The 31st Infantry Regiment may be the most hard-luck regiment in the US Army. 1919-1920 they fought in Siberia, 1941-42 they were in the Philippines and wound up in the Bataan Death March, and here they were at Chosin Reservoir. Poor bastards!
Jesus,. Talk about some luck. Makes you wonder whose had the generational curse on em can't imagine what future history would have ìN store for the 31st,. But GøD BLeSs everyone of them may they ALL LIVE FØREVER! Incredible bravery unparalleled ìN all histories of the world.
Brian Huss The 1st Marine Corps Division wiped out 6 of the 8 Chinese Divisions in hand to hand fighting. The Army sacrifice was in vain and not necessary. Chesty Puller saved the Marines, every Marine knows that and that’s why this ROTC requiring film is not allowed on the Marines website.
I was priviledged to work with his son, Brian Dana Smith, while in the U.S. Navy during the 1970s. It was an honor to know of his Dad through him, and a great joy to work with Brian.
Today is Christmas Eve and a best time to know more about O.P. Smith. Just want to give my warmest thanks to all American GIs who sacrificed in Hungman and Korea during the Korean War. American troops also saved/evacuated almost 100,000 civilians from Hung Nam. Merry Christmas to all!
He should have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for this. He would not cave to ALmond's pressure to rush up that road and stockpiled supplies because he saw it coming. He saved the Corp from its greatest defeat in history.
Hi everyone in the comments. Scrolling down I am quite a bit surprised by some people's animosity towards Mr. Ricks' talk. I gather some has personal stake and perhaps the title of his talk was a tinge provocative. Still some discussion are devolving into personal attacks that seemed unnecessary. I have read Rick's book and this specific chapter. Nowhere in his writing did he ever question the bravery or sacrifices of the army soldiers that suffered those staggering losses. His book focused less on minutiae of specific battles but rather on the history of American generalship, their decision making process in combat and their consequences. He was putting forth an argument here that had O.P. Smith not made certain key decisions at the generalship level, the marines would have equally suffered staggering casualties. Rick's writing focused his criticism on general Almond's decisions as X corp commander that placed Faith and his men out on a limb. Perhaps the title of the talk can be upsetting to some as it appears to diminish the sacrifice of the army. There is no doubt that Task Force Faith had mightily contributed to the survival of the marine. But Ricks was just trying to emphasize the point that poor leadership at the highest level costs a lot of lives.
The Chosin Campaign was very brutal. From all accounts, the 1st marine division sustained nearly as many casualties as the 31st RCT. The Cold weather saved the 10th Corps. Gen Almond helped thousands of Korean civilians escape their fate in N Korea at the final withdrawal. Tom Ricks apparently has access to the mind of General Almond to make the marines vulnerable, and of course, the mind of Gen Smith was to disobey the orders of Gen Almond. Ricks obviously knew that Gen Almond was a "Jerk" after hearing the marine version of the battle. He forgot to tell how Gen Smith failed to help the 31st RCT during their retreat.
Ricks does not mention that the 31st RCT stopped a muti division Chinese force from advancing down the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. This is from Roy Appleman's escaping the trap. The Chinese were very inflexible. They could not change plans to adjust for circumstances. They were unaware that the 5th Marines had been moved to the West side of Chosin. The plan called for one Chinese force to hit the 7th Marines on the West Side of Chosin and another to hit the Marines on the East side of Chosin. That force hit the 31st RCT. Army strength on the East Side of Chosin was actually less than regimental, two infantry battalions, and artillery battalion, and two anti aircraft batteris. The third battalion never got to the East side of Chosin. Ricks talks about 5th and 7th Marines fighting two Chinese Divisions for 4 days and 3 nights. The understrength 31st RCT fought elements of three Chinese divisions for 5 days and 4 nights.
Pfc. Hector Cafferata of Venice, Fla. won the Medal of Honor. He will tell you he was no hero; he was just saving his backside when he killed over 100 enemy soldiers in the battle for “Fox Hill” during the early months of the Korean War. Pvt. Hector Cafferata was a 20-year-old green Marine replacement. He joined Fox Company’s 2nd Platoon a few days before the first wave of Chinese troops attacked his listening post at the Toktong Pass during the early months of the Korean War that cold November night half a century ago. Six hours later, the hulking 6-foot-3-inch Marine was a seasoned “Jarhead” who had survived a number of human wave assaults by the enemy. When daylight came more than 125 Chinese soldiers lay dead in front of his position. He was officially credited with killing 15 of the enemy and wounding many more because they didn’t think those considering him for a commendation would belive one Marine had killed that many Chinamen, according to his company commander. Cafferata would receive the Medal of Honor from President Harry S. Truman. The young private played a key role in stopping the Chinese attack on his company’s defensive position atop a hill overlooking the pass that controlled the winding dirt road leading south to the coast and freedom. Fox Company was surrounded by at least an enemy regiment. Even so, its job was to hold Tokfong Pass and the road that wound through it. If it didn’t, parts of two Marine regiments at Yudam-ni, further to the north up the road near Manchuria and the Yalu River, could be cut off. If that happened 8,000 Marines might be annihilated by the enemy hordes flooding across the North Korean border from China. When the 246 men of Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment arrived on what would become known as “Fox Hill,” the temperature was well below zero. Despite the freezing temperatures, there was talk in the ranks of the war ending and the troops being home by Christmas 1950. The 1st Marine Division-which included the 1st, 5th and 7th Regiments- more than 20,000 strong-was ordered by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, NATO’s supreme commander in Korea, to march to the Yalu River and back. The distance from Hugnam, along the Sea of Japan, to Chosin was 76 miles. The general’s idea: Run the Communist troops out of Korea and unify the entire country as a democracy. Before the march was over, the 1st Marine Division would be confronted by 21 enemy divisions, more than 200,000 soldiers. They would kill and wound 37,000 of the enemy. An additional 30,000 Chinese soldiers suffered frostbite. The Marines would lose 6,000 killed and wounded, and 6,000 more sustained frostbite. “It must have been around 1:30 a.m. I was zipped up in my sleeping bag lying out on the frozen ground behind some rocks and pine trees we’d cut and put up as a wind break. My buddy, Kenny Benson, was next to me in his sleeping bag. We heard some rifle fire and a machine gun open up. I realized this was for real,” said Cafferata, who now lives in Venice, Fla. “I unzipped my bag and grabbed my M-1 rifle. There were Chinese all around us. I shot five or six right in front of me immediately. “I said to Benson, ‘What are you doing?” “’Putting on my boots,’ he replied. “’Forget the boots. Start shooting,’ I said.” He grabbed his Browning Automatic Rifle, but it was frozen. It was 20 degrees below zero and nothing made of steel operated well in such severe temperatures. “There were Chinese all around us, so I knew we had to get the hell out of there. Benson and I started crawling back toward our lines. I wasn’t sure where we were.” All Cafferata knew for certain was that the enemy was shooting at them and they were shooting back. “Then this grenade plopped down right in front of Benson. I threw myself off to the left to get as far away from it as I could. Benson picked up the grenade and threw it just as it exploded. The explosion broke his glasses and burned his face. He couldn’t see worth a damn and he was all shook up. “I told Benson, ‘Hang on to my foot. We’re going to crawl.’ We crawled up to a wash, where rainwater cut a shallow trench into the side of the hill. I told him, ‘This is where we’re going to stay.’” They found three members of their squad badly injured hiding in the same gully. Cafferata took the three injured Marines’ M-1s from them. “By the time we looked up, the Chinese were right there on top of us again. Since Benson couldn’t see, because his glasses were broken, he loaded rifles and passed them to me,” Cafferata said. “For the rest of the night I was batting hand grenades away with my entrenching tool while firing my rifle at them. I must have whacked a dozen grenades that night with my tool. And you know what? I was the world’s worst baseball player. I couldn’t hit a bull in the ass with a baseball bat, but I didn’t miss many that night.”
Thank You for your lecture on my favorite Marine General, O.P. Smith. General Smith should have been awarded the Metal of Honor for his leadership at the Chosin Reservior. You mentioned later in your questions and answers, two things of interest to me. Bowser was the CG of Recruit Training at MCRD San Diego in 58 when I was a boot. Later my CO was an Staff NCO, now a Captain, under Puller at Chosin Reservior. When they reached the beach, they went to an Army Mess Tent. Asked where was their mess gear, he replied, "where is your trash for a tin can and place the pancakes right here on my hand." Harbord in WWI was an Army General in charge of the Marine Brigades.
Well, from the Army point of view Regimental Combat Team 31 is generally remembered for holding the eastern side of the reservoir long enough that there was a Hagaru-ri for the Marines to consolidate to. And, like O.P. Smith, apparently, aren't remembered by name by the Marines or their historians.
+bndoc Aside Rick's myopia as a historian [or maybe hystorian] in this particular case, I'm very interested in his analysis of the failures of American generalship since WWII as. I'm not sure yet how accurate an assessment of his theories are - but they are compelling enough to delve into. Any alternative points of view you are aware of? What's interesting for me personally is my path to the US military began with reading about the Chosin battle as a teenager. At that point I assumed I would wind up a Marine. As it turned out I wound up a Ranger - back before Rangers were cool, were two independent battalions, and still wore black berets.
William Reymond. If you are truly interested in a different perspective. Look up Ray Vallowe's book "What History forgot to Record. You can talk to him directly on facebook at "Chosin Reservoir"
"Dear General Cates: I sincerely regret the unfortunate choice of language which I used in my letter of August 29 to Congressman McDonough concerning the Marine Corps. ...in amending (the National Security Act of 1947) in 1949, the Congress considered the question of Marine Corps representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and did not provide for it. It is my feeling that many of the renewed pleas for such representation are the result of propaganda inspired by individuals who may not be aware of the best interests of our Defense Establishment as a whole, and it was this feeling which I was expressing to Mr. McDonough. I am certain that the Marine Corps itself does not indulge in such propaganda. I am profoundly aware of the magnificent history of the United States Marine Corps, and of the many heroic deeds of the Marines since the Corps was established in 1775. I personally learned of the splendid combat spirit of the Marines when the Fourth Marine Brigade of the Second Infantry Division fought in France in 1918. ...The Corps' ability to carry out whatever task may be assigned to it has been splendidly demonstrated many times in our history. It has again been shown by the immediate response of the Marine Corps to a call for duty in Korea. Since Marine ground and air forces have arrived in Korea I have received a daily report of their actions. The country may feel sure that the record of the Marines now fighting there will add new laurels to the already illustrious record of the Marine Corps. Sincerely yours, HARRY S. TRUMAN"
Absolutely correct, Jennifer! If Lee and the Company he led hadn't succeeded in relieving Fox Company, the Chinese would most likely have taken their positions, had the high ground, cut the one road out and trapped the 1st Marines and the survivors of the 7th Infantry. The Marines that served with and under Lee felt he should have gotten the Medal of Honor! Lees' race, perhaps?
Entry of Chinese army into Korean war was not a surprise. There were ample warning signs picked up by local units of UN but the high command in Tokyo simply ignored them. In the middle of reading The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War by David Halberstam. Gen Almond was in 'command' of an army group in Korea only because he kissed up to Gen. McArthur like there was no tomorrow. There were 2 Separate groups of UN force in the Korean war because Gen McArthur wanted his pet, Gen Almond, to be able to command an army. I can honestly say Gen Almod was one big reason N Korea still exists today.
The last question was painful. I always hate it at these talks when someone gives another mini-lecture before asking a question. The answer is Peyton March. There was no Army Chief of Staff named James D. Hardboard.
My uncle was Army and fought in Korea. He explained that their retreat was every man in their own for survival. Peeling each other off vehicles while in retreat. Utter failure and chaos. Army's generals didn't expect a hard fight from the Chinese.
It's disappointing to see people like exarmydoc basically ignore all the poor decisions Almond and MacArthur made but is happy to go after Smith. Almond put all of the units in the position they were in Marines included. Almond a noted racist, who's poor WWII showing as a General should have prevented him from commanding X Corps. Luckily for him, MacArthur, who was a marginal general himself, loved people who told him what he wanted to hear. Despite repeated attempts by Smith, Faith, and other Commanders Almond refused to slow the advance to consolidate even after Chinese forces were encountered. Faith also ignored advice from the CO of the 5th Marines and moved forward.
I am reminded of a quote by Chesty Puller that went something like "The main difference between the Chinese Army and the American Army is that he could always depend on the Chinese being where they were supposed to be."
James Harbord commanded the Marine Brigade in the fighting at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood during WWI. "We dig no trenches, The Marines will fight where they stand."
Ricks also states that a Marine Officer went up to the site where the Army units were massacred to recover casualties. According to OP Smith's biography, The Gentle Warrior: Oliver Prince Smith, OP Smith made a very desultory attempt to break through to the 31st RCT, which failed.
But you have to give Smith credit for feeding, and taking care of the weaponless, leaderless groups of soldiers who straggled in on foot to the Amrine lines. I'm just looking at the maps Doc and they show multiple Chinese Divisions attacking the Marines. I don't see anything near that on the east. The Chinese were all across the Marines rear all the way out, and multiple Chinese units enveloped them from the west as well. Look at the map. So, thanks for the opinion and the new take on history. But the historians say the RCT was unprepared and not cohesive enough to withstand the same types of attacks the Marines had to fight through . If you think otherwise, why don't you write a book instead of posting these ridiculous claims. Seriously.
William Fraser You indicate again you have disregarded the history of the 31st RCT on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. Roy Appleman's sources include Chinese military documents made accessible after the war. There was a multi division Chinese force on the East side of Chosin tasked with advancing down the East side of Chosin to Hagaru Ri. They did not get there because the 31st RCT blocked them. 2500 US soldiers faced between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese soldiers from six different regiments, fought them, inflicted between 7,000 and 10,000 casualties. The Chinese never got to Chosin. see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_Faith Meanwhile, the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments were on the West side of Chosin fighting a numerically superior Chinese force. The 1st Marine Regiment was not conccentrated, strung out on the MSR from Hagaru Ri south to the coast. 1st Marine Division had nothing to fight the Chinese force East of Chosin. I say again, had the 31st RCT not fought, there would have been two, possibly 3 Chinese divisions advancing unopposed down the East side of the Chosin Reservoir on Hagaru ri, ist Marine Division would have been destroyed, and OP Smith would have ended up a Chinese POW. You haven't read all there is to read about Chosin. Otherwise you would be aware of what happened East of Chosin. I am not surprised you have never seen maps showing Chinese activity East of Chosin. A lot of Marine Histories, like Thomas Ricks, ignore the East side of Chosin.
William Fraser "OP SMith was a lt GEn in the US Marine Corps." So? He was not the only Marine Corps General named Smith who lied about Army Troops. I would not say he was in "good" company. HM Smith was a worse charlie fox trot and liar than he was. "In your wildest dreams will you EVER have his credibility honesty or courage." What honesty? What courage? If he had true honesty and courage he would not have lied about the 31st RCT.
WRONG AGAIN. The Marines at Hagaru , a makeshift hdqrs battalion ,was under heavy attack the entire time RCT 31 and the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudamni were also under attack. There were no forces available to rescue RCT 31.WHICH did not get the leadership it needed to survive.
History of the RCT Chapter 5 "Had the RCT been under Marine Division control it doubtless would have followed Colonel Murray’s advice, advice General Smith also passed on, and not advanced beyond Hill 1221 at least until the entire unit was assembled. The outcome of the battle would have been drastically different."
When I shook hands with Raymond G. Davis, my eyes were drawn to his chest showing that he had been awarded the Medal of Honor. At that time I did not know the circumstances regarding his MOH. Now I do, thanks to the book "The Last Stand of Fox Company". I deeply regret not knowing Gen Davis' history when I shook his hand.
General Davis was an American hero and a Marine Corps hero. He should also have received the Medal of Honor at Peleliu when he was a major commanding "Chesty" Puller's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines! His unit suffered the worst casualties in Marine Corps history. None of that was because Davis failed as a leader, but because his regimental commander and 1MarDiv commanding general kept throwing the First Marines at the Umurbrogal Heights, aka "Bloody Nose Ridge". The regimental commander NEVER saw the terrain he was ordering his men to attack. By the battle of Changjin Reservoir; Davis was a Lieutenant Colonel, and his old regimental commander was still a Colonel, six years AFTER Peleliu. One of Davis' company commanders was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at Peleliu. This award was approved by all channels EXCEPT by his regimental commander, who tried to quash the award for this LEADER. His actions in brutal hand-to-hand combat, and his opinion of his regimental commander should be taught to every Marine Corps Second Lieutenant at The Basic School.
Can you say the same of Col. Don Faith and his actions with RCT31? That Faith didn't fail as a leader but was left to make the best of his situation with what he was left alone to deal with?
When China sent their troops to Korea, we were warned. The Chinese had no representation at the UN, but they relayed thru the Indian UN Ambassador that they would intervene if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Mac ignored this warning. The Eighth Army was devastated on the west coast of Korea. The Second Infantry Division still remembers the ass kicking it took at the Chongchon River. X Corps fared better on the East Coast because OP Smith knew Chinese troops were around and prepared his units for the clusterf*** that followed. His Corps Commander, who was an incompetent division commander in WW2, but a FANTASTIC MacArthur syncophant post-war, tried to get Smith's 1st Marine Division to abandon prudence, as he succeeded in doing to the 31st RCT, but Smith wasn't having any of it. Marines understand small unit warfare, even if Army generals don't. The ass kicking the 31st RCT took east of the reservoir was X Corps Commanders fault, NOT OP Smith's. End of story.
THIS WAS EXCELLENT. HE COVERED EVERYTHING IN AN HOUR. MY UNCLE MIKE SERVICE IN FIR MAR DIV AT CHOSEN HE ALWAYS CALLED IT FROZEN HELL ON EARTH. GOD BLESS GEN SMITH AND THE USMC. SEMPER FIDELIS. ALWAYS. SHALOM
Ricks quotes General Almond telling LTC Don Faith not to let a bunch of Chinese Laundrymen stop his attack towards the Yalu. General Almond said that to Colonel Allan McLean, original commander of the 31st RCT BEFORE the Chinese attack began.
Great lecture from an excellent author and historian. Read 'Fiasco' if you haven't already. I particularly loved the slap down of the last question from an obvious jerk.
OP Smith did not save the 1st Marine Division from annihilation. What saved the 1st Marine DIvision was that the Army's 31st RCT on the east side of Chosin prevented two Chinese DIvisions from getting to Hagaru-ri before 5th and 7th Marines could consolidate there. OP Smith claimed the soldiers ran and did not fight. if he Soldiers had not fought two Chinese infantry divisions would have been able to advance down the East side of CHosin unopposed.
exarmydoc what a tremendous chapter in military history. The Marines made their mark at Chosin and at Inchon during the Korean War. So proud of what they did.
William Fraser Check out www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/USMCKor.html "The Fleet Marine Force, cut drastically from a WWII high of 300,000, had only 27, 656 men. General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, was ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy the 1st Marine Division to Korea by mid-September. However, short of equipment and with only 8,000 men, Cates requested President Truman to mobilize all reserve elements of the Marine Corps and attached Navy medical personnel to bring the division to wartime strength of 22,000." In 1950 the Marine Corps was seriously understrength and unprepared. When the North Koreans came south in June of 1950, the top priority was to put boots on the ground. The USMC was not capable of putting boots on the ground. The Army was. Army troops were, admittedly poorly trained and poorly prepared. However, Army troops went in first and fought the North Koreans effectively enough to form the Pusan Perimeter. They fought and bled and died to buy time for the USMC to get ready. The first Marine ground unit, the 5th Marine Regimental Combat Team, did not get there until AFTER the perimeter was formed. By that time the US Army had 4 Divisions on te ground including the 2nd Infantry Division which deployed from the US before 1st Marine Division could be reconstituted. Had the Army not gone in first, the USMC would have never gotten to Korea. Had the USMC been charged with the defense of Korea in 1950, there would have been no defense of Korea.
+William Fraser More about Inchon. The final battle for the Pusan perimeer was fought and won AFTER the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was withdrawn. One reason the Marines were successful at Inchon was that the North Korean Army was all down at Pusan trying to crack the perimeter. You'll never hear people like Ricks mention that.
People do not remember OP Smith because ultimately the battle was a defeat akin to the evacuation of Dunkirk--basically escape from utter disaster. This does no justice to the soldiers or Smith, but is often the way history is rendered.
Wrong. The marine retreated in complete form. The Chinese suffered 4 times more casualties despite four to five times superior in numbers. After this battle the Chinese could not mount another attack due to casualties until several months later.
Ray Davis made two trips to Turkey Hill to relieve Marines there (3.5 miles away by jeep) before he took after Fox Hill. The marines started moving on the day that 31RCT was destroyed due to O.P. Smiths orders. He removed the tanks of the 2bn 31st and Cp back to Hagaru before 31RCT could reach them. Marines had warming tents, Brandy, and 24 hour breaks off the front lines. RCT31 did not. They (the Marines) had a caravan that was miles long marching into Hagaru dealing with long range rifle fire. Almonds quotes to Col. Faith were intended to motivate. Not anything else. If Almond was not good, then why did General Ridgeway state, that he preferred Almond over O.P. Smith. Smith who was quickly replaced shortly after Ridgeway took command because O.P. Smith was again asking for concessions as he did so many times with Almond. Smith, Almond, and MacArthur should have faced a tribunal or board of inquiry following the battle of the Chosin IMHO. Had that been done, Ricks speech would never have taken place. How does one get to be a Gentleman Warrior as O.P. Smith is accredited and considered a Good General. Lawful Orders are Lawful Orders. O.P. Smith was not invited by to speak on the Chosin because he would have been embarrassed and brought to task. Ricks book will not change the history, but god knows he is trying. Sadly IMHO
Ricks mentioned the gap between 8th Army and 1st Marine Division. That gap was terrain impassable to military units. According to other histories, OP Smith's left flank was not open.
The problem with govt bureaucracies like the military is that good combat officers and ncos are often expected to benefit those higher in rank, not lower.
As a Marine Mustang who was privileged to lead many fine young Marines, I never bought into that careerist mindset. Maybe that's why I didn't really have one, and thus left with 15 years of service. I can relate to an old German saying: Past glories are poor feeding.
He made all the right moves and had his head into it. Makes you wonder what in the world the other guys were thinking...if at all. Really seems like politics played a hand in things rather than smarts and deeds. I was in the `Nam fiasco and things hadn't changed much between those two times just the field..Iraq wasn't a smart move either...the more it changes the more it stays the same. O.P. probably got back and called `em all a bunch of idiots and as we all know you can't do that with the powers to be `cuz it's never THEIR fault.
SLA MARSHALL wrote a history report on the Chosin operation. OP Smith praised the report. MARSHALL's report was highly CRITICAL of the leadership of the 7th and 3rd Divisions and the RCT as well.
After Korea, Chesty Puller was asked by a interview what hard lessons the Marines learned......he spat it out in a Second, NEVER SERVE UNDER X CORPS !! He was RIGHT ON !! Semper Fi. 💯👍💪
There is a Chinese saying, a horse that can run 1000 miles a day is easier to be found that the man who can find that horse. So this lecturer did the almost same important thing as Smith did.
I like and appreciate the thought. Nevertheless Mr. Ricks is not alone. The Marine Corps itself and our culture (me having been a Marine Infantry officer) might be largely to blame. We are very resistant to making heros out of Marine commanders. Our ethos is to win battles...as Marines. While some exceptions exist they are few, and it does not always go well to be the exception. The most famous Marine himself was one of General Smith's regimental Commanding Officers, Lewis "Chesty" Puller. His role it seems gets no special attention in the history books, unless it's a book about him specifically. That's just how it goes. Idk if that's right or wrong tbh, but I'm grateful for the work Mr. Ricks has done to give credit where credit is due.
RIP Task Force Faith, aka Regimental Combat Team 31. Those "Army cowards" saved the Marines' asses. IF RCT-31 didn't hold out to the last man on the eastern flank there would have been no successful retreat by the Marines.
31st RCT was overrun by the Chinese while most of them were still aboard trucks trying to take over position from the 5th Marin regiment which was order to go to the Northwest to reinforce Yudamni. If they had been on foot in a tactical formation, they might have survived. There were a few who escaped across the ice the Marine positions but the bulk of the unit could not engage while still in the 6 bys that carried them past Hagaru.
Jean White, you are mis-informed. The serious wounded were in the trucks. The walking wounded were deployed alongside to defend the trucks as infantrymen assaulted the Chinese position above them. They were on a single lane road with steep hills on one side and the Reservoir on the other side. At least know the fact before insulting the men of that Army RCT.
You were at Chosin? Were you with the 31 RCT? If not then your opinion is worthless. Personal experience is limited to one's immediate area which is limited to how far one can see.
@@condorc72 What should they have done: fight to the last man, like the Spartans? They were grossly outnumbered. Dying in place wouldn't have stopped the Chinese from sending more troops - there were other Chinese units formed up in Manchuria ready to come in if necessary!
Lt Gen William McCaffery United States Army and a veteran of the Chosin Campaign said the following about RCT 31 "“.I suggest the unraveling of the 31st RCT was a reflection of incompetence and misconduct on the part of Gens Barr and Hodes,(ARMY) a lesser degree of incompetence on the part of the field grade officers, who, nevertheless, in general, died or were overwhelmed by the cold, the enemy and the enormity of the problems that cascaded over them. In three days the chain of command ceased to function and leaderless men faced death from the enemy and the cold with no guidance and only whatever desperate courage could be summoned up from their innermost sources of their being.” Unravelled.......RCT 31
Seems evident to me that General Smith just wasn't part of the good ol' boy network. And I think it's important to mention that a good Marine can be fully dedicated to the Corps and not be part of that club. I know of one such good Marine Officer - I see him every time I look in the mirror.
@36:30 in the video the person commented about a person not being fired upon by the Chinese. IMHO on speaking to many of the Vets and information gathered it was probably due to the fact that the Chinese were woefully under maintained and under supplied. Though they had the numbers, they did not have enough equipment/ammunition to finish the job. I think the Chinese by that time were just trying to stay alive as well as using their ammo sparingly. Though the US were taken by surprise the Chinese were taken by surprise on the sheer stubbornness of the Marine's defensive withdraw. As the fighting continued The Chinese army had less and less ammunition to continue the ferocity of the fight as they had in their initial attack. The US units were battered but well armed and amply supplied. Far better than their Chinese counter parts. This is a perfect example of losing such an important battle because of logistics and support. Which the PLA did not have. Just think if the PLA had adequate supplies through out this battle. It would not been the famous retreat at the Chosin Reservoir. It may have been the greatest victory over the US during the Korean War.
It's the weakest of all military arguments, although a common one, to say, well if this or that side just had more stuff... It works both ways. Did you know that the Chinese had superior cold weather lubricants for their small arms compared with what the Marines had? It was a constant issue which undoubtedly cost many Marines their lives. How would it have been if that one detail was reversed?
Chinese frostbite saved these troops' lives. Hiking, attacking, and camping in -30 degree weather in the hills and mountains killed and injured the Chinese advance. The lesson I take from this is to move mostly out of the cold mountains during winter fighting and then move back into them as soon as the thaw breaks and things warm up. Let your enemies "battle the weather" and freeze unnecessarily. The Chinese attack might have succeeded better had they attacked in warmer weather. Also, retreat to better areas when dangerously under-supplied, otherwise the fighting moral eventually drops to zero.
Very interesting. I have read the Marine history on this matter and know that the tactics used by Smith were very similar to those used by Xenophon in the Anabasis (Anabasis means march up country- Xenophon eventually became more or less the commander). It would be interesting to know how much Smith knew of that campaign. Particularly since it appears that Smith was an avid reader. The terrain Xenophon faced was very similar to that faced by the Marines.
There were many excellent documentaries on youtube about this battle, all removed now that PBS made their own documentary , with the same material, which you have to buy, sigh
We will be posting a add on to the Facebook page "Chosin Reservoir" shortly after tonights airing of "American Experience" The battle of Chosin. See PBS stations for times. This posting will show the breakdowns and holes that have been persisted through the decades regarding the Chosin Reservoir campaign. The author, Ray Vallowe, challenges most of what Ricks has stated in this video, and his validated research will bear that out. Watch the Show. Check the website. Decide for yourself. Vallowe monitors this page will be happy to discuss his findings vs accepted history through out the decades. It is my humble opinion that Ricks only perpetuates some of the hype and myths of this General, and the campaign itself. But come see for yourself.
What separates the Marine Corps from all the others is psychological. Marine Corps boot camp is an indoctrination on abject suffering. Expect the worst and you'll never be disappointed. Semper FI
56:47 That kid shouldn't smoke dope while he's doing "research". Attending VMI isn't anything like ROTC and he got the answer wrong to his own question. What a buffoon.
The fact that he still didn't get a clue about the difference when he was corrected is telling. The difference between VMI and the USMA being negligible as far as military quality makes comparing either to ROTC just a joke, especially in the years when they were masculine institutions.
"That greatest of all Marine institutions, the Drill Instructor." I feel great pity for the USMC now. How sorrowful, to have DIs as their greatest institution!
+verilyheld The Marine Corps would not exist without the Drill Instructors and certainly not as an elite fighting organization.Your comment suggests that you were not a Marine.
One of the lies Marine admirers propagates this lie about Chosin, that hundreds of Soldiers faked wounds to get evacuated from Hagaru-ri. From the DVD on Task Force Faith and from other sources, fewer than 1500 soldiers made it to Hagaru-ri. Fewer than 400 were able bodied and they marched out. Just about all the rest were severely injured or frost bitten. The source of the falsehood actually is a priest, Father Otto Sporrer, who served as a Chaplain with the Marines. I believe he was assigned either to the 5th Marines or to the 11th Marines. In 1951, the Navy produced a documentary about Chosin which was not at all complimentary to the Army. The Army protested and DOD forced the Navy to revise the documentary. Sporrer was pissed about the alterations. So, in 1952, several months after the event, he made the claim that he had witnessed 400 soldiers faking wounds and getting on medieval aircraft. There was an investigation of his claims by General Matthew Ridgeway, who commanded 8th Army after the death of Walton Walker. The investigation founded that Sporrer's claims were unfounded. When one looks at it, one wonders why Sporrer would have had any credibility except that people wanted to glorify the Corps, considering he made the claims months after the Battle of Chosin, and had an ulterior motive for making the claims.
exarmydoc ooohhhwwww the Marines lied !!!! SO now you're telling everyone OP Smith the Commanding General of the 3rd Marine Division is a liar. OK. Now we can take the interaction up a notch. You're a gutless piece of trash exarmy doc. I'll take General Smith's word over yours any day. Piss off clown. You don't deserve the right to be on this page. Trashman
andrelebaron Never read it, so I am not in a position to like it or hate it. Have you ever read East of Chosin or Escaping the Trap by Roy Appleman? Have you ever watched the documentary on Task Force Faith? You can order it from this site: www.taskforcefaith.com/. Thomas Ricks must really hate the Soldiers who fought and bled and died on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir saving the 1st Marine Division. He must love Otto Sporrer, the lying Chaplain who accused those valiant Soldiers of cowardice.
Rick's is incorrect on a number of points. "With the assistance of Marine Corps air support - expertly coordinated by Capt. Stamford and without which the task force would have been overwhelmed - RCT 31 fought off heavy assaults by the PLA 80th and 81st divisions for another two days, inflicting severe losses on the communist forces who left hundreds of bodies in the snow around the army position. During the day Stamford directed 38 sorties, making this the major effort of the 1st Marine Air Wing for the day. From 0645 until 1830 Marine planes attacked the Chinese, dropping 21 napalm tanks, 16 500-lb bombs, 21 fragmentation bombs, and firing 190 rockets. All attacks on the perimeter were repulsed. The Americans were running low on ammunition, and over half their number had been killed or wounded, including a high proportion of key leaders. Faith, realizing he was surrounded and greatly outnumbered, decided to attempt a breakout to the south, toward Marine lines. The situation was so desperate that only a minimum of equipment and sufficient vehicles to carry the wounded were taken, freeing more soldiers to fight as infantry. The rest of the equipment was destroyed in place, including the artillery's howitzers after they fired their last rounds." The above passage is supported by the bulk of the available information available from the DoD.
First mistake Ricks makes is that OP Smith insisted he be allowed to consolidate his regiments. He had 5th Marine on the East side of Chosin, 7th Marines on the west side and the 1st Marines strung out to the South along the MSR. General Almond put the 31st RCT on the East side of Chosin, which allowed OP Smith to put 5th Marines and 7th Marines on the West side. My source is Roy Appleman's Escaping the Trap, available as a Kindle download from Amazon.
Smith made so many mistakes he brought his entire Division out of Chosin . My source is every single history book written about Chosin reservoir. It must really annoy you to have to read the history books. Semper Fidelis
William Fraser There have been multiple history books written about Chosin including East of Chosin and Escaping the Trap by Roy Appleman which document what the31st RCT did on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. It nust really gall you to read that an Army Unit fought to the death saving the First Marine Division. You have obviously never read those books, or if you did you are in denial.
William Fraser What in hell do you think RCT 31 was doing while they were there? Jumping rope? Good thing the Marines didn't consult with armchair historian "William Fraser" regarding the PUC indorsement since you've got it all figured out. The other thing I wanted to point out is that the TACP officer with them (a Marine) has stated that most of the army officers and many of the NCO's were well trained and good leaders. I say this because you mentioned leadership...
What were they doing. Well lets look at the record. Unprepared, the first night many were bayoneted in their sleeping bags. The performance of RCT 31 is not anything you need to be bragging about. And if you had read anything about what happened to them, you'd know that. Next, I don't argue with imbeciles. Casual observers might not be able to tell us apart. So long soup and sandwich.
William Fraser You are dodging the rel situation. There was a multi divisin chinese force on the East side of Chosin. Their objective was Hagaru-Ri(See Roy Appeman's Escaping the Trap). The only troops between them and Hagaru_-Ri were the 31st RCT. They never got to Hagaru-Ri. It wasn't because of the Marines that those Chinese never got to their objective.
Four casualties were helicoptered out of RCT 31 before its disintegration. Two battalion commanders and two others....WTF? Why the battalion commanders? What kind of leadership is that?
The USA should have stopped their advance at the narrowest point of the peninsula north of Pyonyang and dug in there. If they had done that, the Chinese would not have attacked and Pyongyang would now be part of South Korea. North Korea, on the other hand, would be a small mountain-bound country. Seole would be a lot farther from its northern border and we would not be having the trouble with the fat boy. Its all MacArthur's fault.
IF Litzenberg had taken Yudam ni by Nov. 14th as Ordered, they would have been able to prevent the Chinese from incircling the forces and changed the entire scope of the battles in North Korea or at least change the situation to a different outcome. But alas he dragged his feet for 11 days to get there. Sheppard knew Almond probably better than he knew O.P. Smith because they were fellow students at VMI. After Smith whined to the higher ups, Sheppard basically told him to get in line. A general has the right and the priviledge to address his orders from the higher up, but he does not have the righto disregard a Valid Order. O.P. Smith was told by Almond to make Litzeberg to take Yudam-ni. For Ricks to not believe him is his choice, but the reality was, it happened. O.P. Smiths orders caused the death of 31RCT TF MacLean/Faith. That is pretty cut and dry on November 29th. Smith did nothing to help the Army on the East of Chosin who was ordered to take out the previous assignments of the Marines as verified by Divisional order OpO 7 and Regimental order by MacLean of 31RCT, OpO 25. Ricks is so far off base I am offended.
Page 323 of Appleman's “East of Chosin” states: "Withdrawing these forces (31st Tank Co and 31st Rear) from Hudong-ni had the effect of signing the death warrant for Task Force Faith and its wounded. What commander in his right mind could order such a move...". If you are to cheap or lazy to buy the book, contact me and I will send you a copy.
numkie How about explain this. Thomas Ricks does not. There were Chinese troops on the East side of Chosin, the 27th Chinese Army. Their mission was to advance down the east side of the Chosin Reservoir on Hagaru Ri. They made the attempt but never got there and took thousands of killed and wounded in the attempt. There were no Marines on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. The only troops were the Soldiers of the 31st RCT. If they just crumbled and offered no resistance to the Chinese, then why did the Chinese 27th Army never get to Hagaru ri. How did they incur all those casualties? Again, there were no Marines on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. 5th and 7th Marines were on the west side. 1st Marines were strung out along the MSR from Hagaru ri south. The only US troops on the East side of Chosin were the soldiers of the 31st RCT. If the 31st RCT had not fought effectively, there would have been two, possibly 3 Chinese divisions advancing unfought on Hagaru ri. They would have gotten there before the 5th and 7th Marines, before Task Force Drysdale, and the Marines holding Hagaru ri were already under heavy attack. How come those 2, possibly 3 Chinese divisions took thousands of casualties and never got to Hagaru ri?
exarmydoc Who knows what type of stupid post you put up but history isn't your thing. OP Smith says a thousand RCT soldiers jumped on the first plane out and only 485 walked out with the Marines. bwahahahahahahah He got his numbers wrong.. What a pathetic gutless liar you are. Maggot.
In my time on this earth, playing football, in the Corps and in business, is that leaders have it and others don't, and there is not alot you can do about that. You can try to teach, train and direct, but people have leadership capabilities or they don't. No amount of training or attention can make someone a leader if they dont have in the first place.
The destruction of Task Force Faith is something the Army seldom mentions. The 7th ID was spread all over N. Korea; the USMC 1st Div. kept their Regiments fairly close...a wise decision. Had they scattered their regiments - as the 7th ID did - they likely would have never made it to the coast. TF Faith - comprised of both US & Koreans, was not a very cohesive force - ya just can't throw people together & "call" them a regiment. Applemans book - East of Chosin - should be mandatory reading by every 2LT before commissioning. TF Faith did what they were ordered to, but if the Principles of War are ignored, the consequences are predictable. LTC Faith is now buried at Arlington...his remains were returned ~2012...what was left of them. (I have a personal interest in this - my uncle (RIP) was in N. Korea w/ the 7th ID in 1950...he never talked about it. It wasn't his first time in combat; he had served on the USS California in WWII, in the last battleship on battleship battle the world will likely see.)
Buck123four, there is much more information regarding RCT31. I would offer that if you have read Ebb and Flow, East of Chosin, Breakout, then it is time to read The Chosin Chronology by Col Rasula. But if you really want to get to the brass tax I would offer that you read, Ray Vallowe's "What History Forgot to Record." Access to these are on the net. Vallowe's book is available for free at the TheKoreanWarEducator on the net. He is has joined to the group page on Facebook. "Chosin Reservoir". You can direct your questions to one of the best historians on the subject directly yourself. I think you will discover many issue in Appleman's book, Russman's book, ect.
The 7th ID was not spread out over Korea as you stated. In fact they were just hours away from taking over the entire Marine objectives that O.P. Smith failed to accomplish under OpO 6, and OpO 7 for that matter. The bigger question to ask, is Why? the 7th ID was even in the Marine Corps Area of Operation in the first place. The east side of the Chosin was clearly assigned to Murrays 5RCT 5th Marines. Why was Faith and the 31 RCT sent to Chosin? See maps at "Chosin Reservoir" Facebook for that answer. One could argue that the destruction of TF MacLean/Faith of 31RCT was due large and in part by the inaction of Gen. O.P. Smith/LItzenberg, and Murray.
1st Marine Division was able to concentrate because the 31st RCT was deployed on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. Prior to that, 5th Marines were on the East side of Chosin, the 7th Marines were on the West side and 1st Marines were strung out from Hagaru ri south along the MSR.
My objection is at around 34:58. Mr. Ricks (although he said Almond) is clearly speaking of Lt. Don Carlos Faith and Mr Ricks is wrong in his assessment. Lt. Col. Faith knew his job, he knew what he was facing, and he didn't take his artillery pieces with him on the retreat because all of the ammunition for the artillery had been used.
disagree. faith would have rather staffed 32nd INF with fresh jump school airborne officers than have combat veteran leg officers. He was brave, determined, and unprepared to command a battalion or regiment in combat. General Ridgway's Dog robber doesn't make a battalion commander.
Ex-PFC Wintergreen, your argument is flawed. The Army has routinely rotated officers between staff and field positions. In 1940-41 the US Army was ranked 17th in the world. There is a 22-year gap between the ending of WW1 and the beginning of WW2. Upon our entry into WW2, only a handful of officers had any combat experience or experience as a troop leader and that experience derived from WW1 which utilized a different set of tactics. In 1940 the US Army had 9 Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, 1 Mechanized Brigand. In 1944-45 in the European Theater of Operations, the US Army consisted of 43 Infantry Divisions, 24 Armor Divisions, 4 Airborne (light infantry) Divisions. The vast majority of all officers, from General down to 2nd Lieutenant, had no combat experience prior to going into battle. Yet during Operation Torch, Operation Overlord, etc., these "inexperienced" officers, by and large, performed well and some were exceptional. This was a reflection of the quality of their training not of their experience commanding field units for very few had that experience. By all existing accounts, MacLean performed well while in command RCT-31 and Faith was exceptional. Experience as a troop leader does not always translate into command ability. Any officer can tell you that. Also, the majority of combat experienced battalion or regiment officers were discharged at the end of WW2 or did not remain in the army when it reduced to peacetime levels.
OP Smith did not save 15,000 Marines. In spite of Thomas Ricks, it was the 31st RCT which covered 1st Marine Division's exposed Eastern flank. Mr.Ricks doesn't even try to explain why the 27th Chinese Army failed in its mission to take Hagaru ri.
Sam Whitmore Maybe so. Nevertheless, you have the Marine Corps trying to credit itself with what the Army accomplished, e.g. being the first to fight, fighting in the Battles of trenton and princeton, taking Chapultepec in the Mexican war, defending the Philippines. The Army never tries to credit itself with Marine accomplishments
Hello exarmydoc, if that information is correct I would have no problem with bringing the truth to the light. However, according to what I learned in bootcamp, the 1st Marine Division was surrounded by over 100,000 enemy troops and managed to fight it's way back to the sea. Yes, the army was there, but it was Chesty Puller and the use of close air support that was instrumental in saving our US forces.
One thing I don’t understand about this battle is why the US didn’t carpet bomb the Chinese positions surrounding the Marines and soldiers at Chosin reservoir with B29’s or some other heavy bomber? Were the Chinese simply too close to the Americans to risk hitting friendlies?
I think you're at least in part correct. There was also fear that this could escalate into WWIII. idk how much that factored in. Tactically, it also might have done more harm than good, if Air force resupply drops (which went to the enemy too much of the time) is any measure. Naval aviation (especially USMC) was far more accurate and the helicopters were especially useful* except there were just too few. *Resupply and medevac, which, btw, were ideas pioneered by Marines as far back as the Banana Wars with fixed wing aircraft.
More artillery, heavier artillery (esp. for range) and lots more arty rounds would have also been a big help. On the west side of the peninsula where the Army had a much larger force than X Corps (Chosin) they abandoned a huge number of artillery pieces. For all we know, those tubes might still be in use by N. Korea today.
54:33 - Must teach the midshipmen the difference between the Chief of Staff UNDER Pershing (Harbord) and the Army Chief of Staff OVER Pershing (March) :-)
the best marine!RCT 31 would of need someone like him too..Maclean comander of the rtc made a few mistakes in organizsing defense altough they didn know that such an amount of chinese is coming ..also many soldiers meeting the first blocks just runaway and deserted the convoy..and records show 1500 alive fro 2500 , many wonden and with frost bit
@@marktercsak9728 u are so stupid and disillusioned....pullers bravado got his men surrounded and they had to retreat rearward....that's not a rearguard action..its running to save your sorry butt
His act below is kind of a taint to his career. There is evidence that Smith misstated the contribution of United States Army units under his command to the effort at Chosin. 31st Infantry Regimental Combat Team (also known as "Task Force Faith" or "Task Force Maclean"), which protected his right flank and took the brunt of a reinforced CCF corps for five days was not included in Smith's recommendation for the Presidential Unit Citation after the battle.[8] Thirty years later, the CCF commanders, Gen Song and Gen Peng, attributed the 31st RCT with breaking their offensive and preventing them from achieving their objectives.
Louis Katz passed August 8, 2021, one of the last surviving members of the Chosin Reservoir. Rest in peace Marine.
My grandpa was 26 they called him Pops. 1st Marines will never forget. Ooh rah!❤❤❤
The 31st Infantry Regiment may be the most hard-luck regiment in the US Army. 1919-1920 they fought in Siberia, 1941-42 they were in the Philippines and wound up in the Bataan Death March, and here they were at Chosin Reservoir. Poor bastards!
Poor bastards indeed. RIP!
Brecconable nj
Jesus,. Talk about some luck. Makes you wonder whose had the generational curse on em can't imagine what future history would have ìN store for the 31st,. But GøD BLeSs everyone of them may they ALL LIVE FØREVER! Incredible bravery unparalleled ìN all histories of the world.
Brian Huss The 1st Marine Corps Division wiped out 6 of the 8 Chinese Divisions in hand to hand fighting. The Army sacrifice was in vain and not necessary. Chesty Puller saved the Marines, every Marine knows that and that’s why this ROTC requiring film is not allowed on the Marines website.
Me realizng I'm in the same Regiment 4-31 Polar Bears 🤙🇺🇸🤯
I was priviledged to work with his son, Brian Dana Smith, while in the U.S. Navy during the 1970s. It was an honor to know of his Dad through him, and a great joy to work with Brian.
Today is Christmas Eve and a best time to know more about O.P. Smith. Just want to give my warmest thanks to all American GIs who sacrificed in Hungman and Korea during the Korean War. American troops also saved/evacuated almost 100,000 civilians from Hung Nam. Merry Christmas to all!
Sammy
You owe thanks to LTG Ned Almond for forcing the evacuation of these civilians to Pusan. He made it happen on the Miracle Ship.
He should have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for this. He would not cave to ALmond's pressure to rush up that road and stockpiled supplies because he saw it coming. He saved the Corp from its greatest defeat in history.
Hi everyone in the comments. Scrolling down I am quite a bit surprised by some people's animosity towards Mr. Ricks' talk. I gather some has personal stake and perhaps the title of his talk was a tinge provocative. Still some discussion are devolving into personal attacks that seemed unnecessary. I have read Rick's book and this specific chapter. Nowhere in his writing did he ever question the bravery or sacrifices of the army soldiers that suffered those staggering losses. His book focused less on minutiae of specific battles but rather on the history of American generalship, their decision making process in combat and their consequences. He was putting forth an argument here that had O.P. Smith not made certain key decisions at the generalship level, the marines would have equally suffered staggering casualties. Rick's writing focused his criticism on general Almond's decisions as X corp commander that placed Faith and his men out on a limb. Perhaps the title of the talk can be upsetting to some as it appears to diminish the sacrifice of the army. There is no doubt that Task Force Faith had mightily contributed to the survival of the marine. But Ricks was just trying to emphasize the point that poor leadership at the highest level costs a lot of lives.
The Chosin Campaign was very brutal. From all accounts, the 1st marine division sustained nearly as many casualties as the 31st RCT. The Cold weather saved the 10th Corps. Gen Almond helped thousands of Korean civilians escape their fate in N Korea at the final withdrawal.
Tom Ricks apparently has access to the mind of General Almond to make the marines vulnerable, and of course, the mind of Gen Smith was to disobey the orders of Gen Almond. Ricks obviously knew that Gen Almond was a "Jerk" after hearing the marine version of the battle.
He forgot to tell how Gen Smith failed to help the 31st RCT during their retreat.
Ricks does not mention that the 31st RCT stopped a muti division Chinese force from advancing down the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. This is from Roy Appleman's escaping the trap. The Chinese were very inflexible. They could not change plans to adjust for circumstances. They were unaware that the 5th Marines had been moved to the West side of Chosin. The plan called for one Chinese force to hit the 7th Marines on the West Side of Chosin and another to hit the Marines on the East side of Chosin. That force hit the 31st RCT. Army strength on the East Side of Chosin was actually less than regimental, two infantry battalions, and artillery battalion, and two anti aircraft batteris. The third battalion never got to the East side of Chosin. Ricks talks about 5th and 7th Marines fighting two Chinese Divisions for 4 days and 3 nights. The understrength 31st RCT fought elements of three Chinese divisions for 5 days and 4 nights.
The Marines were engaged by a total of FIVE chinese divisions if you would reference the maps provided in multiple references.
Excellent presentation. Thank you.
Thanks for your sacrifice from S Korea
Pfc. Hector Cafferata of Venice, Fla. won the Medal of Honor. He will tell you he was no hero; he was just saving his backside when he killed over 100 enemy soldiers in the battle for “Fox Hill” during the early months of the Korean War.
Pvt. Hector Cafferata was a 20-year-old green Marine replacement. He joined Fox Company’s 2nd Platoon a few days before the first wave of Chinese troops attacked his listening post at the Toktong Pass during the early months of the Korean War that cold November night half a century ago.
Six hours later, the hulking 6-foot-3-inch Marine was a seasoned “Jarhead” who had survived a number of human wave assaults by the enemy. When daylight came more than 125 Chinese soldiers lay dead in front of his position. He was officially credited with killing 15 of the enemy and wounding many more because they didn’t think those considering him for a commendation would belive one Marine had killed that many Chinamen, according to his company commander.
Cafferata would receive the Medal of Honor from President Harry S. Truman. The young private played a key role in stopping the Chinese attack on his company’s defensive position atop a hill overlooking the pass that controlled the winding dirt road leading south to the coast and freedom.
Fox Company was surrounded by at least an enemy regiment. Even so, its job was to hold Tokfong Pass and the road that wound through it.
If it didn’t, parts of two Marine regiments at Yudam-ni, further to the north up the road near Manchuria and the Yalu River, could be cut off. If that happened 8,000 Marines might be annihilated by the enemy hordes flooding across the North Korean border from China.
When the 246 men of Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment arrived on what would become known as “Fox Hill,” the temperature was well below zero. Despite the freezing temperatures, there was talk in the ranks of the war ending and the troops being home by Christmas 1950.
The 1st Marine Division-which included the 1st, 5th and 7th Regiments- more than 20,000 strong-was ordered by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, NATO’s supreme commander in Korea, to march to the Yalu River and back. The distance from Hugnam, along the Sea of Japan, to Chosin was 76 miles. The general’s idea: Run the Communist troops out of Korea and unify the entire country as a democracy.
Before the march was over, the 1st Marine Division would be confronted by 21 enemy divisions, more than 200,000 soldiers. They would kill and wound 37,000 of the enemy. An additional 30,000 Chinese soldiers suffered frostbite. The Marines would lose 6,000 killed and wounded, and 6,000 more sustained frostbite.
“It must have been around 1:30 a.m. I was zipped up in my sleeping bag lying out on the frozen ground behind some rocks and pine trees we’d cut and put up as a wind break. My buddy, Kenny Benson, was next to me in his sleeping bag. We heard some rifle fire and a machine gun open up. I realized this was for real,” said Cafferata, who now lives in Venice, Fla.
“I unzipped my bag and grabbed my M-1 rifle. There were Chinese all around us. I shot five or six right in front of me immediately.
“I said to Benson, ‘What are you doing?”
“’Putting on my boots,’ he replied.
“’Forget the boots. Start shooting,’ I said.”
He grabbed his Browning Automatic Rifle, but it was frozen. It was 20 degrees below zero and nothing made of steel operated well in such severe temperatures.
“There were Chinese all around us, so I knew we had to get the hell out of there. Benson and I started crawling back toward our lines. I wasn’t sure where we were.”
All Cafferata knew for certain was that the enemy was shooting at them and they were shooting back.
“Then this grenade plopped down right in front of Benson. I threw myself off to the left to get as far away from it as I could. Benson picked up the grenade and threw it just as it exploded. The explosion broke his glasses and burned his face. He couldn’t see worth a damn and he was all shook up.
“I told Benson, ‘Hang on to my foot. We’re going to crawl.’ We crawled up to a wash, where rainwater cut a shallow trench into the side of the hill. I told him, ‘This is where we’re going to stay.’”
They found three members of their squad badly injured hiding in the same gully. Cafferata took the three injured Marines’ M-1s from them.
“By the time we looked up, the Chinese were right there on top of us again. Since Benson couldn’t see, because his glasses were broken, he loaded rifles and passed them to me,” Cafferata said. “For the rest of the night I was batting hand grenades away with my entrenching tool while firing my rifle at them. I must have whacked a dozen grenades that night with my tool. And you know what? I was the world’s worst baseball player. I couldn’t hit a bull in the ass with a baseball bat, but I didn’t miss many that night.”
Thank You for your lecture on my favorite Marine General, O.P. Smith. General Smith should have been awarded the Metal of Honor for his leadership at the Chosin Reservior. You mentioned later in your questions and answers, two things of interest to me. Bowser was the CG of Recruit Training at MCRD San Diego in 58 when I was a boot. Later my CO was an Staff NCO, now a Captain, under Puller at Chosin Reservior. When they reached the beach, they went to an Army Mess Tent. Asked where was their mess gear, he replied, "where is your trash for a tin can and place the pancakes right here on my hand." Harbord in WWI was an Army General in charge of the Marine Brigades.
Well, from the Army point of view Regimental Combat Team 31 is generally remembered for holding the eastern side of the reservoir long enough that there was a Hagaru-ri for the Marines to consolidate to. And, like O.P. Smith, apparently, aren't remembered by name by the Marines or their historians.
+bndoc Aside Rick's myopia as a historian [or maybe hystorian] in this particular case, I'm very interested in his analysis of the failures of American generalship since WWII as. I'm not sure yet how accurate an assessment of his theories are - but they are compelling enough to delve into. Any alternative points of view you are aware of?
What's interesting for me personally is my path to the US military began with reading about the Chosin battle as a teenager. At that point I assumed I would wind up a Marine. As it turned out I wound up a Ranger - back before Rangers were cool, were two independent battalions, and still wore black berets.
+bndoc Thanks for the recommend.
William Reymond. If you are truly interested in a different perspective. Look up Ray Vallowe's book "What History forgot to Record. You can talk to him directly on facebook at "Chosin Reservoir"
"Dear General Cates:
I sincerely regret the unfortunate choice of language which I
used in my letter of August 29 to Congressman McDonough concerning the Marine Corps.
...in amending (the National Security Act of 1947) in 1949, the Congress considered the question of Marine Corps representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and did not provide for it. It is my feeling that many of the renewed pleas for such representation are the result of propaganda inspired by individuals who may not be aware of the best interests of our Defense Establishment as a whole, and it was this feeling which I was expressing to Mr. McDonough.
I am certain that the Marine Corps itself does not indulge in such
propaganda.
I am profoundly aware of the magnificent history of the United States Marine Corps, and of the many heroic deeds of the Marines since the Corps was established in 1775. I personally learned of the splendid combat spirit of the Marines when the Fourth Marine Brigade of the Second Infantry Division fought in France in 1918.
...The Corps' ability to carry out whatever task may be assigned to it has been splendidly demonstrated many times in our history. It has again been shown by the immediate response of the Marine Corps to a call for duty in Korea.
Since Marine ground and air forces have arrived in Korea I have received a daily report of their actions. The country may feel sure that the record of the Marines now fighting there will add new laurels to the already illustrious record of the Marine Corps.
Sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN"
I really could use your source on this letter. Can you provide it for me.
One of the greatest presentations on TH-cam.
I joined the Corps in 1957. The veterans worshipped Chesty, but attributed their lives to O.P.
CORRECTION: Lt. Chew En Lee (not Col. Ray Davis) was the hero who lead Baker Company as they rescued Fox Company out of the Chosin Reservoir.
Absolutely correct, Jennifer! If Lee and the Company he led hadn't succeeded in relieving Fox Company, the Chinese would most likely have taken their positions, had the high ground, cut the one road out and trapped the 1st Marines and the survivors of the 7th Infantry. The Marines that served with and under Lee felt he should have gotten the Medal of Honor! Lees' race, perhaps?
Appall and Salute Gen OP Smith an unsung Hero of US history.
"The Last Stand of Fox Company." I have one regret: that I did not know about Gen Raymond G. Davis's when I shook his hand. I do now. Semper Fidelis.
Entry of Chinese army into Korean war was not a surprise. There were ample warning signs picked up by local units of UN but the high command in Tokyo simply ignored them.
In the middle of reading The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War by David Halberstam. Gen Almond was in 'command' of an army group in Korea only because he kissed up to Gen. McArthur like there was no tomorrow. There were 2 Separate groups of UN force in the Korean war because Gen McArthur wanted his pet, Gen Almond, to be able to command an army.
I can honestly say Gen Almod was one big reason N Korea still exists today.
The last question was painful. I always hate it at these talks when someone gives another mini-lecture before asking a question.
The answer is Peyton March. There was no Army Chief of Staff named James D. Hardboard.
I agree. That blowhard who asked that question had all his information wrong. Ugh.
I just Googled maps north korea. That airstrip at Changjin (Chosun Reservoir) is still there. It's now a north korean air force base.
My uncle was Army and fought in Korea. He explained that their retreat was every man in their own for survival. Peeling each other off vehicles while in retreat. Utter failure and chaos. Army's generals didn't expect a hard fight from the Chinese.
It's disappointing to see people like exarmydoc basically ignore all the poor decisions Almond and MacArthur made but is happy to go after Smith. Almond put all of the units in the position they were in Marines included. Almond a noted racist, who's poor WWII showing as a General should have prevented him from commanding X Corps. Luckily for him, MacArthur, who was a marginal general himself, loved people who told him what he wanted to hear. Despite repeated attempts by Smith, Faith, and other Commanders Almond refused to slow the advance to consolidate even after Chinese forces were encountered. Faith also ignored advice from the CO of the 5th Marines and moved forward.
You've been brainwashed, o p Smith, didn't keep his Supply Road open in the Chinese blocked it
I am reminded of a quote by Chesty Puller that went something like "The main difference between the Chinese Army and the American Army is that he could always depend on the Chinese being where they were supposed to be."
Thank God for men like o p smith
16:58
Almond lying about the airstrips? Incompetent and liar. And put in charge. Great...
The world is full of Almonds.
@@livingadreamlife1428 hahaha sad but true, unfortunately.
almond was macarthurs yes man
James Harbord commanded the Marine Brigade in the fighting at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood during WWI.
"We dig no trenches, The Marines will fight where they stand."
Ricks also states that a Marine Officer went up to the site where the Army units were massacred to recover casualties. According to OP Smith's biography, The Gentle Warrior: Oliver Prince Smith, OP Smith made a very desultory attempt to break through to the 31st RCT, which failed.
But you have to give Smith credit for feeding, and taking care of the weaponless, leaderless groups of soldiers who straggled in on foot to the Amrine lines.
I'm just looking at the maps Doc and they show multiple Chinese Divisions attacking the Marines. I don't see anything near that on the east. The Chinese were all across the Marines rear all the way out, and multiple Chinese units enveloped them from the west as well. Look at the map.
So, thanks for the opinion and the new take on history. But the historians say the RCT was unprepared and not cohesive enough to withstand the same types of attacks the Marines had to fight through . If you think otherwise, why don't you write a book instead of posting these ridiculous claims. Seriously.
William Fraser You indicate again you have disregarded the history of the 31st RCT on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. Roy Appleman's sources include Chinese military documents made accessible after the war. There was a multi division Chinese force on the East side of Chosin tasked with advancing down the East side of Chosin to Hagaru Ri. They did not get there because the 31st RCT blocked them. 2500 US soldiers faced between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese soldiers from six different regiments, fought them, inflicted between 7,000 and 10,000 casualties. The Chinese never got to Chosin.
see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_Faith
Meanwhile, the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments were on the West side of Chosin fighting a numerically superior Chinese force. The 1st Marine Regiment was not conccentrated, strung out on the MSR from Hagaru Ri south to the coast. 1st Marine Division had nothing to fight the Chinese force East of Chosin.
I say again, had the 31st RCT not fought, there would have been two, possibly 3 Chinese divisions advancing unopposed down the East side of the Chosin Reservoir on Hagaru ri, ist Marine Division would have been destroyed, and OP Smith would have ended up a Chinese POW.
You haven't read all there is to read about Chosin. Otherwise you would be aware of what happened East of Chosin.
I am not surprised you have never seen maps showing Chinese activity East of Chosin. A lot of Marine Histories, like Thomas Ricks, ignore the East side of Chosin.
exarmydoc OP SMith was a lt GEn in the US Marine Corps. In your wildest dreams will you EVER have his credibility honesty or courage.
William Fraser "OP SMith was a lt GEn in the US Marine Corps."
So? He was not the only Marine Corps General named Smith who lied about Army Troops. I would not say he was in "good" company. HM Smith was a worse charlie fox trot and liar than he was.
"In your wildest dreams will you EVER have his credibility honesty or courage."
What honesty? What courage? If he had true honesty and courage he would not have lied about the 31st RCT.
WRONG AGAIN. The Marines at Hagaru , a makeshift hdqrs battalion ,was under heavy attack the entire time RCT 31 and the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudamni were also under attack. There were no forces available to rescue RCT 31.WHICH did not get the leadership it needed to survive.
History of the RCT Chapter 5
"Had the RCT been under Marine Division control it doubtless would have followed Colonel Murray’s advice, advice General Smith also passed on, and not advanced beyond Hill 1221 at least until the entire unit was assembled. The outcome of the battle would have been drastically different."
Every Clime and Place !. The World's Finest US Marines . Semper Fi
O.P. SMITH "WE ARE COMEING OUT, WITH OUR HONOR!"
When I shook hands with Raymond G. Davis, my eyes were drawn to his chest showing that he had been awarded the Medal of Honor. At that time I did not know the circumstances regarding his MOH. Now I do, thanks to the book "The Last Stand of Fox Company". I deeply regret not knowing Gen Davis' history when I shook his hand.
General Davis was an American hero and a Marine Corps hero. He should also have received the Medal of Honor at Peleliu when he was a major commanding "Chesty" Puller's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines! His unit suffered the worst casualties in Marine Corps history. None of that was because Davis failed as a leader, but because his regimental commander and 1MarDiv commanding general kept throwing the First Marines at the Umurbrogal Heights, aka "Bloody Nose Ridge". The regimental commander NEVER saw the terrain he was ordering his men to attack. By the battle of Changjin Reservoir; Davis was a Lieutenant Colonel, and his old regimental commander was still a Colonel, six years AFTER Peleliu.
One of Davis' company commanders was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at Peleliu. This award was approved by all channels EXCEPT by his regimental commander, who tried to quash the award for this LEADER. His actions in brutal hand-to-hand combat, and his opinion of his regimental commander should be taught to every Marine Corps Second Lieutenant at The Basic School.
Can you say the same of Col. Don Faith and his actions with RCT31? That Faith didn't fail as a leader but was left to make the best of his situation with what he was left alone to deal with?
@@ex-pfcwintergreen417
General Davis also strongly supported the belated award of the Presidential Unit Citation to RCT31 for Chosin in 1999.
When China sent their troops to Korea, we were warned. The Chinese had no representation at the UN, but they relayed thru the Indian UN Ambassador that they would intervene if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Mac ignored this warning.
The Eighth Army was devastated on the west coast of Korea. The Second Infantry Division still remembers the ass kicking it took at the Chongchon River.
X Corps fared better on the East Coast because OP Smith knew Chinese troops were around and prepared his units for the clusterf*** that followed.
His Corps Commander, who was an incompetent division commander in WW2, but a FANTASTIC MacArthur syncophant post-war, tried to get Smith's 1st Marine Division to abandon prudence, as he succeeded in doing to the 31st RCT, but Smith wasn't having any of it. Marines understand small unit warfare, even if Army generals don't.
The ass kicking the 31st RCT took east of the reservoir was X Corps Commanders fault, NOT OP Smith's.
End of story.
THIS WAS EXCELLENT. HE COVERED EVERYTHING IN AN HOUR. MY UNCLE MIKE SERVICE IN FIR MAR DIV AT CHOSEN HE ALWAYS CALLED IT FROZEN HELL ON EARTH. GOD BLESS GEN SMITH AND THE USMC. SEMPER FIDELIS. ALWAYS. SHALOM
Caesar's Roman Legions would have been in awe of the US Marines @ Chosin.
Superb history, so well told
Really interesting lecture.
Ricks quotes General Almond telling LTC Don Faith not to let a bunch of Chinese Laundrymen stop his attack towards the Yalu. General Almond said that to Colonel Allan McLean, original commander of the 31st RCT BEFORE the Chinese attack began.
Great lecture from an excellent author and historian. Read 'Fiasco' if you haven't already. I particularly loved the slap down of the last question from an obvious jerk.
OP Smith did not save the 1st Marine Division from annihilation. What saved the 1st Marine DIvision was that the Army's 31st RCT on the east side of Chosin prevented two Chinese DIvisions from getting to Hagaru-ri before 5th and 7th Marines could consolidate there. OP Smith claimed the soldiers ran and did not fight. if he Soldiers had not fought two Chinese infantry divisions would have been able to advance down the East side of CHosin unopposed.
Doc, thanks for sharing...........
The talk is accurate.
William Fraser Thomas Ricks' talk is not accurate, especially with regard to LTC Don C. Faith.
exarmydoc what a tremendous chapter in military history. The Marines made their mark at Chosin and at Inchon during the Korean War. So proud of what they did.
William Fraser Check out www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/USMCKor.html
"The Fleet Marine Force, cut drastically from a WWII high of 300,000, had only 27, 656 men.
General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, was ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy the 1st Marine Division to Korea by mid-September. However, short of equipment and with only 8,000 men, Cates requested President Truman to mobilize all reserve elements of the Marine Corps and attached Navy medical personnel to bring the division to wartime strength of 22,000."
In 1950 the Marine Corps was seriously understrength and unprepared. When the North Koreans came south in June of 1950, the top priority was to put boots on the ground. The USMC was not capable of putting boots on the ground. The Army was. Army troops were, admittedly poorly trained and poorly prepared. However, Army troops went in first and fought the North Koreans effectively enough to form the Pusan Perimeter. They fought and bled and died to buy time for the USMC to get ready. The first Marine ground unit, the 5th Marine Regimental Combat Team, did not get there until AFTER the perimeter was formed. By that time the US Army had 4 Divisions on te ground including the 2nd Infantry Division which deployed from the US before 1st Marine Division could be reconstituted.
Had the Army not gone in first, the USMC would have never gotten to Korea. Had the USMC been charged with the defense of Korea in 1950, there would have been no defense of Korea.
+William Fraser More about Inchon. The final battle for the Pusan perimeer was fought and won AFTER the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was withdrawn. One reason the Marines were successful at Inchon was that the North Korean Army was all down at Pusan trying to crack the perimeter. You'll never hear people like Ricks mention that.
The Chosin Few.
People do not remember OP Smith because ultimately the battle was a defeat akin to the evacuation of Dunkirk--basically escape from utter disaster. This does no justice to the soldiers or Smith, but is often the way history is rendered.
Wrong. The marine retreated in complete form. The Chinese suffered 4 times more casualties despite four to five times superior in numbers. After this battle the Chinese could not mount another attack due to casualties until several months later.
Brilliant . . . ask everyone but the man in charge what happened ?
I believe that this is actually Vincent D'Onofrio playing the part of Thomas Ricks. What an actor! He certainly nailed it.
Ray Davis made two trips to Turkey Hill to relieve Marines there (3.5 miles away by jeep) before he took after Fox Hill. The marines started moving on the day that 31RCT was destroyed due to O.P. Smiths orders. He removed the tanks of the 2bn 31st and Cp back to Hagaru before 31RCT could reach them. Marines had warming tents, Brandy, and 24 hour breaks off the front lines. RCT31 did not. They (the Marines) had a caravan that was miles long marching into Hagaru dealing with long range rifle fire. Almonds quotes to Col. Faith were intended to motivate. Not anything else. If Almond was not good, then why did General Ridgeway state, that he preferred Almond over O.P. Smith. Smith who was quickly replaced shortly after Ridgeway took command because O.P. Smith was again asking for concessions as he did so many times with Almond. Smith, Almond, and MacArthur should have faced a tribunal or board of inquiry following the battle of the Chosin IMHO. Had that been done, Ricks speech would never have taken place. How does one get to be a Gentleman Warrior as O.P. Smith is accredited and considered a Good General. Lawful Orders are Lawful Orders. O.P. Smith was not invited by to speak on the Chosin because he would have been embarrassed and brought to task. Ricks book will not change the history, but god knows he is trying. Sadly IMHO
Ricks mentioned the gap between 8th Army and 1st Marine Division. That gap was terrain impassable to military units. According to other histories, OP Smith's left flank was not open.
The Army units to the Marines west disintegrated under chinese attack, much like RCT 31 did.
The problem with govt bureaucracies like the military is that good combat officers and ncos are often expected to benefit those higher in rank, not lower.
As a Marine Mustang who was privileged to lead many fine young Marines, I never bought into that careerist mindset. Maybe that's why I didn't really have one, and thus left with 15 years of service.
I can relate to an old German saying: Past glories are poor feeding.
He made all the right moves and had his head into it. Makes you wonder what in the world the other guys were thinking...if at all.
Really seems like politics played a hand in things rather than smarts and deeds. I was in the `Nam fiasco and things hadn't changed much between those two times just the field..Iraq wasn't a smart move either...the more it changes the more it stays the same.
O.P. probably got back and called `em all a bunch of idiots and as we all know you can't do that with the powers to be `cuz it's never THEIR fault.
Milley prime example .
SLA MARSHALL wrote a history report on the Chosin operation. OP Smith praised the report. MARSHALL's report was highly CRITICAL of the leadership of the 7th and 3rd Divisions and the RCT as well.
Enjoyed watching the speaker drinking the glass of water
THANK YOU
Exactly Semper Fi
After Korea, Chesty Puller was asked by a interview what hard lessons the Marines learned......he spat it out in a Second, NEVER SERVE UNDER X CORPS !!
He was RIGHT ON !!
Semper Fi.
💯👍💪
Great lesson on how to slowly drink a glass of water over 50 minutes.
There is a Chinese saying, a horse that can run 1000 miles a day is easier to be found that the man who can find that horse. So this lecturer did the almost same important thing as Smith did.
I like and appreciate the thought. Nevertheless Mr. Ricks is not alone. The Marine Corps itself and our culture (me having been a Marine Infantry officer) might be largely to blame. We are very resistant to making heros out of Marine commanders. Our ethos is to win battles...as Marines.
While some exceptions exist they are few, and it does not always go well to be the exception. The most famous Marine himself was one of General Smith's regimental Commanding Officers, Lewis "Chesty" Puller. His role it seems gets no special attention in the history books, unless it's a book about him specifically. That's just how it goes. Idk if that's right or wrong tbh, but I'm grateful for the work Mr. Ricks has done to give credit where credit is due.
... To all interested in this subject -> A must: David Halberstam's "The Coldest Winter"
RIP Task Force Faith, aka Regimental Combat Team 31. Those "Army cowards" saved the Marines' asses. IF RCT-31 didn't hold out to the last man on the eastern flank there would have been no successful retreat by the Marines.
31st RCT was overrun by the Chinese while most of them were still aboard
trucks trying to take over position from the 5th Marin regiment which
was order to go to the Northwest to reinforce Yudamni. If they had been
on foot in a tactical formation, they might have survived. There were a
few who escaped across the ice the Marine positions but the bulk of the
unit could not engage while still in the 6 bys that carried them past
Hagaru.
I was at Chosin- were you? Don't try to tell me what you domn't know from personal experience in the area.
WRONG! give us evidence you were there, keyboard warrior
Jean White, you are mis-informed. The serious wounded were in the trucks. The walking wounded were deployed alongside to defend the trucks as infantrymen assaulted the Chinese position above them. They were on a single lane road with steep hills on one side and the Reservoir on the other side. At least know the fact before insulting the men of that Army RCT.
You were at Chosin? Were you with the 31 RCT? If not then your opinion is worthless. Personal experience is limited to one's immediate area which is limited to how far one can see.
I wouldnt call the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir decisive but WHAT a rearguard action
Its called cowardice
@@condorc72 What should they have done: fight to the last man, like the Spartans? They were grossly outnumbered. Dying in place wouldn't have stopped the Chinese from sending more troops - there were other Chinese units formed up in Manchuria ready to come in if necessary!
Lt Gen William McCaffery United States Army and a veteran of the Chosin Campaign said the following about RCT 31 "“.I suggest the unraveling of the 31st RCT was a reflection of incompetence and misconduct on the part of Gens Barr and Hodes,(ARMY) a lesser degree of incompetence on the part of the field grade officers, who, nevertheless, in general, died or were overwhelmed by the cold, the enemy and the enormity of the problems that cascaded over them. In three days the chain of command ceased to function and leaderless men faced death from the enemy and the cold with no guidance and only whatever desperate courage could be summoned up from their innermost sources of their being.” Unravelled.......RCT 31
Seems evident to me that General Smith just wasn't part of the good ol' boy network.
And I think it's important to mention that a good Marine can be fully dedicated to the Corps and not be part of that club. I know of one such good Marine Officer - I see him every time I look in the mirror.
@36:30 in the video the person commented about a person not being fired upon by the Chinese. IMHO on speaking to many of the Vets and information gathered it was probably due to the fact that the Chinese were woefully under maintained and under supplied. Though they had the numbers, they did not have enough equipment/ammunition to finish the job. I think the Chinese by that time were just trying to stay alive as well as using their ammo sparingly.
Though the US were taken by surprise the Chinese were taken by surprise on the sheer stubbornness of the Marine's defensive withdraw. As the fighting continued The Chinese army had less and less ammunition to continue the ferocity of the fight as they had in their initial attack. The US units were battered but well armed and amply supplied. Far better than their Chinese counter parts.
This is a perfect example of losing such an important battle because of logistics and support. Which the PLA did not have. Just think if the PLA had adequate supplies through out this battle. It would not been the famous retreat at the Chosin Reservoir. It may have been the greatest victory over the US during the Korean War.
It's the weakest of all military arguments, although a common one, to say, well if this or that side just had more stuff...
It works both ways.
Did you know that the Chinese had superior cold weather lubricants for their small arms compared with what the Marines had? It was a constant issue which undoubtedly cost many Marines their lives. How would it have been if that one detail was reversed?
Chinese frostbite saved these troops' lives. Hiking, attacking, and camping in -30 degree weather in the hills and mountains killed and injured the Chinese advance. The lesson I take from this is to move mostly out of the cold mountains during winter fighting and then move back into them as soon as the thaw breaks and things warm up. Let your enemies "battle the weather" and freeze unnecessarily. The Chinese attack might have succeeded better had they attacked in warmer weather. Also, retreat to better areas when dangerously under-supplied, otherwise the fighting moral eventually drops to zero.
Napoleon learned that lesson, Paulus learned that lesson, it seems easily forgotten every hundred years or so.
Very interesting. I have read the Marine history on this matter and know that the tactics used by Smith were very similar to those used by Xenophon in the Anabasis (Anabasis means march up country- Xenophon eventually became more or less the commander). It would be interesting to know how much Smith knew of that campaign. Particularly since it appears that Smith was an avid reader. The terrain Xenophon faced was very similar to that faced by the Marines.
True badass hero!
How the US Army and OP Smith saved 15,000 Marines.
There were many excellent documentaries on youtube about this battle, all removed now that PBS made their own documentary , with the same material, which you have to buy, sigh
We will be posting a add on to the Facebook page "Chosin Reservoir" shortly after tonights airing of "American Experience" The battle of Chosin. See PBS stations for times. This posting will show the breakdowns and holes that have been persisted through the decades regarding the Chosin Reservoir campaign. The author, Ray Vallowe, challenges most of what Ricks has stated in this video, and his validated research will bear that out. Watch the Show. Check the website. Decide for yourself. Vallowe monitors this page will be happy to discuss his findings vs accepted history through out the decades. It is my humble opinion that Ricks only perpetuates some of the hype and myths of this General, and the campaign itself. But come see for yourself.
What separates the Marine Corps from all the others is psychological. Marine Corps boot camp is an indoctrination on abject suffering. Expect the worst and you'll never be disappointed. Semper FI
No mention of Hell Fire Valley? I guess this was a high level discussion, but what a battle to totally leave out and not even mention.
That microphone works a little too good.
56:47 That kid shouldn't smoke dope while he's doing "research". Attending VMI isn't anything like ROTC and he got the answer wrong to his own question. What a buffoon.
The fact that he still didn't get a clue about the difference when he was corrected is telling.
The difference between VMI and the USMA being negligible as far as military quality makes comparing either to ROTC just a joke, especially in the years when they were masculine institutions.
"That greatest of all Marine institutions, the Drill Instructor."
I feel great pity for the USMC now. How sorrowful, to have DIs as their greatest institution!
+verilyheld The Marine Corps would not exist without the Drill Instructors and certainly not as an elite fighting organization.Your comment suggests that you were not a Marine.
Jonathan Sievers No, but I've seen Full Metal Jacket!
+verilyheld lol....
One of the lies Marine admirers propagates this lie about Chosin, that hundreds of Soldiers faked wounds to get evacuated from Hagaru-ri. From the DVD on Task Force Faith and from other sources, fewer than 1500 soldiers made it to Hagaru-ri. Fewer than 400 were able bodied and they marched out. Just about all the rest were severely injured or frost bitten.
The source of the falsehood actually is a priest, Father Otto Sporrer, who served as a Chaplain with the Marines. I believe he was assigned either to the 5th Marines or to the 11th Marines. In 1951, the Navy produced a documentary about Chosin which was not at all complimentary to the Army. The Army protested and DOD forced the Navy to revise the documentary. Sporrer was pissed about the alterations. So, in 1952, several months after the event, he made the claim that he had witnessed 400 soldiers faking wounds and getting on medieval aircraft. There was an investigation of his claims by General Matthew Ridgeway, who commanded 8th Army after the death of Walton Walker. The investigation founded that Sporrer's claims were unfounded.
When one looks at it, one wonders why Sporrer would have had any credibility except that people wanted to glorify the Corps, considering he made the claims months after the Battle of Chosin, and had an ulterior motive for making the claims.
exarmydoc ooohhhwwww the Marines lied !!!!
SO now you're telling everyone OP Smith the Commanding General of the 3rd Marine Division is a liar.
OK. Now we can take the interaction up a notch. You're a gutless piece of trash exarmy doc. I'll take General Smith's word over yours any day. Piss off clown. You don't deserve the right to be on this page. Trashman
William Fraser "I'll take General Smith's word over yours any day. "
Which is but an admission that you have problems with the truth..
+William Fraser O.P.Smith was commanding Gen.of the 1st mar.div...........
not the 3rd mars.
+exarmydoc you must hate that martin russ book
andrelebaron Never read it, so I am not in a position to like it or hate it.
Have you ever read East of Chosin or Escaping the Trap by Roy Appleman?
Have you ever watched the documentary on Task Force Faith? You can order it from this site: www.taskforcefaith.com/.
Thomas Ricks must really hate the Soldiers who fought and bled and died on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir saving the 1st Marine Division. He must love Otto Sporrer, the lying Chaplain who accused those valiant Soldiers of cowardice.
"Stacked like cordwood" is just poetry. Most people like poetry more than the truth. Thanks for the insight.
Rick's is incorrect on a number of points.
"With the assistance of Marine Corps air support - expertly coordinated by Capt. Stamford and without which the task force would have been overwhelmed - RCT 31 fought off heavy assaults by the PLA 80th and 81st divisions for another two days, inflicting severe losses on the communist forces who left hundreds of bodies in the snow around the army position. During the day Stamford directed 38 sorties, making this the major effort of the 1st Marine Air Wing for the day. From 0645 until 1830 Marine planes attacked the Chinese, dropping 21 napalm tanks, 16 500-lb bombs, 21 fragmentation bombs, and firing 190 rockets. All attacks on the perimeter were repulsed. The Americans were running low on ammunition, and over half their number had been killed or wounded, including a high proportion of key leaders. Faith, realizing he was surrounded and greatly outnumbered, decided to attempt a breakout to the south, toward Marine lines. The situation was so desperate that only a minimum of equipment and sufficient vehicles to carry the wounded were taken, freeing more soldiers to fight as infantry. The rest of the equipment was destroyed in place, including
the artillery's howitzers after they fired their last rounds."
The above passage is supported by the bulk of the available information available from the DoD.
First mistake Ricks makes is that OP Smith insisted he be allowed to consolidate his regiments. He had 5th Marine on the East side of Chosin, 7th Marines on the west side and the 1st Marines strung out to the South along the MSR. General Almond put the 31st RCT on the East side of Chosin, which allowed OP Smith to put 5th Marines and 7th Marines on the West side. My source is Roy Appleman's Escaping the Trap, available as a Kindle download from Amazon.
Smith made so many mistakes he brought his entire Division out of Chosin .
My source is every single history book written about Chosin reservoir. It must really annoy you to have to read the history books. Semper Fidelis
William Fraser There have been multiple history books written about Chosin including East of Chosin and Escaping the Trap by Roy Appleman which document what the31st RCT did on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. It nust really gall you to read that an Army Unit fought to the death saving the First Marine Division. You have obviously never read those books, or if you did you are in denial.
William Fraser What in hell do you think RCT 31 was doing while they were there? Jumping rope? Good thing the Marines didn't consult with armchair historian "William Fraser" regarding the PUC indorsement since you've got it all figured out.
The other thing I wanted to point out is that the TACP officer with them (a Marine) has stated that most of the army officers and many of the NCO's were well trained and good leaders. I say this because you mentioned leadership...
What were they doing. Well lets look at the record. Unprepared, the first night many were bayoneted in their sleeping bags. The performance of RCT 31 is not anything you need to be bragging about. And if you had read anything about what happened to them,
you'd know that. Next, I don't argue with imbeciles. Casual observers might not be able to tell us apart. So long soup and sandwich.
William Fraser You are dodging the rel situation. There was a multi divisin chinese force on the East side of Chosin. Their objective was Hagaru-Ri(See Roy Appeman's Escaping the Trap). The only troops between them and Hagaru_-Ri were the 31st RCT. They never got to Hagaru-Ri. It wasn't because of the Marines that those Chinese never got to their objective.
this lecturer insinuated that D. MacArthur was not brave. His bravery was well documented especially during WW!.
MacArthur was a peacock 🦚
Four casualties were helicoptered out of RCT 31 before its disintegration. Two battalion commanders and two others....WTF? Why the battalion commanders? What kind of leadership is that?
The USA should have stopped their advance at the narrowest point of the peninsula north of Pyonyang and dug in there. If they had done that, the Chinese would not have attacked and Pyongyang would now be part of South Korea. North Korea, on the other hand, would be a small mountain-bound country. Seole would be a lot farther from its northern border and we would not be having the trouble with the fat boy. Its all MacArthur's fault.
IF Litzenberg had taken Yudam ni by Nov. 14th as Ordered, they would have been able to prevent the Chinese from incircling the forces and changed the entire scope of the battles in North Korea or at least change the situation to a different outcome. But alas he dragged his feet for 11 days to get there. Sheppard knew Almond probably better than he knew O.P. Smith because they were fellow students at VMI. After Smith whined to the higher ups, Sheppard basically told him to get in line. A general has the right and the priviledge to address his orders from the higher up, but he does not have the righto disregard a Valid Order. O.P. Smith was told by Almond to make Litzeberg to take Yudam-ni. For Ricks to not believe him is his choice, but the reality was, it happened. O.P. Smiths orders caused the death of 31RCT TF MacLean/Faith. That is pretty cut and dry on November 29th. Smith did nothing to help the Army on the East of Chosin who was ordered to take out the previous assignments of the Marines as verified by Divisional order OpO 7 and Regimental order by MacLean of 31RCT, OpO 25. Ricks is so far off base I am offended.
There was an additional 500,000 Chinese soldiers in reserve just over the border in Manchuria. The marines played their hand well.
this guy should move away from the mic when he takes a drink.
Page 323 of Appleman's “East of Chosin” states:
"Withdrawing these forces (31st Tank Co and 31st Rear) from Hudong-ni had the effect of signing the death warrant for Task Force Faith and its wounded. What commander in his right mind could order such a move...".
If you are to cheap or lazy to buy the book, contact me and I will send you a copy.
How Thomas Ricks THINKS OP Smith saved 15,000 Marines. Thomas Ricks is wrong.
No he's not.
numkie Yes he is.
numkie How about explain this. Thomas Ricks does not.
There were Chinese troops on the East side of Chosin, the 27th Chinese Army. Their mission was to advance down the east side of the Chosin Reservoir on Hagaru Ri. They made the attempt but never got there and took thousands of killed and wounded in the attempt.
There were no Marines on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. The only troops were the Soldiers of the 31st RCT. If they just crumbled and offered no resistance to the Chinese, then why did the Chinese 27th Army never get to Hagaru ri. How did they incur all those casualties?
Again, there were no Marines on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. 5th and 7th Marines were on the west side. 1st Marines were strung out along the MSR from Hagaru ri south. The only US troops on the East side of Chosin were the soldiers of the 31st RCT. If the 31st RCT had not fought effectively, there would have been two, possibly 3 Chinese divisions advancing unfought on Hagaru ri. They would have gotten there before the 5th and 7th Marines, before Task Force Drysdale, and the Marines holding Hagaru ri were already under heavy attack. How come those 2, possibly 3 Chinese divisions took thousands of casualties and never got to Hagaru ri?
exarmydoc Who knows what type of stupid post you put up but history isn't your thing. OP Smith says a thousand RCT soldiers jumped on the first plane out and only 485 walked out with the Marines. bwahahahahahahah
He got his numbers wrong..
What a pathetic gutless liar you are. Maggot.
In my time on this earth, playing football, in the Corps and in business, is that leaders have it and others don't, and there is not alot you can do about that. You can try to teach, train and direct, but people have leadership capabilities or they don't. No amount of training or attention can make someone a leader if they dont have in the first place.
it is 2018, just before the November mid-term elections. I wonder if this series is still being offered?
Non-commercial, unless you want to post it on TH-cam and monetise it
The destruction of Task Force Faith is something the Army seldom mentions. The 7th ID was spread all over N. Korea; the USMC 1st Div. kept their Regiments fairly close...a wise decision. Had they scattered their regiments - as the 7th ID did - they likely would have never made it to the coast. TF Faith - comprised of both US & Koreans, was not a very cohesive force - ya just can't throw people together & "call" them a regiment. Applemans book - East of Chosin - should be mandatory reading by every 2LT before commissioning. TF Faith did what they were ordered to, but if the Principles of War are ignored, the consequences are predictable. LTC Faith is now buried at Arlington...his remains were returned ~2012...what was left of them. (I have a personal interest in this - my uncle (RIP) was in N. Korea w/ the 7th ID in 1950...he never talked about it. It wasn't his first time in combat; he had served on the USS California in WWII, in the last battleship on battleship battle the world will likely see.)
Buck123four, there is much more information regarding RCT31. I would offer that if you have read Ebb and Flow, East of Chosin, Breakout, then it is time to read The Chosin Chronology by Col Rasula. But if you really want to get to the brass tax I would offer that you read, Ray Vallowe's "What History Forgot to Record." Access to these are on the net. Vallowe's book is available for free at the TheKoreanWarEducator on the net. He is has joined to the group page on Facebook. "Chosin Reservoir". You can direct your questions to one of the best historians on the subject directly yourself. I think you will discover many issue in Appleman's book, Russman's book, ect.
The 7th ID was not spread out over Korea as you stated. In fact they were just hours away from taking over the entire Marine objectives that O.P. Smith failed to accomplish under OpO 6, and OpO 7 for that matter. The bigger question to ask, is Why? the 7th ID was even in the Marine Corps Area of Operation in the first place. The east side of the Chosin was clearly assigned to Murrays 5RCT 5th Marines. Why was Faith and the 31 RCT sent to Chosin? See maps at "Chosin Reservoir" Facebook for that answer. One could argue that the destruction of TF MacLean/Faith of 31RCT was due large and in part by the inaction of Gen. O.P. Smith/LItzenberg, and Murray.
1st Marine Division was able to concentrate because the 31st RCT was deployed on the East side of the Chosin Reservoir. Prior to that, 5th Marines were on the East side of Chosin, the 7th Marines were on the West side and 1st Marines were strung out from Hagaru ri south along the MSR.
My objection is at around 34:58. Mr. Ricks (although he said Almond) is clearly speaking of Lt. Don Carlos Faith and Mr Ricks is wrong in his assessment. Lt. Col. Faith knew his job, he knew what he was facing, and he didn't take his artillery pieces with him on the retreat because all of the ammunition for the artillery had been used.
disagree. faith would have rather staffed 32nd INF with fresh jump school airborne officers than have combat veteran leg officers. He was brave, determined, and unprepared to command a battalion or regiment in combat. General Ridgway's Dog robber doesn't make a battalion commander.
Ex-PFC Wintergreen, your argument is flawed. The Army has routinely rotated officers between staff and field positions. In 1940-41 the US
Army was ranked 17th in the world. There is a 22-year gap between the ending of WW1 and the beginning of WW2. Upon our entry into WW2, only a handful of officers had any combat experience or experience as a troop leader and that experience derived from WW1 which utilized a different set of tactics. In 1940 the US Army had 9 Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, 1 Mechanized Brigand. In 1944-45 in the European Theater of Operations, the US Army consisted of 43 Infantry Divisions, 24 Armor Divisions, 4 Airborne (light infantry) Divisions. The vast majority of all officers, from General down to 2nd Lieutenant, had no combat experience prior to going into battle. Yet during Operation Torch, Operation Overlord, etc., these "inexperienced" officers, by and large, performed well and some were exceptional. This was a reflection of the quality of their training not of their experience commanding field units for very few had that experience. By all existing accounts, MacLean performed well while in command RCT-31 and Faith was exceptional. Experience as a troop leader does not always translate into command ability. Any officer can tell you that. Also, the majority of combat experienced battalion or regiment officers were discharged at the end of WW2 or did not remain in the army when it reduced to peacetime levels.
OP Smith did not save 15,000 Marines. In spite of Thomas Ricks, it was the 31st RCT which covered 1st Marine Division's exposed Eastern flank. Mr.Ricks doesn't even try to explain why the 27th Chinese Army failed in its mission to take Hagaru ri.
exarmydoc another stupid post, as usual
William Fraser "+exarmydoc another stupid post, as usual"
Yes your last post was.
+exarmydoc , You will never hear a Marine say "I could have been in the Army". :-)
Sam Whitmore Maybe so. Nevertheless, you have the Marine Corps trying to credit itself with what the Army accomplished, e.g. being the first to fight, fighting in the Battles of trenton and princeton, taking Chapultepec in the Mexican war, defending the Philippines. The Army never tries to credit itself with Marine accomplishments
Hello exarmydoc, if that information is correct I would have no problem with bringing the truth to the light. However, according to what I learned in bootcamp, the 1st Marine Division was surrounded by over 100,000 enemy troops and managed to fight it's way back to the sea. Yes, the army was there, but it was Chesty Puller and the use of close air support that was instrumental in saving our US forces.
One thing I don’t understand about this battle is why the US didn’t carpet bomb the Chinese positions surrounding the Marines and soldiers at Chosin reservoir with B29’s or some other heavy bomber? Were the Chinese simply too close to the Americans to risk hitting friendlies?
I think you're at least in part correct.
There was also fear that this could escalate into WWIII. idk how much that factored in.
Tactically, it also might have done more harm than good, if Air force resupply drops (which went to the enemy too much of the time) is any measure.
Naval aviation (especially USMC) was far more accurate and the helicopters were especially useful* except there were just too few. *Resupply and medevac, which, btw, were ideas pioneered by Marines as far back as the Banana Wars with fixed wing aircraft.
More artillery, heavier artillery (esp. for range) and lots more arty rounds would have also been a big help.
On the west side of the peninsula where the Army had a much larger force than X Corps (Chosin) they abandoned a huge number of artillery pieces. For all we know, those tubes might still be in use by N. Korea today.
we are not retreating, we are just fighting in another direction.
No Task force Faith and Maclane saved the 1st Mar DIV...
the troops received presidential citation in 2012
RIP Jose Guerena
54:33 - Must teach the midshipmen the difference between the Chief of Staff UNDER Pershing (Harbord) and the Army Chief of Staff OVER Pershing (March) :-)
It was one of the "Reasons", for his ACTUAL NAME ( to "Us" MARINES anyway . . . ) . . . "Howling Mad" SMITH !.
the best marine!RCT 31 would of need someone like him too..Maclean comander of the rtc made a few mistakes in organizsing defense altough they didn know that such an amount of chinese is coming ..also many soldiers meeting the first blocks just runaway and deserted the convoy..and records show 1500 alive fro 2500 , many wonden and with frost bit
Yeah he cleaned up Chesty Puller's debacle
evans johnny AH JOHNNY BOY YOU'RE STILL AN IDIOT!
I agree. Chest had no debacle to be cleaned up
CHESTY HELD THE LINE AND FOUGHT THE REAR GUARD ACTION.
@@marktercsak9728 u are so stupid and disillusioned....pullers bravado got his men surrounded and they had to retreat rearward....that's not a rearguard action..its running to save your sorry butt
His act below is kind of a taint to his career.
There is evidence that Smith misstated the contribution of United States Army units under his command to the effort at Chosin. 31st Infantry Regimental Combat Team (also known as "Task Force Faith" or "Task Force Maclean"), which protected his right flank and took the brunt of a reinforced CCF corps for five days was not included in Smith's recommendation for the Presidential Unit Citation after the battle.[8] Thirty years later, the CCF commanders, Gen Song and Gen Peng, attributed the 31st RCT with breaking their offensive and preventing them from achieving their objectives.
I'm using this for commercial purposes! Ah hah! Hah hah hah hah!