it is green, and then you taste it to confirm that it is in fact not a licorice-flavored green jellybean. When it tastes like lime, you have lent evidence to the claim that all licorice-flavored jellybeans are black, by showing that the green jellybean isn't licorice-flavored.
kavi randhawa The problem is very real. It takes a little detective work to see it. The statement, "All non-black things are non-raven." Its easy to conclude the truth of this idea if truth could be so simple. The statement, "All ravens are black" is equivalent to the preceding statement and difficult to argue. Since we can can't disprove the truth of these two statements then each being equally logical conclusions we then take a step back at how we arrived at their "truth." The first statement, "All non-black things are non-raven," can be supported by observing all objects that are non-black and non-raven. A green plant is non-black and non-raven so I have supported my statement. Now, pay attention here, since both our statements are equally true at first look then I can conclude, without ever viewing a black raven, that ravens must be black due to the fact that a green plant is non-black and non-raven. While the second statement, "All ravens are black" seems reasonable the equivalent statement, "All non-black things are non-raven" certainly leaves some doubt as to the statement makers knowledge of ravens. In fact one could never see a black raven yet conclude by other observations of non-black, non-raven objects that their statement is just as valid as, "All ravens are black" without any first hand observations. This is the paradox and the problem confirming truth.
I think you are making this more complicated than it is. The statements all Ravens are Black, and all non-black things are non-raven are equivalent. Normally, to show that this is true, we don't go through the nearly infinite things that are non-black to see if one is a raven to falsify our claim, because it is far less efficient than looking at all ravens to verify they are all black. The statement could be disproved in two ways, 1. finding a raven who is non-black 2.Finding a non-black object that is a raven. So yes, if you viewed all non-black objects in the universe, and found that none of them are ravens, you could conclude that all ravens are in fact black. I'll try to give an easier analogy which removes some of the weirdness of this problem. 1. You have a medical condition that leaves you unable to see objects of the color green 2. You are placed in a closed room 3. You are told that tennis balls exist in the room 3. You are asked to verify that all the tennis balls in the room are green Could you do it? Despite the fact that you can't see a green tennis ball, you can verify that all the objects in the room that are not green are not tennis balls.
If you bear in mind that the blackness of something, in and of itself, does not make it very likely that it is a raven, then a fortiori you will believe that the non-blackness of something is irrelevant to its being raven or otherwise. Add to that the grue/bleen type problem which suggests one observation (or 100,000) of a black raven is not actually evidence about all ravens, and this problem seems to be more about a psychological peculiarity, considered as a practical matter. Considered as a logical matter, it makes one uneasy about rules of logic, which can sometimes simply look like conventions of logic.
The only thing I can take away from this is that man-made laws are not to be taken seriously unless it is demonstrated to be true. Every raven would have to be identified; every man has to die; and, everything with a mass has to be shown to go below or at the speed of light. At most: it is an assumption that the statements made could be possibly true until disproved.
+Sam Stone The key is to recognize that is an assumption, not something that is sure or proven. If you accept that these things that we claim are scientific laws are set in stone you are missing how science works. (th-cam.com/video/7GVyGkqAGaY/w-d-xo.html)
+Carneades.org I agree it is an assumption. However: like stated; there is a finite number of ravens in our universe. Until each have been identified: it will remain an assumption using probability. 10,000 ravens have been identified as being black with none being any other color. You can assume: the next can be blue (or: any other color): 1/10,000. QM fan where nothing is certain!
+Carneades.org To the linked shared: replied the best I could there. Don't see how it helps further the argument here. What you might be missing by checking all the stuff that are not a raven: is that; you've eliminated the possibility of missing a raven in your conformation. I'd rather trust the person who checked every object in the known universe for that sneaky raven hiding its identity than someone who goes out looking for black ravens (or: ones that look like ravens).
Under Bayesian confirmation theory, there's no reason to expect that the probability of finding a given nonblack nonraven is any different whether all ravens are black or not. Therefore, updating probabilities upon finding a given nonblack nonraven leaves the probability of all ravens being black unchanged. That's one way out of the paradox.
First, this young lady is charming to a fault, pretty as well and obviously very smart. But, a few thoughts on this….All ravens are black - subject is ravens, the object is black. All non-black things are not ravens -subject is non-black things, the object is (not) ravens. One could say that the latter proposition is NOT a logical equivalent but rather a conclusion of the first. That all things that are not black are not ravens is a proposition contingent upon the proposition that all ravens are black. The first proposition must exist in prerequisite. Try considering it this way…”IF” all ravens are black then all non-black things are not ravens. If the latter proposition is contingent upon the first, they cannot be logical equivalents, can they? Thoughts anyone?
all non black things are not ravens is NOT the logical equivalent of all ravens are black, it is by definition, necessarily so as an extension of the statement that all ravens are black. Consider it this way....IF all ravens are black THEN all non black things are not ravens. The latter does NOTHING to bolster the hypothesis that all ravens are black. It follows by definition and can only be true IF we assume that all ravens are black is true in prerequisite. There are no real paradoxes (which actually means an "apparent contradiction" and not an actual contradiction, for they are not possible. This confused philosophers for years? Really? It's piffle
I think your best critique is that the number of items must be finite in order to support a claim. Otherwise yes, the observation of a red fly does support the claim "all ravens are black."
This isn't really a paradox; the trouble comes in a conflation between "confirms that" and "serves as evidence that". Finding a red ant actually *is* evidence that all ravens are black, because if you were to examine everything that isn't black and not find any ravens, that would prove that all ravens are black.
He kind of addresses that at 5:32, but his explanation of why this shouldn't be the case at 6:17 doesn't make much sense to me. Why do they have to be "equally confirmed" like he says?
This is exactly what I was thinking
A sequel to this video would be cool. I'd like to see a video on Nelson Goodman's "Grue" predicate and his so-called, "New Problem of Induction." The set-up is similar to Hempel's Raven Paradox. Great vid, by the way!
+Jose Vera Cruz I already have one (th-cam.com/video/kGE2Ig2dvaE/w-d-xo.html) that I made around the beginning of the channel. Thanks for watching! I'm glad you enjoy.
Ahh! I see.
9:35 I don't see the meaning of this sentence; how it is the same as the previous example with objects moving at the speed of light and abstract ideas.
1:57 Doesn't this imply a distinction between 'confirmation' and 'gradual confidence in a belief with each extra piece of evidence' ? The latter is of Bayesian nature while the first means that finding red flies and crocodiles absolutely 'confirm' that all ravens are black: if this distinction is considered, which of the two are you intellectually criticizing? At the time-stamp of this (1:57) you have in mind the latter but later in the video you talk as if you argue against the former.
did you do a video on the problem (or if there is a problem) of proving that induction "works" ?
+Deconverted Man I have a couple on the original Problem of Induction (th-cam.com/video/sd8cxXfPJU4/w-d-xo.html) and the New Riddle of Induction (th-cam.com/video/kGE2Ig2dvaE/w-d-xo.html).
Carneades.org Maybe you want to answer the question I got for OMS? :D -
"Can you prove that induction is reliable?"
docs.google.com/document/d/1BUjpiF7ZFKTdBLl-fmfNANzo54y_nB2WCN0nU0ujdu8/edit
I
guess the theist was thinking that those pesky atheists can't answer this because... ???
Will watch vids ^_^
This very interesting, but very hard to follow.
Adding pictures might help next time.
Is this paradox considered solved?
Asking at the end 'what do you think?' ?, man you read me like a book lol
Well the way I look at it, is to essentially say that to confirm that all ravens are black, you would need to either have the set of all ravens and be able to confirm that each of them is black directly, or by proving it indirectly somehow (eg from some sort of biological process, the ravens feathers have a certain amount of pigment in them), or you could do the opposite and check every object to see that if its not black, that it's also not a raven.
Weirdly while writing this out, I came to the realisation that the point I just made about checking every object has a subtlety with it. Initially was thinking you just have to check that each object is both not black and not a raven, but I now suppose that what you'd actually need to check is that IF each object is not black, THEN it is not a raven. Note that instead of confirming a conjunction, you're confirming a conditional.
so
(x)(Rx -> Bx)
is materially equivalent to
(x)(~Bx -> ~Rx)
but not to
(x)(~Bx ^ ~Rx)
So now I would be assigning my hypothetical self to the immense task of checking ~By -> ~Ry for every object y, so you just have to check By v ~Ry in each case, which could be done in the case where you have knowledge of whether Ry or By are true.
For me the unpleasant part is when you realise that you have to check every object, which is not only impossible in practice, but possibly impossible in principle too, I'm not sure now what constitutes an object, this seems to be touching on issues faced by set theory which I don't understand so well yet hehe, anyway great video bro ty if you read this whole thing
7:42 What is this sentence lol...
So I did a poor job on the previous post. I steal minute to write what I post for these videos and find them inadequate later when I re-read them. So….
The argument presented in the video was that the proposition, “all non-black things are not ravens” is the logical equivalent of “all ravens are black and thus, all objects observed not black support the hypothesis that all ravens are black. But that is not the case. That “all non-black things are not ravens” is “not” the logical equivalent of “all ravens are black”, but rather a proposition, wholly contingent upon it.
Consider the argument proposed rather as “If all ravens are black then all non-black objects are not ravens”. By the same logic to which the author of this video and the overall argument appealed, that all non-black things are not ravens is simply the logical conclusion/extension of all ravens are black. The latter proposition is necessarily logically so by the assumption of the first. Therefore, non-black things do not prove the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
The problem here as in “all” supposed paradoxes is that the language is manipulated to formulate them and the strictures which allow it to be at all are ignored where convenient. This is not a paradox any more than Russell’s paradox or Hilbert’s hotel. It’s all sophistry.
but if we define ravens as black birds then we have no problem am i right? the problem is that we assume that all ravens color is black but maybe is red blue etc right?
To be honest, I understand the logic, but don't get how it is a paradox.
All concrete objects are a pineapple, so I am going to look at this lamp.
Is it a pinaple? No.
Hence it must not be a concrete object.
But I can then test if it is a concrete object, which it is.
That forces me to expand the set because I cannot define it to be anything other than a concrete object.
With ravens you simply make a new set, but concrete objects already has its own larger sets. So although defining something as a concrete object is the raven paradox expanded, it is a mutually shared set. Which is kinda the saying "reality is the parts of our imagination we agree upon".
So all seems in order....
What did I miss?
Are the statements "All ravens are black." and "All objects are either not ravens or black." really logically equivalent?
I would rather say, that "All ravens are black." is logically following from "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black." by conjunction elimination.
If "All ravens are black." would really be logically equivalent to "All objects are either not ravens or black." and we would simultaneously accept "All ravens are black." as a logical result from "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black.", then that would imply "Some objects are ravens and -all ravens are black- all objects are either not ravens or black."
So the finding of a red fly might imply and confirm "All ravens are black." and "All objects are either not ravens or black.", but it doesn't necessarily confirm "Some objects are ravens and all objects are either not ravens or black." since a finding of at least one object as raven is necessary to confirm "Some objects are ravens and all objects are either not ravens or black." specifically to confirm its part "Some objects are ravens.". A finding of a red fly on its own will neither necessarily nor sufficiently confirm the crucial part "Some objects are ravens." since it still might be the case by sololy finding a red fly, that Not-"Some objects are ravens.", but all objects are not ravens. So in the case of finding a red fly it wouldn't make sense to say, that "All ravens are black." since a red fly is a fly and not a raven and it might be the case, that there are no ravens, which certainly wouldn't confirm, that "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black.".
On the other hand, finding a red fly and a black raven would confirm, that "Some objects are ravens and all ravens are black." and "All ravens are black.".
“ Are the statements "All ravens are black." and "All objects are either not ravens or black." really logically equivalent?””
He never said these two statements are equivalent he said that the statement “all ravens are black” is equivalent to the statement “all things that aren’t black aren’t ravens” or to put it another way “all objects that aren’t black aren’t a raven.” I hope that clears some things up, although I may have missed your point.
@@duder6387 That's not a good point.
My claim is that the statement "All ravens are black."/∀x(Rx>Bx) is just a short term for "Some (existing) objects are ravens and all ravens are black."/∃x(Rx)&∀x(Rx>Bx).
If so, then an existing red fly/∃x[~Bx&(~Rx)] might confirm the statement ∀x(~Bx>~Rx) and might also confirm the logically equivalent statement ∀x(Rx>Bx).
But that existing red fly/∃x[~Bx&(~Rx)] will never confirm the statement ∃x(Rx)&∀x(Rx>Bx), from which the statement ∀x(Rx>Bx) might have originated (in my opinion actually does originate), simply because the existence of a red fly/∃x[~Bx&(~Rx)] doesn't confirm the existence of any or some ravens/∃x(Rx).
@@duder6387 I just have found this recently ( *"Existential fallacy"* en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_fallacy ) and I remembered this comment of mine.
Hopefully, that also gives a good explanation, what I have meant by my original comment and reply.
@@zsoltnagy5654
I don't see your point
I understand that finding a bug wouldn't confirm the claim that there exist some raven and all ravens are black, but it still confirms that all ravens are black and any logically equivalent claims
@@malteeaser101 I just think, that whoever stutters the term _"All ravens are black."_ also simultaneously and indirectly postulates with that term, that some ravens actually exist in the first place, such that all of them are or could be black.
It's like me asking you, where you have hidden the dead body of the person, which you have previously murdered.
Sure, finding a dead bug confirms, that _"All ravens are black"_ as it confirmes, that _"There was a dead body somewhere, which you have previously killed."._
But that dead bug doesn't at all confirm the implied postulation of *"there being some ravens"* or *"Specificially and particularly that bug being killed or murdered by specificially and particularly by you".*
Or do you think, that finding a dead bug will confirm the hypothesis, that _"There was a dead body somewhere, which you, Controversy Owl, have previously killed."?_
I don't think so. But hey, if you want to be so simple minded with these terms, then please don't wonder about someday waking up behind bars for no good reason or at least no better of a reason than finding a dead bug.
can I use this as an mp3 for a social experiment?
Yes, just cite Carneades.org in any publications related to the experiment. And I would love to know your results, but that's not a requirement. :)
I don't see the paradox. Finding both black ravens and non-black non-ravens both confirm to some degree the claim that all ravens are black. To prove that all ravens are black, you must look at all objects that exist, and determine if they are a raven and verify their black or non-blackness. Since you must go through all objects, each object is equally valuable in the road to getting that proof. Instead, however, if you want to do what most people do to show to a degree of certainty that ravens are black, you use a Bayesian probabilistic approach. This would make it far more efficient to look for ravens to get a reasonable certainty that all ravens are black.
Let's look at a bigger problem. Take the claim, all gods are metaphysically necessary. Any time that I find something that is not metaphysically necessary and not a God, I confirm the claim that all Gods are metaphysically necessary. Or to put it another way, I can gain a huge amount of certainty that all ravens are pink having never seen a raven, but found a lot of blue flies. As for Bayes, I have my concerns: th-cam.com/video/rWb7up_MoZc/w-d-xo.html
I've been trying to figure out why this paradox seems confusing, and I think there are two reasons. The first, is that the problem of finding out if all ravens are black is unbounded. The second, is that the act of observing an object tells you immediately whether an object is a raven, and it's black or non-blackness, so it all seems like one step. But really, you are 1. Finding an object, 2. Determining the properties of that object (including the two we are testing). When you find a blue fly, what you are really doing, is finding one of the objects that exist that could be a non-black raven, but finding out that it is instead a blue fly, hence confirming the positive by dis-confirming the negative.
Instead, let's use an analogy of jellybeans in a bag. If I say, "All black jellybeans in this bag, are licorice flavored." At first, it may seem that finding a green lime-flavored jellybean in the bag does nothing to lend evidence to that statement. However, that is because the act of observing the jellybean tells you its color, lending it's taste unnecessary for additional evidence if the color isn't black. If I restate this action as, pulling out 1 of the 20 jellybeans from the bag, and determining that it is a green lime-flavored jellybean, it becomes easier to see how it lends evidence to the claim that all black jellybeans, in the bag, are licorice flavored. The confusion is, that you know that a jellybean is black or non-black on observation, where as to determine it's flavor you will need to taste it.
So, an even easier way to see this is to reverse the statement to, "All licorice-flavored jellybeans in this bag, are black." If you pull one of the 20 jellybeans out of the bag, and it is green, and then you taste it to confirm that it is in fact not a licorice-flavored green jellybean. When it tastes like lime, you have lent evidence to the claim that all licorice-flavored jellybeans are black, by showing that the green jellybean isn't licorice-flavored.
kavi randhawa
The problem is very real. It takes a little detective work to see it. The statement, "All non-black things are non-raven." Its easy to conclude the truth of this idea if truth could be so simple. The statement, "All ravens are black" is equivalent to the preceding statement and difficult to argue. Since we can can't disprove the truth of these two statements then each being equally logical conclusions we then take a step back at how we arrived at their "truth." The first statement, "All non-black things are non-raven," can be supported by observing all objects that are non-black and non-raven. A green plant is non-black and non-raven so I have supported my statement. Now, pay attention here, since both our statements are equally true at first look then I can conclude, without ever viewing a black raven, that ravens must be black due to the fact that a green plant is non-black and non-raven. While the second statement, "All ravens are black" seems reasonable the equivalent statement, "All non-black things are non-raven" certainly leaves some doubt as to the statement makers knowledge of ravens. In fact one could never see a black raven yet conclude by other observations of non-black, non-raven objects that their statement is just as valid as, "All ravens are black" without any first hand observations. This is the paradox and the problem confirming truth.
I think you are making this more complicated than it is. The statements all Ravens are Black, and all non-black things are non-raven are equivalent. Normally, to show that this is true, we don't go through the nearly infinite things that are non-black to see if one is a raven to falsify our claim, because it is far less efficient than looking at all ravens to verify they are all black. The statement could be disproved in two ways, 1. finding a raven who is non-black 2.Finding a non-black object that is a raven. So yes, if you viewed all non-black objects in the universe, and found that none of them are ravens, you could conclude that all ravens are in fact black.
I'll try to give an easier analogy which removes some of the weirdness of this problem.
1. You have a medical condition that leaves you unable to see objects of the color green
2. You are placed in a closed room
3. You are told that tennis balls exist in the room
3. You are asked to verify that all the tennis balls in the room are green
Could you do it?
Despite the fact that you can't see a green tennis ball, you can verify that all the objects in the room that are not green are not tennis balls.
If you bear in mind that the blackness of something, in and of itself, does not make it very likely that it is a raven, then a fortiori you will believe that the non-blackness of something is irrelevant to its being raven or otherwise. Add to that the grue/bleen type problem which suggests one observation (or 100,000) of a black raven is not actually evidence about all ravens, and this problem seems to be more about a psychological peculiarity, considered as a practical matter. Considered as a logical matter, it makes one uneasy about rules of logic, which can sometimes simply look like conventions of logic.
The only thing I can take away from this is that man-made laws are not to be taken seriously unless it is demonstrated to be true. Every raven would have to be identified; every man has to die; and, everything with a mass has to be shown to go below or at the speed of light. At most: it is an assumption that the statements made could be possibly true until disproved.
+Sam Stone The key is to recognize that is an assumption, not something that is sure or proven. If you accept that these things that we claim are scientific laws are set in stone you are missing how science works. (th-cam.com/video/7GVyGkqAGaY/w-d-xo.html)
+Carneades.org
I agree it is an assumption. However: like stated; there is a finite number of ravens in our universe. Until each have been identified: it will remain an assumption using probability. 10,000 ravens have been identified as being black with none being any other color. You can assume: the next can be blue (or: any other color): 1/10,000. QM fan where nothing is certain!
+Carneades.org
To the linked shared: replied the best I could there. Don't see how it helps further the argument here. What you might be missing by checking all the stuff that are not a raven: is that; you've eliminated the possibility of missing a raven in your conformation. I'd rather trust the person who checked every object in the known universe for that sneaky raven hiding its identity than someone who goes out looking for black ravens (or: ones that look like ravens).
Under Bayesian confirmation theory, there's no reason to expect that the probability of finding a given nonblack nonraven is any different whether all ravens are black or not. Therefore, updating probabilities upon finding a given nonblack nonraven leaves the probability of all ravens being black unchanged. That's one way out of the paradox.
+Fabio García And yet there are quite a few problems for Bayesian Epistemology (th-cam.com/video/rWb7up_MoZc/w-d-xo.html).
+Carneades.org But not this problem in particular!
Is there any criticism toward material equivalent in a way to out of this paradox?
First, this young lady is charming to a fault, pretty as well and obviously very smart. But, a few thoughts on this….All ravens are black - subject is ravens, the object is black. All non-black things are not ravens -subject is non-black things, the object is (not) ravens. One could say that the latter proposition is NOT a logical equivalent but rather a conclusion of the first. That all things that are not black are not ravens is a proposition contingent upon the proposition that all ravens are black. The first proposition must exist in prerequisite. Try considering it this way…”IF” all ravens are black then all non-black things are not ravens. If the latter proposition is contingent upon the first, they cannot be logical equivalents, can they? Thoughts anyone?
all non black things are not ravens is NOT the logical equivalent of all ravens are black, it is by definition, necessarily so as an extension of the statement that all ravens are black. Consider it this way....IF all ravens are black THEN all non black things are not ravens. The latter does NOTHING to bolster the hypothesis that all ravens are black. It follows by definition and can only be true IF we assume that all ravens are black is true in prerequisite. There are no real paradoxes (which actually means an "apparent contradiction" and not an actual contradiction, for they are not possible. This confused philosophers for years? Really? It's piffle
I can learn through a desk that Brandy makes you drunk?
Quoth the raven, nevermore
black swan.
+Deconverted Man Is confirmation for all ravens being black.
Carneades.org I was thinking the black swan fallacy - this is very close to that.
why does the black swan confirm that all ravens are black?
Janice Choi why does a black ps3 confirm all ravens are black?