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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 18 ก.ย. 2024
- Caen to Arnhem: Monty's Narrow Front
With Roger Cirillo
Part of our Arnhem Week series
• Arnhem Week
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Also part of our 80th Anniversary Series
• 80th Anniversary Special
We look at the various options available to the Allies for progression in Normandy, including the phase lines proposed ahead of DDay. We also talk about the involvement of SHAEF and the Antwerp and Market Garden plans.
Roger Cirillo is a Military Historian and analyst specializing in twentieth century. Experience in battlefield analysis and staff rides on more than sixty battlefields on four continents. Former staff college instructor, war plans officer, armored cavalry commander. Assignments in United States, Korea and Germany during Cold War.
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This was an exceptional discussion of the big picture aspects of the campaign in Northwest Europe from Normandy through Market/Garden. Dr. Cirillo offers relatively unbiased, extensively researched and supported conclusions. Provides answers to a lot of questions I’ve had for quite awhile. Great episode.
Totally agree. He was entertaining with his blunt style and well setup material.
@@PorqueNoLosDos Yes I realized after the talk I had seen videos of him speaking about the Italian Campaign and about US Army leadership past and present. He is both funny and blunt. Quotes; re General Alexander, “If a general was a 10 story building his elevator went up to floor 6.” re General Montgomery, “He overcame a bad childhood by going through the British public school system and Sandhurst and came out strange.” re Mark Clark, “Mark Clark was tall.” pause “In the US Army I would rather be tall than competent,” He went on to say some complementary things about each of those generals after the one liners but he was very funny.
Wow, I can't believe you got Roger on the show! I remember watching several of his WW2 presentations several years ago, and I fell in love with his presentation style. Funny guy, too!
Came in late during the last bit, but went back to the beginning and it was very much worth it. Learned a great deal from Roger which he presented in an objective manner. Some controversy was cleared up yet still there are things that may never be agreed upon. One thing I think we all can agree upon was the courage, skill and sacrifice of all the allied soldiers who fought Market Garden, especially the British 1st Airborne Division.
I guess my one nit is: While the Allies took 30% of the German army, the allies also forced Germany to pull the Luftwaffe and 88 mm Flak cannons back for 'Defense of the Reich; (88 mm Flak cannons were used against tanks.) The withdrawal of the Luftwaffe/Flak were critical assets that could not be used in a combined arms defense strategy against the Soviets. Also, the Allies removal of the U-Boats in May 1943, allowed for greater war material shipments to the Soviet Union.
The air war in the Western front also knocked out over 27,000 Luftwaffe air craft, by contrast only 11,000 were lost on the Eastern front.
In addition to those tens of thousands of guns, 2 million German men were also employed on air defence duties inside Germany. The colossal effort prompted Reichsminister Albert Speer to declare in 1943 that all the talk of a 'second front' was missing the point because the second front was already here. Right at home in Germany.
Theres also some crazy stat that 40% of german production went toward fighters and 5% to tanks, or something like that. James and Al always mention it.
Excellent presentation - thanks to Roger and to Paul for hosting. This was one of the Arnhem week videos I was most looking forward to, so cheers for that.
Wow just watched Rogers presentation, that was an Oscar winning performance. I was enthralled, especially that he had spoken to so many of the WW2 generals on both sides. His comprehensive presentation, with maps, strategy and accounts from those involved. Thank you Roger and Woody, a future question and answer session is a must thanks both again
Excellent presentation from Roger
This is a profound discussion because it is both a top view of both strategic INTENT and considerations, and yet also backs this up with generous detail (and great maps) on personalities, relationships and conflicts that drive the execution of strategic intent. This applies to all manner of large organizations and campaigns, whether corporate/business or military. At my (senior) age I fully appreciate Roger's discussion - execution, relationships and culture trumps strategy every single day. Business experts have said this countless times, and Roger drives home that military campaigns are no different.
Brilliant disquisition. Wish he had talked about Gavin's 48 hour delay in taking Nijmegen bridge, slowing down 30 Corps' drive to Arnhem. Should have mentioned who took Monty's concept and was actually in charge of Mkt Garden.
Regarding Roger's comment about Horrocks stopping at Antwerp, I believe Horrocks exact words during an interview on world at war 1973 episode 19 - Battle of the Bulge were.
"We had 100 kilometres of Petrol and another 100 kilometres within 24 hours reach and they should have in my opinion have taken a chance, the only thing between us and the rhine was one division of very old gentleman, we call them stomach divisions, they'd been guarding the coast of holland plus one dutch SS battalion, we could have brushed straight through them, gone on and bounced across into the rhine and cut all the germans in holland off from the rhur and then got round behind the rhur, it was a very bad mistake we should have taken a risk"
Interesting. This could've led to German forces for Battle of bulge sent to the Netherlands for reinforcements.
He also says in his memoirs: Roberts was ordered to, and did in fact, secure a bridgehead over the Albert Canal, but was subsequently forced to withdraw in face of increasing German resistance. He had not sufficient troops to seize the docks, clear the town and occupy the bridgehead."
I wish someone did serious research on this 100km soundbyte because it's quoted profusely but never is there a speck of documented proof.
"could have brushed straight through them, gone on and bounced across into the rhine and cut all the germans in holland off from the rhur and then got round behind the rhur, it was a very bad mistake we should have taken a risk"
this bit is just straight-up sci-fi.
I was aware of the same quote and that Pip Roberts of 11th Armoured Division admitted he misread the map and thought all the docks were south of the Albert Canal - the old docks are, but the new constructions were to the northwest along the Scheldt and may not have even been on some of the road maps they were using if they were not up to date.
It's also interesting that according to the research by Didden and Swarts for Autumn Gale (2013) that the fighting in Antwerp on 4 September did not end until the final German surrender at the Ortskommandantur (town military HQ) at 2230 hrs, and then they tried to push two infantry battalions across the canal the next day (Mad Tuesday - 5 September) without time for any planning or reconnaissance, but the Germans contained the bridgehead and the arrival of the freshly refitted schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559 (with Kampfgruppe Chill the subject of the book) forced the battalions to be withdrawn.
One of the infantry battalion commanders in 11th Armoured that had liberated Antwerp complained that he was so exhausted he had to order barbed wire to be errected around his command post just so he could think straight, while the Belgian civilians were only just starting to party. It paints a picture, and while Horrocks may have had 100 kilometers of fuel remaining, I don't think the troops had another 100 kilometers in them that night. They started 3 September still in France and were now nearly at the Dutch border.
@@davemac1197 Yeah it seems that memories of the Hundred Days in WW1, when exactly this had happened, were still fresh in the memory of many officers.
The open window of opportunity to seize a bridgehead over the Albert Canal, against light opposition, at Antwerp existed for only 2-3 days. There were no orders to push across the Albert Canal, no appreciation of the situation and the pleas from the Belgian White Brigade were ignored. It was a mere 15 miles from Antwerp to Woensdrecht and the narrow 2 mile Beveland isthmus against feeble resistance.
@@sumivescent The interview is interesting though, worth a watch.
Excellent! Plan Sixteen was the clincher. 🌟
Excellent presentation. Goes hand in hand with Edwin Popken and others MG Ops.
Roger is simply brilliant, talk about learnt a lot. Thanks boys
Superb presentation by a historian who doesn't pull his punches in his views backed up with facts and in depth knowledge of the subject. Great talk on a channel that is a must for anyone interested in WW2.
Absolutely terrific presentation, the best that I have heard. Thank you.
Fascinating. Learned a great deal more on a subject I thought I knew quite well. First class Guest.
An excellent presentation. I appreciated Roger’s frank assessment of the personalities and operations in NW Europe in 1944-1945.
Sorry I missed this one live. But loving it now
Very detailed analysis, thank you!!
WOW!!! Brilliant! Really explains Market Garden on operational & strategic level.
Absolutely , the world was much smaller back in the 40s.
Combined with Edwin's earlier presentation, these two have been eye-opening. Really, really good. Thank you.
Fantastic presentation and discussion. Thank you Paul and Roger - look forward to seeing Roger again.
Superb presentation ...brilliant analysis 👍
Fantastic presentation! So many little known facts that affected the whole out common of the campaign.Very good Paul and Roger.
First rate presentation from consideration and personal enquiry. Impressively even-handed between the parties
Thanks Lt Colonel Roger Cirillo. Please come back because your style is calm and precise. Thanks Roger and Woody. Fascinating topic and so many rabbit holes. X
full of detail, hard going but enjoyed Roger's insight and depth of knowledge.....do bring him back for Q&A
People saying that the Scheldt should have been cleared at the same time as Antwerp was captured.
Landing craft wasn’t ready (it was I think in the Mediterranean and the troops, who comprised quite a few different nationalities, involved had to be trained in working together for the amphibious assault.) Then after the Germans had been overcome the Scheldt had to be cleared of mines and even after that the Luftwaffe dropped mines agin into the estuary and into the North Sea. Plus Antwerp was sunder constant threat from the V2s. Antwerp was always going to take time and then you’re already into the winter weather. ( A fully successful Market Garden would have cut off the Germans in the estuary from supply, reinforcement and retreat and brought Rotterdam into play).
And even then when Antwerp was fully open within 2 weeks a backlog of 85,000 tons of supplies had accumulated at the port, and from the second week of December American unloading actually declined. There wasn’t enough storage. Antwerp had never been planned to be used by the Americans.
In fact, according to Roger Cirillo, Antwerp originally didn’t feature all that prominently in allied plans:
_The report stressed that the original logistical estimates counted on the Brittany ports to supply and stage U.S. divisions arriving from the states. Eisenhower justified backing both avenues with an equal sized attack by arguing that the logistical support for the southern attack was no more difficult than the northern blow. Additionally, the assessment infers that _*_Antwerp’s availability was not an original assumption in the Broad Front plan which was based on German assumed surrender on D + 360 not far within Germany and only a month after Antwerp’s capture._*_ The primary ports basis for OVERLORD were the Brittany Ports, the Marseilles Group, and the Channel Ports. Central to the maintenance of the American armies would be the Brittany ports, and the Commonwealth armies the Channel ports._
-Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On (Wolverhampton Military Studies Book 20) by John Buckley, Peter Preston-Hough
The Germans were on the run in August and September, they didn’t have any new panzer divisions to throw into the front lines. They just lost TEN panzer divisions the month before in August.
This is why in September they could only throw in green and badly trained panzer brigades, and these got mauled very quickly. It took Germany MONTHS to build up their panzer divisions to use in the Ardennes. By December they had built them up, although still only at half strength in tanks compared to Normandy.
The reason why Germany was able to rebuild for the Ardennes was because Eisenhower’s broad-front strategy got nowhere and Germany was able to keep on producing.
Had Montgomery’s concentrated, powerful northern thrust been agreed to by Eisenhower, the industrial heartland of the Ruhr would have been reached much sooner and this would have been detrimental to Germany’s ability to reproduce much of their armaments. Their steel production for tanks was largely in the the Ruhr.
_”This brilliant coup was full justification for Eisenhower’s decision to give priority to the capture of Antwerp. As soon as the approaches on either shore of the Scheldt Estuary were cleared, he would be able to bring in through Antwerp all the supplies he required to carry the offensive deep into Germany. _*_It was now apparent, however, that he would not need to open the port of Antwerp before advancing to the Ruhr, for the British drive through Belgium had split the German front._*_ Fifteenth Army on the Channel coast was cut off with its back to the sea. Seventh Army, exhausted by a succession of defeats and envelopments, was on the point of disintegration. Its remnants, retreating from the Somme before the flood of Allied armour, were swept aside by the British and driven into the capricious hands of the Americans at Mons. Here in three days one American corps took nearly 30,000 prisoners, most of them from five divisions which had been ordered to withdraw to the Siegfried Line. The plight of the Germans in Belgium, at the gateway to the Ruhr, was the more serious in view of Hitler’s orders that all available reserves should be concentrated on the Upper Moselle.”_
-The Struggle For Europe. Chester Wilmot.
Another outstanding, maybe the finest, podcast from Paul and his Posse. Roger gave a brilliant presentation. Never realized how close to parity existed between the German and Allied infantry on the Western Front. If the Russians did not press on past their borders, what would have happened?? Perhaps Stalin would have paused, allowed the Germans to press the Allies back and then rushed in and taken all of Europe?
Brilliant one of the best presentations I've seen.
Keep thinking of Edwin's comment about consolidation . Superb
Fantastic presentation gentlemen I learned a lot today thank you very much Roger and Sir Woody
Excellent presentation, but as usual a few points but of course always up for discussion...........Gavin was not told, he admitted it was 'his personal decision to deprioritise the Nijmegen Bridge', a decision Browning ratified. Written orders also did NOT deprioritise taking Nijmegen Bridge. Also British 43rd Division were ready to execute a river crossing on the 20th (fully trained) but Gavin insisted his 504th PIR do this. On the evening of the 20th, the Germans had up to 24 heavy guns within 2-3 miles north of Nijmegen Bridge, contrary to popular opinion.
What were the original orders then for the 82nd?
How could the 43rd Wessex make a river crossing of the Waal, when they were still in their transit camps in Belgium on the 20th?
@@jbjones1957 Written orders - Official Field Order number 11, by the authority of 82nd U.S. Airborne Division, APO 469 U.S. Army, 13 September 1944............
Signed by Brigadier-General James Gavin, the official written order number 11 read: - “82nd U.S. Airborne Division will land by parachute and glider south of Nijmegen during the afternoon and evening, with missions to seize and hold the high ground between Nijmegen and Groesbeek and the highway bridges at Nijmegen and Grave.”
So it is clear that the ‘road-bridge’ at Nijmegen was a top written operational priority, and not a secondary one as is often implied, irrespective of the underlying thinking that the Groesbeek Heights must be secured at all cost.
Field Order Number 11 specifically instructed the 508th PIR to: - “Seize, organize and hold key terrain features in areas of responsibility, prevent all hostile movement south of line at Hatert 681584 and Klooster 712589, and be prepared to seize Waal River crossing at Nijmegen 714633 on order of Divisional Commander”.
Hence, the order, or command to the 508th PIR to strike for the bridge ultimately lay with General Gavin, and 508th PIR’s Commander Colonel Lindquist depended on and awaited Gavin’s instruction. Whether Gavin issued a verbal command to Lindquist just prior to the operation is open to much debate. As part of the official post-war U.S. Enquiry into the issues at Nijmegen, Captain Westover interviewed Brigadier-General Gavin. Westover initially asked him: - “What position or HQ made the decision to apportion weight of the 82nd Division to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?”
Gavin answered in unequivocal terms: - “This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander”.
Furthermore, Gavin re-iterated this in his book ‘On to Berlin’, reconfirming that it was his plan that was presented to Browning, where he explained his reasoning, and that Browning then merely confirmed the de-prioritisation, probably at the highlighted meeting on the 16th September.
It is little known that a small British unit actually crossed Nijmegen Bridge on the 17th September when it was lightly defended. British Airborne Officer Lieutenant Howe, Commanding Officer of 1st Air Landing Anti-Tank Battery told a quite incredible story, that is highlighted in the book ‘A Lost Opportunity - Battery Z Troop’, by Nigel Simpson, Philip Reinders, Peter Vrolijk, and Marcel Zwarts. Howe recalled how he was told that a number of the battery had landed not far north of Nijmegen and had been hidden in a monastery in the south of Nijmegen after crossing Nijmegen Bridge, and was later shocked to see that it was Lieutenant Eustace McNaught of Z Troop with his gunners, who had landed in glider CN.1005 near Zetten on ‘the island' between Nijmegen and Arnhem. Howe recalled that Eustace McNaught explained exactly what happened to him after landing too far south on the 17th September: - “Eustace took the Jeep and his gunners and left the Glider Pilots and other gun crew, telling them he was off to the bridge at Arnhem. According to Eustace, he travelled down the main road and was shocked to find it empty with no German troops anywhere to be seen until he got pretty close to the bridge. Then he saw in the distance a large German armoured force on the main road heading away from Arnhem and a lot of smoke in the distance. Eustace decided that there was no way he could get through and so they turned around the Jeep and decided to head for the Americans at Nijmegen. Again, the road was devoid of any German Troops and Eustace said by this time it was late and pretty dark when they arrived at the road Bridge at Nijmegen. He could hear fighting to the south so headed to the ‘sound of the guns’. They cautiously crossed the Bridge and were completely unchallenged, that's what made him angry also, as why wasn't there any Americans to the north to take it also. He exclaimed "What a lost Opportunity!".
Regards the 43rd Division, written operational orders dictated that they were meant to execute ‘Operation Basil’ across the Waal River if 30 Corps arrived and found the bridge at Nijmegen untaken, as was the case. Two infantry brigades were ready to undertake the river crossing on the 20th September, with forty storm-boats and close support rafts to transport the troops across if DUKWs struggled on steep banks or on muddy river beds. They were simply awaiting the command. The 32nd Guards Brigade’s War Diary from the 19th September, stated: - “Planning is going ahead for an assault crossing the river at Nijmegen. This would be a two battalion assault by 30 Corps (43rd Division) with 130th Brigade on the right and 214th Brigade on the left. Brigade boundaries not clear, but the main road-bridge will be inclusive to the right brigade”.
I know some units of 43rd Div were some way back but as far as I know, on the 20th, these two brigades were simply waiting the order to move forward and execute. Stand to be corrected, as ever (:-
@@OldWolflad The written orders are from Operation Sixteen: “Will seize and hold the bridges at NIJMEGEN and GRAVE with the same object in view. The capture and retention of the high ground between NIJMEGEN and GROESBEEK is imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task”. This mission was originally for the 101st but later changed to the 82nd during the meeting on the evening of the 10th September. This mission remained unchanged and is wrote in Browning’s Operational Instruction No.1 for 1st British Airborne Corps, which the 82nd was under operational control.
What does “imperative in order to accomplish the Division's task” mean? That was wrote in by either Montgomery, Dempsey or Browning because it came from the Outline Plan conceived on the morning of the 10th September.
Why do people ignore higher level written orders for a subordinate unit?
@@OldWolflad Operational Instruction No. 25 from 30 Corps of 15 September, had 43rd Division to overtake river crossing if a bridge was destroyed or a bridge secured. However, the reality of the ground meant 43rd was still in Belgium on the 20th, as per their War Diary:
20th Sept - The 43rd Division commenced its move to transit areas.
21th Sept - The 43rd Division completed its move to transit areas , advancing in the wake of the Guards Armd Div.
Orders received from 30 Corps that:
- 52 Div Recce Gp, who are being glided in, came under comd 43 Div on arrival NIJMEGEN area and
- Polish Para Bde comes under comd 43 Div as soon as contact is made.
- The 43rd Division is to capture ARNHEM rd br intact and to operate with maximum speed to contact 1 Airborne Div in area OOSTERBEEK ferry 6976 subsequently passing one Bde gp over NERDER RIJN.
@@OldWolflad War Diary for 32nd Guards Brigade makes no mention of what you stated:
19th Sept 0930 - Left Valkenswaard
19th Sept 2200 - Harboured at 660572 after uneventful journey except for some shelling of ST OEDENRODE as we passed through. Coldm Gp under comd 82 U.S. Div. WG Gp to defend GRAVE br.
Where does the statement from 32nd Guards Brigade come from?
What a great presentation. I appreciate you addressing answers to controversial questions that make sense and have facts to back them up.
I was honored to watch this presentation.
A great presentation
Sounds like every time Bradley met with Montgomery he would reinforce Patton.
So much for”Old men on bicycles”.
They were part of the mix. The local defence battalion at Arnhem was Sicherungs-Infanterie-Batailon 908, which gave rise to the "old men on bicycles" intel at Arnhem. They consisted of WW1 veteran logistics troops who were deemed unfit for combat duty in 1914-18 and were deployed with a company each guarding the Ijssel bridges at Doesburg and Westervoort, and the other two companies as ground defence of Deelen airfield.
The "children" or "Hitler Youth" reference was to Krafft's SS-Panzergrenadier-Ausbildungs-und-Ersatz-Bataillon 16, which had changed designation from '12' to '16' in August as they were completing the training of some Hitler Youth replacements for 12.SS-Panzer-Division they still had at Arnhem-Oosterbeek and were preparing to receive 1,000 new recruits from Germany to train for 16.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division 'Reichsführer-SS'.
The intel at Arnhem was suprisingly accurate, even down to the knowledge that 400 artillery troops were in a collection centre in the grounds of the psychiatric hospital at Wolfheze in the middle of the British Airborne landing zones - together with accommodations for Luftwaffe senior officers stationed at Deelen, it was the reason the hospital was bombed on the morning of the operation.
Brilliant, thank you.
US forces didn’t have a decent port to sustain them because they didn’t do their jobs in Brittany.
The plan was for the Atlantic ports to be the main US supply method. This was meant to enable the US to land everything direct from the USA. Everything planned for the US Army was built around that fact.
The French railways south of The Loire were left relatively intact because it was planned that they would be used to move the supplies inland from Quiberon Bay. The planners had factored this in so Brest would have been a game-changer if only Bradley had managed to take it more quickly before it was destroyed.
Even then there was a plan for a pre-fabricated port to be built. See OPERATION CHASTITY.
Bradley and Patton were supposed to clear the Brest peninsula and the approaches to Quiberon Bay. They failed to do this which meant they didn’t have a large port to supply them.
Eisenhower cancelled the plan on September 7th 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. Mack, of the Communications Zone staff, described the failure to implement Operation Chastity as "the critical error of World War II".
That was another great episode!!
Please can Roger come back on the show! This was a brilliant analysis of the strategic position in August and September 1944
Roger was spot with his analysis. From U.S. well done 👍
I learned a lot from him.
Great history lesson, thank you!
👍I liked this so much I dug out Roger's PhD thesis. Looks great. Should be a book but can't find it. The Op that slipped Roger's mind was Veritable. (Which just happens to be the subject of my award winning thesis "Slog or Swan: British Army effectiveness in Operation Veritable" coming soon to all good bookshops. 😉)
Fabulous as usual, thanks so much
Corker. Thank you.
After the Normandy Breakthrough Supply is not just the difficulty facing the Allies Men and Machine Maintenance as well.
Interesting presentation
People talking about victory disease are off base I think.
As Stephen Ashley Hart has noted, senior British commanders recognised that if their forces suffered devastating losses defeating the Germans in North-west Europe, British influence on post-war Europe would be diminished: Britain had not just to win the war but also the ensuing peace as well. Montgomery’s dispute with Eisenhower over theatre strategy and command reflected his determination “to maintain” the campaign on “lines most suitable to Britain, because it was of no avail to win the war strategically if Britain lost it politically. The maintenance of Britain’s international influence necessitated that British forces played a prominent role in the prosecution of the vital North-west Europe campaign; Britain’s post-war political prestige rested in part on the glory that her soldiers won on the battlefields of Europe.
However, if Britain maintained such a high profile, with the 21st Army Group spearheading the Allied onslaught against the German Army in the West (Westheer), its forces would incur severe casualties. These partly irreplaceable losses would compel the army group to disband formations, thus reducing its already meagre peak strength of 16 divisions. The fewer the divisions with which the British army emerged at the war’s end, the weaker its influence on Europe would be in the face of the growing might of two nascent superpowers. Indeed, by 1945, the American forces deployed in the theatre outnumbered the British Commonwealth’s forces by three to one. Montgomery’s generalship qsought to achieve a high British military profile while paradoxically avoiding the casualties that went with such a profile. The longer the war lasted, moreover, the smaller would be the British effort in North-west Europe comparison with that of the ever increasing American forces. Thus the British remained more interested in achieving victory quickly than the Americans, since the British economy and man-power situation demanded victory in 1944: no later.
The 21st Army Group, however, possessed insufficient resources to achieve early victory by itself, unless the Germans collapsed unexpectedly. Equally, Montgomery could not afford to sustain the heavy casualties that would be incurred in a British-dominated attempt to secure swift strategic victory over the Westheer. Should such a full-blown British offensive effort fail, Montgomery’s emasculated army group might be reduced to a secondary role in the theatre, left merely to observe America’s defeat of the Wehrmacht.
On the 4th September Monty was told by a SHAEF intel report that the Germans facing his 2nd British army were disorganized, demoralized, short of equipment and arms, so he tried to hit them hard and force a crossing at the Rhine as quickly as he could, before the winter weather and before the Germans could regroup, strengthen their defences and bring reinforcements in. (Eisenhower’s dilly-dallying however meant that MG didn’t start until Sep 17th 1944)
If 21AG concentrated on clearing the Scheldt first then the Germans would probably have blown the bridges over the Waal and everywhere else in advance of the British and Canadian advance. Market Garden had the practical goal of ensuring that these major bridges were captured intact. And if they didn’t get there before the freezing weather Monty had already predicted no river assaults would be possible during ice season as pontoon bridges couldn’t be placed on the Rhine.
The launching of Market-Garden is more intelligible in this context. The operation reflected Montgomery’s attempt to exploit an apparently unique fleeting battlefield opportunity. If Montgomery’s forces succeeded in capturing the Ruhr it might just deliver the crucial knock-blow to end the war, without the army group’s forces being devastated in the process.
Although it failed to obtain a bridgehead over the Rhine British forces didn’t have to fight through the southern Netherlands through the winter of 1944/1945 as they were already there due to Market Garden.
There almost certainly would have been more difficulties and more casualties had a British 2nd Army ground advance been carried out later in worse weather and strengthened German defences.
the main issue with Monty is his personality rather than his capability
Great talk, but let's be sure to qualify some things about the Canadian Army: 1st Corps is in Italy, so that explains why we have so many British and other forces attached. Also, our "reinforcement crisis" is actually quite brief (admittedly at this crucial period) and somewhat overblown. There are not enough trained infantry in and around September '44.
Thanks Alex
The American army was also short of replacement infantry. Just not as badly as the 21st Army Group was
'Walt Disney operation" I love it, I wonder if that's in Al's new book?
Montgomery didn’t ignore Antwerp. He proposed a para drop to help clear the Scheldt on Sep 8th 1944 repeated on Sep 10th but was turned down by Brereton of the US Air Force as not being suitable ground for paras but Guy Simonds, the Canadian corps commander disagreed. This was still being proposed and discussed as late as 23rd September 1944.
There were also several proposals to use heavy bombers to breach the defenses but these were turned down initially and then referred to Eisenhower. As well as amphibious craft needed for a seaward attack on Walcheren being in the Mediterranean. The amphibious operation on Walcheten was complex and the forces comprising consisted of quite a few different nationalities and had to be trained in working together. All of this dragged on into October.
From Monty The Field-Marshal:
_In fact Eisenhower’s headquarters had ruled out Monty’s appeal for an airborne assault on Walcheren early in September, repeated on 10 September; they had also ruled out Monty’s requests for a series of heavy bomber attacks to inundate the German defences on 29 September - and when Teddder informed Monty on 7 October that Leigh-Mallory was departing to South-East Asia and would not be replaced as Air C-in-C, Monty had told Eisenhower of his ‘considerable alarm’._
-Monty, The Field-Marshal 1944-1976. Nigel Hamilton
Montgomery had to protect his flank, what forces did he have left available with which to reinforce the Canadians much more than he in fact did? Montgomery met Eisenhower and explained that he didn’t have sufficient forces to achieve his objectives and he required 12 American divisions from Bradley’s armies to cover his right flank so that he concentrate his own resources on Antwerp but Eisenhower refused. Eisenhower had stretched everyone too thin.
_”As Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander, Eisenhower should have given Montgomery a direct order to clear the Scheldt early in September. However, on the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower’s new directive ordered ‘the forces north-west of the Ardennes’-21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army-‘to secure Antwerp, reach the sector of the Rhine covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.’ In other words, _*_not one priority task, but three. Antwerp was already secure but the task given to ‘the forces north-west of the Ardennes’ was formidable enough and would absorb every division Montgomery had or could borrow. This left him with nothing to spare to assist the Canadians in the clearing of the Scheldt-and that task was not specified in Eisenhower’s orders at all.”_*
- The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands
Antwerp only became an issue later when Bradley and Patton failed to do their job in Brittany, the American’s prodigious expenditure of ammunition, maintenance issues and lack of grip from the top began to bite.
Eisenhower sent Montgomery a message stating that unless Antwerp was producing by *the middle of November* then entire operations would come to a standstill, so it’s hard to see how Antwerp delayed anything by very long since Antwerp was opened before the end of November. (Accepting the middle of November as true, I’m not sure because in November there were still some 600,000 long tons of supplies stockpiled in the Normandy lodgment area but an inability to deliver them)
Eisenhower was certainly not telling Montgomery to halt and clear Antwerp first and disregard the Ruhr for the time being.
The Scheldt wasn’t the priority when Market Garden was devised. Nor did Eisenhower think so either. He told Monty on September 9th the attack towards the Ruhr could be done at the same time and that the advance eastwards need not be halted. Not clearing the Scheldt didn’t stop the Americans from opening up the major US 1st Army attacks towards Aachen and the Hurtgen Forest from late September, which was far greater supplied than Market Garden.
Eisenhower’s orders specifically state the Ruhr was to be captured.
_”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”_
- Eisenhower
Eisenhower’s orders specifically state the Ruhr was to be captured. On the 9th September 1944 Eisenhower’s communication to Montgomery declared this:
_”My intention is to initially occupy the Saar and the Ruhr, and by the time we have done this both Le Havre and Antwerp should be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts you mention.”_
Eisenhower wrote to Monty and Bradley on 14 September - the day the first battle for Aachen began and three days before Market Garden started - he had predicted: 'We shall soon, I hope, have achieved all the objectives set forth in my directive of September 4 and shall then be in possession of the Ruhr, the Saar and the Frankfurt areas.' With that much achieved, Ike added, he proposed moving on Berlin with both Army Groups and 'would like his Commanders' views on the best route - or routes'.
_”At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.”_
- CRUSADE IN EUROPEDWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1948Page 336
Montgomery was actually doing exactly as he was ordered - Antwerp, take the channel ports, te Rhine, prepare for an assault on the Ruhr - these were Eisenhower’s orders.
Just to note, you typically quote secondary not primary sources, and as has been stated many times the memoirs of the main players contain their amendments and interpretations. Note how Roger quoted the exchanges sent in 1944
@@WW2TV
Not sure anything Roger Cirillo quoted contradicts anything I’ve written?
What I’m trying to is draw from different sources in order to try to understand something of what was going on in Montgomery’s mind in terms of British strategy in the autumn of 1944. Selective quotes, even from primary sources, won’t necessarily give you that. How many people are aware for example, that the British were suffering a manpower crisis by the summer of 1944 yet concomitantly felt it was vital that the army play both a decisive role in defeating The Third Reich and still have a sizeable army left to influence events around the table in post war Europe AND link thaow considerations to the debates around opening Antwerp, Market Garden and ending the war quickly?
I also earlier quoted Roger Cirillo himself referring to The assessment of Strategy by the U.S. Theater Board:
_The report stressed that the original logistical estimates counted on the Brittany ports to supply and stage U.S. divisions arriving from the states. Eisenhower justified backing both avenues with an equal sized attack by arguing that the logistical support for the southern attack was no more difficult than the northern blow. Additionally, the assessment infers that Antwerp’s availability was not an original assumption in the Broad Front plan which was based on German assumed surrender on D + 360 not far within Germany and only a month after Antwerp’s capture. The primary ports basis for OVERLORD were the Brittany Ports, the Marseilles Group, and the Channel Ports. Central to the maintenance of the American armies would be the Brittany ports, and the Commonwealth armies the Channel ports._
-Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On (Wolverhampton Military Studies Book 20) by John Buckley, Peter Preston-Hough
@@WW2TV
Also, the following are primary sources,
A telegram sent to Montgomery by Eisenhower on September 9th 1944 read:
_The bulk of the German Army that was in the west has now been destroyed. Must immediately exploit our success by promptly breaching the SIEGFRIED LINES crossing the RHINE on a wide front and seizing the SAAR and the RUHR. This will give us a stranglehold on two of Germany’s main industrial areas and largely destroy her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take……_
_My intention is to initially occupy the Saar and the Ruhr, and by the time we have done this both Le Havre and Antwerp should be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts you mention.”_
On 9th September 1944 Eisenhower was signalling to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that his intention was ‘
_’to press on with all speed to destroy the German Armed Forces and occupy the heart of Germany…… striking at the Ruhr and Saar……The main effort will be on the left…..Antwerp having been seized, the Northern Group of Armies and that part of the Central Group of Armies operating northwest of the Ardennes will breach the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and seize the Ruhr. The First Allied Airborne Army supports the Northern Group of Armies in the attainment of first objectives. An operation to seize the crossings over the Rhine and in the area Arnhem-Nijmegen has been twice postponed on account of weather and only awaits favourable weather conditions….’_
Nigel Hamilton is surely right when he says for Monty now to cancel the British part of the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border, particularly given Eisenhower’s view of Montgomery as slow and over-cautious.
On the 15th September, Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery as follows:
_”Dear Montgomery, We shall soon, I hope, have achieved the objectives set forth in my last directive (FWD 13765) and shall then be in possession of the Ruhr, the Saar and the Frankfurt. “I have been considering our next move.”_
@@WW2TV
Also, the following are primary sources,
On the 9th September 1944 Eisenhower’s communication to Montgomery declared this:
_Dear Montgomery, We shall soon, I hope, have achieved the objectives set forth in my last directive (FWD 13765) and shall then be in possession of the Ruhr, the Saar and the Frankfurt…_
_My intention is to initially occupy the Saar and the Ruhr, and by the time we have done this both Le Havre and Antwerp should be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts you mention_
On 9th September 1944 Eisenhower was signalling to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that his intention was ‘
_press on with all speed to destroy the German Armed Forces and occupy the heart of Germany…… striking at the Ruhr and Saar……The main effort will be on the left…..Antwerp having been seized, the Northern Group of Armies and that part of the Central Group of Armies operating northwest of the Ardennes will breach the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and seize the Ruhr. The First Allied Airborne Army supports the Northern Group of Armies in the attainment of first objectives. An operation to seize the crossings over the Rhine and in the area Arnhem-Nijmegen has been twice postponed on account of weather and only awaits favourable weather conditions…._
Nigel Hamilton is surely right when he says that for Monty to now to cancel the British part of ‘the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border, particularly given Eisenhower’s view of Montgomery as slow and over-cautious.
On the 15th September, Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery:
_Dear Montgomery, We shall soon, I hope, have achieved the objectives set forth in my last directive (FWD 13765) and shall then be in possession of the Ruhr, the Saar and the Frankfurt_
Great one with immense details.
One bit that bothered me (and I'm sure is going to be the source of endless discussion regarding the Market Garden series) is his definitive statement that Gavin of the 82nd was "ordered" by Browning to secure that "hill" instead of the bridge at Nijmegen on the immediate drop. The main source for this being the case is Gavin's own words in the post-war investigation of what went wrong with Market Garden.
However, this is contradicted by Browning's orders before and during the operation, and the testimonies after the war. Not only Browning but also the operational orders, the intel briefing and various interactions before and during the operation show a much more nuanced situation: first Gavin was explicitly ordered to take the bridge once he drops. He doesn't do that because according to his faulty assessment, there is a whole Panzer army preparing to attack him from the Reichswald. He communicates with Browning and it seems he manages to convince him that the 82nd must take defensive positions to secure the drop zones for further reinforcements against this supposed attack. Later Gavin says that this order was already given before the drop, which from the record isn't true at all. At any rate, the supposed attack finally comes. Tuned out this "Panzer Army" was a single crippled Volksgrenadier division that the 82nd easily brushes aside. Only then, way later than what the breakneck plan stipulated, does Gavin send a small force to take the bridge, which they fail to do because the until-then completely defenceless bridge gets occupied by a German force that manages to slip from Arnhem and builds up their defence since the 82nd so nicely given them such a head start. This meant that despite XXX Corps making good on their timetable even after the delay at the 101st bridge, they get stuck at Nijmegen.
The issue with the accounts of this is that it gets muddled in US-UK politics. The Americans who were never that happy with the British-led operation were only too quick to push the blame on Monty and Browning and cover as much as possible for Gavin. The British needed a scapegoat since they couldn't accept Monty's plan being faulty (which it was) and ended up throwing Browning and the Polish under the bus, which can be seen as accepting the judgement of the Americans.
Just a ton of bad history
Outstanding presentation! Paul, Mr Cirillo mention a Doug Daly, do you know if this person published any books? Thank you for all. Your hard work.
I don't know sorry
This would be Jeff Dugdale and he has published several volumes of information on German units in WW2, unfortunately out of print and difficult to get hold of now, especially the volume I always wanted to get a hold of - I think it's something like Panzer Divisions from September 1944 to February 1945 - Their Details and Precise Strengths, which is obviously the area of interest for Market Garden, and the books contain data from the regular official returns, etc., so they are invaluable resources for researchers.
I have an extract from an online axishistory forum thread that was discussing 9., 116. und 10. ss panzer division (topic 65154) which quoted from Dugdale to give you an idea of what kind of data it contains:
10. SS Panzer-Division on 5 September 1944
Panzer IV = 16
Panzer V=0
Jagdpanzer IV=21
Bergepanzer III=1
Möbelwagen=0
SdKfz 231=3
SdKfz 222=6
SdKfz 250s=17
SdKfz 251s=61
Grille=0
Wespe=0
SdKfz 10/4=3
StuG III=4
Hummel=0
10. SS Panzer-Division on 12 October 1944
Panzer IV = 6
Panzer V=15
Jagdpanzer IV=19
Bergepanzer III=1
Möbelwagen=0
SdKfz 231=3
SdKfz 222=2
SdKfz 250s=16
SdKfz 251s=63
Grille=0
Wespe=0
SdKfz 10/4=3
SdKfz 7/1=2
StuG III=3
Hummel=0
@@davemac1197 thank you
The broad-front strategy involved all troops being in action, attacking everywhere all along the front without being strong anywhere, with no concentration of force, and no reserves to relieve tired troops.
This led to continuous fighting for the men without relief and very wet, tired and cold troops. It also led to huge casualties and meant that troops who were barely out of recruit training were thrown in. The Americans were relying on green replacements who had no time to know their squad sergeant, the company officers, or even where they were or what was going on.
In addition to losing unbloodied and inadequately/poorly trained troops, their welfare was ignored. There was a trench-foot endemic, cold-related health issues took men off the line and frostbite became a major problem. In the Ardennes the British and Canadians had proper snow-suits, whlle US troops had to use sheets from houses as improvised camouflage. The US Army failed to issue any.
The Chief of Staff to the then German C-in-C West, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, later considered
_”the best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany’s strength is in the north. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in early September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Maas and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany.”_
-General Blumentritt in The Other Side of the Hill. B.H. Liddell Hart
Blumentritt reiterated his view on publication of Monty’s memoirs in 1958, as did General Hasso von Manteuffel, who commanded the Fifth Panzer Army in the Battle of the Bulge:
_”I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower’s insistence on spreading the Allied force’s out for a broader advance was wrong.The acceptance of Montgomery’s plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives- on both sides- would have been saved.”_
Even Bradley’s 12 US Army Group staff came to believe Eisenhower made a fatal mistake by dividing his forces in August 1944 - Bradley’s Deputy Chief of Deception considering that _’if Eisenhower had not been so “wishy washy” and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas.’_
When Amiens was liberated on the 31st August 1944, German documents were found that showed the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces north of the Ardennes than were in Britain in 1940 after Dunkirk. Eisenhower squandered this opportunity.
Chester Wilmot, The Struggle For Europe. Chapter XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P588
_”Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Studen, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. The generals are agreed that even if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery had proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.”_
war ended when 2,500,000 Soviets surrounded Berlin and arty could be heard in hitlers bunker
The Market-Garden plan reminds me of Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for his Midway operation. Too complicated. Too reliant of the enemy doing as you expected.
The problem of logistics in the autumn of 1944 was not absolute. Are there enough supplies - enough for what? What are the objectives, what is to have priority and what state is the enemy in?
On the 4th September Monty was told by a SHAEF intel report that the Germans facing his 2nd British army were disorganized, demoralized, short of equipment and arms. It was in the interests of Montgomery and the British to achieve victory quickly, not least because of manpower problems. Eisenhower however wanted everyone to close up to the Rhine which meant all the armies being in action (ie Patton’s 3rd). Monty felt that to have all the armies in action was unnecessary to cross the Rhine and take the Ruhr in September 1944, given the state the German forces were in, as long as logistical priority was given to 21st Army Group and Hodges 1st Army on Montgomery’s right flank for a strong single thrust, rather than the forces be spread out everywhere and that strength dissipated.
Montgomery could have got to the Ruhr along with elements of 12AG if Bradley had shut down Patton. His plan by the time of Market Garden was not to race off to Berlin but to chase a disorganized, retreating enemy, gaining a footing over the Rhine to the Ruhr before they could regroup, reconstitute and strengthen their defences.
From page 531 of The Struggle for Europe by Chester Wilmot:
_”If he [Eisenhower] had kept Patton halted on the Meuse, and had given full logistic support to Hodges and Dempsey after the capture of Brussels, the operations in Holland could have been an overwhelming triumph, for First U.S. Army could have mounted a formidable diversion, if not a successful offensive, at Aachen, and Second British Army could have attacked sooner, on a wider front and in much greater strength.”_
- The Struggle for Europe by Chester Wilmot:
_”But the evidence also suggests that certain necessary objectives on the road to Berlin, crossing the Rhine and perhaps even taking the Ruhr, were possible with the existing logistical set-up, provided the right strategy to do so was set in place. Montgomery’s popular and astute Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingand, certainly thought so:_
_If Eisenhower had not taken the steps he did to link up at an early date with Anvil and had held back Patton, and had he diverted the resources so released to the north, I think it possible we might have obtained a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter-but not more._
_Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful-and much more than was actually achieved._
_This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944._
- The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands
Keegan credited Wilmot with having "invented the contemporary writing of military history by mixing social, economic and political factors with both strategy and tactics."[100] Wilmot was able to interview Montgomery three times. This was unusual; Montgomery had declined to be interviewed by Pogue, Correlli Barnett or Sir Arthur Bryant's researcher, M. C. "Buster" Long. Montgomery also gave Wilmot access to his letters and correspondence with Eisenhower in September and October 1944.[100] Writing in 1950, Wilmot reflected the frustration of the early Cold War with the outcome of the Second World War that saw the Soviet Union's dominance of eastern Europe and the Balkans, which Wilmot argued could have been avoided.[101] It seemed that instead of making the world safe for democracy, the war had made it safe for communism.[102]
Wilmot's case was bolstered by German general Guenther Blumentritt, the wartime chief of staff of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Eisenhower's German opponent, in his biography of Rundstedt, Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man (1952). Blumentritt wrote that Rundstedt had considered the northern thrust to be the obvious move.[103][104] This was seen as an endorsement of Montgomery's strategy, and prompted headlines like "Did Ike Blunder and Prolong the War?"[105]
American official historian Maurice Matloff described this as a post-war myth, something that had never been seriously considered during the war.[106] The Allied occupation zones in Germany had been agreed upon in February 1944, and a faster Allied advance in the autumn of 1944 would not have altered this.[107] The Soviet Union would have also benefited from a rapid German collapse, and its participation in the war against Japan was greatly desired. The consequences if the narrow front advance had failed, should also be considered. In such a scenario, the Soviet Union could have dominated even more of Europe.[108]
@@nickdanger3802
Was there a point in that verbiage?
❤
Excellent well researched presentation-BALANCED-HOWEVER i dont buy the groesbeek heights argument in preference to the nimigen bridge
Roger's point was about priorities. Go for both, but not at the expense of the bridge
Paul, loved this episode, the political drama behind the scenes is very interesting to me. Do you have plans to make these videos into a podcast? I would very much enjoy listening to many of old and new shows.
No I don't plan to make them into podcasts. Sorry
@@WW2TV can’t win them all. Thanks for replying.
What sources are available that discusses the manpower shortage(s) of the British Empire during world war 2? Great show on this topic.
Jonathan Fennell covers it in his books, and I have seen it in others
@@WW2TV Awesome. Thank you!
Monty’s folly