Regarding giving a person the opportunity to be independent. There's also the lyric in My Zaidy. "When I got back home, they said ''Zaidy's gone' and all his books were packed and stored away."
The question is great. I don't understand the answer. All actions are caused by things and information, education around you. Why is a person responsible for his actions if the reason he did something is clearly because of something that's was not his choice???
All was great until the end where he spoke about kleptomania and smoking. He said it boiled down to "ratzone." Well, yes and no. There are those that explain the difference between first order desires: I want to smoke. Second order desire: I want to not want to smoke. Now are we free to choose the second order desire? Yes, I chose to not want to smoke. If that second order desire brings you to change your behavior, that is called a "second order volition." The freedom to choose not to smoke, when acted upon is now a volition that incorporates acting in accordance. Not as simple as "ratzone" especially for people with drug problems, OCD, psychiatric disorders. But for "normal" people that do not have these special cases, I agree with his point about freedom of choice/will has to do with moral choices.
Wanted to comment on my comment from a year ago. In the beginning R' Tatz made an excellent point: Jewish bechira is about moral dilemmas. What is the right/moral thing to do? Gentile ethics has to do with determinism vs free will to do any kind of action/behavior, etc. That is, are all actions we do determined by previous causes? Jewish philosophy also hotly debated this in the times of the Rishonim and after. The Q is different there however: If G-d knows you're going to do it, and you don't, then G-d didn't know. That is not a moral Q, that is an ontological question. Today when we discuss free will in Jewish terms, we are talking primarily about moral choices, not about whether G-d determines our every action. A kleptomaniac does not have a ratzone problem, in my humble, she has a psychiatric problem manifested in a legal situation.. I have trichotillomania: I pull my hair out. Is that a moral issue? Does G-d have anything to do with my pulling my hair out? I don't think so. The Netivus Shalom, first book, page פג says there are three things that influence behavior: Environment, habits and genetics. For habits, he advises to look up Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah טז.
He is very clear in the first 3/4 part of the lecture but in the last part seems to contradict himself. Somebody in the audience caught it and asked him about the point of choice for the addict but he replied with yes and no re responsibility. Bottom line, it's too complicated to be perfectly clear about it. I would say a person is responsible only for the what he does wrong in the realm that is below his challenge point.
Regarding giving a person the opportunity to be independent. There's also the lyric in My Zaidy. "When I got back home, they said ''Zaidy's gone' and all his books were packed and stored away."
Very interesting
The question is great. I don't understand the answer. All actions are caused by things and information, education around you. Why is a person responsible for his actions if the reason he did something is clearly because of something that's was not his choice???
How does one DO something if they don’t CHOOSE to?!
Did some one force him?!
Your question doesn’t make sense 🤷♀️
All was great until the end where he spoke about kleptomania and smoking. He said it boiled down to "ratzone." Well, yes and no. There are those that explain the difference between first order desires: I want to smoke. Second order desire: I want to not want to smoke. Now are we free to choose the second order desire? Yes, I chose to not want to smoke. If that second order desire brings you to change your behavior, that is called a "second order volition." The freedom to choose not to smoke, when acted upon is now a volition that incorporates acting in accordance. Not as simple as "ratzone" especially for people with drug problems, OCD, psychiatric disorders. But for "normal" people that do not have these special cases, I agree with his point about freedom of choice/will has to do with moral choices.
Wanted to comment on my comment from a year ago. In the beginning R' Tatz made an excellent point: Jewish bechira is about moral dilemmas. What is the right/moral thing to do? Gentile ethics has to do with determinism vs free will to do any kind of action/behavior, etc. That is, are all actions we do determined by previous causes? Jewish philosophy also hotly debated this in the times of the Rishonim and after. The Q is different there however: If G-d knows you're going to do it, and you don't, then G-d didn't know. That is not a moral Q, that is an ontological question. Today when we discuss free will in Jewish terms, we are talking primarily about moral choices, not about whether G-d determines our every action. A kleptomaniac does not have a ratzone problem, in my humble, she has a psychiatric problem manifested in a legal situation.. I have trichotillomania: I pull my hair out. Is that a moral issue? Does G-d have anything to do with my pulling my hair out? I don't think so.
The Netivus Shalom, first book, page פג says there are three things that influence behavior: Environment, habits and genetics. For habits, he advises to look up Sefer HaChinuch, mitzvah טז.
He is very clear in the first 3/4 part of the lecture but in the last part seems to contradict himself. Somebody in the audience caught it and asked him about the point of choice for the addict but he replied with yes and no re responsibility. Bottom line, it's too complicated to be perfectly clear about it. I would say a person is responsible only for the what he does wrong in the realm that is below his challenge point.