Scientific Explanation - Carl Hempel (1963)
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 1 พ.ค. 2024
- Dr. Carl G. Hempel gives a talk on the nature of scientific explanation in 1963. This was the 11th in a series of 17 lectures given on the philosophy of science from Voice of America’s “Forum: The Arts & Sciences in Mid-Century America”. The series includes Willard Van Orman Quine, Max Black, Hilary Putnam, Nelson Goodman, Paul Feyerabend, Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and others.
00:00 Intro
01:05 Talk
#philosophy #epistemology #science
Hempel here is explaining his hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation , and that model includes his concept of covering laws from which predictions may be deduced, hence the emphasis on deduction, though it must be said theories accumulate data inductively through observation and experiment. Once that data is fed into a theoretical model, deductive analysis takes over. .Deduction and induction are thus complementary functions of experimental science.
OmFingG! That this should exist is amazing in itself. And now make it available! Thanks!
Even as late as 1963 this would have been revolutionary and possibly, even a little dangerous. And here we are, 60 years later, with powerful people still somehow manipulating albeit ignoring the scientific and philosophical truths herein.
Most delusional comment ever. Its common people who ignore. Elite are very well versed in sciences. They re smarter thanks to lamentations and better knowledge thanks to Neuralink and Heavy Beast Data/Mothership databases. Your comment its pretty hilarant.
All this seems rather self-evident. What position is Hempel arguing against? Who would be a prominent proponent of this opposite position?
Popper definitely, also Putnam.
@@linski656 What's the opposite position? I'd imagine that Popper would be very sympathetic to the idea that science is about postulating laws and then trying to falsify them.
Yes, of course @@yoramgt for the first part of the talk Hempel mirrors Popper's view almost exactly, but Hempel takes it a step further and asserts that probabilistic laws are also scientific, which Popper absolutely did not believe. Admitting probabilistic laws naturally allows us to classify 'scientific' fields like economics and psychology as sciences, it would possibly even allow us to classify History as a science. Popper did not think that any of the social 'sciences' were sciences, and stuck to hard to his deductive model of science that he even rejected Biology as being a proper science(I think this is why Hempel specifically uses the example of probabalistic laws in biology, I personally favour Hempel's extended model over Popper's somewhat overrestrictive model). I don't actually know very much at all about the Philosophy of Science so I could be wrong about all of this though; tell me if my interpretation is wrong.
@@linski656 I don't feel particularly knowledgeable either. I would imagine that as long as the probabilistic laws allow producing falsifiable predictions, ("xx-sigma") then this would not be considered problematic by Popper. Popper's assertion that darwinism was not scientific was based on the idea that it does not allow generating any falsifiable predictions, IIUC.
Glory to the Vienna Circle.
Peculiar statement coming from Gottfried W. Leibniz.
Hempel was a vocal critic of the Vienna Circle, though.
Yeah, I'm an engineer, I love engineering and science...I did not find this very enlightening....