Might be an opportunity to consider whether someone can even claim to *actually* disagree with something without being capable of representing it as our narrator has done.
I wonder what your thoughts would be on Justin Horn's argument from disagreement. I find their argument to be a fairly plausible argument in favor of first-order moral skepticism.
On the moral peer intransigence argument against moral realism, I want to make sure my reason for rejecting it is sound. I would argue against P2 (that peer-intransigent judgments are not beliefs). Just because one's judgment is unchanging does not necessarily mean that it did not track evidence to the contrary. It is possible to dismiss counter-evidence when the contrary evidence is perfectly accounted for by other evidence that leads to a certain belief. For instance, I believe that the Earth is round. However, the fact is, whenever I look at the landscape around me, all I see is flatness. Thus, my immediate visual sensory information gives me evidence contrary to my belief that the Earth is round. However, other evidence for the roundness of the Earth is compatible with the perceived flatness of the landscape around me, so my belief of the Earth's roundness is completely intransigent to this counter-evidence. Nevertheless, the fact that my belief did not move in the slightest to this counter-evidence does not entail that my judgment that the Earth is round is not a belief. Now, of course my example was not a case where the counter-evidence was perceived peer disagreement. However, I have demonstrated that, in principle, it is possible to account for contrary evidence without being moved in the slightest, particularly when counter-evidence is compatible with the required minimally consistent set of facts that lead to the opposite judgment. Therefore, is it not possible that Putnam's perceived peer disagreement counts as evidence, but that Putnam tracks this evidence in such a way that is compatible with his other foundational facts and beliefs that lead him to the opposite conclusions of Nozick? But, you may argue, the fact is that the seed of disagreement is on something more foundational, what Putnam called a difference in "moral sensibility." All this means is that if you start from different axioms/foundational beliefs, the objective conclusions entailed will differ. This is true both in morality, philosophy, science, and everything objective in life. So intransigence need not comment on evidence tracking.
Hello Kane B Thanks for the good work. Around 1:01:00 you quote three different definition of what evidence can mean I didn't understand the last name you quoted can you give me the detail please ? Thanks a lot
Can you please answer this question...........Find out a case in which there is a genuine moral disagreement. Why do you think there is a moral disagreement in the case?
In some places this video makes it sound like moral realism claims that our opinions be true, while in other places it seems less clear on that point. 1:21 "The moral realist is committed to holding that in principle everyone might be wrong about what the moral facts are." But if everyone were wrong, then it would mean that no moral propositions are known to be true. Wouldn't that make moral realism false? 19:24 "The points raised by the realist will threaten the justification for the realists own beliefs, because the realist is also going to be subject to biases.... So the realist is going to show that her circumstances are such as to mitigate these distorting effects." But why should the realist be burdened with that? This seems to be saying that the realist claims that her beliefs are knowledge even if so many others have false beliefs. Is this claim part of realism? It seems more natural that upon recognizing that moral propositions can be objectively true or false, therefore anyone might be mistaken about the actual truth of such propositions, including the realist herself.
"But if everyone were wrong, then it would mean that no moral propositions are known to be true. Wouldn't that make moral realism false?" Yes, if the world is such that nobody has any true beliefs about the moral facts, moral realism is false. Obviously though the moral realist doesn't think that this is actually the case. "This seems to be saying that the realist claims that her beliefs are knowledge even if so many others have false beliefs. Is this claim part of realism?" Yes. Like I said in the video, there are different ways of defining "moral realism". But it would be a very weak - very strange, frankly - form of realism that denies that we have moral knowledge. (Hell, even some non-realists like quasi-realists and constructivists argue that we have moral knowledge.) "It seems more natural that upon recognizing that moral propositions can be objectively true or false, therefore anyone might be mistaken about the actual truth of such propositions, including the realist herself." Most realists do accept that they *might* be mistaken. In general, most philosophers these days accept some sort of fallibilism. Indeed, offhand, I can't think of any moral realist who claims to be *certain* about their moral views.
@@KaneB "It would be a very weak - very strange, frankly - form of realism that denies that we have moral knowledge." Skeptics tend to balk at the idea of knowledge, especially knowledge about objective propositions. Moral realism that denies knowledge doesn't seem strange at all from a skeptical perspective. We lack knowledge about all sorts of real things, so why should morality be any different?
It just depends on how you're defining those terms. Here, I'm using "objectivity" to mean something like "mind-independent", where the idea is that the moral facts are not determined by us, or maybe another way to put it: in principle, everybody could be wrong about the moral facts. This is necessary to distinguish realism from various forms of relativism.
I'm not sure what part of the video this is in reference to, but I don't think there's anything rational or irrational about specific judgments. Rationality is a property of sets of judgments.
@@KaneB Ok, what is irrational about a set of judgments that is in favor of slavery? That is, suppose two perfectly rational people disagree about slavery being moral or not. How would such a disagreement be resolved? Perhaps by a war...
@@KaneB If the only way to resolve moral disagreement is by fighting a war, that seems pretty different than most other sorts of disagreement, enough so to be a problem for a realist.
@@11kravitzn I'm not a realist, but I don't think there's really anything unique about morality here. There are lots of disagreements that are rationally irresolvable in my view. This is partly because I endorse a very permissive conception of rationality. As I see it, the only constraint imposed by rationality is that your beliefs not be self-sabotaging. What this amounts to is that (a) it must be possible for your beliefs to turn out to be true and (b) your beliefs must be such that they enable you to achieve your goals, with some regularity.
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Wow, your ability to fairly represent moral realism despite disagreeing with it strongly is impressive.
Might be an opportunity to consider whether someone can even claim to *actually* disagree with something without being capable of representing it as our narrator has done.
Just found this channel and I'm here to stay! Great work -- excited to start going through it! :)
I wonder what your thoughts would be on Justin Horn's argument from disagreement. I find their argument to be a fairly plausible argument in favor of first-order moral skepticism.
On the moral peer intransigence argument against moral realism, I want to make sure my reason for rejecting it is sound. I would argue against P2 (that peer-intransigent judgments are not beliefs).
Just because one's judgment is unchanging does not necessarily mean that it did not track evidence to the contrary. It is possible to dismiss counter-evidence when the contrary evidence is perfectly accounted for by other evidence that leads to a certain belief.
For instance, I believe that the Earth is round. However, the fact is, whenever I look at the landscape around me, all I see is flatness. Thus, my immediate visual sensory information gives me evidence contrary to my belief that the Earth is round. However, other evidence for the roundness of the Earth is compatible with the perceived flatness of the landscape around me, so my belief of the Earth's roundness is completely intransigent to this counter-evidence. Nevertheless, the fact that my belief did not move in the slightest to this counter-evidence does not entail that my judgment that the Earth is round is not a belief.
Now, of course my example was not a case where the counter-evidence was perceived peer disagreement. However, I have demonstrated that, in principle, it is possible to account for contrary evidence without being moved in the slightest, particularly when counter-evidence is compatible with the required minimally consistent set of facts that lead to the opposite judgment.
Therefore, is it not possible that Putnam's perceived peer disagreement counts as evidence, but that Putnam tracks this evidence in such a way that is compatible with his other foundational facts and beliefs that lead him to the opposite conclusions of Nozick?
But, you may argue, the fact is that the seed of disagreement is on something more foundational, what Putnam called a difference in "moral sensibility." All this means is that if you start from different axioms/foundational beliefs, the objective conclusions entailed will differ. This is true both in morality, philosophy, science, and everything objective in life.
So intransigence need not comment on evidence tracking.
Could you do a video on human rights and national sovereignty?
Great video
Thanx!!
Hello Kane B
Thanks for the good work.
Around 1:01:00 you quote three different definition of what evidence can mean I didn't understand the last name you quoted can you give me the detail please ?
Thanks a lot
There are no partial moral realists, in the manner your epistemic attitude can vary in science?
Can you please answer this question...........Find out a case in which there is a genuine moral disagreement. Why do you think there
is a moral disagreement in the case?
In some places this video makes it sound like moral realism claims that our opinions be true, while in other places it seems less clear on that point.
1:21 "The moral realist is committed to holding that in principle everyone might be wrong about what the moral facts are."
But if everyone were wrong, then it would mean that no moral propositions are known to be true. Wouldn't that make moral realism false?
19:24 "The points raised by the realist will threaten the justification for the realists own beliefs, because the realist is also going to be subject to biases.... So the realist is going to show that her circumstances are such as to mitigate these distorting effects."
But why should the realist be burdened with that? This seems to be saying that the realist claims that her beliefs are knowledge even if so many others have false beliefs. Is this claim part of realism? It seems more natural that upon recognizing that moral propositions can be objectively true or false, therefore anyone might be mistaken about the actual truth of such propositions, including the realist herself.
"But if everyone were wrong, then it would mean that no moral propositions are known to be true. Wouldn't that make moral realism false?"
Yes, if the world is such that nobody has any true beliefs about the moral facts, moral realism is false. Obviously though the moral realist doesn't think that this is actually the case.
"This seems to be saying that the realist claims that her beliefs are knowledge even if so many others have false beliefs. Is this claim part of realism?"
Yes. Like I said in the video, there are different ways of defining "moral realism". But it would be a very weak - very strange, frankly - form of realism that denies that we have moral knowledge. (Hell, even some non-realists like quasi-realists and constructivists argue that we have moral knowledge.)
"It seems more natural that upon recognizing that moral propositions can be objectively true or false, therefore anyone might be mistaken about the actual truth of such propositions, including the realist herself."
Most realists do accept that they *might* be mistaken. In general, most philosophers these days accept some sort of fallibilism. Indeed, offhand, I can't think of any moral realist who claims to be *certain* about their moral views.
@@KaneB "It would be a very weak - very strange, frankly - form of realism that denies that we have moral knowledge."
Skeptics tend to balk at the idea of knowledge, especially knowledge about objective propositions. Moral realism that denies knowledge doesn't seem strange at all from a skeptical perspective. We lack knowledge about all sorts of real things, so why should morality be any different?
@@Ansatz66 Moral skepticism isn't a form of moral realism.
Re: definition of moral realism. I thought there was a difference between 'realism' and 'objectivity' philosophically speaking?
It just depends on how you're defining those terms. Here, I'm using "objectivity" to mean something like "mind-independent", where the idea is that the moral facts are not determined by us, or maybe another way to put it: in principle, everybody could be wrong about the moral facts. This is necessary to distinguish realism from various forms of relativism.
41:22 Moore
32:00
Why is it irrational to be in favor of e.g. slavery?
I'm not sure what part of the video this is in reference to, but I don't think there's anything rational or irrational about specific judgments. Rationality is a property of sets of judgments.
@@KaneB Ok, what is irrational about a set of judgments that is in favor of slavery? That is, suppose two perfectly rational people disagree about slavery being moral or not. How would such a disagreement be resolved? Perhaps by a war...
@@11kravitzn I don't think that's necessarily irrational. I think it's possible to rationally defend slavery. What point are getting at exactly?
@@KaneB If the only way to resolve moral disagreement is by fighting a war, that seems pretty different than most other sorts of disagreement, enough so to be a problem for a realist.
@@11kravitzn I'm not a realist, but I don't think there's really anything unique about morality here. There are lots of disagreements that are rationally irresolvable in my view. This is partly because I endorse a very permissive conception of rationality. As I see it, the only constraint imposed by rationality is that your beliefs not be self-sabotaging. What this amounts to is that (a) it must be possible for your beliefs to turn out to be true and (b) your beliefs must be such that they enable you to achieve your goals, with some regularity.
A very long winded apologia for western chauvanism.