I find this very relevant to my own experience because whenever I was stuying morality and ethics in college I remember leaving the classroom thinking "You know, all these moral and ethical theories may seem enticing, but they are all pretty deeply flawed", and yet, I think that precisely because I took those classes and thought this way did I become a much more tolerant and accepting person.
Brilliant. The analogy of the relationship between the existence of God and religion compared to the existence of morality and a way of acting/communicating. I hope I understood that correctly.
Just to summarize this idea. Religion is something that does not depend on the existence of God (i.e., an unrealistic assumption). In the same way, morality is a discourse that does not depend on 'true' moral propositions (i.e., also an unrealistic assumption).
I think your view on "secular spirituality" (which Sam Harris is associated with as well) might be extremely interesting, especially due to your knowledge on Eastern philosophy. There generally seems to be a big link between philosophy of mind, the notion that the "self" is an illusion, secularism, etc. at the moment, with e. g. Thomas Metzinger being active in that field as well.
Hi! I just wanted to comment to say that I have been watching your channel, and I like it. It's great to have another more rigorous philosophy channel on youtube. Thank you.
Love this idea that morality is a form of communication, like a particular aesthetic of discourse that deliberately and essentially divides and hierarchizes people.
..but isn't the opposition and distaste against, as well as will to destroy hierarchy itself a deal of a morality which seeks to hierarchicalize modes of being and people (in this case, those who are moral in such and such way that you happen to mislike, modes of being which you happen to mislike)? This is kind of the same thing Deleuze talks about, that binaries can only be shifted, not uprooted. To shun morality for its a- or immorality, following you, is itself a kind of morality with its meres shifted to your taste.
@@percivalyracanth1528 i think the discussion of amorality, as opposed to immorality, is how we should respond to this. It feels like a "gotcha" of sorts to point the potential contradiction of asserting amoral discourse as better in some way. But whats important here is the distinction between hierarchizing in the realm of absolutes vs shifting realms of contingency and context, well being, efficient functionality, etc. And the difference is discourse styles right? In amoral discourse, we contextualize hierarchizing language with relevant facts.
@Weapons Of Mass Distraction The problem is, scientists don't truly work like that. For instance, there is a growing gap in linguistics where one side believes in Universal Grammar and the other in statistically analytic individual grammar(s). Both sides use the same points against one another, and both have a quasireligious understanding of and belief in their respective systems. There's no token as to something that can shut this breach, and both sides have sound insights as to some greater truth, but neither may be 'the' truth. In that way, science does give room for civil wars since discourse isn't some magically settling thing, but rather a system of readings of data, and lots of folk are gonna have wildly differing readings of any given set of data, and these readings lend themselves to, or are rather built upon, hierarchicalization of the weight of certain readings of data.
@@andresirigoyen Problem is, contextualization leans on reading/interpretation, and reading is hierarchical, that is what we wish to read and what data we focus on is set by our hierarchicalizations of what is weighty to us in the data. Even a so-called amorality is more like a sardonic, ironic morality.
@@andresirigoyen But shifting realms isn't "better" than staying the same. What do you want to avoid conflict, why is that better than nuking ourselves to death? Do you not see how amorality is an automatic suicide? Seriously think about it, who gives a rat's behind about this or that being more efficient if there's no underlying reason to choose efficacy rather than personal preference or whatever. You're trying to say "we should" no we shouldn't anything if there is no morality, it's really that simple, if I want to lay down and die, increasingly the case with more cases of depression and euthanasia being legalized slowly but surely, you have no say in it. Child birth to continue the species? Look at the average number of children for Atheist families compared to religious, pathetic. This endeavor is futile and it is the sad conclusion of a people that hate their own religious roots to the point of extinction quite literally. This is not a case for religion, I am just stating the facts, a philosopher and political figure by the name of Rochedy puts this very well but he's a Frenchman so idk if you can watch. Basically he ties all of this to Nitzsche's concept of nihilism which is ultimately anti-life energy and permeates all of these people to one extent or another. They will be extinguished there is no doubt about it.
I did want to point out that the issue in English or at least in America with amorality is not that it is being confused with immorality it is that it is synonymous with apathy and indifference. This synonymy gives amorality an immoral reputation. Moral: Comforting a dying person. Immoral: Abusing a dying person. Amoral: Ignoring a dying person. Or: helping, worsening, not helping. Some might even say that stripping the belongings from the house of a dying person because "They won't need this stuff anymore" is amoral. But in either case one might argue that the action, or inaction is _immoral_ because it shows little to no concern for other people.
within the confines of human experience, there is basically no such thing as an amoral act, and perhaps even no such thing as an amoral thought. some thoughts may be so insignificant as to not even result in an experience for the thinker, or as an experience for another due to the thought leading to action; what im referring to is chaos theory. an ethemeral thought might lead to an act that has sufficient impact to be recognized as an experience after being compounded by however many sequential events (simply put: i dont know). basically, even blinking might lead to an impactful experience for someone, thanks to chaos theory, so naturally the gravity of less benign acts would be greater (or at least i assume so).
9:40 - But this "devaluing" would be problematic only if the talk of absolute good would not be possible. In other words, if Harris' book actually really manages to talk about absolute good, and thus makes all other talk of good insignificant then that is not a problem, because once we have a book of absolute good, then all other books about good are truly irrelevant. Thus it seems to me that this objection already assumes that the absolutist is mistaken in their project, therefore it cannot be a counter-argument to the absolutist.
sams assumption of objective morality only comes to fruition when we have decoded how the brain of every sentient creature works, which is a task of epic proportions. bit on the other hand i dont see how factors apart from concious creatures could even possibly factor into morality, so i guess assuming the brain can be understood completely, it is also possible to find objective peaks in the moral landscape. i think of it like this: sam cannot know, wheter a world where people are happy that they dont need to work or a world where people are really happy about the how fulfilling and productive their jobs are is ultimately better. but hes methodology could definitely aid in optimizing both societies to their respective goals
The point is that there is no absolute good. What Harris talks about is entirely subjective, and referring to it as absolute is what's problematic. Harris conflates the versions of "good" is what the argument is. The devaluing is problematic only as a result.
Exactly. An absolute morality devalues those endeavors which are immoral, which in fact is only undesirable if you're already committed to immoral acts - in which case your opinion is pretty much irrelevant, to be frank, so, truly, relativism would be a very desirable last resort for such an individual, albeit an irrational one in the case where absolute morality is true. She is perfectly able to say that "there is no absolute good", that on itself would simply be a meaningless proposition from the absolutist perspective by virtue of it being false, a "cope" if you will. But I don't know where Wittgenstein was going with the whole idea that "then all other books about good are truly irrelevant" since this is not what we see in philosophical traditions that assume an absolute good, at least as long as the books stay on the same tradition. Assuming the tradition to be correct then, yeah, all the books that deviate from it would be "irrelevant" insofar as they're wrong (and possibly immoral).
That's the problem, that it would be undesirable to give up all human activity that is not supported for that theoretical book, because why assume that being absolutely good is desirable? Besides, how would you go about to prove that such a book is possible without comparing it *relatively* to a specific context? In the case of Harris' argument, he attempts to close the gap between absolute morality and relative morality with a scientific understanding of the human brain, but that's still relative to the human experience. It's paradoxical. You only focus on the second part of the argument, but the first part is that such a book, such absolute morality, is non-existent. Just like all religions and their deities, morality is a form of communication relative to human existence, it does not exist independent of it like, say, the phenomena described by the laws of thermodynamics seem to be. All you would end up with assuming otherwise, like Harris does, is with a bible-like book and a bunch of fundamentalists. This is why philosophy is important, even from scientists.
I would agree with statement that morality can be dangerous topic. That bad things can be done in the name of that moral system, but a lack of any moral system would surely be a chaotic nightmare of nihilism and evil. Furthermore I would not agree at all, that the students have been beaten in education system, because they wanted to make them better students, but rather because they have a psychological need to normalize the violence they experienced themselves as students. I would argue that there is definitely, more often than not, a difference between what people say, why they do things, and what is the actual reason why they do things. Moral speech is often used as an excuse for evil deeds, but the lack of morality would be short lived and destructive. As Will Durant wrote in his book the story of philosophy: “There is nothing so absurd,” said Cicero, “but that it may be found in the books of the philosophers.” Doubtless some philosophers have had all sorts of wisdom except common sense ; and many a philosophic flight has been due to the elevating power of thin air. I think this discourse that Dr. Möller perpetuates is a problem of academics and thinkers/philosophers in general. They over analyze and extrapolate meaning and causality where there is none. They think peoples actions are more philosophical and complex, in the same way they think, and thus fall in love with their own ideas and reasoning. When the reasons for simple peoples actions are more psychological and direct than they want to admit. Most what all people do is automatic/unconscious behavior based on what they saw and experienced growing up, and the morality and philosophical reasoning arises from those experiences naturally.
This felt really strong on absolutist statements and short on supporting examples. Is "the" reason students have been beaten for 1000s of years singularly the result of a particular kind of moral thinking? My personal experience indicates maybe not, but I don't know where the claim comes from. Similarly is it a net negative to think in terms of right and wrong vs. not doing so and is that true in a universal absolute sense?
One of the reason why people are getting bitten is because people are capable of violence and sometimes passionately desire violence. It has nothing to do with morality or amorality. It is just a fact. Strange how two major thinkers of our time are beating around the bush of such a common sensical knowledge. I have my intuitions why it happens, but I will refrain form speculation
I personally support his theory. There is a saying in ancient China: "棒下出孝子‘’：“Sticks give birth to pious son”. To be pious is to be moral/sincere. And violence, in which the ancient Chinese believe, seems to be able to achieve that.
So my question is: what does Harris bring to the table on this question that is any different from the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, etc.? Just seems like he's reiterating their arguments + "wow neuroscience."
He clear this up in his previous podcast (episode #323), saying that utilitarianism focuses mainly on body counts and quality-adjusted life-years and disregards consequences to people's mental states / experiences, which creates vectors for flawed criticisms. I would say it´s a refinement.
This clip is a part of a longer video (please jump to 19:00 to continue) : "Why Sam Harris is Wrong - A Critique of Sam Harris' "The Moral Landscape" (in 2020)" th-cam.com/video/NGt0I5MbQSI/w-d-xo.html
i find myself disagreeing on almost every point the professor makes i think he misinterpreted the wittgenstein quote. why would it be bad if all other books exploded? that's the point of writing a 'moral' book, to say what's good and have nothing left over. that would solve a lot of disagreements, wars, hatreds and a lot of other miscommunications that plague the human race. however, the fact that this kind of 'meta-cultural' morality has not, as of yet, been found speaks volumes. every moral book with great aspirations (like Sam Harris' book, or the Bible, or The Founding of the Metaphysics of Morals) claims to know what's good as good for any human, as long as they are human. yet none of them have been able to assert their claim to the absolute good for as long as humans have existed. maybe that book has already been written. maybe the explosion of all other books doesn't happen in such an instant, at least from a human perspective. maybe it takes a lot of bloodshed to make the real true only good shine through to humans. or maybe that's the testament of the human incompleteness. even though we have the ideas, and even though we have powerful opinions about them, our talking about them and acting them out makes them finite, concrete and r e l a t i v e. maybe that's a testament to the human paradox: even though we can't reach our goal (we don't really even know what the goal is,), we keep striving. 'striving' here is not a relative term. it's not "Humans strive for... (God, good, godliness, truth, godlikeness, power...)". It's "Humans strive". that's what we do. when there's a strive, there's a way to steer that strive. that's where the "unrealistic" assumptions of religion come in. the steering that religion does becomes the steering of what a human is. a strive that is absolute needs absolute enticement to steer it. however, when the absolute becomes intertwined with temporality (language), it corrupts. but that's okay. humans are corrupt (mortal). it seems every absolute in existence is preceded by a relative (the human, the language, the time). and that's a predicament. every absolute is corrupt. paradoxes breed predicaments. now, you can choose to battle that corruptness by disowning every absolute, like the professor does. for instance, There is no God. that's what Sam Harris also does. Sam Harris then at least tries to forge a new absolute, in Science. but that puts Science and God on the same plane, terminologically. the professor does not try to forge a new absolute, he just says that morality talk is bad and dangerous. both the professor and Sam Harris agree in one thing - religion can be (or completely is) bad and dangerous. both of them focus only on the divisive part of religion. they ignore the cohesive. they think that by eradicating the aggressive parts of morality, they will eradicate aggression. a very teenage standpoint. and a dangerous one at that. they either offer cheap platitudes that are based on "scientific objective truth", or they offer nothing at all. by listening to the professor and Sam Harris, we are not much helped in our predicament. that is human fate - to constantly be in a predicament.
Anthony Giddens wrote many things regarding how a runaway society (juggernaut) might or might not be steered, our place in the vehicle and exactly how much agency one has within the context of that structure (structuration).
Sam Harris claims to reject relativism, but only by placing the optimization of relative values as the only true path to absolute values. Really good encapsulation of how his reasoning fails.
@@robertbutchko5066That depends on how you define morality, I'm not sure how you're defining it, but I think your trying to say beliefs that carry negative or positive connotations towards specific ideas and concepts is a form of morality. In that case, objective truths could be considered to be just a person's moral code. I.e., A person tells his friend not to get to close to the cliff-edge because there's a high chance of death. You could say: "Well that's just another moral code". But that would be silly. Morality is a means by which humans participate in society and maintain order, it ain't some buzzword you could associate anything with.
@@PhilosophyOfNoa he distinguished between relative morality and absolute morality. he was obviously saying absolute morality is bad in the relative sense of resulting in behaviors contrary to his preferences.
There is a morality about morality, or a meta-ethic. Universal morality is not a factual claim, it is another value judgement or moral claim. Morality should not be relative, but we have no way of knowing if morality is truly universal or not, just that it ought to be (because, if not, that could exploited). It is not morally preferable to be amoral
Someone please correct me where I'm wrong. I know I'm oversimplifying a 20 minute video, but it sounds like the objection here isn't to pursuing wellbeing, it's to identifying wellbeing in a moral frame work as the very nature of a moral framework diminishes wellbeing? Rather we should pursue wellbeing in an amoral framework discarding the concepts of good and evil that are central to morality?
in the most clinical way i can think of explaining this: there isnt an amoral framework. every experience of note is considered positive or negative by the subjective evaluation of the individual. this is where the moral framework originates from. it is an attempt, be it conciously or otherwise, to establish a standard of conduct. the very purpose of it is to enhance wellbeing, not diminish it. long story short: the guy in the vid was rambling about stuff he didnt understand, hence the 20 min length and you being unsure what he was trying to say.
00:20 - The definition of morality in "The Moral Landscape". 2:00 - Wittgenstein "Lecture on Ethics". 5:50 - The mistake Harris makes - We can optimize the relative usage of the words good and right, until it becomes absolute.
I was considering to write a philosophy paper on Blame and the Sublime once but didn't, because it seemed weird, but now I'm thinking about it again...
“Just as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant, so it is pain, so it is suffering, that make it possible for the recognition of virtue. Sir Thomas Aquinas
the problem you can't not speak in moral term, how can you not speak in moral term? human language and action are inseparable from morality. every word, action carry a judgment/moral behind it.
Exactly what i was thinking.. even with his beating school kids example, be says they were beaten because of morality, (he suggests morality is bad throught fhe video) but says when schools became amoral the result was an inprovement in wellbeing... so his premise there is that being amoral is morally good.
But if morality is dangerous and to be dispensed with in order for it to not to negatively impact well being, what motivation do you then have to care about well being?
@@00i0ii0 Plenty of people can feel well while doing 'bad' things -- hence the effective altruism movement, for one thing -- under your definition of good and bad.
@@badnoisebebopblackoutnetwo3348 you can feel well doing a bad thing, but if you do something and all it does is leave you feeling better than you were before then it was good: how can it not be? And the effective altruism movement answers one question: "how can we use our resources to help others the most?" The effective altruism movement doesn't answer the question of what good is.
@@00i0ii0 My point with effective altruism was that they attack the notion of 'feeling good' is the same as 'what is good'. If you care for better outcomes then just say it's a better outcome for people that they feel well, than to feel terrible -- as per facts about expirience. No need to add some quasi-absolutist idea of 'Good' to the language.
On the whole though, I think Harris has become a poor example of a non-religious moral philosophy. He was really good at one stage by debunking moral absolutism in the major theistic religions. [But many "Abrahamic" religious folks are not moral absolutists anyway, except some literalists or fundamentalists]. The real mystery is why such a flawed concept as "Devine Command Theory" lasted as long as it did.
Well being, for Harris, is a state or condition in which you can say "after a long long time without a vacation I had one - the first in one year" and see nothing wrong with it.
It is immediately obvious from even casual observation of what people do when they are doing morality that it is not for increasing well-being. Most of the behaviors are for hurting disapproved people. Some rationalize this by supposing hurting people makes them better, but an awful lot of moral discourse clearly shows that the goal is largely to hurt people for the sake of a certain sort of pleasure, see Nietzsche. The big question to me is why and how the likes of Harris delude themselves so thoroughly they cannot even apprehend the issue. It is sort of understandable with religious absolutists who have an obvious interest in evading theodicy by defining it away, but there is no excuse for claiming anything remotely resembling a scientific basis.
Paraphrasing somewhat, please let me know if I've mischaracterised your point, but isn't "We shouldn't engage in moral discourse because it can be used to encourage people to perform violent actions including killing people" itself based on the moral concept that avoidable violence and killing is bad?
I don't think he says "we shouldn't," but more that we should recognize the danger in moral discourse, the same way we recognize the danger in religion. But you're right: He's using a moral argument to show the danger of moral arguments.
I'm not sure but I think this is a logical argument and not a moral one. The problem is not that religion leads people to do violent acts, but that it leads people to do violent acts *that they would not do otherwise*. This hints at a paradox. It is possible to derive from the religion that the action is right but it is also possible to derive, from some belief held by the person, that this is wrong. If you assume that what we do should follow some form of logic this is problematic, because once you have these contradictions you can deduce anything. Every action is right and wrong at the same time. This means that one of the assumptions has to be wrong. And because religion or moralism claims *absolut* truth it has to be your intuition. This now means that we can't evaluate these assumptions neutrally. The point is not that we should not make any asumptions. Or in other words follow relativ truths. Philosophy should not abolish religion. If we don't follow relativ truths we can't do anything. But because absolut truth can never be achieved we have to always critically assess these assumptions. An analogy would be the way we do modern mathematics. Basically all mathematicians are in a way "dogmatists". They assume that some axioms (e.g. ZFC and Peano) are consistent and are concerned with proving propositions that follow from these axioms. But in contrast to moralists they don't claim absolute truth (in fact they know that the consistency of these axioms cannot be proven) but they do math anyway. And if some inconsistency is found they change the axioms. ZFC is only 120 years old. It was developed because of Russels paradox. Without this critical assessment ZFC would have never been invented. An example of what happens if you don't do this can be found in christianity. Here the religion not only contradicts "common sense" but is in itself contradictory, for example the presence of evil under an allmighty and good god. Here one (not the best but a common) answer is "god works in mysterious ways". Which basically ridicules this most basic assumption that the things around us follow some kind of logic.
Again you can’t be conflating any mental inclination for or against something to be a robust morality. The whole point of denying morality is to deny that there is some moral LAW that holds true IRREGARDLESS of mental, societal, cultural, historical (etc) dispositions. Having a desire to not see murder obtain can never be a robust account of morality
This is a great angle. Personally, my biggest gripe with Harris is how selective he is with his arguments and standards, and how flimsy much of his reasoning is when he applies it on specific real-world issues. He makes insane leaps of logic to justify a clear agenda, ignoring huge swaths of evidence, alternative explanations, and possibilities, only to claim that it is reasonable and un-ideological. Professor of Criminology Peter Hanink posted a detailled analysis of Harris' talk on issues in his expertise ("A Response to Sam Harris on BLM, police violence, and the merits of conversation") that's very much worth watching for anyone who wishes to understand more of the critique against Harris or of the state of criminology.
The problem with moral arguments is they assume we are superior as human animals, and there is some obejctive, underlying universal truth to morality. Morality, like "freedom" is relative to a particular time. Rape can be deemed moral if the majority agrees that it is, and polices it as such. There's no outside force that demands that to be true. We apply empathy to deem these things "immoral," but that's merely extending a courtesy to our fellow beings. It's not an objective law of nature. Sacrfices, and etc. were deemed moral by groups throughout history. Things we value as immoral will fade from society, and things we deem as moral will face the same judgement in the future.
Excellent video! I wonder what you think of Max Stirner's egoism? In 'The Unique and its Property' he raises similar criticisms of humanism where some concept of Humanity (or human well-being in Harris' case) is raised to the same level as god is in religions. Under religion your purpose in life is to serve god, and under humanism your purpose is to serve humanity, but in both cases you are subjecting yourself to arbitrary external authority.
If you grant that it is good to ascertain the patterns that improve well-being for the parts, why do you refuse to extend that preference to the whole? Are we simply playing devil's advocate here? The whole is the sum of those operations. If you grant that there is a shared structure of cognition, (which is the most plausible theory if you study personality,) then a “moral landscape” is a descriptive act rather than a prescriptive command. We can find better tools to navigate our language games, we can unchain sensations from specific objects and make judgments about which games are worth playing. We can show the fly the way out of the fly bottle. I can’t tell you which options to pick, but if the options are illuminated sufficiently I can know with some certainty the options you won’t pick. “Ethics and aesthetics are one.” Ludwig Wittgenstein. My problem with Harris is that he refuses to acknowledge the flip side of loose association. He acknowledges its power for taking lives but ignores the power when it saves them. His attachment to hyperlinked structures renders his goal impossible. His neuroscience and psychology are being sabotaged by logical positivism.
Not sure there's a sound definition of a word like that because people can always easily disagree with any definition for what it excludes. We could give it the Peirce test: What is "exists" role in the guidance of conduct? In some situations, it is meaningless, while in others quite important.
what's the problem if someone states I am not trying to be a good person, maybe is not looking for your approval. What about if the answer was: I am not a Saint, I have my faults. Would that be so unacceptable? I am not sure the example fits well
even though I do agree with what it is said about morality and the use of good in a relative rather than absolute terms. Something is good relative to someone or something, it can never be absolute
I am kind of confused about something. Why do we know that objective morality does not exist? I don't see any particular reason to conclude that with certainty. Is is because it would lead to some sort of contradiction? Otherwise I would say it is not necessarily something that does not exist, but rather something that we cannot prove to exist nor prove to not exist (in my opinion this also applies to a non-specific God). I would agree that we therefore have no use for the concept of morality, as it cannot (correctly) be tied to anything within the world around us. I guess maybe this is what he means with "absolute morality does not exist"?
In a trivial sense, we know objective morality doesn't exist because you can never achieve a consensus on what is good or bad. There's always an item on the list that causes conflict or argument. It's like these days we may insist that human life is precious, or all life is precious. However, human life is approaching a breaking point at which there are ecologically too many people. If we could prevent all of the human death that occurs every day, we would destroy the world. So, at some critical point, it isn't precious but dangerous. I'm not arguing human life isn't precious or that life isn't, but that such ideas are always arguable.
I think Harris' claim is much easier to confute. For science to be able to produce moral propositions, there would need to be an undisputable and objective empirical evidence of good or bad in nature, which science would need to observe and then formalize into a principle just the same as it does with the laws of physics. I would argue that this, however, is not the case. Even if we follow our empirical observations (which Harris equates to "science") in order to preserve another person's well being, there are no empirical observations that scientifically prove to us that we should preserve other people's well being. On the contrary, we could argue that death, exploitation and self preservation are key components of natural life. The basic principles of Harris' morality (we should care for another person's well being) is not derived from experience, therefore it is not of scientific but rather dogmatic (and in this sense "religious") nature.
HAHA your comment "". The basic principles of Harris' morality (we should care for another person's well being) is not derived from experience" is actually hilarious. I am very much interested how you live your life if you don't think this is true, do you not care for others well being? All it takes is one instance where you do and then you make zero sense.
@@BryanAFC exactly. It doesn't matter if I follow it or not, the point is that the fact that I follow it is not a result of scientific observation. I am a human being, therefore I am involved in human practices, but this doesn't mean that these practices are products of absolute metaphysical and moral truths.
Harris has a simple response to this which involves an analogy to medicine. Everything you say here seems equally applicable to the concept of health. One could say there is no “objective empirical observation” of health to be found. Who is to say the smoker is less healthy than the non-smoker? And yet we have a science of health and a strict commitment to understanding and creating it. The problems you raise are generic epistemic problems and don’t seem specific to morality. Maybe you are just a skeptic and anti-realist in general. But really Harris’s point is that we don’t seem to have the same attitude about established sciences compared to morality and are asking _more_ of a science of ethics than we would of a science of anything else. This is a double standard.
@@samuelstephens6904 I agree only partially. It's true that my objection is epistemological and therefore could be applied to other areas of observation (btw, it's also true that I would not mind being defined a skeptic). On the specific example though, I kinda have to disagree. We could agree on a basic linguistic definition of "health" as a state that causes you as little physical pain as possible and/or will delay your death as much as possible. Once we agree on this (and this is of course a purely linguistic and therefore epistemologically criticizable agreement), then we can proceed with empirical observations: we have physical evidence that smoking makes you less healthy in the sense that it increases your likelihood of developing cancer and/or other respiratory problems. This observation is of course possible thanks to medical science. In the case of morality though, we don't need scientific analysis to determine if this or that individual is behaving according to our moral principles, and, on the other hand, neither can we use it to produce an undisputable and universal ("objective") moral law, because we still continue to have disagreements about the very definition of good, bad, right and wrong. In other words, science cannot solve THE problem of morality itself
I feel this is a bit short sighted. We can think about multitudes of subjective experiences in aggregate, in averages, cohorts, cultures, etc. It's the same thing as utilitarianism attempts to do. We might not be able to measure and quantify the experiences (to do the statistics) at the moment, but that doesn't make those things magical. Once we all have brain-computer interfaces, it might be trivial to evaluate metal states en masse.
I'm only 7 minutes in the video, so perhaps my comment is premature, but how could you say that it's simply not possible to summarize everything, and therefore there can be no bridge between relative and absolute good when it's far from true that in order to make valid claims about a subject, you must first understand everything about said subject? We don't have to summarize well being completely in order to know, for instance, that persecuting a group of people because of their ethnicity is antithetical to well being. I hope I'm not misunderstanding your point. Even Kant understood that developing his philosophical system served primarily to purge dogma. The utility of Harris's system is analogous in that way. It's much more adept at purging immoral human behavior, especially on a large scale, than it is at proving moral claims. Also, in regards to other books exploding if absolute good is confirmed, that just isn't true, as a statement about the systematic process of discovering good is not the same as a specific statement of good, so in fact we could still consider and learn from the books, but judge them using a given criteria. Only claims of a contradicting system would become invalid, not, say, the claim "do unto others as you would have them do unto you". We would still have the arduous task of pontificating that specific claim relative to his criteria. In the same way, to claim that asserting a system as true is arrogant disregards the general advancement of human understanding with time. The credit is only partially placed on Harris, but much more on those before him who he learned from, i.e standing on the shoulders of giants. In fact, wouldn't kant be arrogant as well according to your description of Harris? Furthermore, it would be far more accurate to say he combines them rather than conflating them, as he's pretty explicit in saying that there are indeed different uses of good, and that he is trying to unify them under one commonality. Conflating implies he's doing it unintentionally. Also, and this is probably just a matter of my own ignorance, wouldn't you say the quality of a moral claim can be rooted in the effects it has on making certain actions permissible, and certain actions impermissible?
i think sam even makes it pretty clear in the subtext that he isnt claiming to have found objecitve morality. He talks about peaks (plural) of the moral landscape, not about A peak with him as leader on top. the main take away from his work is to me that we should use science to better morality and construct actual arguments instead of falling back to religious dogma and post hoc rationalizations of emotional reactions.
The problem with Harris argument is that he seems to think that, through science and a better understanding of the brain, we can close the gap between relative morality and absolute morality, which is not the case, you're just considering scientific observations to make moral arguments relative to them. For example, "led can cause several mental issues, so it is immoral to use led paint." That's a strong moral argument... relative to how led affects humans, but would it be absolutely immoral to use led paint, even in settings that do not affect humans? No. That's not to say that there's no value to use science to figure out better ways to increase human well being, it's just that human well being is relatively defined.
@@Lambda_Ovine You're example is a false dichotomy. As It seems we both like to think in associatations, can you provide a better one? Just to demonstrate why, you could answer the hypothetical no in x scenarios, and yes in y scenarios.You don't have to make a blanket yes or no answer regarding all uses of led paint.
@@Lambda_Ovine Let me also clarify my position real quick. I believe Harris' argument is is more like a conjecture than an argument. I belive he observred that in the vast majority of moral assertions with clear agreement, there is a common denominator of them having the properties laid out in his book. However, there is no reason to believe they are correct in all cases except that they are correct in the ones he already observed. in the same sense that we can't be sure 3n+1 will always result in a 4-2-1 loop, but in all cases we've observed it does. It is absolutley possible to continually heighten the complexities of a dillema until the variables are difficult to calculate and timely, but I do think it serves great use
My understanding is that students are not given corporal punishment in certain parts of the USA for failing academically, but for misbehaving in the classroom.
Your core argument is within the analytic tradition (taking Wittgenstein as your exemplar). Trying to ascertain the truth value or content of moral propositions or arguments. Yet Wittgenstein's own "partner in crime" Anscombe exemplifies the tradition of practical reason (Aristotle-Aquinas). Significant attempts have been made under this tradition of moral realism to bridge the gap between impossibility of universal moral truths and possibility of particular moral actions. Being a-moral is theoretically possible in analytic tradition, it seems to be practically difficult in matters of human affairs (ethics, politics and economics). As Aquinas indicates, this is a common fallacy to conflate 2nd order universe of analytical logic with the 3rd order universe of human affairs. One must reflect (by practical reason) on an ordinary or an exemplar life actually lived to understand the value of moral judgments and prescriptions that we utilize. Also this conversation itself was replete with universalistic claims of moral judgments, eg historical usage of corporeal punishment as moral bullying... or impossibility of moral meaning etc.
As to moral behaviours being studied scientifically. There has been a lot of progress in animal studies about "morality" "cognition", "self awareness" "theory of mind" and other attributes once thought to be the sole province of humanity. True, one can't just observe something that seems to be similar in a non-human animal, and conclude absolutely that such behaviour is exactly the same thing. But on the other hand, you can't dismiss it glibly as not the same thing without reason and further evidence either. Charles Darwin was one of those who tried to demolish these unrealistic hard barriers to what is human and what is not. Because if biological evolution is true, then one would expect to see most human attributes, at least to some, present to some degree in other social cognitive species. [A pity some of our close human relatives didn't make it, because then perhaps the level of verbal and [and especially written] written communications would not be confined to one species. I don't think there is now much room to dismiss moral behaviours in complex non-human animals. You can test for a sense of fairness in dogs, and so on. Even social bees seem to have some sort of moral behaviours. How they can ignore a co-worker who gets a little inebriated on one occasion, but if she keeps on doing it, they might sting her to death. Why, presumably because by neglecting her duties, the whole hive and the larvae may be at hazard from disease, etc. That seems to make sense to me. So if we are talking about wellness, as social animals, there is immediately a potential source of conflict between personal wellness, and the wellness of the social group. Is there an objective morality then. Yes. Once you decide what things are moral, then you can work out what get you closer to that goal or further away from it. The real trick is working out what wellness is, and it differs in context/situation. If I was a genocidal murderer, the society might be better off if I did not exist. Objectively, society would be better off in wellness terms, and the mean wellness of most people would be improved too, in objective terms. But it can get more nuanced than that. They could put me in prison, or maybe find out what makes people commit genocide, and fix society to that it does not occur, or at least occurs less often. But of course this is a bit of a straw-man argument, because the whole criterion I was using was life or death. But there is another problem. is life over death an objective and invariable thing? Life works because organisms survive, at least long enough to replicate/reproduce, or the species goes extinct. Is this good or bad? One can argue that we are a pest species which are not only killing off most other life forms, but in the process fouling our own nest, and thereby, our own eventual extinction. So scaling out the problem makes it even more complex. Rather than say life is objectively good or bad, we should perhaps say that it just is. A brute fact. But we should be honest about it. We have a vested interest in being alive. A bias inherited from ancestors. To say it is moral or immoral seems to be an oxymoron. So while the goals of morality are subject to debate, actually measuring that we achieve in regard to any moral principle is not. It either enhances well-being or it does not. The problem with that may be making the criteria too narrow. Does it give someone with a painful, debilitating, incurable disease wellness to force them to keep on living no matter what, if they genuinely want, or rather need, to die? Medicine has got very good at keeping people alive, but not always so good at maintaining quality of life. So there are wrinkles to every moral case. I think that clear cut moral decisions are a lot harder than most people imagine. Often we can't get to perfect solutions, and at best have to realise that we pick the least harmful version from a bad bunch of nasty alternatives.
thank you for restoring some of my faith in humankind. you are only one person, so my faith is still at rock bottom, but you clearly understand morality on a level that most alive today (or through history) will never achieve in their entire lives. kudos.
there's a sort of contradiction here ... if, as he says, moral principles are only used a posteriory, to justify a decision, then children have not been beaten at school because they're perceived as bad people if they're not studying well .. everything boils down to the question how and why is this feeling of deficiency instilled in children and young people that makes them susceptible to succumb to moral judgments addressed at themselves .. at what moment and why do we begin to panic when we believe we're being perceived as bad ... ... and the difference between him and harris is that harris would happily exploit this feeling of deficiency for controlling society, while comrade Moeller would probably rather get rid of it altogether .. which kinda shows that there's nothing radically emancipatory in harris' philosophy .. he's a regular charlatan ..
Isn't there a contradiction in saying it isn't desirable to speak morally? After all, to say there is such thing as something which is absolutely desirable is to make a moral statement!
No it's not. Consider this version of Moore's argument: the statement "what is absolutely desirable is good" is not analytic, because we can imagine all desiring something we consider bad; hence what is absolutely desirable is not necessarily good. But moral talk is talk about goodness. Therefore talk about what is absolutely desirable is not moral talk.
@@10mimu To say it is desirable at all is a moral judgment. Why did this guy make the video, to help us (moral), or to pass time ("amoral" if not immoral) ? Take your pick
@@VirginMostPowerfull It depends on what exactly you mean by desirable. If you mean worthy of being wanted, then I agree it is a moral judgement; but if by "desirable to S" we mean "it is wanted by S" simpliciter, then I don't see how that is a moral judgement, but merely a description of a state of affairs. A banana is desirable to a monkey: a monkey wants a banana.
@@10mimu So you think this professor just chooses to make this video because he wants to? Unpack that for me psychologically, what does that mean, really what does that mean, let's unpack.
@@10mimu Something being DESIRED BY ALL and being ABSOLUTELY DESIRED are different things. A psychopath does not wish to care about others, but to care for others is desirable. What is absolutely desirable can occasionally not be desired by some individuals.
Everything is derivative this days, and highly overrated Disco Elysium is a good example of this. Internet didn't make the world (of thoughts and ideas) bigger, but quite the opposite
But isn't the point that Wittgenstein has made is that the notion of an 'absolute right' is absurd, that the absolute moralism of a 'de-relative right' simply cannot exist within language? If private languages cannot exist because they lack the social and cultural underpinning essential to a natural language, so too absolute moralities or, (neo-Platonic) essential truths lack the necessary ontological weight to be acceptable as 'real'. Harris may be too ambitious in asserting that relative good is the same as absolute good, but the underlying issue that I think he is addressing, is that the absolute good has no 'reality' grounding from which to be asserted. That at best it is a hang-over from (idealist) metaphysics or, theology (incidentally the same concern that Wittgenstein was addressing).
Morality is biological. Ethics are cultural. What is morality? The way it's being talked about in this video I can't tell if we're talking about ethics (culturally prescribed behavior) or some sort of platonic essential or supernatural force. What makes sense to me is that morality is a meta-ethic that allows for and defines what it is to be a social creature (non-hive). A "normal" human mind recognizes unfairness when observing as a third party even at a very early age. Well before complex communication proto-humans instinctively operated with cooperation and altruism.
And for every universal moral law, you can find some tribe out in the Amazon or the South Pacific who insists on the exact opposite. Then you have to guess, "Are they inherently immoral?" And that's where the "danger" of the moral discourse comes in.
@@ceruchi2084 Morality is a perception not a behavioral prescription. There is something that it is to be a organism with subjective experience. There is something that it is to be a mammal. There is something that it is to a social animal. Morality is the balancing of intuitions that comes from the gestalt of these components of human existence. Or canine existence. Cultural norms can interfere with that perception. In such cases it's practically certain that the cultural norm is immoral rather than the culture moire is revealing a deeper truth.
Why would it be bad to devalue previous efforts if what you've found is in fact superior? This is generally seen as normal as we make progress right Also isn't this vid kind of claiming that Harris way of thinking is morally bad e.g. trying to also make an objective moral statement?
15:45 And why would social conflict and violence be bad? It seems to me that this criticism of absolute good and bad, assumes that social conflict and violence is an absolute bad
I don't agree they used to beat children up because of their poor learning skills. Usually, it is to do with children misbehaving, causing riots, hitting other pupils and stuff like that, being disrespectful and so on. I don't condone hitting children to cause actual physical harm, but it might sometimes be necessary to restrain a child or maybe spank them (talking about parents and guardians here, not school) so as to prevent them from hurting themselves or others.
I think that (in a strict sense), relativity and contingency upon higher-level states of affairs are the only factual truths....nothing unusual here.But, anyhow one must make some sort of compromise by grounding an idea into something "real".For me consciousness (in the larger sense),subjective experience and biological factors are the most important criteria.No need for God , nor other analytic/semantic endeavors.
While Sam Harris fumbles and fails in his endeavor to demonstrate objective morality, the principles of such do actually exist, and are logically discernable: *P1* - The existence of sentient subjects is an objective reality. *P2* - As real entities, subjects have properties inherent to them which may be objectively known and explicated. *P3* - Among the properties of sentience is the inherent capacity to have interests, which may be harmed or benefited. *P4* - This dichotomy of benefit & harm is the ontological basis of intrasubjective normativity, as it entails existential conditions such as "good/bad" and "better/worse" defining what's preferable or non-preferable for a given subject. *P5* - The property of inhering interests further entails that subjects as entities are ultimate ends. *P6* - There exist a multiplicity of distinct subjects with their own interests which may align or conflict with one another, entailing an intersubjective landscape for them to navigate which broadly coincides with the domain we call "morality". *P7* - Subjects are liable to have motive dispositions which generally incline them towards wanting to benefit the interests of others or harm them, entailing that subjects may themselves have normative value of an intersubjective nature, defining their worth as moral ends. *P8* - The concept generally referred to as "justice" entails reciprocity (i.e. commentsurate responsivity) in the intersubjective domain, with impartial and equitable judgments in such matters constituting an objective approach to it. *P9* - The equitable distribution of justice inevitably promotes general intersubjective well-being, in that it reinforces benevolent interpersonal choices & subjects while simultaneously punishing malevolent choices & subjects. *C* - Given the objective reality of sentient subjects, the inherent normative properties of their existence, and the possibility of making epistemologically objective assessments of such normative conditions _(which includes the matter of reciprocity in the intersubjective domain)_ it stands to reason that impartial, existential justice is definitionally the objective basis of natural rights.
17'49" This is a totally wrong conception of morality. Because surely morality can only be taught by example. And teachers who beat their pupils are setting a bad example. They are equating might with right. And this can never be the case. Professor Moeller your conception of morality is far too crude. You cannot teach good using evil means. The means should be commensurate with the end. You can only teach by setting a good example, and by being good yourself. To say that there is no such thing as good is no solution. And can only lead to evil ends. Of course I realise that this requires infinite patience. But as Spinoza says at the end of his Ethics: 'For all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare'. And there is nothing more excellent than virtue. It is surely the sine qua non of the civilised life. Which I for one am not prepared to give up. (If we have ever had it.)
Really cool video, I have a few concerns/questions though. I don't understand how you can make statements like (paraphrasing) "doing morality is problematic". This sounds really close to "we ought not do morality", which sounds a bit ridiculous to me. In what way does the quality of being problematic matter if we simultaneously reject valuation? I am genuinely confused and would appreciate help in alleviating any possible misunderstandings I might have of this position.
you didnt misunderstand unfortunately, he's just a bad philosopher. he literally contradicts himself in the way you described. "doing morality is problematic" problematic is obviously a negative to him, this is what peeps mean when they say "immoral" - a perceived negative (im assuming you know that morality is relative/subjective and therefore perception is its entirety).
@@manaleauxduclaire482 Thanks for this reply, but I think you should slow down with your premises in this comment. I'm not willing to call someone a "bad philosopher until I've read their works/communicated with their works on a deeper level than a few videos would be able to provide. Moreover, your claim that morality is "known" to be "relative" and therefore "subjective" needs an unbelieveable amount of groundwork before I can accept it.
@@shrill_2165 life is too short to waste it listening to every invalid argument that some so so makes. but if thats what you want to do, up to you obviously. im afraid the groundwork you would need for accepting that morality is relative is something you would have to 'witness' for yourself. best i can do to try and point you in the right direction is: if the universe disappeared right this instant, never to be seen again (the cessation of existence), would it objectively matter? consider that question and be honest with yourself about the answer, even if you dont like the answer.
@@manaleauxduclaire482 With all due respect, I don't think you've put as much thought into that statement as you think you have. You might think that you have that all figured out, but the way that you write this strikes me as someone who has figured out very little, not the reverse.
This video shows perfectly the difference between the popularized discussion of Harris (based on lose, intuitive and sometime incoherent arguments) and a scholarly discussion of Prof. Moeller. Thank you very much for the insight. I found the religion - god analogy particularly useful and apt to describe the difference between a relative social normative construct (there are many religions) and an absolute normative authority (there is one god and at best one true religion, where all the other religions need to be false).
Its quite hard to hear an amoral person speak confidently about conflict and about killing other people, as if he is sure they are quite bad. He seems to have a moral stance towards that. Well, if its not a moral preference, what is it. I am interested in knowing
15:27 "moral language is very dangerous. . . it's a form of communication that is, empirically speaking, highly problematic". This is a qualitative claim. If you thought violence was good, than anything which lead to violence would NOT be problematic. So why do you think it's problematic? Even in your effort to undermine morality, you nonetheless use moral language. Morality cannot be brushed aside. It's inescapable. So silly.
You have to remember the distinction between good, right in a relative (amoral) and an absolute (moral ) sense. He said moral communication can lead to violence, implying it can also not lead to violence. If violence increases your well-being, then moral language would be dangerous to you because it could lead to the condamnation of violence. If you're against violence, then moral language would be dangerous to you because it could lead to the justification of violence. This is precisely a judgement of moraliy in a relative sense. If he would say morality is absolutely bad, he would argue morally. If he says morality is bad in certain circumstances for specific people, he is argueing amorally. The whole point is that amorality in most specific situations increases well-being, when morality isn't. Because moral judgements in their absolute nature, apply themselves to all situations indifferently, regardless if they increase well-being or not, they lead to unintended side effects. While amoral judgements apply only to situations if they fit in and increase well-being.
@@sualtam9509 What you describe as 'amoral language' is whatever result of action is in concordance with an explicit desire, taste, or end. Sam Harris puts forth well-being as the ultimate end, whereby all judgments of good can be construed as those decisions which produce well-being, admitting of the fact it will be different for different people in different places and times. Unless well-being isn't a universal end, it seems to me the disagreement can be reduced to the use of the word 'moral'. But where do those explicit desires, tastes, and ends come from? And why are they preferable to their opposites (why is well-being better than suffering)? Why should you not change your mind about what you want? What happens when your desires are in competition with someone else? How does amorality solve that? In other words, what becomes of 'amoral good' when decisions transcend individuals?
@@PhilosophyOfNoa I will try to answer your last question. Amorality won't solve a dispute about competing interests. We could try to approximate a solution in a consensus either in court or in a democratic process or in any other sort of agreement. To find such a common ground it is often wise to see both interests as equally valid and legitimate. This can be achieved through amorality. That's why judges shall be impartial and neutral. If we moralize such a conflict of interests, we burden each person with more than just their personal interest, but with a moral judgement on themselves. Probably each one will see themselves as morally good, therefore the other one as evil. The conflict is no longer just about the specific topic at hand, but about saint or sinner e.g. a potential social death. It will make a consensus extremely hard to reach.
@@sualtam9509 You're right. Consensus, however, assumes that people can be moved toward common ground either by some rhetorical or coercive incentive. But if there is no absolute logic by which to judge personal interests, why should anyone change their position? All it comes down to is finding which individual button to press to bend someone nearer your own will. And if someone won't bend? The only recourse seems, to me, to be violence. Empirically, most people will seek consensus to avoid violence, but there is no logic which compels a person to value the avoidance of violence rather than justification by might. Amorality does not offer a solution to the existential crises one might face in questioning his or her own desires, nor in questioning how to spend one's time.
1. Has to use God not existing to justify morality not existing. Interesting. 2. People are closley related to violence. 3. Harris is quite fantastically narrow minded. 4. Would like to see a positive Kant video on this channel. Kant is notoriously difficult to read.
@@dominiks5068 i struggle to think of a reason that would convince a philosopher of his level of experience, to believe that god doesnt exist (not to be confused with talent (im saying he's old). i mean atheist in the literal sense i can understand, due to a lack of empirical evidence (guess they didnt read descartes' meditations though, right? :). though i would say most of the vocal ones are actually anti-theist and just want to make you think theyre super intellectual.
I don't really know what you mean by morality in an absolute sense? To me morality only makes sense relative to behaviour and its outcomes? What meaning would morality have in a void?
He's not only saying this. He's also acting it out and uploading this video to communicate the idea. Probably because he thought this action leads to something good rather than bad. Otherwise why would he say these things and take these actions when he could be - i dont know - taking his shirt off on the film and not uploading the video. I think he hinted on his values. "Conflict is bad" "Division is bad" "People killing people is bad". And it seems, trying to prevent these things from happening in the world with his speech and actions is the right thing for him to be doing as he has done these things. So much for amorality.
With quoting Wickenstein he argues that identifying with moral truth in an absolute way devalues other peoples activities and that this is problematic. So he hints that devaluing other peoples activities is problematic or bad or should be avoided. So much for amoralism. And he's also contradicting with these values I assumed he's acting upon. I think he would agree, that peoples actions contradicting these values, such as people killing people or people causing division, should be devalued actions and deemed less moral or bad in his value network. At least he is implicitly doing this devaluing in hinting that this kind of objectives should be thrived for.
I think the other commenters are conflating Prof. Moeller's personal moral stance with his opinions on how schools should be run. He does not seem to be an "amoral" actor. He cautions against the _overuse_ of moral discourse because it can create immoral situations. He, as a moral actor, is advising schools not to concern themselves so much with the morality of their students. This doesn't mean that the schools enforce amorality or immorality, or that the ideal student will be amoral. It is the duty of the school to create better _students_ and not _more moral_ students. Corporal punishment is an overuse or misuse of the language of morality in a context where no such language need be used. The effects of these abuses are "immoral" (they harm children).
@@dragonsaul There's a difference between choosing to behave in a way you believe to be right and behaving according to some moral 'fact'. The former is humble, and leaves room for self-criticism. The latter is both absolute and arrogant. I rather think what the video is cautioning against is the idea that you have, or ever can have, THE ANSWER to the moral question - and concomitant dangers that come from believing you do. That kind of overconfidence often leads us to do things that we ourselves may usually deem as bad, such as 'holy' wars. In some cases, such as his school example at the end, it even increases well-being (what Harris uses to measure moral worth) to simply stop making moral judgments at all - when we stopped thinking of underperformers as morally deficient, we stopped beating them into shape as well, which is an increase to childrens' well-being. You can argue that concern for children's well-being is itself a moral decision, but it was Harris' decision - the point he's making is that, ironically, 'de-moralizing' the issue is what achieved it. Basically, it's not so much about being AMORAL as it is about being THE MORAL. You may always have some sense of right and wrong, just don't go believing it's absolute. Indeed as he says, just believing that in itself automatically de-legitimizes or consigns to irrelevance everyone else's beliefs, and so probably even the quest for and/or certainty in the existence of absolute moral 'facts' (what, in his view, Harris is trying to find via secular / scientific means) is itself something to be avoided. You can be guided by your beliefs, just never forget that it is merely a belief i.e. don't let it get to your head. Ironically, despite people thinking bloodshed is bad, plenty of blood has been shed thanks to 'moral' crusades - it's hard to launch a crusade if you can't demonize the other side because of how they differ from your set of moral 'facts'. Morality ought to be a discourse - an ongoing communication - rather than a 'discovery' of objective 'facts'. And in many cases it may even be better to simply ditch moral judgments altogether - not quite being 'amoral' in the sense of someone lacking a moral sense at all, but being 'amoral' in the sense of not approaching the issue from a moral angle.
Two poor and incredibly off-putting options here. Harris is far too fixated on science. The repeat focus on "morality" and "absolutes" here seems so dated. Wittgenstein's foolish approach to ethics and philosophy is also highly problematic. He contributed to academic philosophy being scarcely philosophy for much of the past hundred years, and helped create foolish taboos against actually educating ourselves towards wisdom. Pursuing philosophy as the love of wisdom can actually work out exceptionally well as the life of Florence Nightingale helps to convey. (Her father, who put a lot of effort into homeschooling her, was huge on Plato and Dugald Stewart, a leading figure of the Scottish Enlightenment. Thanks in large part to her exemplary education, Nightingale accomplished even far more than she is known for; she is an excellent example of how a traditional conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom may show up in a contemporary context.) Is it concern about morality that has people complacently supporting factory farms, failing to adequately respond to climate change, doing far too little in response to escalating rates of depressed youths, and looking the other way as genocides take place and people starve to death? Look for exemplars. There's a lot of wisdom in the ancients that far surpass the two approaches highlighted here.
@@shyman3000, many thanks. I was glad to find this channel through its criticism of Philosophy Tube's treatment of Kant and then my enthusiasm quickly soured when I saw that ^^^ this ^^^ is what was being offered as a sound approach to philosophy. ACK!!!
@@jonasjorgensen8759 Do you agree that he FINISHED philosophy with the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he wrote while still a youth, and that in doing so, he hadn't actually accomplished much, as he indicates that he believed he had done in the preface of the work? Such an arrogant and ridiculous claim. He hadn't even learned much of anything about the history of philosophy yet he took himself as able to swoop in and show that everyone prior to him had been grossly in error and talking a lot of nonsense!!! (Plato saw no one as ready to even begin serious study of philosophy until 50 or so). Do you think philosophy is aptly construed as a disease to be cured -- a fly to be shown the way out of the fly bottle? Philosophy is actually VITALLY important. He pushed the notion that it leaves everything as it is. That's bullshit. Capable approaches to philosophy can and have made vast improvements to the world at large. In part due to the idiotic cult of genius that arose around him, Wittgenstein did a lot to derail philosophy from its fundamental task of helping us move towards wisdom.
@@reconstructingphilosophy you Will find his biggest contributions in his later works :) regarded as one, If not the, Greatest mind in 20th century philosophy.
The assertion seems to be that morality is fundamentally problematic because it can create discord and conflict. That ignores the fact that it can also create harmony and benefit. Indeed the notion of morality would not have survived in successful societies over time, in fact it is surely a fundamental necessity for any society to flourish. It does not imply the same values for each society but there must be some sort of code or understanding that has wide consensus which on the whole has beneficial utility. The beating is a good example, if it did not serve as an overall benefit despite the immediate plain it inflicted, given the circumstances of the period and presumably lack of useful alternative, then it probably would not have been continued as a practice for so long. I don't believe it is possible to judge well the full implications and effects of such practices viewed from a society that is now different in so many ways. Furthermore has there actual been any serious studies to determine the long term effects of beating on life outcomes on an individual and society level? Many times has the statement been made that society is too soft on kids now, they lack discipline, spare the rod spoil the child, it just might be they have a point.
i think psychological research is pretty clear on violence with children: they either become adults who see violance as an answer or become terrified of everything. maybe more discipline would be good for todays children but not in the form of physical violence. Talking to the child and explaining their bad behavior and punishing them with chores seems way more productive if you want more discipline. the reason violent punishments for children stuck around imo has nothing to do with its utility, but with the utility of frustration induced violence in general. it is important for a person to at some point snap and lash out, otherwise neither proper negotiotions nor revolutions or defense of the motherland would be possible. punishment of children as well as all other domestic violence is just a byproduct of humans needing a drive for violence to survive. but in generall, the proximal reason for spanking your child is just that you spend a lot of time with them and can get frustrated easily. one more thing regarding violence in eduction: it is basically just conditioning the child to associate a behavior with pain. learning like this vanishes incredible fast as soon as the stimulus disappears (i.e. the spanking when the child becomes an adult). so you just end up with someone who is afraid of punishments but also doesnt know why some things are wrong while also believing that violence is a proper response to people of lower status disagreeing with you. if you actually talk to your child and explain to them the reasons we dont take certain actions, the learning might be a bit slower but actually last into adulthood. again, a person who only behaves well because he fears punishment will stop doing so once he is certain the punishment cant reach him
@@kettenschlosd Agree with some of that, I never felt the need to use corporal punishment on my two girls and would talk through issues with them. They were and still are well adjusted and behaved in my view. I do have a feeling that this to a degree is a modern day luxury not shared by all still for various reasons. Bigger families were the norm, children less supervised. A good talking to didn't cut much ice with me when I decided at eight years old to wander off occasionally on the odd adventure over the park or round the streets for a couple of hours, a whack from my father when he got home got the message through pretty quick. I have to say I am somewhat sceptical of claims around psychological research, much of the social sciences seems to consist of hypothesis assertion conclusion, not necessarily in that order, that do not invest the years controls and attention to detail required to ascertain for example how a child who was smacked fares in life compared to one who was not. Not saying there are no worthwhile studies in psychology but I suggest there are many that are not. Has violence in teenagers and young adults improved since corporal punishment was deemed unacceptable, certainly levels of knife crime in London for example doesn't seem to support that claim and how about shootings and stabbings in America. One modern phenomenon I find extremely annoying and I suspect benefits nobody is when there is a child behaving really badly, they are upsetting other children, damaging property, generally disrupting everything and the parent stands by calmly explaining why they should not be doing that while the child just carries on regardless and then kicks up a mighty tantrum when somebody eventually intervenes. I will say there is a lot worse which can be done and often is than the odd whack. Verbal castigation can be cruel and damaging when it is persistent as can other forms of non physical punishment. Not a major example but when I was about nine I was sent to the headmaster for what I thought a minor indiscretion. He told me he was going to stop me playing in the school football team cup final. He offered me an alternative, the cane. Without hesitation I opted for the cane. Five whacks on the hand and it was all over. If I had been stopped from playing I would have been miserable for weeks and probably harboured a resentment that would have stayed with me. As it was I got to play and now had a bonus of a bit of street cred for getting the cane and not crying. Yes abusive violence is awful but there is a huge distinction between that and occasional controlled corporal punishment which often seems to get lost when the subject is discussed.
I think how Sam wrote his book was very lackluster and cast on the wrong light. It's generally easy to end in the pitfall of semantics by taking the linguistic approach to what morality is. Which is the common criticism to Sam's book. Through that road, morality just makes sense when we provide a reference or goal, either explicit or implicit. Sam goes through a completely different (and I would argue better) way of approaching morality, which is through neuroscience. What ever morality is, it is something that exists in the brain of conscious creatures (we can find moral judgment even in monkeys and dogs). It is some form of brain structure. How that brain structure is created/organized/interacts with the rest of the world is a pure scientific question. Exactly because of that can science tells us what is moral and what is not. It then becomes interesting because we might ask the question. Can we change our own morality structure? Would it be moral?
That's complete nonsense. You need to know what you're looking for before you can chase it down in the brain and identify it. I could equally well say that round stones are morality or that people's deisre for rape is morality.
About "book exploding": stupid metaphor, because book is piece of art that'why can be estimated only from aesthetic point of view,, not from moral point of view!
To me it's more along the lines of simplicity being an illusion, the fact is that reality is unperceivable without abstraction but we don't really bother thinking too much about how we abstract it and so we take it for granted and often mistake the real with the image of the real we invent. Does that make sense? I'm shit at philosophy lol
I don't think I agree with that definition of morality, for me morality is not a form of communication. Maybe a set of principles (or the attempt at creating a set of principle) that try to be universal, and can be used by the individual to regulate his behavior when interacting with other individuals for the purpose of limiting friction and conflict. Or perhaps it is a form of communication, if we regard the laws as a form of communication which inform people on what they can and cannot do
Not ONCE in the entire video is the meaning of "well-being" questioned. This "moving toward well-being" without objective standards is plainly arbitrary.
2:27 1. Some dead white guy said we only use the term good or right in relative or trivial way, therefore Harris is wrong because he uses the word in an absolute way and that's not allowed, so sayeth the dead white guy (Ludwig Wittgenstein). 4:40 2. The criteria is the science of wellbeing, which may be relative in terms of different brains visavis activities but is otherwise a fairly straightforward objective science. So Harris's moral philosophy has a criteria and that criteria is objective (mostly). 6:48 3. The term relative is being downright abused here, the science of health/wellbeing isn't so relative and individually distinctive that nothing about the field can be reliably summarized, that's inane and factually wrong. For the love of Phil and Sophy what the hell does he think medical students study, just endless case histories? He can keep making the claim that you can't jump from the contextual wellbeing of an individual to wellbeing as such but it falls flat every time I glance over at the trove of generalized knowledge on wellbeing known as medical studies... 7:54 to 8:53 This goes beyond inane, the idea that a book of absolute morality would make everything everyone has ever done, is doing or will do insignificant is completely asinine. That idea that such a book is undesirable because it would trivialize all other books on the matter is equally stupid, it's like saying a definitive book on consciousness and the mind is undesirable because it would trivialize all other books on the matter. I mean, in either case there's always posterity and lovers of the written word that will read anything, so who cares whether or how trivial the activity is? 9:26 to 9:42 🙄 10:54 to 11:00 🙄 14:10 to 14:44 He is doing with morality what capitalists tend to do to communism, he's painting the whole subject with it's worst attempts. 17:00 This whole scenario is undermined when you make wellbeing the center of your mortality, which is why Harris doesn't address this. I wonder if anyone can think of a scenario in which being amoral leads to less wellbeing or less improvement in wellbeing than a system of morality built upon it (wellbeing).
Professor Moeller has not even risen to the level of philosophy. If one evokes Wittgenstein as one's authority, one remains outside the gates of this science.
God doesn't exist but determines our behavior Morality doesn't exist but determines our behavior Truth doesn't exist but determines our behavior Free Will doesn't exist but determines our behavior Value doesn't exist but determines our behavior Human race to existence: I am a joke to you?
@@dmitryalexandersamoilov You are very much right. The problem of an idea is that the idea of Santa there is in my mind will never be the idea of Santa you have on your mind. In this sense an idea can't be real unless we have a realm of perfect ideas where those different concepts of Santa are derived from
Morality and knives. Knives have the potential to lead to harm, so we should not use knives. Sometimes I wish A. Einstein had not discovered relativity in physics, so that we would not have all this relativistic speak in ALL aspects of human thinking.
Helgian nonsense is actually at fault for this nonsense, they would have just piggy backed off another cool kid term. Hell, you can take this nonsense all the way back to the protestant reformation, and even them further all the way to the gnostic heresies of the early church days.
Only philosophers speak in absolutes and then equate them into the real world. I find Harris comprehensible, since there no absolutes, the best we can do is map morality into the real world. Human morality arises from values that contribute to a particular world view (hence their danger). But pursuing as broad as possible a moral world view is the pursuit of drawing an absolute circle in a discreet world.
I think that the main point of Harris has been misunderstood. He does not try to make the case that there are objective moral truths within the classical definitions of morality which are culturally or religiously derived without any actual criteria behind. Instead he proposes that the only useful way for society to talk about something like morality (a compass for better or worse / benevolent or maleovolant), assuming we are compassionate and altruistic human beings, as opposed to tribal human beings, is to simply use a well defined criteria: that which maximizes well-being (even though that might be difficult to evaluate in some cases, but that's the how rather than the what). The last point about the beaten students does not seem right, I don't think most teachers care about whether their students are morally good or bad people, but only about their results as students. They've beaten students instead, either under false assumption that punishment improved their learning performance by demotivating them e.g. from being distracted and/or for sadistic pleasure of the teachers.
Just discovered this channel - I like Prof Moeller! But I think he is too generous to Harris when he says it is reasonable to speak of increasing human well-being even in specific circumstances. Even in such situations it is meaningless, as it is in principle not measurable by reference to any criteria. It is also trivial in that it assumes one can quantify and resolve an infinitude of variables. This is why, given the same factual matrix, Moeller can legitimately come to a conclusion the opposite of Harris'. If Harris is right about the specific (which he is not), his extrapolation to the universal becomes perhaps a challenge only of degree.
Harris also seems to believe that a well-meaning neuroscientist can determine, objectively, what the best life is for everyone and how to achieve it. I can't believe such a universal standard exists. We are too different from each other. I think the Stoics were more sane: Each of them had to find balance and peace within his own life, in his own way. That was true whether you were a lowly soldier or the Emperor of Rome.
Seems, I know not seems, dear mother. I have the markings…. But it does seem that by saying you cannot use language to instantiate some objective moral truth that at least that is part of la nuance speaking some absolute moral truth. That is the issue, is it not? Does god exist? And that is by faith either way you answer. But the TAO remains. Think about your words next to, say, the Book of Mark. One is eternal, the other is dust in the wind.
I don't know...it seems like a rejection of Harris's claim based on a technicality? Maybe Harris doesn't have the objective moral code, and is wrong to speak of it that way. But for structuring any given person's own moral code, structuring how they make value judgements of the world and deciding how to act, valuing actions that improve human wellbeing, well that seems like a good start to me. That there is no objective morality, it is instead just a discourse, like religion is given God isn't real. I suppose that makes sense, but it creates a kind of discomfort...what is the point of moral striving, making value judgements, and acting in a particular way if there is no objective morality? How should one reconcile what they believe is "right" or "good' with what another person believes is "right" or "good"? Is it based on consensus...objective morality is the minimum set of beliefs what we can all agree are good? And I see others in the comments point out that an objective morality, maybe it is illusory, but perhaps it is still a fine target to aim at. Perhaps it has utility to conceive of and try to agree on a common morality, to draw boundaries between good and bad. Perhaps I should read your book.
Objective Morality, in the simplest terms, is the belief that morality is universal, meaning that it isn't up for interpretation. Basically there is only one right and wrong.
@@lobstered_blue-lobster its not biased though. its called moral relativism. its true because objective value doesn't exist, so we have to rely on subjective experience to interpret and attempt to assign value, either positive or negative to how actions effect others.
Moral _realism_ is probably a better term than “objective” morality. That seems to be the term actual philosophers researching and debating metaethics use.
Amorality is such an empty philosophy. People seem to forget that if you dispense with [objective] morality, you also have to abandon moral duties and responsibilities - the pressing obligation to "be good" and "do good." Imagine a life where no such obligation existed and it was just invented arbitrarily to prolong our wellbeing (whatever that is) as we course through time and space towards our inevitable and meaningless end.
Ok, but... morals bad and amorality good? Wouldn't this view require absolute good and bad to exist and isn't it very moral itself? I don't think this matrix can be left.
Why would this view require an "absolute" good and bad to exist? One can be good or bad in a non-moral sense, for example, in relation to a practical skill, such as playing chess or tennis. I don't think anyone would suggest that saying someone is good or bad at tennis is a moral judgement. If we regard living well within a given society as a practical matterr then surely the same would apply in this instance.
@@robertpierce4069 No, you are getting me wrong. I referred to the interviewee. He advocates for amorality. As it seems, he advocates for it under all circumstances. Therefore, amorality must be absolutely good and pursuing it must thus be moral. I just wanted to point out that contradiction.
seems like you haven't really taken wittgenstein's message to heart. morality doesn't exist, yeah, neither does pain, nor thought, nor concepts or notions or whatever you use when trying to make sense of life. but still you can without overanalyzing see that some actions are wrong and should be condemned, and you really don't need some complete theory of what is right and wrong. we do have instincts to be compassionate and helpful and friendly, evolutionarily ingrained propensities for behavior that is not exclusively self serving, but not everyone is to same degree prone to that, so agreeing on some key things is much more beneficial than what your talk makes it seem to be. it is not at all reasonable to think that things would somehow be better if we did away with morality, or even just religion. also you are talking wittgenstein and at the same time dealing with words like morality and religion exactly in the way that he advised against. like right and wrong are concepts, so morality is wrong, i mean that is just silly, and i know that the way i put it is sort of exagerated, but pay attention to how you put it and you'll see that silly things follow after you or anyone tries to unground themselves completely, pure reason in that sense is nonsense
long story short: this guy doesnt know what he's talking about and contradicts himself. "moral language/discussion/beliefs often leads to conflict (which is a negative/immoral in his own words), therefore we shouldnt use moral language/discussion/beliefs". take it from someone who actually knows what theyre on about: within the confines of human understanding; morality is entirely relative/subjective. this is an absolute undeniable truth (must stress: within the confines of human understanding), anyone who disagrees simply doesnt understand morality. however; and this is crucial: you really, REALLY dont want to spend your entire childhood in jimmy savilles basement, right? obviously not. so with that said, we have a very basic foundation for a reasonable affirmation in regards to what could be considered moral/immoral. long story short: do unto others as you would have them do unto you (the golden rule) - maybe jesus? though confucius beat him to it with the silver rule - dont do unto others as you wouldnt have them do unto you; exactly the same when you consider the 'ought' and not the 'is' - this presents a major problem, which is why there is so much strife and conflict with humans; peeps cant agree on what ought to be considered moral. basically, it all boils down to whoever can enforce their position, and that really is it.
Of course you have an anime profile picture of a prepubescent. Only your type could shamelessly post this sort of verbal vomit and think its some sort of valuable retort.
I barely made it halfway through. Too much "uh" & "um"...hearing the professor's talk is like trying to hear a podcast or radio program through ongoing static.
Glad I found this channel. I either vehemently agree, or disagree, but I'm always glad I listened.
What happened on this one?
I wasn't a big fan of God, but I'm not much more excited about the technocrats.
If you’d like, I know a guy with a really big ladder and a really sharp knife who can take care of the former.
@@randomperson2078 love that edge 👌🏾
@@calmexit6483
Careful how you talk to me. Don’t disrespect me - I know a guy with a really sharp knife.
Monstrous dictator vs technocrats is a really easy choice if you aren't an anti intellectual libertarian idiot!
@@fuckfannyfiddlefart let me know how you enjoy your armed drones, Winston Smith.
Alright that's it, this is the channel of the month for me.🏆
I find this very relevant to my own experience because whenever I was stuying morality and ethics in college I remember leaving the classroom thinking "You know, all these moral and ethical theories may seem enticing, but they are all pretty deeply flawed", and yet, I think that precisely because I took those classes and thought this way did I become a much more tolerant and accepting person.
Brilliant. The analogy of the relationship between the existence of God and religion compared to the existence of morality and a way of acting/communicating. I hope I understood that correctly.
Just to summarize this idea. Religion is something that does not depend on the existence of God (i.e., an unrealistic assumption). In the same way, morality is a discourse that does not depend on 'true' moral propositions (i.e., also an unrealistic assumption).
what time stamp does he talk about this idea?
I think your view on "secular spirituality" (which Sam Harris is associated with as well) might be extremely interesting, especially due to your knowledge on Eastern philosophy. There generally seems to be a big link between philosophy of mind, the notion that the "self" is an illusion, secularism, etc. at the moment, with e. g. Thomas Metzinger being active in that field as well.
Hi! I just wanted to comment to say that I have been watching your channel, and I like it. It's great to have another more rigorous philosophy channel on youtube. Thank you.
Love this idea that morality is a form of communication, like a particular aesthetic of discourse that deliberately and essentially divides and hierarchizes people.
..but isn't the opposition and distaste against, as well as will to destroy hierarchy itself a deal of a morality which seeks to hierarchicalize modes of being and people (in this case, those who are moral in such and such way that you happen to mislike, modes of being which you happen to mislike)?
This is kind of the same thing Deleuze talks about, that binaries can only be shifted, not uprooted. To shun morality for its a- or immorality, following you, is itself a kind of morality with its meres shifted to your taste.
@@percivalyracanth1528 i think the discussion of amorality, as opposed to immorality, is how we should respond to this. It feels like a "gotcha" of sorts to point the potential contradiction of asserting amoral discourse as better in some way. But whats important here is the distinction between hierarchizing in the realm of absolutes vs shifting realms of contingency and context, well being, efficient functionality, etc. And the difference is discourse styles right? In amoral discourse, we contextualize hierarchizing language with relevant facts.
@Weapons Of Mass Distraction The problem is, scientists don't truly work like that. For instance, there is a growing gap in linguistics where one side believes in Universal Grammar and the other in statistically analytic individual grammar(s). Both sides use the same points against one another, and both have a quasireligious understanding of and belief in their respective systems. There's no token as to something that can shut this breach, and both sides have sound insights as to some greater truth, but neither may be 'the' truth. In that way, science does give room for civil wars since discourse isn't some magically settling thing, but rather a system of readings of data, and lots of folk are gonna have wildly differing readings of any given set of data, and these readings lend themselves to, or are rather built upon, hierarchicalization of the weight of certain readings of data.
@@andresirigoyen Problem is, contextualization leans on reading/interpretation, and reading is hierarchical, that is what we wish to read and what data we focus on is set by our hierarchicalizations of what is weighty to us in the data. Even a so-called amorality is more like a sardonic, ironic morality.
@@andresirigoyen But shifting realms isn't "better" than staying the same.
What do you want to avoid conflict, why is that better than nuking ourselves to death?
Do you not see how amorality is an automatic suicide?
Seriously think about it, who gives a rat's behind about this or that being more efficient if there's no underlying reason to choose efficacy rather than personal preference or whatever.
You're trying to say "we should" no we shouldn't anything if there is no morality, it's really that simple, if I want to lay down and die, increasingly the case with more cases of depression and euthanasia being legalized slowly but surely, you have no say in it.
Child birth to continue the species?
Look at the average number of children for Atheist families compared to religious, pathetic.
This endeavor is futile and it is the sad conclusion of a people that hate their own religious roots to the point of extinction quite literally.
This is not a case for religion, I am just stating the facts, a philosopher and political figure by the name of Rochedy puts this very well but he's a Frenchman so idk if you can watch.
Basically he ties all of this to Nitzsche's concept of nihilism which is ultimately anti-life energy and permeates all of these people to one extent or another.
They will be extinguished there is no doubt about it.
Found this very interesting, especially the discussion of the Wittgenstein essay, thanks for the upload!
I did want to point out that the issue in English or at least in America with amorality is not that it is being confused with immorality it is that it is synonymous with apathy and indifference. This synonymy gives amorality an immoral reputation.
Moral: Comforting a dying person.
Immoral: Abusing a dying person.
Amoral: Ignoring a dying person.
Or: helping, worsening, not helping. Some might even say that stripping the belongings from the house of a dying person because "They won't need this stuff anymore" is amoral. But in either case one might argue that the action, or inaction is _immoral_ because it shows little to no concern for other people.
@Michael You want... doctors who ignore dying people?
within the confines of human experience, there is basically no such thing as an amoral act, and perhaps even no such thing as an amoral thought. some thoughts may be so insignificant as to not even result in an experience for the thinker, or as an experience for another due to the thought leading to action; what im referring to is chaos theory. an ethemeral thought might lead to an act that has sufficient impact to be recognized as an experience after being compounded by however many sequential events (simply put: i dont know).
basically, even blinking might lead to an impactful experience for someone, thanks to chaos theory, so naturally the gravity of less benign acts would be greater (or at least i assume so).
@@futurestoryteller ikr, complete lunacy.
@@futurestoryteller How would you understand amorality as explained in this video then?
9:40 - But this "devaluing" would be problematic only if the talk of absolute good would not be possible. In other words, if Harris' book actually really manages to talk about absolute good, and thus makes all other talk of good insignificant then that is not a problem, because once we have a book of absolute good, then all other books about good are truly irrelevant. Thus it seems to me that this objection already assumes that the absolutist is mistaken in their project, therefore it cannot be a counter-argument to the absolutist.
But you presume all readers are seeking the good, and I for one am not >:)
sams assumption of objective morality only comes to fruition when we have decoded how the brain of every sentient creature works, which is a task of epic proportions. bit on the other hand i dont see how factors apart from concious creatures could even possibly factor into morality, so i guess assuming the brain can be understood completely, it is also possible to find objective peaks in the moral landscape. i think of it like this: sam cannot know, wheter a world where people are happy that they dont need to work or a world where people are really happy about the how fulfilling and productive their jobs are is ultimately better. but hes methodology could definitely aid in optimizing both societies to their respective goals
The point is that there is no absolute good. What Harris talks about is entirely subjective, and referring to it as absolute is what's problematic. Harris conflates the versions of "good" is what the argument is. The devaluing is problematic only as a result.
Exactly. An absolute morality devalues those endeavors which are immoral, which in fact is only undesirable if you're already committed to immoral acts - in which case your opinion is pretty much irrelevant, to be frank, so, truly, relativism would be a very desirable last resort for such an individual, albeit an irrational one in the case where absolute morality is true. She is perfectly able to say that "there is no absolute good", that on itself would simply be a meaningless proposition from the absolutist perspective by virtue of it being false, a "cope" if you will. But I don't know where Wittgenstein was going with the whole idea that "then all other books about good are truly irrelevant" since this is not what we see in philosophical traditions that assume an absolute good, at least as long as the books stay on the same tradition. Assuming the tradition to be correct then, yeah, all the books that deviate from it would be "irrelevant" insofar as they're wrong (and possibly immoral).
That's the problem, that it would be undesirable to give up all human activity that is not supported for that theoretical book, because why assume that being absolutely good is desirable? Besides, how would you go about to prove that such a book is possible without comparing it *relatively* to a specific context? In the case of Harris' argument, he attempts to close the gap between absolute morality and relative morality with a scientific understanding of the human brain, but that's still relative to the human experience. It's paradoxical. You only focus on the second part of the argument, but the first part is that such a book, such absolute morality, is non-existent. Just like all religions and their deities, morality is a form of communication relative to human existence, it does not exist independent of it like, say, the phenomena described by the laws of thermodynamics seem to be. All you would end up with assuming otherwise, like Harris does, is with a bible-like book and a bunch of fundamentalists.
This is why philosophy is important, even from scientists.
I would agree with statement that morality can be dangerous topic. That bad things can be done in the name of that moral system, but a lack of any moral system would surely be a chaotic nightmare of nihilism and evil.
Furthermore I would not agree at all, that the students have been beaten in education system, because they wanted to make them better students, but rather because they have a psychological need to normalize the violence they experienced themselves as students. I would argue that there is definitely, more often than not, a difference between what people say, why they do things, and what is the actual reason why they do things. Moral speech is often used as an excuse for evil deeds, but the lack of morality would be short lived and destructive.
As Will Durant wrote in his book the story of philosophy:
“There is nothing so absurd,” said Cicero, “but that it may be found in the books of the philosophers.” Doubtless some philosophers have had all sorts of wisdom except common sense ; and many a philosophic flight has been due to the elevating power of thin air.
I think this discourse that Dr. Möller perpetuates is a problem of academics and thinkers/philosophers in general. They over analyze and extrapolate meaning and causality where there is none. They think peoples actions are more philosophical and complex, in the same way they think, and thus fall in love with their own ideas and reasoning. When the reasons for simple peoples actions are more psychological and direct than they want to admit.
Most what all people do is automatic/unconscious behavior based on what they saw and experienced growing up, and the morality and philosophical reasoning arises from those experiences naturally.
This felt really strong on absolutist statements and short on supporting examples. Is "the" reason students have been beaten for 1000s of years singularly the result of a particular kind of moral thinking? My personal experience indicates maybe not, but I don't know where the claim comes from. Similarly is it a net negative to think in terms of right and wrong vs. not doing so and is that true in a universal absolute sense?
One of the reason why people are getting bitten is because people are capable of violence and sometimes passionately desire violence. It has nothing to do with morality or amorality. It is just a fact. Strange how two major thinkers of our time are beating around the bush of such a common sensical knowledge. I have my intuitions why it happens, but I will refrain form speculation
I personally support his theory.
There is a saying in ancient China: "棒下出孝子‘’：“Sticks give birth to pious son”. To be pious is to be moral/sincere. And violence, in which the ancient Chinese believe, seems to be able to achieve that.
So my question is: what does Harris bring to the table on this question that is any different from the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, etc.? Just seems like he's reiterating their arguments + "wow neuroscience."
He clear this up in his previous podcast (episode #323), saying that utilitarianism focuses mainly on body counts and quality-adjusted life-years and disregards consequences to people's mental states / experiences, which creates vectors for flawed criticisms. I would say it´s a refinement.
This clip is a part of a longer video (please jump to 19:00 to continue) :
"Why Sam Harris is Wrong - A Critique of Sam Harris' "The Moral Landscape" (in 2020)"
th-cam.com/video/NGt0I5MbQSI/w-d-xo.html
Comments like this are usually 'pinned' so they appear on the top of the comments section.
i find myself disagreeing on almost every point the professor makes
i think he misinterpreted the wittgenstein quote. why would it be bad if all other books exploded? that's the point of writing a 'moral' book, to say what's good and have nothing left over. that would solve a lot of disagreements, wars, hatreds and a lot of other miscommunications that plague the human race.
however, the fact that this kind of 'meta-cultural' morality has not, as of yet, been found speaks volumes.
every moral book with great aspirations (like Sam Harris' book, or the Bible, or The Founding of the Metaphysics of Morals) claims to know what's good as good for any human, as long as they are human. yet none of them have been able to assert their claim to the absolute good for as long as humans have existed.
maybe that book has already been written. maybe the explosion of all other books doesn't happen in such an instant, at least from a human perspective. maybe it takes a lot of bloodshed to make the real true only good shine through to humans.
or maybe that's the testament of the human incompleteness. even though we have the ideas, and even though we have powerful opinions about them, our talking about them and acting them out makes them finite, concrete and r e l a t i v e.
maybe that's a testament to the human paradox: even though we can't reach our goal (we don't really even know what the goal is,), we keep striving. 'striving' here is not a relative term. it's not "Humans strive for... (God, good, godliness, truth, godlikeness, power...)". It's "Humans strive". that's what we do.
when there's a strive, there's a way to steer that strive. that's where the "unrealistic" assumptions of religion come in. the steering that religion does becomes the steering of what a human is.
a strive that is absolute needs absolute enticement to steer it. however, when the absolute becomes intertwined with temporality (language), it corrupts.
but that's okay. humans are corrupt (mortal). it seems every absolute in existence is preceded by a relative (the human, the language, the time). and that's a predicament. every absolute is corrupt. paradoxes breed predicaments.
now, you can choose to battle that corruptness by disowning every absolute, like the professor does. for instance, There is no God. that's what Sam Harris also does.
Sam Harris then at least tries to forge a new absolute, in Science. but that puts Science and God on the same plane, terminologically.
the professor does not try to forge a new absolute, he just says that morality talk is bad and dangerous.
both the professor and Sam Harris agree in one thing - religion can be (or completely is) bad and dangerous.
both of them focus only on the divisive part of religion. they ignore the cohesive.
they think that by eradicating the aggressive parts of morality, they will eradicate aggression. a very teenage standpoint. and a dangerous one at that.
they either offer cheap platitudes that are based on "scientific objective truth", or they offer nothing at all.
by listening to the professor and Sam Harris, we are not much helped in our predicament. that is human fate - to constantly be in a predicament.
Anthony Giddens wrote many things regarding how a runaway society (juggernaut) might or might not be steered, our place in the vehicle and exactly how much agency one has within the context of that structure (structuration).
Sam Harris claims to reject relativism, but only by placing the optimization of relative values as the only true path to absolute values. Really good encapsulation of how his reasoning fails.
This guy claims to reject morality, but only by claiming that morality is problematic, which is itself a moral claim. Morality is inescapable.
@@robertbutchko5066 That's exactly right.
@@robertbutchko5066That depends on how you define morality, I'm not sure how you're defining it, but I think your trying to say beliefs that carry negative or positive connotations towards specific ideas and concepts is a form of morality. In that case, objective truths could be considered to be just a person's moral code. I.e., A person tells his friend not to get to close to the cliff-edge because there's a high chance of death. You could say: "Well that's just another moral code". But that would be silly. Morality is a means by which humans participate in society and maintain order, it ain't some buzzword you could associate anything with.
@@PhilosophyOfNoa he distinguished between relative morality and absolute morality. he was obviously saying absolute morality is bad in the relative sense of resulting in behaviors contrary to his preferences.
@@Synerco why should anyone care about his preferences. How is that an argument?
There is a morality about morality, or a meta-ethic. Universal morality is not a factual claim, it is another value judgement or moral claim. Morality should not be relative, but we have no way of knowing if morality is truly universal or not, just that it ought to be (because, if not, that could exploited). It is not morally preferable to be amoral
Someone please correct me where I'm wrong. I know I'm oversimplifying a 20 minute video, but it sounds like the objection here isn't to pursuing wellbeing, it's to identifying wellbeing in a moral frame work as the very nature of a moral framework diminishes wellbeing? Rather we should pursue wellbeing in an amoral framework discarding the concepts of good and evil that are central to morality?
in the most clinical way i can think of explaining this: there isnt an amoral framework. every experience of note is considered positive or negative by the subjective evaluation of the individual. this is where the moral framework originates from. it is an attempt, be it conciously or otherwise, to establish a standard of conduct. the very purpose of it is to enhance wellbeing, not diminish it.
long story short: the guy in the vid was rambling about stuff he didnt understand, hence the 20 min length and you being unsure what he was trying to say.
00:20 - The definition of morality in "The Moral Landscape".
2:00 - Wittgenstein "Lecture on Ethics".
5:50 - The mistake Harris makes - We can optimize the relative usage of the words good and right, until it becomes absolute.
Is that the manga BLAME! on the left of the professor on the shelf?! Would love his views on it if that is the case.
I was considering to write a philosophy paper on Blame and the Sublime once but didn't, because it seemed weird, but now I'm thinking about it again...
“Just as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant, so it is pain, so it is suffering, that make it possible for the recognition of virtue.
Sir Thomas Aquinas
the problem you can't not speak in moral term, how can you not speak in moral term? human language and action are inseparable from
morality. every word, action carry a judgment/moral behind it.
Exactly what i was thinking.. even with his beating school kids example, be says they were beaten because of morality, (he suggests morality is bad throught fhe video) but says when schools became amoral the result was an inprovement in wellbeing... so his premise there is that being amoral is morally good.
What about pooping?
But if morality is dangerous and to be dispensed with in order for it to not to negatively impact well being, what motivation do you then have to care about well being?
that it feels well
@@fernandoizu "that it feels well", bruh just admit that it's because it's good. How is doing something that makes you feel well not good for you?
@@00i0ii0 Plenty of people can feel well while doing 'bad' things -- hence the effective altruism movement, for one thing -- under your definition of good and bad.
@@badnoisebebopblackoutnetwo3348 you can feel well doing a bad thing, but if you do something and all it does is leave you feeling better than you were before then it was good: how can it not be?
And the effective altruism movement answers one question: "how can we use our resources to help others the most?" The effective altruism movement doesn't answer the question of what good is.
@@00i0ii0 My point with effective altruism was that they attack the notion of 'feeling good' is the same as 'what is good'. If you care for better outcomes then just say it's a better outcome for people that they feel well, than to feel terrible -- as per facts about expirience. No need to add some quasi-absolutist idea of 'Good' to the language.
On the whole though, I think Harris has become a poor example of a non-religious moral philosophy. He was really good at one stage by debunking moral absolutism in the major theistic religions. [But many "Abrahamic" religious folks are not moral absolutists anyway, except some literalists or fundamentalists]. The real mystery is why such a flawed concept as "Devine Command Theory" lasted as long as it did.
Well being, for Harris, is a state or condition in which you can say "after a long long time without a vacation I had one - the first in one year" and see nothing wrong with it.
What specific paper of Wittgenstein is Prof Moeller referring to here? Very keen to read it
I think it is: Wittgenstein, L. (1965). I: A lecture on ethics. The philosophical review, 3-12.
--Fai
Nice copy of the "Blame! (vol. 1)" manga on the shelf.
It is immediately obvious from even casual observation of what people do when they are doing morality that it is not for increasing well-being. Most of the behaviors are for hurting disapproved people. Some rationalize this by supposing hurting people makes them better, but an awful lot of moral discourse clearly shows that the goal is largely to hurt people for the sake of a certain sort of pleasure, see Nietzsche.
The big question to me is why and how the likes of Harris delude themselves so thoroughly they cannot even apprehend the issue. It is sort of understandable with religious absolutists who have an obvious interest in evading theodicy by defining it away, but there is no excuse for claiming anything remotely resembling a scientific basis.
You complain about "hurting people" therefore are doing morality as well.
You're just completely unreflected.
Paraphrasing somewhat, please let me know if I've mischaracterised your point, but isn't "We shouldn't engage in moral discourse because it can be used to encourage people to perform violent actions including killing people" itself based on the moral concept that avoidable violence and killing is bad?
I don't think he says "we shouldn't," but more that we should recognize the danger in moral discourse, the same way we recognize the danger in religion. But you're right: He's using a moral argument to show the danger of moral arguments.
I'm not sure but I think this is a logical argument and not a moral one. The problem is not that religion leads people to do violent acts, but that it leads people to do violent acts *that they would not do otherwise*. This hints at a paradox.
It is possible to derive from the religion that the action is right but it is also possible to derive, from some belief held by the person, that this is wrong. If you assume that what we do should follow some form of logic this is problematic, because once you have these contradictions you can deduce anything. Every action is right and wrong at the same time. This means that one of the assumptions has to be wrong. And because religion or moralism claims *absolut* truth it has to be your intuition. This now means that we can't evaluate these assumptions neutrally. The point is not that we should not make any asumptions. Or in other words follow relativ truths. Philosophy should not abolish religion. If we don't follow relativ truths we can't do anything. But because absolut truth can never be achieved we have to always critically assess these assumptions.
An analogy would be the way we do modern mathematics. Basically all mathematicians are in a way "dogmatists". They assume that some axioms (e.g. ZFC and Peano) are consistent and are concerned with proving propositions that follow from these axioms. But in contrast to moralists they don't claim absolute truth (in fact they know that the consistency of these axioms cannot be proven) but they do math anyway. And if some inconsistency is found they change the axioms. ZFC is only 120 years old. It was developed because of Russels paradox. Without this critical assessment ZFC would have never been invented.
An example of what happens if you don't do this can be found in christianity. Here the religion not only contradicts "common sense" but is in itself contradictory, for example the presence of evil under an allmighty and good god. Here one (not the best but a common) answer is "god works in mysterious ways". Which basically ridicules this most basic assumption that the things around us follow some kind of logic.
Again you can’t be conflating any mental inclination for or against something to be a robust morality.
The whole point of denying morality is to deny that there is some moral LAW that holds true IRREGARDLESS of mental, societal, cultural, historical (etc) dispositions.
Having a desire to not see murder obtain can never be a robust account of morality
This is a great angle. Personally, my biggest gripe with Harris is how selective he is with his arguments and standards, and how flimsy much of his reasoning is when he applies it on specific real-world issues. He makes insane leaps of logic to justify a clear agenda, ignoring huge swaths of evidence, alternative explanations, and possibilities, only to claim that it is reasonable and un-ideological.
Professor of Criminology Peter Hanink posted a detailled analysis of Harris' talk on issues in his expertise ("A Response to Sam Harris on BLM, police violence, and the merits of conversation") that's very much worth watching for anyone who wishes to understand more of the critique against Harris or of the state of criminology.
The problem with moral arguments is they assume we are superior as human animals, and there is some obejctive, underlying universal truth to morality. Morality, like "freedom" is relative to a particular time. Rape can be deemed moral if the majority agrees that it is, and polices it as such. There's no outside force that demands that to be true. We apply empathy to deem these things "immoral," but that's merely extending a courtesy to our fellow beings. It's not an objective law of nature. Sacrfices, and etc. were deemed moral by groups throughout history. Things we value as immoral will fade from society, and things we deem as moral will face the same judgement in the future.
Excellent video! I wonder what you think of Max Stirner's egoism? In 'The Unique and its Property' he raises similar criticisms of humanism where some concept of Humanity (or human well-being in Harris' case) is raised to the same level as god is in religions. Under religion your purpose in life is to serve god, and under humanism your purpose is to serve humanity, but in both cases you are subjecting yourself to arbitrary external authority.
Humanity is a spook!
If you grant that it is good to ascertain the patterns that improve well-being for the parts, why do you refuse to extend that preference to the whole? Are we simply playing devil's advocate here? The whole is the sum of those operations. If you grant that there is a shared structure of cognition, (which is the most plausible theory if you study personality,) then a “moral landscape” is a descriptive act rather than a prescriptive command. We can find better tools to navigate our language games, we can unchain sensations from specific objects and make judgments about which games are worth playing. We can show the fly the way out of the fly bottle. I can’t tell you which options to pick, but if the options are illuminated sufficiently I can know with some certainty the options you won’t pick.
“Ethics and aesthetics are one.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein.
My problem with Harris is that he refuses to acknowledge the flip side of loose association. He acknowledges its power for taking lives but ignores the power when it saves them. His attachment to hyperlinked structures renders his goal impossible. His neuroscience and psychology are being sabotaged by logical positivism.
Very good, but I wonder what is rational non-circular definition of the word exist ? Pretty important word
Not sure there's a sound definition of a word like that because people can always easily disagree with any definition for what it excludes. We could give it the Peirce test: What is "exists" role in the guidance of conduct? In some situations, it is meaningless, while in others quite important.
what's the problem if someone states I am not trying to be a good person, maybe is not looking for your approval. What about if the answer was: I am not a Saint, I have my faults. Would that be so unacceptable? I am not sure the example fits well
even though I do agree with what it is said about morality and the use of good in a relative rather than absolute terms. Something is good relative to someone or something, it can never be absolute
I am kind of confused about something. Why do we know that objective morality does not exist? I don't see any particular reason to conclude that with certainty. Is is because it would lead to some sort of contradiction? Otherwise I would say it is not necessarily something that does not exist, but rather something that we cannot prove to exist nor prove to not exist (in my opinion this also applies to a non-specific God). I would agree that we therefore have no use for the concept of morality, as it cannot (correctly) be tied to anything within the world around us. I guess maybe this is what he means with "absolute morality does not exist"?
In a trivial sense, we know objective morality doesn't exist because you can never achieve a consensus on what is good or bad. There's always an item on the list that causes conflict or argument. It's like these days we may insist that human life is precious, or all life is precious. However, human life is approaching a breaking point at which there are ecologically too many people. If we could prevent all of the human death that occurs every day, we would destroy the world. So, at some critical point, it isn't precious but dangerous. I'm not arguing human life isn't precious or that life isn't, but that such ideas are always arguable.
I think Harris' claim is much easier to confute. For science to be able to produce moral propositions, there would need to be an undisputable and objective empirical evidence of good or bad in nature, which science would need to observe and then formalize into a principle just the same as it does with the laws of physics. I would argue that this, however, is not the case. Even if we follow our empirical observations (which Harris equates to "science") in order to preserve another person's well being, there are no empirical observations that scientifically prove to us that we should preserve other people's well being. On the contrary, we could argue that death, exploitation and self preservation are key components of natural life. The basic principles of Harris' morality (we should care for another person's well being) is not derived from experience, therefore it is not of scientific but rather dogmatic (and in this sense "religious") nature.
HAHA your comment "". The basic principles of Harris' morality (we should care for another person's well being) is not derived from experience" is actually hilarious. I am very much interested how you live your life if you don't think this is true, do you not care for others well being? All it takes is one instance where you do and then you make zero sense.
@@BigFudg Think you missed the point of his comment, he was critiquing the epistemology not the actual belief
@@BryanAFC exactly. It doesn't matter if I follow it or not, the point is that the fact that I follow it is not a result of scientific observation. I am a human being, therefore I am involved in human practices, but this doesn't mean that these practices are products of absolute metaphysical and moral truths.
Harris has a simple response to this which involves an analogy to medicine. Everything you say here seems equally applicable to the concept of health. One could say there is no “objective empirical observation” of health to be found. Who is to say the smoker is less healthy than the non-smoker? And yet we have a science of health and a strict commitment to understanding and creating it. The problems you raise are generic epistemic problems and don’t seem specific to morality. Maybe you are just a skeptic and anti-realist in general. But really Harris’s point is that we don’t seem to have the same attitude about established sciences compared to morality and are asking _more_ of a science of ethics than we would of a science of anything else. This is a double standard.
@@samuelstephens6904 I agree only partially. It's true that my objection is epistemological and therefore could be applied to other areas of observation (btw, it's also true that I would not mind being defined a skeptic). On the specific example though, I kinda have to disagree. We could agree on a basic linguistic definition of "health" as a state that causes you as little physical pain as possible and/or will delay your death as much as possible. Once we agree on this (and this is of course a purely linguistic and therefore epistemologically criticizable agreement), then we can proceed with empirical observations: we have physical evidence that smoking makes you less healthy in the sense that it increases your likelihood of developing cancer and/or other respiratory problems. This observation is of course possible thanks to medical science. In the case of morality though, we don't need scientific analysis to determine if this or that individual is behaving according to our moral principles, and, on the other hand, neither can we use it to produce an undisputable and universal ("objective") moral law, because we still continue to have disagreements about the very definition of good, bad, right and wrong. In other words, science cannot solve THE problem of morality itself
I feel this is a bit short sighted. We can think about multitudes of subjective experiences in aggregate, in averages, cohorts, cultures, etc. It's the same thing as utilitarianism attempts to do. We might not be able to measure and quantify the experiences (to do the statistics) at the moment, but that doesn't make those things magical. Once we all have brain-computer interfaces, it might be trivial to evaluate metal states en masse.
I'm only 7 minutes in the video, so perhaps my comment is premature, but how could you say that it's simply not possible to summarize everything, and therefore there can be no bridge between relative and absolute good when it's far from true that in order to make valid claims about a subject, you must first understand everything about said subject? We don't have to summarize well being completely in order to know, for instance, that persecuting a group of people because of their ethnicity is antithetical to well being. I hope I'm not misunderstanding your point. Even Kant understood that developing his philosophical system served primarily to purge dogma. The utility of Harris's system is analogous in that way. It's much more adept at purging immoral human behavior, especially on a large scale, than it is at proving moral claims. Also, in regards to other books exploding if absolute good is confirmed, that just isn't true, as a statement about the systematic process of discovering good is not the same as a specific statement of good, so in fact we could still consider and learn from the books, but judge them using a given criteria. Only claims of a contradicting system would become invalid, not, say, the claim "do unto others as you would have them do unto you". We would still have the arduous task of pontificating that specific claim relative to his criteria. In the same way, to claim that asserting a system as true is arrogant disregards the general advancement of human understanding with time. The credit is only partially placed on Harris, but much more on those before him who he learned from, i.e standing on the shoulders of giants. In fact, wouldn't kant be arrogant as well according to your description of Harris?
Furthermore, it would be far more accurate to say he combines them rather than conflating them, as he's pretty explicit in saying that there are indeed different uses of good, and that he is trying to unify them under one commonality. Conflating implies he's doing it unintentionally. Also, and this is probably just a matter of my own ignorance, wouldn't you say the quality of a moral claim can be rooted in the effects it has on making certain actions permissible, and certain actions impermissible?
i think sam even makes it pretty clear in the subtext that he isnt claiming to have found objecitve morality. He talks about peaks (plural) of the moral landscape, not about A peak with him as leader on top. the main take away from his work is to me that we should use science to better morality and construct actual arguments instead of falling back to religious dogma and post hoc rationalizations of emotional reactions.
@@kettenschlosd yes sir, he does indeed say that
The problem with Harris argument is that he seems to think that, through science and a better understanding of the brain, we can close the gap between relative morality and absolute morality, which is not the case, you're just considering scientific observations to make moral arguments relative to them. For example, "led can cause several mental issues, so it is immoral to use led paint." That's a strong moral argument... relative to how led affects humans, but would it be absolutely immoral to use led paint, even in settings that do not affect humans? No. That's not to say that there's no value to use science to figure out better ways to increase human well being, it's just that human well being is relatively defined.
@@Lambda_Ovine You're example is a false dichotomy. As It seems we both like to think in associatations, can you provide a better one?
Just to demonstrate why, you could answer the hypothetical no in x scenarios, and yes in y scenarios.You don't have to make a blanket yes or no answer regarding all uses of led paint.
@@Lambda_Ovine Let me also clarify my position real quick. I believe Harris' argument is is more like a conjecture than an argument. I belive he observred that in the vast majority of moral assertions with clear agreement, there is a common denominator of them having the properties laid out in his book. However, there is no reason to believe they are correct in all cases except that they are correct in the ones he already observed. in the same sense that we can't be sure 3n+1 will always result in a 4-2-1 loop, but in all cases we've observed it does. It is absolutley possible to continually heighten the complexities of a dillema until the variables are difficult to calculate and timely, but I do think it serves great use
Idk about one example. If being a good person is just a laungustisc place holder but not really aligned with my values I may want to be a bad person
My understanding is that students are not given corporal punishment in certain parts of the USA for failing academically, but for misbehaving in the classroom.
would you make a take on Tjumps hypothesis of objective morality?
Who is this guy? He's really good.
Your core argument is within the analytic tradition (taking Wittgenstein as your exemplar). Trying to ascertain the truth value or content of moral propositions or arguments. Yet Wittgenstein's own "partner in crime" Anscombe exemplifies the tradition of practical reason (Aristotle-Aquinas).
Significant attempts have been made under this tradition of moral realism to bridge the gap between impossibility of universal moral truths and possibility of particular moral actions.
Being a-moral is theoretically possible in analytic tradition, it seems to be practically difficult in matters of human affairs (ethics, politics and economics).
As Aquinas indicates, this is a common fallacy to conflate 2nd order universe of analytical logic with the 3rd order universe of human affairs.
One must reflect (by practical reason) on an ordinary or an exemplar life actually lived to understand the value of moral judgments and prescriptions that we utilize.
Also this conversation itself was replete with universalistic claims of moral judgments, eg historical usage of corporeal punishment as moral bullying... or impossibility of moral meaning etc.
As to moral behaviours being studied scientifically. There has been a lot of progress in animal studies about "morality" "cognition", "self awareness" "theory of mind" and other attributes once thought to be the sole province of humanity.
True, one can't just observe something that seems to be similar in a non-human animal, and conclude absolutely that such behaviour is exactly the same thing. But on the other hand, you can't dismiss it glibly as not the same thing without reason and further evidence either.
Charles Darwin was one of those who tried to demolish these unrealistic hard barriers to what is human and what is not. Because if biological evolution is true, then one would expect to see most human attributes, at least to some, present to some degree in other social cognitive species. [A pity some of our close human relatives didn't make it, because then perhaps the level of verbal and [and especially written] written communications would not be confined to one species.
I don't think there is now much room to dismiss moral behaviours in complex non-human animals. You can test for a sense of fairness in dogs, and so on. Even social bees seem to have some sort of moral behaviours. How they can ignore a co-worker who gets a little inebriated on one occasion, but if she keeps on doing it, they might sting her to death. Why, presumably because by neglecting her duties, the whole hive and the larvae may be at hazard from disease, etc. That seems to make sense to me.
So if we are talking about wellness, as social animals, there is immediately a potential source of conflict between personal wellness, and the wellness of the social group.
Is there an objective morality then. Yes. Once you decide what things are moral, then you can work out what get you closer to that goal or further away from it.
The real trick is working out what wellness is, and it differs in context/situation.
If I was a genocidal murderer, the society might be better off if I did not exist. Objectively, society would be better off in wellness terms, and the mean wellness of most people would be improved too, in objective terms. But it can get more nuanced than that. They could put me in prison, or maybe find out what makes people commit genocide, and fix society to that it does not occur, or at least occurs less often. But of course this is a bit of a straw-man argument, because the whole criterion I was using was life or death.
But there is another problem. is life over death an objective and invariable thing? Life works because organisms survive, at least long enough to replicate/reproduce, or the species goes extinct. Is this good or bad? One can argue that we are a pest species which are not only killing off most other life forms, but in the process fouling our own nest, and thereby, our own eventual extinction. So scaling out the problem makes it even more complex.
Rather than say life is objectively good or bad, we should perhaps say that it just is. A brute fact. But we should be honest about it. We have a vested interest in being alive. A bias inherited from ancestors. To say it is moral or immoral seems to be an oxymoron.
So while the goals of morality are subject to debate, actually measuring that we achieve in regard to any moral principle is not. It either enhances well-being or it does not. The problem with that may be making the criteria too narrow. Does it give someone with a painful, debilitating, incurable disease wellness to force them to keep on living no matter what, if they genuinely want, or rather need, to die? Medicine has got very good at keeping people alive, but not always so good at maintaining quality of life. So there are wrinkles to every moral case.
I think that clear cut moral decisions are a lot harder than most people imagine. Often we can't get to perfect solutions, and at best have to realise that we pick the least harmful version from a bad bunch of nasty alternatives.
thank you for restoring some of my faith in humankind. you are only one person, so my faith is still at rock bottom, but you clearly understand morality on a level that most alive today (or through history) will never achieve in their entire lives. kudos.
there's a sort of contradiction here ... if, as he says, moral principles are only used a posteriory, to justify a decision, then children have not been beaten at school because they're perceived as bad people if they're not studying well ..
everything boils down to the question how and why is this feeling of deficiency instilled in children and young people that makes them susceptible to succumb to moral judgments addressed at themselves .. at what moment and why do we begin to panic when we believe we're being perceived as bad ...
... and the difference between him and harris is that harris would happily exploit this feeling of deficiency for controlling society, while comrade Moeller would probably rather get rid of it altogether .. which kinda shows that there's nothing radically emancipatory in harris' philosophy .. he's a regular charlatan ..
Isn't there a contradiction in saying it isn't desirable to speak morally? After all, to say there is such thing as something which is absolutely desirable is to make a moral statement!
No it's not. Consider this version of Moore's argument: the statement "what is absolutely desirable is good" is not analytic, because we can imagine all desiring something we consider bad; hence what is absolutely desirable is not necessarily good. But moral talk is talk about goodness. Therefore talk about what is absolutely desirable is not moral talk.
@@10mimu To say it is desirable at all is a moral judgment.
Why did this guy make the video, to help us (moral), or to pass time ("amoral" if not immoral) ?
Take your pick
@@VirginMostPowerfull It depends on what exactly you mean by desirable. If you mean worthy of being wanted, then I agree it is a moral judgement; but if by "desirable to S" we mean "it is wanted by S" simpliciter, then I don't see how that is a moral judgement, but merely a description of a state of affairs. A banana is desirable to a monkey: a monkey wants a banana.
@@10mimu
So you think this professor just chooses to make this video because he wants to?
Unpack that for me psychologically, what does that mean, really what does that mean, let's unpack.
@@10mimu Something being DESIRED BY ALL and being ABSOLUTELY DESIRED are different things. A psychopath does not wish to care about others, but to care for others is desirable. What is absolutely desirable can occasionally not be desired by some individuals.
I recently played Disco Elysium and I love how well its "Moralist" ideology captured Sam Harris's moralism.
Everything is derivative this days, and highly overrated Disco Elysium is a good example of this. Internet didn't make the world (of thoughts and ideas) bigger, but quite the opposite
I'm sure I don't understand, but why do you assume it isn't possible to find universally beneficial things to be considered good?
But isn't the point that Wittgenstein has made is that the notion of an 'absolute right' is absurd, that the absolute moralism of a 'de-relative right' simply cannot exist within language?
If private languages cannot exist because they lack the social and cultural underpinning essential to a natural language, so too absolute moralities or, (neo-Platonic) essential truths lack the necessary ontological weight to be acceptable as 'real'.
Harris may be too ambitious in asserting that relative good is the same as absolute good, but the underlying issue that I think he is addressing, is that the absolute good has no 'reality' grounding from which to be asserted. That at best it is a hang-over from (idealist) metaphysics or, theology (incidentally the same concern that Wittgenstein was addressing).
Morality is biological.
Ethics are cultural.
What is morality? The way it's being talked about in this video I can't tell if we're talking about ethics (culturally prescribed behavior) or some sort of platonic essential or supernatural force.
What makes sense to me is that morality is a meta-ethic that allows for and defines what it is to be a social creature (non-hive). A "normal" human mind recognizes unfairness when observing as a third party even at a very early age. Well before complex communication proto-humans instinctively operated with cooperation and altruism.
And for every universal moral law, you can find some tribe out in the Amazon or the South Pacific who insists on the exact opposite. Then you have to guess, "Are they inherently immoral?" And that's where the "danger" of the moral discourse comes in.
@@ceruchi2084 Morality is a perception not a behavioral prescription.
There is something that it is to be a organism with subjective experience.
There is something that it is to be a mammal.
There is something that it is to a social animal.
Morality is the balancing of intuitions that comes from the gestalt of these components of human existence.
Or canine existence.
Cultural norms can interfere with that perception.
In such cases it's practically certain that the cultural norm is immoral rather than the culture moire is revealing a deeper truth.
Why would it be bad to devalue previous efforts if what you've found is in fact superior? This is generally seen as normal as we make progress right
Also isn't this vid kind of claiming that Harris way of thinking is morally bad e.g. trying to also make an objective moral statement?
Why don't you make video about Jordan Peterson?
15:45 And why would social conflict and violence be bad? It seems to me that this criticism of absolute good and bad, assumes that social conflict and violence is an absolute bad
was thinking the same thing
I don't agree they used to beat children up because of their poor learning skills. Usually, it is to do with children misbehaving, causing riots, hitting other pupils and stuff like that, being disrespectful and so on. I don't condone hitting children to cause actual physical harm, but it might sometimes be necessary to restrain a child or maybe spank them (talking about parents and guardians here, not school) so as to prevent them from hurting themselves or others.
This was quite enlightening.
I think that (in a strict sense), relativity and contingency upon higher-level states of affairs are the only factual truths....nothing unusual here.But, anyhow one must make some sort of compromise by grounding an idea into something "real".For me consciousness (in the larger sense),subjective experience and biological factors are the most important criteria.No need for God , nor other analytic/semantic endeavors.
While Sam Harris fumbles and fails in his endeavor to demonstrate objective morality, the principles of such do actually exist, and are logically discernable:
*P1* - The existence of sentient subjects is an objective reality.
*P2* - As real entities, subjects have properties inherent to them which may be objectively known and explicated.
*P3* - Among the properties of sentience is the inherent capacity to have interests, which may be harmed or benefited.
*P4* - This dichotomy of benefit & harm is the ontological basis of intrasubjective normativity, as it entails existential conditions such as "good/bad" and "better/worse" defining what's preferable or non-preferable for a given subject.
*P5* - The property of inhering interests further entails that subjects as entities are ultimate ends.
*P6* - There exist a multiplicity of distinct subjects with their own interests which may align or conflict with one another, entailing an intersubjective landscape for them to navigate which broadly coincides with the domain we call "morality".
*P7* - Subjects are liable to have motive dispositions which generally incline them towards wanting to benefit the interests of others or harm them, entailing that subjects may themselves have normative value of an intersubjective nature, defining their worth as moral ends.
*P8* - The concept generally referred to as "justice" entails reciprocity (i.e. commentsurate responsivity) in the intersubjective domain, with impartial and equitable judgments in such matters constituting an objective approach to it.
*P9* - The equitable distribution of justice inevitably promotes general intersubjective well-being, in that it reinforces benevolent interpersonal choices & subjects while simultaneously punishing malevolent choices & subjects.
*C* - Given the objective reality of sentient subjects, the inherent normative properties of their existence, and the possibility of making epistemologically objective assessments of such normative conditions _(which includes the matter of reciprocity in the intersubjective domain)_ it stands to reason that impartial, existential justice is definitionally the objective basis of natural rights.
This whole series: "We american/canadian philosophers have an unsolvable moral dilemma"
German philisopher: hold my beer.
17'49" This is a totally wrong conception of morality. Because surely morality can only be taught by example. And teachers who beat their pupils are setting a bad example. They are equating might with right. And this can never be the case. Professor Moeller your conception of morality is far too crude. You cannot teach good using evil means. The means should be commensurate with the end. You can only teach by setting a good example, and by being good yourself. To say that there is no such thing as good is no solution. And can only lead to evil ends. Of course I realise that this requires infinite patience. But as Spinoza says at the end of his Ethics: 'For all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare'. And there is nothing more excellent than virtue. It is surely the sine qua non of the civilised life. Which I for one am not prepared to give up. (If we have ever had it.)
Really cool video, I have a few concerns/questions though. I don't understand how you can make statements like (paraphrasing) "doing morality is problematic". This sounds really close to "we ought not do morality", which sounds a bit ridiculous to me. In what way does the quality of being problematic matter if we simultaneously reject valuation? I am genuinely confused and would appreciate help in alleviating any possible misunderstandings I might have of this position.
you didnt misunderstand unfortunately, he's just a bad philosopher. he literally contradicts himself in the way you described. "doing morality is problematic" problematic is obviously a negative to him, this is what peeps mean when they say "immoral" - a perceived negative (im assuming you know that morality is relative/subjective and therefore perception is its entirety).
@@manaleauxduclaire482 Thanks for this reply, but I think you should slow down with your premises in this comment. I'm not willing to call someone a "bad philosopher until I've read their works/communicated with their works on a deeper level than a few videos would be able to provide. Moreover, your claim that morality is "known" to be "relative" and therefore "subjective" needs an unbelieveable amount of groundwork before I can accept it.
@@shrill_2165 life is too short to waste it listening to every invalid argument that some so so makes. but if thats what you want to do, up to you obviously.
im afraid the groundwork you would need for accepting that morality is relative is something you would have to 'witness' for yourself. best i can do to try and point you in the right direction is: if the universe disappeared right this instant, never to be seen again (the cessation of existence), would it objectively matter? consider that question and be honest with yourself about the answer, even if you dont like the answer.
@@manaleauxduclaire482 With all due respect, I don't think you've put as much thought into that statement as you think you have. You might think that you have that all figured out, but the way that you write this strikes me as someone who has figured out very little, not the reverse.
@@shrill_2165 ok bro.
This video shows perfectly the difference between the popularized discussion of Harris (based on lose, intuitive and sometime incoherent arguments) and a scholarly discussion of Prof. Moeller. Thank you very much for the insight. I found the religion - god analogy particularly useful and apt to describe the difference between a relative social normative construct (there are many religions) and an absolute normative authority (there is one god and at best one true religion, where all the other religions need to be false).
Its quite hard to hear an amoral person speak confidently about conflict and about killing other people, as if he is sure they are quite bad. He seems to have a moral stance towards that. Well, if its not a moral preference, what is it. I am interested in knowing
15:27 "moral language is very dangerous. . . it's a form of communication that is, empirically speaking, highly problematic". This is a qualitative claim. If you thought violence was good, than anything which lead to violence would NOT be problematic. So why do you think it's problematic? Even in your effort to undermine morality, you nonetheless use moral language. Morality cannot be brushed aside. It's inescapable. So silly.
You have to remember the distinction between good, right in a relative (amoral) and an absolute (moral ) sense.
He said moral communication can lead to violence, implying it can also not lead to violence.
If violence increases your well-being, then moral language would be dangerous to you because it could lead to the condamnation of violence.
If you're against violence, then moral language would be dangerous to you because it could lead to the justification of violence.
This is precisely a judgement of moraliy in a relative sense. If he would say morality is absolutely bad, he would argue morally. If he says morality is bad in certain circumstances for specific people, he is argueing amorally.
The whole point is that amorality in most specific situations increases well-being, when morality isn't. Because moral judgements in their absolute nature, apply themselves to all situations indifferently, regardless if they increase well-being or not, they lead to unintended side effects.
While amoral judgements apply only to situations if they fit in and increase well-being.
@@sualtam9509 What you describe as 'amoral language' is whatever result of action is in concordance with an explicit desire, taste, or end. Sam Harris puts forth well-being as the ultimate end, whereby all judgments of good can be construed as those decisions which produce well-being, admitting of the fact it will be different for different people in different places and times. Unless well-being isn't a universal end, it seems to me the disagreement can be reduced to the use of the word 'moral'. But where do those explicit desires, tastes, and ends come from? And why are they preferable to their opposites (why is well-being better than suffering)? Why should you not change your mind about what you want? What happens when your desires are in competition with someone else? How does amorality solve that? In other words, what becomes of 'amoral good' when decisions transcend individuals?
@@PhilosophyOfNoa I will try to answer your last question.
Amorality won't solve a dispute about competing interests. We could try to approximate a solution in a consensus either in court or in a democratic process or in any other sort of agreement.
To find such a common ground it is often wise to see both interests as equally valid and legitimate. This can be achieved through amorality. That's why judges shall be impartial and neutral.
If we moralize such a conflict of interests, we burden each person with more than just their personal interest, but with a moral judgement on themselves.
Probably each one will see themselves as morally good, therefore the other one as evil. The conflict is no longer just about the specific topic at hand, but about saint or sinner e.g. a potential social death.
It will make a consensus extremely hard to reach.
@@sualtam9509 You're right. Consensus, however, assumes that people can be moved toward common ground either by some rhetorical or coercive incentive. But if there is no absolute logic by which to judge personal interests, why should anyone change their position? All it comes down to is finding which individual button to press to bend someone nearer your own will. And if someone won't bend? The only recourse seems, to me, to be violence. Empirically, most people will seek consensus to avoid violence, but there is no logic which compels a person to value the avoidance of violence rather than justification by might. Amorality does not offer a solution to the existential crises one might face in questioning his or her own desires, nor in questioning how to spend one's time.
1. Has to use God not existing to justify morality not existing. Interesting.
2. People are closley related to violence.
3. Harris is quite fantastically narrow minded.
4. Would like to see a positive Kant video on this channel. Kant is notoriously difficult to read.
yeah his religion analogy was incredibly bad. "morality doesn't exist, just like god doesn't exist" is not a good argument whatsoever
@@dominiks5068 i struggle to think of a reason that would convince a philosopher of his level of experience, to believe that god doesnt exist (not to be confused with talent (im saying he's old). i mean atheist in the literal sense i can understand, due to a lack of empirical evidence (guess they didnt read descartes' meditations though, right? :). though i would say most of the vocal ones are actually anti-theist and just want to make you think theyre super intellectual.
I don't really know what you mean by morality in an absolute sense? To me morality only makes sense relative to behaviour and its outcomes? What meaning would morality have in a void?
so your argument for amorality is that it's morally good?
He's not only saying this. He's also acting it out and uploading this video to communicate the idea. Probably because he thought this action leads to something good rather than bad. Otherwise why would he say these things and take these actions when he could be - i dont know - taking his shirt off on the film and not uploading the video.
I think he hinted on his values. "Conflict is bad" "Division is bad" "People killing people is bad". And it seems, trying to prevent these things from happening in the world with his speech and actions is the right thing for him to be doing as he has done these things.
So much for amorality.
With quoting Wickenstein he argues that identifying with moral truth in an absolute way devalues other peoples activities and that this is problematic. So he hints that devaluing other peoples activities is problematic or bad or should be avoided.
So much for amoralism.
And he's also contradicting with these values I assumed he's acting upon. I think he would agree, that peoples actions contradicting these values, such as people killing people or people causing division, should be devalued actions and deemed less moral or bad in his value network. At least he is implicitly doing this devaluing in hinting that this kind of objectives should be thrived for.
I think the other commenters are conflating Prof. Moeller's personal moral stance with his opinions on how schools should be run. He does not seem to be an "amoral" actor. He cautions against the _overuse_ of moral discourse because it can create immoral situations. He, as a moral actor, is advising schools not to concern themselves so much with the morality of their students. This doesn't mean that the schools enforce amorality or immorality, or that the ideal student will be amoral. It is the duty of the school to create better _students_ and not _more moral_ students. Corporal punishment is an overuse or misuse of the language of morality in a context where no such language need be used. The effects of these abuses are "immoral" (they harm children).
@@dragonsaul There's a difference between choosing to behave in a way you believe to be right and behaving according to some moral 'fact'. The former is humble, and leaves room for self-criticism. The latter is both absolute and arrogant. I rather think what the video is cautioning against is the idea that you have, or ever can have, THE ANSWER to the moral question - and concomitant dangers that come from believing you do. That kind of overconfidence often leads us to do things that we ourselves may usually deem as bad, such as 'holy' wars. In some cases, such as his school example at the end, it even increases well-being (what Harris uses to measure moral worth) to simply stop making moral judgments at all - when we stopped thinking of underperformers as morally deficient, we stopped beating them into shape as well, which is an increase to childrens' well-being. You can argue that concern for children's well-being is itself a moral decision, but it was Harris' decision - the point he's making is that, ironically, 'de-moralizing' the issue is what achieved it.
Basically, it's not so much about being AMORAL as it is about being THE MORAL. You may always have some sense of right and wrong, just don't go believing it's absolute. Indeed as he says, just believing that in itself automatically de-legitimizes or consigns to irrelevance everyone else's beliefs, and so probably even the quest for and/or certainty in the existence of absolute moral 'facts' (what, in his view, Harris is trying to find via secular / scientific means) is itself something to be avoided. You can be guided by your beliefs, just never forget that it is merely a belief i.e. don't let it get to your head. Ironically, despite people thinking bloodshed is bad, plenty of blood has been shed thanks to 'moral' crusades - it's hard to launch a crusade if you can't demonize the other side because of how they differ from your set of moral 'facts'. Morality ought to be a discourse - an ongoing communication - rather than a 'discovery' of objective 'facts'. And in many cases it may even be better to simply ditch moral judgments altogether - not quite being 'amoral' in the sense of someone lacking a moral sense at all, but being 'amoral' in the sense of not approaching the issue from a moral angle.
Two poor and incredibly off-putting options here. Harris is far too fixated on science. The repeat focus on "morality" and "absolutes" here seems so dated. Wittgenstein's foolish approach to ethics and philosophy is also highly problematic. He contributed to academic philosophy being scarcely philosophy for much of the past hundred years, and helped create foolish taboos against actually educating ourselves towards wisdom. Pursuing philosophy as the love of wisdom can actually work out exceptionally well as the life of Florence Nightingale helps to convey. (Her father, who put a lot of effort into homeschooling her, was huge on Plato and Dugald Stewart, a leading figure of the Scottish Enlightenment. Thanks in large part to her exemplary education, Nightingale accomplished even far more than she is known for; she is an excellent example of how a traditional conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom may show up in a contemporary context.)
Is it concern about morality that has people complacently supporting factory farms, failing to adequately respond to climate change, doing far too little in response to escalating rates of depressed youths, and looking the other way as genocides take place and people starve to death? Look for exemplars. There's a lot of wisdom in the ancients that far surpass the two approaches highlighted here.
Multiple thumbs up to this.
@@shyman3000, many thanks. I was glad to find this channel through its criticism of Philosophy Tube's treatment of Kant and then my enthusiasm quickly soured when I saw that ^^^ this ^^^ is what was being offered as a sound approach to philosophy. ACK!!!
@@reconstructingphilosophy Wittgensteins foolish approach to philosophy? Wow, thats a bold statement.
@@jonasjorgensen8759 Do you agree that he FINISHED philosophy with the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he wrote while still a youth, and that in doing so, he hadn't actually accomplished much, as he indicates that he believed he had done in the preface of the work? Such an arrogant and ridiculous claim. He hadn't even learned much of anything about the history of philosophy yet he took himself as able to swoop in and show that everyone prior to him had been grossly in error and talking a lot of nonsense!!! (Plato saw no one as ready to even begin serious study of philosophy until 50 or so). Do you think philosophy is aptly construed as a disease to be cured -- a fly to be shown the way out of the fly bottle? Philosophy is actually VITALLY important. He pushed the notion that it leaves everything as it is. That's bullshit. Capable approaches to philosophy can and have made vast improvements to the world at large. In part due to the idiotic cult of genius that arose around him, Wittgenstein did a lot to derail philosophy from its fundamental task of helping us move towards wisdom.
@@reconstructingphilosophy you Will find his biggest contributions in his later works :) regarded as one, If not the, Greatest mind in 20th century philosophy.
The assertion seems to be that morality is fundamentally problematic because it can create discord and conflict. That ignores the fact that it can also create harmony and benefit. Indeed the notion of morality would not have survived in successful societies over time, in fact it is surely a fundamental necessity for any society to flourish. It does not imply the same values for each society but there must be some sort of code or understanding that has wide consensus which on the whole has beneficial utility. The beating is a good example, if it did not serve as an overall benefit despite the immediate plain it inflicted, given the circumstances of the period and presumably lack of useful alternative, then it probably would not have been continued as a practice for so long. I don't believe it is possible to judge well the full implications and effects of such practices viewed from a society that is now different in so many ways. Furthermore has there actual been any serious studies to determine the long term effects of beating on life outcomes on an individual and society level? Many times has the statement been made that society is too soft on kids now, they lack discipline, spare the rod spoil the child, it just might be they have a point.
i think psychological research is pretty clear on violence with children: they either become adults who see violance as an answer or become terrified of everything. maybe more discipline would be good for todays children but not in the form of physical violence. Talking to the child and explaining their bad behavior and punishing them with chores seems way more productive if you want more discipline.
the reason violent punishments for children stuck around imo has nothing to do with its utility, but with the utility of frustration induced violence in general. it is important for a person to at some point snap and lash out, otherwise neither proper negotiotions nor revolutions or defense of the motherland would be possible. punishment of children as well as all other domestic violence is just a byproduct of humans needing a drive for violence to survive. but in generall, the proximal reason for spanking your child is just that you spend a lot of time with them and can get frustrated easily.
one more thing regarding violence in eduction: it is basically just conditioning the child to associate a behavior with pain. learning like this vanishes incredible fast as soon as the stimulus disappears (i.e. the spanking when the child becomes an adult). so you just end up with someone who is afraid of punishments but also doesnt know why some things are wrong while also believing that violence is a proper response to people of lower status disagreeing with you. if you actually talk to your child and explain to them the reasons we dont take certain actions, the learning might be a bit slower but actually last into adulthood. again, a person who only behaves well because he fears punishment will stop doing so once he is certain the punishment cant reach him
@@kettenschlosd Agree with some of that, I never felt the need to use corporal punishment on my two girls and would talk through issues with them. They were and still are well adjusted and behaved in my view. I do have a feeling that this to a degree is a modern day luxury not shared by all still for various reasons. Bigger families were the norm, children less supervised. A good talking to didn't cut much ice with me when I decided at eight years old to wander off occasionally on the odd adventure over the park or round the streets for a couple of hours, a whack from my father when he got home got the message through pretty quick.
I have to say I am somewhat sceptical of claims around psychological research, much of the social sciences seems to consist of hypothesis assertion conclusion, not necessarily in that order, that do not invest the years controls and attention to detail required to ascertain for example how a child who was smacked fares in life compared to one who was not. Not saying there are no worthwhile studies in psychology but I suggest there are many that are not. Has violence in teenagers and young adults improved since corporal punishment was deemed unacceptable, certainly levels of knife crime in London for example doesn't seem to support that claim and how about shootings and stabbings in America.
One modern phenomenon I find extremely annoying and I suspect benefits nobody is when there is a child behaving really badly, they are upsetting other children, damaging property, generally disrupting everything and the parent stands by calmly explaining why they should not be doing that while the child just carries on regardless and then kicks up a mighty tantrum when somebody eventually intervenes.
I will say there is a lot worse which can be done and often is than the odd whack. Verbal castigation can be cruel and damaging when it is persistent as can other forms of non physical punishment. Not a major example but when I was about nine I was sent to the headmaster for what I thought a minor indiscretion. He told me he was going to stop me playing in the school football team cup final. He offered me an alternative, the cane. Without hesitation I opted for the cane. Five whacks on the hand and it was all over. If I had been stopped from playing I would have been miserable for weeks and probably harboured a resentment that would have stayed with me. As it was I got to play and now had a bonus of a bit of street cred for getting the cane and not crying.
Yes abusive violence is awful but there is a huge distinction between that and occasional controlled corporal punishment which often seems to get lost when the subject is discussed.
I think how Sam wrote his book was very lackluster and cast on the wrong light. It's generally easy to end in the pitfall of semantics by taking the linguistic approach to what morality is. Which is the common criticism to Sam's book. Through that road, morality just makes sense when we provide a reference or goal, either explicit or implicit. Sam goes through a completely different (and I would argue better) way of approaching morality, which is through neuroscience. What ever morality is, it is something that exists in the brain of conscious creatures (we can find moral judgment even in monkeys and dogs). It is some form of brain structure. How that brain structure is created/organized/interacts with the rest of the world is a pure scientific question. Exactly because of that can science tells us what is moral and what is not. It then becomes interesting because we might ask the question. Can we change our own morality structure? Would it be moral?
That's complete nonsense. You need to know what you're looking for before you can chase it down in the brain and identify it. I could equally well say that round stones are morality or that people's deisre for rape is morality.
Pretty good. In line with what I've learned from several sources, most of them on thought control tactics.
I agree with you%100.
About "book exploding": stupid metaphor, because book is piece of art that'why can be estimated only from aesthetic point of view,, not from moral point of view!
The more I listen, the more I realize philosophy is the art of taking the simplest ideas and expressing them in the most complicated manner possible.
To me it's more along the lines of simplicity being an illusion, the fact is that reality is unperceivable without abstraction but we don't really bother thinking too much about how we abstract it and so we take it for granted and often mistake the real with the image of the real we invent. Does that make sense? I'm shit at philosophy lol
morality is moral laws, what is this use of circular arguments from academics? Are we going forward or backwards?
I don't think I agree with that definition of morality, for me morality is not a form of communication. Maybe a set of principles (or the attempt at creating a set of principle) that try to be universal, and can be used by the individual to regulate his behavior when interacting with other individuals for the purpose of limiting friction and conflict.
Or perhaps it is a form of communication, if we regard the laws as a form of communication which inform people on what they can and cannot do
Can all things have equal value?
Value is mind-dependent, so it depends on who you ask..
Not ONCE in the entire video is the meaning of "well-being" questioned. This "moving toward well-being" without objective standards is plainly arbitrary.
2:27 1. Some dead white guy said we only use the term good or right in relative or trivial way, therefore Harris is wrong because he uses the word in an absolute way and that's not allowed, so sayeth the dead white guy (Ludwig Wittgenstein).
4:40 2. The criteria is the science of wellbeing, which may be relative in terms of different brains visavis activities but is otherwise a fairly straightforward objective science. So Harris's moral philosophy has a criteria and that criteria is objective (mostly).
6:48 3. The term relative is being downright abused here, the science of health/wellbeing isn't so relative and individually distinctive that nothing about the field can be reliably summarized, that's inane and factually wrong. For the love of Phil and Sophy what the hell does he think medical students study, just endless case histories? He can keep making the claim that you can't jump from the contextual wellbeing of an individual to wellbeing as such but it falls flat every time I glance over at the trove of generalized knowledge on wellbeing known as medical studies...
7:54 to 8:53 This goes beyond inane, the idea that a book of absolute morality would make everything everyone has ever done, is doing or will do insignificant is completely asinine. That idea that such a book is undesirable because it would trivialize all other books on the matter is equally stupid, it's like saying a definitive book on consciousness and the mind is undesirable because it would trivialize all other books on the matter. I mean, in either case there's always posterity and lovers of the written word that will read anything, so who cares whether or how trivial the activity is?
9:26 to 9:42 🙄
10:54 to 11:00 🙄
14:10 to 14:44 He is doing with morality what capitalists tend to do to communism, he's painting the whole subject with it's worst attempts.
17:00 This whole scenario is undermined when you make wellbeing the center of your mortality, which is why Harris doesn't address this.
I wonder if anyone can think of a scenario in which being amoral leads to less wellbeing or less improvement in wellbeing than a system of morality built upon it (wellbeing).
Professor Moeller has not even risen to the level of philosophy. If one evokes Wittgenstein as one's authority, one remains outside the gates of this science.
God doesn't exist but determines our behavior
Morality doesn't exist but determines our behavior
Truth doesn't exist but determines our behavior
Free Will doesn't exist but determines our behavior
Value doesn't exist but determines our behavior
Human race to existence: I am a joke to you?
Ergo existence doesn't exist. Is my am a cruel joke then?
What if existing means affecting other things?
@@originalblob Well, then Santa Claus exists
@@jorgemachado5317 the idea of santa claus anyway
@@dmitryalexandersamoilov You are very much right. The problem of an idea is that the idea of Santa there is in my mind will never be the idea of Santa you have on your mind. In this sense an idea can't be real unless we have a realm of perfect ideas where those different concepts of Santa are derived from
The point about moral truth is nonsense, it's either objective or not, simple as.
error theory gang where u @
Morality and knives.
Knives have the potential to lead to harm, so we should not use knives.
Sometimes I wish A. Einstein had not discovered relativity in physics, so that we would not have all this relativistic speak in ALL aspects of human thinking.
Helgian nonsense is actually at fault for this nonsense, they would have just piggy backed off another cool kid term. Hell, you can take this nonsense all the way back to the protestant reformation, and even them further all the way to the gnostic heresies of the early church days.
The theory of relativity has literally nothing to do with morality
These videos look like numberphile videos
Only philosophers speak in absolutes and then equate them into the real world. I find Harris comprehensible, since there no absolutes, the best we can do is map morality into the real world. Human morality arises from values that contribute to a particular world view (hence their danger). But pursuing as broad as possible a moral world view is the pursuit of drawing an absolute circle in a discreet world.
I think that the main point of Harris has been misunderstood. He does not try to make the case that there are objective moral truths within the classical definitions of morality which are culturally or religiously derived without any actual criteria behind. Instead he proposes that the only useful way for society to talk about something like morality (a compass for better or worse / benevolent or maleovolant), assuming we are compassionate and altruistic human beings, as opposed to tribal human beings, is to simply use a well defined criteria: that which maximizes well-being (even though that might be difficult to evaluate in some cases, but that's the how rather than the what).
The last point about the beaten students does not seem right, I don't think most teachers care about whether their students are morally good or bad people, but only about their results as students. They've beaten students instead, either under false assumption that punishment improved their learning performance by demotivating them e.g. from being distracted and/or for sadistic pleasure of the teachers.
Just discovered this channel - I like Prof Moeller! But I think he is too generous to Harris when he says it is reasonable to speak of increasing human well-being even in specific circumstances. Even in such situations it is meaningless, as it is in principle not measurable by reference to any criteria. It is also trivial in that it assumes one can quantify and resolve an infinitude of variables. This is why, given the same factual matrix, Moeller can legitimately come to a conclusion the opposite of Harris'. If Harris is right about the specific (which he is not), his extrapolation to the universal becomes perhaps a challenge only of degree.
Harris also seems to believe that a well-meaning neuroscientist can determine, objectively, what the best life is for everyone and how to achieve it. I can't believe such a universal standard exists. We are too different from each other. I think the Stoics were more sane: Each of them had to find balance and peace within his own life, in his own way. That was true whether you were a lowly soldier or the Emperor of Rome.
Seems, I know not seems, dear mother. I have the markings…. But it does seem that by saying you cannot use language to instantiate some objective moral truth that at least that is part of la nuance speaking some absolute moral truth. That is the issue, is it not? Does god exist? And that is by faith either way you answer. But the TAO remains. Think about your words next to, say, the Book of Mark. One is eternal, the other is dust in the wind.
I don't know...it seems like a rejection of Harris's claim based on a technicality? Maybe Harris doesn't have the objective moral code, and is wrong to speak of it that way. But for structuring any given person's own moral code, structuring how they make value judgements of the world and deciding how to act, valuing actions that improve human wellbeing, well that seems like a good start to me.
That there is no objective morality, it is instead just a discourse, like religion is given God isn't real. I suppose that makes sense, but it creates a kind of discomfort...what is the point of moral striving, making value judgements, and acting in a particular way if there is no objective morality? How should one reconcile what they believe is "right" or "good' with what another person believes is "right" or "good"? Is it based on consensus...objective morality is the minimum set of beliefs what we can all agree are good? And I see others in the comments point out that an objective morality, maybe it is illusory, but perhaps it is still a fine target to aim at. Perhaps it has utility to conceive of and try to agree on a common morality, to draw boundaries between good and bad. Perhaps I should read your book.
What even is objective morality?
Objective Morality, in the simplest terms, is the belief that morality is universal, meaning that it isn't up for interpretation.
Basically there is only one right and wrong.
it is a myth.
@@manaleauxduclaire482 bruh...don't spread biased beliefs as facts
@@lobstered_blue-lobster its not biased though. its called moral relativism. its true because objective value doesn't exist, so we have to rely on subjective experience to interpret and attempt to assign value, either positive or negative to how actions effect others.
Moral _realism_ is probably a better term than “objective” morality. That seems to be the term actual philosophers researching and debating metaethics use.
Hi
WeLl tHaT DePeNds oN wHaT YoU MeAn bY GoD..
Moral is everything that maximises the sum total of human happiness and minimises the sum total of human suffering.
Amorality is such an empty philosophy. People seem to forget that if you dispense with [objective] morality, you also have to abandon moral duties and responsibilities - the pressing obligation to "be good" and "do good." Imagine a life where no such obligation existed and it was just invented arbitrarily to prolong our wellbeing (whatever that is) as we course through time and space towards our inevitable and meaningless end.
Sounds like a fantastic world.
I get one life and get to live it according to my values.
Instead of wasting it following somebody else's.
Ok, but... morals bad and amorality good? Wouldn't this view require absolute good and bad to exist and isn't it very moral itself? I don't think this matrix can be left.
Why would this view require an "absolute" good and bad to exist? One can be good or bad in a non-moral sense, for example, in relation to a practical skill, such as playing chess or tennis. I don't think anyone would suggest that saying someone is good or bad at tennis is a moral judgement. If we regard living well within a given society as a practical matterr then surely the same would apply in this instance.
@@robertpierce4069 No, you are getting me wrong. I referred to the interviewee. He advocates for amorality. As it seems, he advocates for it under all circumstances. Therefore, amorality must be absolutely good and pursuing it must thus be moral. I just wanted to point out that contradiction.
seems like you haven't really taken wittgenstein's message to heart. morality doesn't exist, yeah, neither does pain, nor thought, nor concepts or notions or whatever you use when trying to make sense of life. but still you can without overanalyzing see that some actions are wrong and should be condemned, and you really don't need some complete theory of what is right and wrong. we do have instincts to be compassionate and helpful and friendly, evolutionarily ingrained propensities for behavior that is not exclusively self serving, but not everyone is to same degree prone to that, so agreeing on some key things is much more beneficial than what your talk makes it seem to be. it is not at all reasonable to think that things would somehow be better if we did away with morality, or even just religion. also you are talking wittgenstein and at the same time dealing with words like morality and religion exactly in the way that he advised against. like right and wrong are concepts, so morality is wrong, i mean that is just silly, and i know that the way i put it is sort of exagerated, but pay attention to how you put it and you'll see that silly things follow after you or anyone tries to unground themselves completely, pure reason in that sense is nonsense
19 min and said nothing but what he believes, no arguments, only examples without argumentation. Extremely poor
long story short: this guy doesnt know what he's talking about and contradicts himself. "moral language/discussion/beliefs often leads to conflict (which is a negative/immoral in his own words), therefore we shouldnt use moral language/discussion/beliefs".
take it from someone who actually knows what theyre on about: within the confines of human understanding; morality is entirely relative/subjective. this is an absolute undeniable truth (must stress: within the confines of human understanding), anyone who disagrees simply doesnt understand morality.
however; and this is crucial: you really, REALLY dont want to spend your entire childhood in jimmy savilles basement, right? obviously not. so with that said, we have a very basic foundation for a reasonable affirmation in regards to what could be considered moral/immoral.
long story short: do unto others as you would have them do unto you (the golden rule) - maybe jesus? though confucius beat him to it with the silver rule - dont do unto others as you wouldnt have them do unto you; exactly the same when you consider the 'ought' and not the 'is' - this presents a major problem, which is why there is so much strife and conflict with humans; peeps cant agree on what ought to be considered moral. basically, it all boils down to whoever can enforce their position, and that really is it.
yikes
Of course you have an anime profile picture of a prepubescent. Only your type could shamelessly post this sort of verbal vomit and think its some sort of valuable retort.
I barely made it halfway through. Too much "uh" & "um"...hearing the professor's talk is like trying to hear a podcast or radio program through ongoing static.
keep in mind english is not his native language he is german and formulating on the fly sentences in tough topics in a foreign language is really hard