A full on Operations Order to conduct an MTC also has COA Courses Of Actions upon making enemy contact is what is the Commander's Intent? Seize and hold to fix or Break Contact for a probing attack. Usually this has a fire support plan for fires on the enemy like mortars or artillery, colored smoke for command and signal. The MTC is also a favored tactic for harassing the enemy or a diversion suited for small guerilla ambushes to develop a situation to how the enemy will react to you upon meeting them. Your video has stimulated my old infantry mind after many years being dormant after retirement.
Correct. Remember...the Commander's Intent is the biggest picture view of the mission. It's much broader than the Operations Order, and therefore significantly larger than each COA or contingency within the Order. (Be sure to watch my videos on Combat Orders and Commander's Intent.)
Good stuff and very informative. Especially since the average green line infantryman is taught "March to the sound of enemy guns and shoot the people not dressed like us!"
how is it that you’re channel is so small? this kind of information is priceless…and the manner in which you teach it is concise and digestible… i recently found your channel and i’m glad i did…ive been searching for someone like yiu for quite a while and will be sharing your channel with all of my like minded friends..keep up the good work sir!!
Brother...I promise, the answer is yes. It's just that last year I was so busy setting up Charlie Company for the One Shepherd Regiment in Florida. And this year, my publishers tell me I MUST WRITE a third edition to the OPFOR 3 SMARTbook: Russian Military Forces. I will try to return to my videos in 2025. I really enjoy making them. Promise.
Potential minor addendum sir: the vanguard is the forward (van) guard, in relation to the main body the guards of/to the flanks and rear are generally doctrinally, respectively, the flank guards and rearguard. I was told many moons ago it was anglicized from the french "avant-garde" I'm not an American military officer, but from what I understand from interacting with some of you, coming from US doctrine, your older FM17-95 for Armored Cavalry formations had a detailed breakdown, although much poorer than yours here, as that was their doctrinal justification for existence. It's my understanding that those formations and their associated doctrine has since evolved with the introduction of the Interim Stryker formations (and the dissolution of any US Army organization capable of performing a doctrinal Guard mission), but the explanations as I recall them match up. In the successors to the Soviet institutional knowledge base that is broadly consistent with the doctrine currently taught in regards to taskings for the composite reinforced Brigades which the Motor Rifle Regiments have evolved in as a response to Gerasimov's reforms and combat experience in Chechnya and Ukraine. Incidentally, can I take a moment to recognize and appreciate that you are one of the VERY few american officers I've encountered who both knows, appreciates, and attempts to disseminate your own doctrine. In my experience it seems to be something of a hallmark of american officers to not read or understand their own publications. Quite refreshing to see you out here bucking the trend in such a professional and approachable format.
Much appreciated, William! Agreed. The vanguard is the forward guard (and I, too, was told that it comes from French "avant-garde"). There are also rear guard and flank guard, by doctrine. The last time we saw the US military use these concepts in any large operation was during the ground invasion of Kuwait and Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. To be fair, I believe vanguards were also used in the ground invasion of Iraq in 2003 - but much of this knowledge has been lost, or at least ignored for 20 years. What the US refers to colloquially as Red Team Armies - Russia, China, N.Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela - are quite adept at such tactical doctrine on both large and smaller scale. The US has been too preoccupied with counterinsurgency. Anecdotally, when the US 173rd Airborne BDE went to advise and assist Ukraine forces, the US paratroopers attempted to teach counterinsurgency tactics to the Ukraine Recon Companies (top tier unit). The Recon Companies politely but flatly refused this instruction from the US paratroopers. Thankfully, they talked it out and found common ground in combat technologies and first aid/CASEVAC for the paratroopers to teach. The US forces not only failed to understand Red Team Army doctrine, but didn't even know their own doctrine in maneuver warfare! Frightening. And a little bit embarrassing for the US. But it all worked out in the end. The American military is playing a game of "catch up" these days.
@@E5kiloUSMC - Hmmm. It's only a few years old, so to my knowledge no one has written an account about it yet. Perhaps with the US Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL)? My point of reference is a colleague, US Army SSG Tyler Jackson of the Light Fighter Study Group in Kansas City, Missouri. I'm not sure of their web presence, but I'm willing to be they maintain some kind of contact info. I think perhaps a Facebook page.
In a seek and attack tactic, how far away will the main force and the vanguard squads be from each other? And how far away will the vanguards be from eachother?
Fair question. And the answer is the dreaded, "It depends on METT-TC ... Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain - Troops available, Civilians in the battlespace. Mounted Infantry use vehicles to cover large spans of distance very quickly. So, the main force in a Mechanized Infantry Company might be a mile (1.6 Km) or so behind the vanguards. The vanguards might have a quarter mile (400 m) between each team. Dismounted Infantry must run the distance on foot. So, the main body in an Airborne Infantry Company might be a quarter mile (400 m) behind the vanguards. The vanguards might have 100 meters between each team. But of course, steep terrain and dense vegetation will decrease these distances. Whereas, open terrain and a lack of vegetation can increase these distances. Yes?
Yes and no. I will be addressing the EVOLUTION of drones in warfare (they've been around a long time). But to date, drones have not changed either the strategic or tactical doctrine yet. What they have changed is the technology and the techniques of existing doctrine. So, in that sense, no. Drones haven't negated MTC. If anything, they've made it more feasible.
@@christopherlarsen7788 thanks! (By revisit the concepts I meant describe any changes in practice of the concept enabled by FPV drones organic to units. I was just starting my coffee when I wrote my comment, apologies.)
The fan method is a scouting technique in which one or more teams departs a central halt position, and then circles that halt position with a series of "loops" to cover the area immediately around the halt position. When viewed from a top-down observation, it appears the scouting teams are traveling along a multi-blade fan pattern. Again, this is used in reconnaissance or local area security from temporary halt positions.
Great video Chris! It also stands to reason much like in your Military unit size video th-cam.com/video/QbbG5wniv4c/w-d-xo.html that vanguards could break down into smaller vanguards for the vanguards.
Agreed. For example, when a platoon is sent forward as a vanguard for the battalion, that platoon may very well split its force into multiple vanguards forward, while retaining 50 percent or greater force as a reserve and command element as the main force. Correct. Now of course, this depends on the description and disposition of the enemy. Clearly, at some point we'd face a force protection issue in that the vanguards may no longer be able to protect themselves, nor be able to fix the enemy in place for the main body to maneuver upon it. So, we have to be careful here. There is an artful application of the MTC. No doubt.
Could a battalion 's deliberate attack also involve a movement to contact at a squad or platoon level? for example if an enemy's lines been successfully breached but not as much is known about what is beyond it?
Hey-Hey-Hey! YES! More specifically, you've described the transition from a battalion deliberate attack upon a known enemy force...to a movement to contact as a means of exploiting the breach in the enemy's defenses. And yes, this transition (or "follow on") tactic is actually quite common.
@@christopherlarsen7788 Thanks for clearing that up, maybe your next videos on tactics can focus on how these different schemes can all interlink during an operation? I think that a lot of people who don't have sufficient pre existing knowledge would see these different attacks and would view them purely in isolation and may think that a movement to contact or deliberate attack as being a single battle, I think it would be good to also explain how a battalion can reorganized and transition from one maneuver to the next. In case you're wondering what made me ask this question, I was reading a book by historian Stephen Bull called "Commando Tactics: The Second World War" which focuses on the Special Service Bridge (which were like the British Army's equivalent to the Marine Raiders), and in it's appendix it described some of the units battle drills and one of which sounded very much like a movement to contact and the document implied that it was one of their primary methods of attack. I thought that was odd considering that their raids in Norway for instance seemed to be very synchronized with a lot of preparation and supporting arms that appeared to have much more in common with a deliberate attack, but then I realized that maybe it wouldn't be such a bad idea as a follow through maneuver in a obscure part of a unfamiliar country that was never thoroughly surveilled due to not previously having military significance, in an age before things like satellites and sophisticated spy planes, once the battalion reaches the limit of it's preexisting intel.
@@christopherlarsen7788 Another thing I would like to point it, is that a lot of people speaking as a civilian myself, might not know what a battalion level attack would look like at the small unit level, for example plenty would probably assume that a movement to contact would be generally limited to one unit finding another hiding in a bush and see the battle drills associated with deliberate attacks as being mutually exclusive and only for deliberate attacks, even though the a platoon participating in a movement to contact might come into a situation that would require techniques and battle drills more associated with a deliberate attack such as obstacle breaching and trench clearing.
@@johnnyjohn-johnson7738 - On another comment thread (another video) I'm having a parallel discussion. The request is the same - an overview of how maneuver warfare is conducted. I would have to create a video of "okay, let's put it all together now." But yes, this is quite feasible. Let me give it some more thought. Thanks.
Cordon and Search is a new-ish variation that is typically executed within the MOUT environment - Military Operations in Urban Terrain. It's not really new at all, but the codification of Cordon and Search within US doctrine is a recent evolution. Search and Attack is one of the two forms of MTC discussed in this video. The other variant, which is most commonly used while on the move toward an objective is the Approach March. Got it?
@@christopherlarsen7788 Thanks for the explanation. I'm a little confused because reading FM 3-21.8 from 2007 MTC has two methods that you mentioned (just like in MCIP 3-10A.3i publication from 2019). But ATP 3-21.8 from 2016, as well as the new FM 3-90 Tactics do not mention Approach March but Cordon and Search.
@@citadela365 - Yep. And those two terms ARE NOT synonymous! But Cordon and Search had become the more frequent form of MTC in Iraq - whereas Approach March had become the normative form of MTC in Afghanistan due to the constant relief-in-place, rotation, and resupply of countless combat outposts.
@@christopherlarsen7788 You think you might find time to do a lesson on a platoon Attack, because on the board the difference between Raid and attacks are clear but during Drills, the difference between the two disappears, please help, and thanks again for sharing your wisdom Sir 🇺🇸
@@andranikdovlatyan731 - Yes. I think I can help with that. I'll definitely get a video up for the future. In the meantime, you can find a discussion on the platoon Deliberate Attack here - th-cam.com/video/2y04nhxSfuA/w-d-xo.html as well as a discussion on the platoon Raid here - th-cam.com/video/BLv-Bp9rHmc/w-d-xo.html In the most general terms, the difference is intent. An attack intends to either seize ground permanently, such as to create fortifications on the seized terrain; OR to seize ground/facilities in order to exploit the advantage and make further gains against an enemy force or territory. The point is...the Deliberate Attack intends to stay. The Raid does not intend to stay. Raids have remarkably temporary goals - for example to destroy enemy facilities or assets, capture key personnel, liberate prisoners, seize intelligence assets, or possibly to shape another larger offensive action by offering a diversion. The point is...the Raid intends to leave. Quickly!
It always made me crazy when people try n be sneaky on MTC. BRO! WE are TRYING to MAKE CONTACT! DRAW some damn FIRE! Also, I think infantry officers could learn a lot from fighter pilots. What is an infantry company if not a fighting machine. Most Army Infantry officers get very very little time "flying" their companies and platoons. The rank progression is too fast. We ought to have CPTs as PLs and MAJs as Company Commanders. LTs as PLT XOs and staff weenies.
Not sure about the restructuring of officers - we have too many already at the platoon and company level. But, I definitely agree with your comments about the MTC. Yes.
@christopherlarsen7788 not saying to make more. I'm saying keep them assigned at the platoon and company level twice or three time longer than they are now with responsibilities commensurate with their experience. So that the fighting power of each platoon is maximized. The way the Army is set up now, the organizational fighting skill is low because the leaders administering that fighting power are woefully inexperienced.
@@ThanxBeToGod - Oh. Well in that case, I'll go you one further. Make officer commissions only available after achieving the rank of E5 Sergeant. I think that would even be better...but I don't have a problem with longer command times.
![[[OFFICIAL MV]] เอิ้นขวัญให้อ้าย- อ๊ะอาย สกุณาพร | ค่ายเพลงเป็นหนึ่ง](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/83x6L3X3qh0/mqdefault.jpg)
A full on Operations Order to conduct an MTC also has COA Courses Of Actions upon making enemy contact is what is the Commander's Intent? Seize and hold to fix or Break Contact for a probing attack. Usually this has a fire support plan for fires on the enemy like mortars or artillery, colored smoke for command and signal. The MTC is also a favored tactic for harassing the enemy or a diversion suited for small guerilla ambushes to develop a situation to how the enemy will react to you upon meeting them. Your video has stimulated my old infantry mind after many years being dormant after retirement.
Correct. Remember...the Commander's Intent is the biggest picture view of the mission. It's much broader than the Operations Order, and therefore significantly larger than each COA or contingency within the Order. (Be sure to watch my videos on Combat Orders and Commander's Intent.)
Good stuff and very informative. Especially since the average green line infantryman is taught "March to the sound of enemy guns and shoot the people not dressed like us!"
Ha! And yes, exactly.
how is it that you’re channel is so small? this kind of information is priceless…and the manner in which you teach it is concise and digestible…
i recently found your channel and i’m glad i did…ive been searching for someone like yiu for quite a while and will be sharing your channel with all of my like minded friends..keep up the good work sir!!
Much obliged, Derek. And my sincere thanks for the compliment.
optimal...when it is utilized. Thank you for your time.
Thanks for watching.
Really enjoying the content you are putting out, the way you convey information is exceptionally clear and greatly appreciated.
Thank you, brother.
Great briefing!
Find them
Fix them
Fight them
Finish them
Best explanation for MTC! Thank you!
Thanks for the compliment.
This is ossifer level info! Good stuff. As a lowly Grunt I wondered exactly what I was doing in the grand scheme of things and now I know!
All these videos are very easy to understand
Thank you, brother.
This is the best channel for these topics on TH-cam.
That's high praise! I'll take it. Thank you.
more vids pls doc!!!
Brother...I promise, the answer is yes. It's just that last year I was so busy setting up Charlie Company for the One Shepherd Regiment in Florida. And this year, my publishers tell me I MUST WRITE a third edition to the OPFOR 3 SMARTbook: Russian Military Forces. I will try to return to my videos in 2025. I really enjoy making them. Promise.
@@christopherlarsen7788 guess I'll just have to come to 1 Shepherd and get the dope in person🇺🇸
What an amazing video, I will be ordering your book!
Thanks, brother.
Thank you Sir for being the fuel for my newly developed special interest in military tactics for the next evenings to come ❤ wonderful video
Potential minor addendum sir: the vanguard is the forward (van) guard, in relation to the main body the guards of/to the flanks and rear are generally doctrinally, respectively, the flank guards and rearguard. I was told many moons ago it was anglicized from the french "avant-garde"
I'm not an American military officer, but from what I understand from interacting with some of you, coming from US doctrine, your older FM17-95 for Armored Cavalry formations had a detailed breakdown, although much poorer than yours here, as that was their doctrinal justification for existence. It's my understanding that those formations and their associated doctrine has since evolved with the introduction of the Interim Stryker formations (and the dissolution of any US Army organization capable of performing a doctrinal Guard mission), but the explanations as I recall them match up. In the successors to the Soviet institutional knowledge base that is broadly consistent with the doctrine currently taught in regards to taskings for the composite reinforced Brigades which the Motor Rifle Regiments have evolved in as a response to Gerasimov's reforms and combat experience in Chechnya and Ukraine.
Incidentally, can I take a moment to recognize and appreciate that you are one of the VERY few american officers I've encountered who both knows, appreciates, and attempts to disseminate your own doctrine. In my experience it seems to be something of a hallmark of american officers to not read or understand their own publications. Quite refreshing to see you out here bucking the trend in such a professional and approachable format.
Much appreciated, William!
Agreed. The vanguard is the forward guard (and I, too, was told that it comes from French "avant-garde"). There are also rear guard and flank guard, by doctrine. The last time we saw the US military use these concepts in any large operation was during the ground invasion of Kuwait and Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. To be fair, I believe vanguards were also used in the ground invasion of Iraq in 2003 - but much of this knowledge has been lost, or at least ignored for 20 years.
What the US refers to colloquially as Red Team Armies - Russia, China, N.Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela - are quite adept at such tactical doctrine on both large and smaller scale. The US has been too preoccupied with counterinsurgency.
Anecdotally, when the US 173rd Airborne BDE went to advise and assist Ukraine forces, the US paratroopers attempted to teach counterinsurgency tactics to the Ukraine Recon Companies (top tier unit). The Recon Companies politely but flatly refused this instruction from the US paratroopers. Thankfully, they talked it out and found common ground in combat technologies and first aid/CASEVAC for the paratroopers to teach. The US forces not only failed to understand Red Team Army doctrine, but didn't even know their own doctrine in maneuver warfare! Frightening. And a little bit embarrassing for the US. But it all worked out in the end.
The American military is playing a game of "catch up" these days.
@@christopherlarsen7788 I'm shocked and disappointed. Does anyone know where I can learn more about the 173rd and the Ukraine Recon Company meeting?
@@E5kiloUSMC - Hmmm. It's only a few years old, so to my knowledge no one has written an account about it yet. Perhaps with the US Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL)?
My point of reference is a colleague, US Army SSG Tyler Jackson of the Light Fighter Study Group in Kansas City, Missouri. I'm not sure of their web presence, but I'm willing to be they maintain some kind of contact info. I think perhaps a Facebook page.
You always wanna make contact with the enemy with the smallest element
Correct.
In a seek and attack tactic, how far away will the main force and the vanguard squads be from each other?
And how far away will the vanguards be from eachother?
Fair question. And the answer is the dreaded, "It depends on METT-TC ... Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain - Troops available, Civilians in the battlespace.
Mounted Infantry use vehicles to cover large spans of distance very quickly. So, the main force in a Mechanized Infantry Company might be a mile (1.6 Km) or so behind the vanguards. The vanguards might have a quarter mile (400 m) between each team.
Dismounted Infantry must run the distance on foot. So, the main body in an Airborne Infantry Company might be a quarter mile (400 m) behind the vanguards. The vanguards might have 100 meters between each team.
But of course, steep terrain and dense vegetation will decrease these distances. Whereas, open terrain and a lack of vegetation can increase these distances. Yes?
@@christopherlarsen7788 thanks
My guy looks like Chris mullin.. Great 3 point shooter
Interesting thank you
You bet!
Will you revisit these concepts in light of mass adaptation of drones?
Yes and no. I will be addressing the EVOLUTION of drones in warfare (they've been around a long time). But to date, drones have not changed either the strategic or tactical doctrine yet. What they have changed is the technology and the techniques of existing doctrine. So, in that sense, no. Drones haven't negated MTC. If anything, they've made it more feasible.
@@christopherlarsen7788 thanks! (By revisit the concepts I meant describe any changes in practice of the concept enabled by FPV drones organic to units. I was just starting my coffee when I wrote my comment, apologies.)
What is the fan method?
The fan method is a scouting technique in which one or more teams departs a central halt position, and then circles that halt position with a series of "loops" to cover the area immediately around the halt position. When viewed from a top-down observation, it appears the scouting teams are traveling along a multi-blade fan pattern. Again, this is used in reconnaissance or local area security from temporary halt positions.
@@christopherlarsen7788 fascinating, thank you sir
Could you make a video about body armor and when it makes sense to not use it ?
Good idea. Thanks for the recommendation. I'll put that on my list.
@@christopherlarsen7788 ok cool 🦐🦐
Great video Chris! It also stands to reason much like in your Military unit size video th-cam.com/video/QbbG5wniv4c/w-d-xo.html that vanguards could break down into smaller vanguards for the vanguards.
Agreed. For example, when a platoon is sent forward as a vanguard for the battalion, that platoon may very well split its force into multiple vanguards forward, while retaining 50 percent or greater force as a reserve and command element as the main force. Correct.
Now of course, this depends on the description and disposition of the enemy. Clearly, at some point we'd face a force protection issue in that the vanguards may no longer be able to protect themselves, nor be able to fix the enemy in place for the main body to maneuver upon it. So, we have to be careful here. There is an artful application of the MTC. No doubt.
Could a battalion 's deliberate attack also involve a movement to contact at a squad or platoon level? for example if an enemy's lines been successfully breached but not as much is known about what is beyond it?
Hey-Hey-Hey! YES!
More specifically, you've described the transition from a battalion deliberate attack upon a known enemy force...to a movement to contact as a means of exploiting the breach in the enemy's defenses. And yes, this transition (or "follow on") tactic is actually quite common.
@@christopherlarsen7788 Thanks for clearing that up, maybe your next videos on tactics can focus on how these different schemes can all interlink during an operation? I think that a lot of people who don't have sufficient pre existing knowledge would see these different attacks and would view them purely in isolation and may think that a movement to contact or deliberate attack as being a single battle, I think it would be good to also explain how a battalion can reorganized and transition from one maneuver to the next.
In case you're wondering what made me ask this question, I was reading a book by historian Stephen Bull called "Commando Tactics: The Second World War" which focuses on the Special Service Bridge (which were like the British Army's equivalent to the Marine Raiders), and in it's appendix it described some of the units battle drills and one of which sounded very much like a movement to contact and the document implied that it was one of their primary methods of attack.
I thought that was odd considering that their raids in Norway for instance seemed to be very synchronized with a lot of preparation and supporting arms that appeared to have much more in common with a deliberate attack, but then I realized that maybe it wouldn't be such a bad idea as a follow through maneuver in a obscure part of a unfamiliar country that was never thoroughly surveilled due to not previously having military significance, in an age before things like satellites and sophisticated spy planes, once the battalion reaches the limit of it's preexisting intel.
@@johnnyjohn-johnson7738 - Exactly. Well...okay, maybe I do need a video on the overarching method of maneuver warfare. Good suggestion.
@@christopherlarsen7788 Another thing I would like to point it, is that a lot of people speaking as a civilian myself, might not know what a battalion level attack would look like at the small unit level, for example plenty would probably assume that a movement to contact would be generally limited to one unit finding another hiding in a bush and see the battle drills associated with deliberate attacks as being mutually exclusive and only for deliberate attacks, even though the a platoon participating in a movement to contact might come into a situation that would require techniques and battle drills more associated with a deliberate attack such as obstacle breaching and trench clearing.
@@johnnyjohn-johnson7738 - On another comment thread (another video) I'm having a parallel discussion. The request is the same - an overview of how maneuver warfare is conducted. I would have to create a video of "okay, let's put it all together now." But yes, this is quite feasible. Let me give it some more thought. Thanks.
"Movement to contact has two variations: search and attack and cordon and search." - FM 3-90, can you explain this part?
Cordon and Search is a new-ish variation that is typically executed within the MOUT environment - Military Operations in Urban Terrain. It's not really new at all, but the codification of Cordon and Search within US doctrine is a recent evolution.
Search and Attack is one of the two forms of MTC discussed in this video. The other variant, which is most commonly used while on the move toward an objective is the Approach March. Got it?
@@christopherlarsen7788
Thanks for the explanation.
I'm a little confused because reading FM 3-21.8 from 2007 MTC has two methods that you mentioned (just like in MCIP 3-10A.3i publication from 2019).
But ATP 3-21.8 from 2016, as well as the new FM 3-90 Tactics do not mention Approach March but Cordon and Search.
@@citadela365 - Yep. And those two terms ARE NOT synonymous! But Cordon and Search had become the more frequent form of MTC in Iraq - whereas Approach March had become the normative form of MTC in Afghanistan due to the constant relief-in-place, rotation, and resupply of countless combat outposts.
@@christopherlarsen7788
Thanks for the clarification.
🤠👍👍
Johnson Margaret Perez Gary Hall Elizabeth
I shot a BB gun once
Thank you for your work Sir, Awesome video !
Thank you, brother, for tuning in.
@@christopherlarsen7788 You think you might find time to do a lesson on a platoon Attack, because on the board the difference between Raid and attacks are clear but during Drills, the difference between the two disappears, please help, and thanks again for sharing your wisdom Sir 🇺🇸
@@andranikdovlatyan731 - Yes. I think I can help with that. I'll definitely get a video up for the future. In the meantime, you can find a discussion on the platoon Deliberate Attack here - th-cam.com/video/2y04nhxSfuA/w-d-xo.html as well as a discussion on the platoon Raid here - th-cam.com/video/BLv-Bp9rHmc/w-d-xo.html
In the most general terms, the difference is intent. An attack intends to either seize ground permanently, such as to create fortifications on the seized terrain; OR to seize ground/facilities in order to exploit the advantage and make further gains against an enemy force or territory. The point is...the Deliberate Attack intends to stay.
The Raid does not intend to stay. Raids have remarkably temporary goals - for example to destroy enemy facilities or assets, capture key personnel, liberate prisoners, seize intelligence assets, or possibly to shape another larger offensive action by offering a diversion. The point is...the Raid intends to leave. Quickly!
@@christopherlarsen7788 thanks again
It always made me crazy when people try n be sneaky on MTC. BRO! WE are TRYING to MAKE CONTACT! DRAW some damn FIRE! Also, I think infantry officers could learn a lot from fighter pilots. What is an infantry company if not a fighting machine. Most Army Infantry officers get very very little time "flying" their companies and platoons. The rank progression is too fast. We ought to have CPTs as PLs and MAJs as Company Commanders. LTs as PLT XOs and staff weenies.
Not sure about the restructuring of officers - we have too many already at the platoon and company level. But, I definitely agree with your comments about the MTC. Yes.
@christopherlarsen7788 not saying to make more. I'm saying keep them assigned at the platoon and company level twice or three time longer than they are now with responsibilities commensurate with their experience. So that the fighting power of each platoon is maximized.
The way the Army is set up now, the organizational fighting skill is low because the leaders administering that fighting power are woefully inexperienced.
@@ThanxBeToGod - Oh. Well in that case, I'll go you one further. Make officer commissions only available after achieving the rank of E5 Sergeant. I think that would even be better...but I don't have a problem with longer command times.