This was extremely helpful! Do you think you could also post quotes you are using with reference as to where exactly they are coming from in your future videos?
Hume finds support in modern cognitive psychology. Type 1 thinking (fast, affectual, autonomous) supply pre-attentive substance for Type 2 processes, which in turn (if in the absence of Type 3 rational disposition), merely post-hoc rationalise and place into the linguistic domain the decisions already sent to the conscious mind by the Type 1 processes.
I think many philosophers would argue against this dichotomous construct of dual process theory but yes, plenty of support. Their support centers on the kinds of decisions which are made, namely deontological vs. utilitarian.
@@gotpancakes Leaving the ontology of cognitive processes aside for the moment, most cognitive psychology would not consider that automated processes are informed by any higher-order rational processes (except in the sense of overlearning). This means that it is difficult to apply the empirical results of studies in pre-reflective processes in any form of philosophical argument for Kantian vs Benthamist positions. It is, of course, possible to rationalise any intuition-generated cognition in any way. But I do agree with you that there are many unresolved issues in dual process theory.
@@Koriyama Sorry, don't have a strong enough back ground in the literature to clearly make sense of your following sentence: " It is difficult to apply the empirical results of studies in pre-reflective processes in any form of philosophical argument for Kantian vs Benthamist positions". Would you mind rephrasing? Are you claiming that there is a fundamental boundary which keeps us from empirically determining the quality of type 1 vs type 2 decision?
@@gotpancakes Great question, and sorry for the confusion. As I understand it (I work in educational psychology, not philosophy), both Benthian utilitarian and Kantian deontology presuppose deliberate modes of cognition. One isn't a utilitarian or a deontologist without reflective capabilities. This is a type 2 mode of cognition. It is possible, I suspect, to have prereflective dispositions towards what is later understood to be a recognised philosophical tradition. These would be type 1 modes of cognition; e.g. the recognition of an instinctive pull towards or disgust against any moral proposition. Now, your question is more barbed than my simple distinction is implying. Evans in 1984 famously set up the heuristic vs analytical distinction that led to the more modern type/system 1 and 2 nomenclature. But there are those who argue against "The mythical number two", to cite the title of Melnikof and Bargh's article in 2018. Their position is that while there is a consensus regarding the modularity of the mind (post-Fodor), it's too early to make strong claims about a broad bifurcated division. Stanovich (2005), though, lists 23 different research teams that have used that division successfully. If there is a boundary, it's a transient one. I'm not arguing for one view over the other. My comment was only attempting to claim that we can't use dual processing theory to support utilitarianism over deontology. We can, and I suspect this is where you are coming from, assess a heuristic intuition as being more related to one philosophical belief set than another. And perhaps we could do the same for a deliberately reflected upon intuition. This action would necessarily be at the level of the individual person and individual intuition and be contingent on many other social facts. But given the vast amount of knowledge we have about how blind most people are to their own moral reasoning (see Haidt's metaphor of the elephant and rider), assessing type 2 cognitions is in moral questions is largely academic.
Thx you Dr Sadler ! I have a question for you (if you’ll see this comment) I am very interested in learning the basics of modern philosophy, Kant, Hume, do you think by just reading there books I’ll get it, I’m a working guy with some extra time,? Thx 🙏🏻
Hey Gregory? What do you think Gregory would say about autonomy? Do you think that education of the passions could lead us to making autonomous choices? I know he doesn't use the word autonomy but he does use 'liberty' which i think can be substituted by autonomy sometimes. I wonder what you think about this.. :)
Hume really was the dark horse of the Enlightenment. Love it.
Thanks for talking about Hume! Greetings from Guadalajara, México
You're welcome!
I desire each one of these stimulating videos ahah, Wow this got views fast- I loved watching and rewatching the Gabriel Marcel ones thanks for those!
You're welcome!
This was extremely helpful! Do you think you could also post quotes you are using with reference as to where exactly they are coming from in your future videos?
No, I do not think so. I think people can read the works
Hume finds support in modern cognitive psychology. Type 1 thinking (fast, affectual, autonomous) supply pre-attentive substance for Type 2 processes, which in turn (if in the absence of Type 3 rational disposition), merely post-hoc rationalise and place into the linguistic domain the decisions already sent to the conscious mind by the Type 1 processes.
I think many philosophers would argue against this dichotomous construct of dual process theory but yes, plenty of support. Their support centers on the kinds of decisions which are made, namely deontological vs. utilitarian.
@@gotpancakes Leaving the ontology of cognitive processes aside for the moment, most cognitive psychology would not consider that automated processes are informed by any higher-order rational processes (except in the sense of overlearning). This means that it is difficult to apply the empirical results of studies in pre-reflective processes in any form of philosophical argument for Kantian vs Benthamist positions. It is, of course, possible to rationalise any intuition-generated cognition in any way. But I do agree with you that there are many unresolved issues in dual process theory.
@@Koriyama Sorry, don't have a strong enough back ground in the literature to clearly make sense of your following sentence: " It is difficult to apply the empirical results of studies in pre-reflective processes in any form of philosophical argument for Kantian vs Benthamist positions". Would you mind rephrasing? Are you claiming that there is a fundamental boundary which keeps us from empirically determining the quality of type 1 vs type 2 decision?
@@gotpancakes Great question, and sorry for the confusion. As I understand it (I work in educational psychology, not philosophy), both Benthian utilitarian and Kantian deontology presuppose deliberate modes of cognition. One isn't a utilitarian or a deontologist without reflective capabilities. This is a type 2 mode of cognition. It is possible, I suspect, to have prereflective dispositions towards what is later understood to be a recognised philosophical tradition. These would be type 1 modes of cognition; e.g. the recognition of an instinctive pull towards or disgust against any moral proposition.
Now, your question is more barbed than my simple distinction is implying. Evans in 1984 famously set up the heuristic vs analytical distinction that led to the more modern type/system 1 and 2 nomenclature. But there are those who argue against "The mythical number two", to cite the title of Melnikof and Bargh's article in 2018. Their position is that while there is a consensus regarding the modularity of the mind (post-Fodor), it's too early to make strong claims about a broad bifurcated division. Stanovich (2005), though, lists 23 different research teams that have used that division successfully. If there is a boundary, it's a transient one. I'm not arguing for one view over the other.
My comment was only attempting to claim that we can't use dual processing theory to support utilitarianism over deontology. We can, and I suspect this is where you are coming from, assess a heuristic intuition as being more related to one philosophical belief set than another. And perhaps we could do the same for a deliberately reflected upon intuition. This action would necessarily be at the level of the individual person and individual intuition and be contingent on many other social facts. But given the vast amount of knowledge we have about how blind most people are to their own moral reasoning (see Haidt's metaphor of the elephant and rider), assessing type 2 cognitions is in moral questions is largely academic.
Thx you Dr Sadler !
I have a question for you (if you’ll see this comment) I am very interested in learning the basics of modern philosophy, Kant, Hume, do you think by just reading there books I’ll get it, I’m a working guy with some extra time,? Thx 🙏🏻
Here's a playlist you'll find useful th-cam.com/play/PL4gvlOxpKKIgFVZpisYc8GTl7rxuyRtwm.html
@@GregoryBSadler thank you very much!
Thank you.
You're welcome
Hey Gregory? What do you think Gregory would say about autonomy? Do you think that education of the passions could lead us to making autonomous choices? I know he doesn't use the word autonomy but he does use 'liberty' which i think can be substituted by autonomy sometimes. I wonder what you think about this.. :)
Depends on how you mean the term "autonomy"
thank you :)
You're welcome!
thanks a lot
You're welcome
Fifth helping. Yeah after the forth helping you know you are over indulging.
Indeed