Hey Juan from Syd about the near miss Qantas 737-A380 the flight number was QF426 sunday morn here incident time 10.18am maybe you can find it on flightradar24 i cant text you from AUS 🤷♂️
Chris Brady deals here only with the CVR and FDR, both of which appear to have stopped working at a time coincidental with everything else failing. Still yet a mystery. On touchdown, expertly carried out indicating well-trained crew, the bird-struck engine appears to be delivering thrust while the other engine is delivering none. A mystery again. Did the crew shut down the wrong engine as happened at Kegworth, UK in 1989, also a B737? After shutting down the wrong engine while initiating the go around did panic set in? Off to the right you can see the tantalising safety of a long runway and here on downwind you have lost power to both engines, the bird-struck engine only weakly performing. What do you do? The crew appear to have hauled the craft round immediately relying on muscle memory in place of checklists, and what might have ended heroically instead ended in tragedy.
As an outsider to the world of aviation, it just seems crazy to me that systems designed to record what happened during emergencies fail during emergencies.
You would think they would make it foolproof. No accessible circuit breakers, (In the case of suicides, or just wanting to shut off the system for nefarious reasons) multible battery backups etc. While their at it, make it impossible to disconnect the plane ID system.
The ICAO proposed to have battery backup incorporated into the recorders, that's still pending approval. The recorders are AC powered, so either engine would power them, as would the APU. But, it can take up to a minute to spool up the APU - while scrambling with all four arms to get the aircraft configured and sort of stabilized for a no thrust landing. All while one really needed six arms and another ten minutes of controlled flight... :/
"We're from the government and here to help you." Whether you like it or not. Bureaus are all overwhelmed with their own attempts at micromanaging everything, so important revisions to regulations such as this get missed (Combined with the childish bureaucrat mentality that revising is some terrible confession of fault. Related to why the normally only add more regs to the pile.).
i agree, many engines these days are already sending data to manufacturers incase they are developing issues, so why not all aircraft data, as mentioned above, they already and mostly have internet connection
@@eddiek204 i never understood why location beacons or ID locators GPS could be either switched off or indeed available to be removed, also cockpit voice recorders etc - surely these devices can all be located in the tail section, which in 9 out of 10 cases survives a crash
I'm a retired B777 captain. If we can have internet connectivity on planes, we can stream CVR/FDR in real time to the ground. F1 cars have a ridiculous amount of data. Why can't we? We shouldn't have to wait for accident data. It's time to get streaming with battery backup. You have a big audience footprint, Juan. Make it happen!
@@kinikinrd it takes a USB stick and a split into an antenna. The age of the aircraft isn't an excuse for not having live data coming from every commercial aircraft.
With solid state electronics, it's about as easy to make an indestructible black box as it is to do the egg drop in Middle School. Yeah it's going to take a little effort, but if you try it all, it should be foolproof. You don't need some crazy reel to reel, SD cards would work.
From The 737 Handbook - “It points to loss of AC power which was never recovered. CVR is powered by DC BUS 2 (needs AC power to get powered). FDR is powered by AC TRANSFER BUS 1. Finally ADS-B data transmitted by Transponder is also missing. Transponders are powered by AC TRANSFER BUS 1 and 2 respectively. AC power is required to power the electric motor driven pumps (EMDPs) which supply HYD pressure for normal gear and flap extension. Without the HYD and AC power,flaps cannot be extended and gear can only be lowered through manual gear extension. Starting the APU and putting it on the busses isn't part of the Loss of Thrust on Both Engines memory items, but is a crucial step in regaining control over the systems (gear,flaps, trim among others). I hope to see this step moved to the memory items part in the future.”
You have data just before the power loss. It occured when the second engine/generator failed. So it can still be determined why the first one failed. If first one failed due to damage, and second one was ok in the data until data was lost, this would indicate towards crew error.
Also, when a crew is running a procedure to shut down an engine, every step is called out aloud and will be on the the CVR right up to the point they move the switch.
I flew both the 737 and the A320 and usually started the APU if bird activity was reported, especially after Sully’s wild ride. I have always felt that was a major factor in his successful water landing.
as a retired airline captain of 42 years, when ever there was a loss of power either engine or electrical i was trained to reach up and start apu without having someone or some checklist tell me to . on airbus its push button and when available it comes on line . the b 737 is more switches than airbus but would still be an immediate step to help situation. its always training and experience!
@@josephaltieri1017 to be fair on the 737ng you need to start the apu, and then after a minute or so flip the switch to draw power from it. So I could see that second step getting missed. The Airbus (and newer Boeings) put the power on the bus once avail. I completely agree though that getting the APu on in an emergency is a good idea. That said if they were down two engines I could see why they didn't have much time to mess with it.
AGREE 100% I do it on every PC after an eng fail or any significant SYS malfunction. No need for a checklist to tell me to start the APU. It's going ON providing it's working that day.
@@bernieschiff5919 build a box that withstand the violent crash of a jet airliner, even be submerged deep undersea, with the express purpose to find out what happened....And not even a 30min battery backup??? (the amount of time of recording)??? sheesh.
What about all the families? Now they don’t get quick and definitive closure. They will get a report that takes years and will say this and that occurred but we can’t state the why.
Hi Juan, there is a really good (safety) case for having the APU running, for T/O & departure, and for the approach. Of course the airlines will never buy into this, because of the fuel cost. I used to leave the APU running for zero-vis departures, and for low-vis approaches, in particular, RNP approaches into mountainous terrain, when going right down to low minima. On the 737, it was there to select the generator on; on the A320, if running, the APU would pick up the un-powered bus, automatically. It might be “ belt and braces” but increases one’s safety margins, and less distraction in the worst case. Just some thoughts. Cheers, John. NZ🇳🇿 (retired) 😁
@@justvid366yes it will definitely consume fuel to run but minimally since it won't be seeing any electrical load since the engine generators will be handling that.
@@MikeTheSeeker1961 That was my first instinct as well. But the bean counters account for even the smallest cost. Because in operations you have so many starts and landings in one company that a seemingly tiny fuel consumption of an APU will add up to a sizeable amount of costs in no time.
I'm a retired 737 pilot and aviation accident investigator. The 737 flies and lands fine with one engine and electrical failure down to battery power in VMC conditions like they had in Korea. The question is, of course, why did the pilots decide to land immediately with gear and flaps up at an non-survivable landing speed on a relatively short runway? Normally you would tell the tower on the Captain's radio (FO radio would be out) you were going to hold VFR (fly in circles) to run checklists and have the tower roll the emergency vehicles. You'd run the engine failure checklist, electrical failure checklist, brief the single-engine approach, lower flaps to 15, lower the gear and run the emergency extension checklist if needed, then land with flaps 15 (standard single-engine flap setting). In the crash video you can hear an engine running and the right thrust reverser seemed to deploy on landing so it appears at least one engine was operating at touchdown. If that ends up being true, then this is my best guess at what happened. Possibly the combination of losing an engine, transitioning to a single-engine go-around, having smoke in the cockpit from the bird ingestion, and almost complete loss of electrical power caused the pilot to make a series of fatal decisions to get the plane on the ground too quickly.
I think its starting to show a combination of mechanical problems and mistakes made by the pilots. I don't understand why they didn't do a second go around and if the landing gear didn't deploy, why they didn't attempt to deploy it manually. Their are so many factors to consider in this case. As Juan says, all the holes in the cheese lined up.
I'd back it up farther in the events chain. Why did they elect TOGA on strike during landing. Even with power loss, seconds from landing, the brakes would've worked to stop the aircraft safely. I am honestly thinking it was a startle response driven error that set the entire chain of events into a hot mess. I'm also suspecting that they had one immediate power loss in one engine, damage that eventually caused the other engine to fail as well, but initially allowed degraded thrust and loss of AC power hampering critical functions, coupled with a no time, no power and resulting in no ideas that could help in the awful mess they found themselves in. Telling was the not going around, but going reciprocal. Also suggestive was the damage from photos I saw of the fans, #1 having only collapsed fan components at the bottom, suggesting it wasn't even windmilling on impact, #2 showing damage consistent with a damaged fan still rotating, although due to the limited area showing damage, likely windmilling on impact and obviously missing elements. It's a tragic end for a workhorse of an aircraft, crew and passengers.
"why did the pilots decide to land immediately with gear and flaps up?" My biggest 'huh?' moment too. As a non-expert who's solo'd a few times in a Cessna 152, "no flaps and gears up" seems like the pilots forgot about Step 1 For A Good Landing in their haste to complete various tasks.
Starting the APU in that situation is great pilot instinct, in spite of the fact the Airbus A320s has a Ram Air Turbine (RAT), which the Boeing 737s do not have.
And it was an Airbus with a RAT (should never lose power). Powering up the APU was simply prudent airmanship from an experienced Captain. Looks to me like there's another critical problem with the 737. AGAIN !
Going by the checklist, he may have never gotten to that item. This is where thinking outside the box (something discouraged by some cultures) can be a real assist.
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There are just too many monkey controls, settings, and manual steps in the cockpit. The APU should auto start in the event of either engine loss of bleed air or electrical power.
At the airline I work for, except for the early model 737-800, the recorder independent power supply provides power to the cockpit voice recorder for 10 minutes after aircraft power is interrupted by either normal shutdown or by any other loss of power.
Yeah, from what I've found in forums it seems like an option airlines can buy. I know airlines vary a lot in terms of how much optional safety gear they buy.
I am shocked(not really) that this system on the aircraft was not designed better. I keep asking myself; Who designs a system that allows smoke in the cockpit if the right engine is damaged? Being an engineer, I am baffled by these system designs and that there were optional safety features that should have NEVER been optional.
I am not a conspiracy theorist, but if the CVR and FDR are disabled when both engines fail, then in my opinion that was a deliberate action by Boeing designers. It is outrageous that such a design was accepted by the FAA and this aircraft was approved for worldwide use.
I heard about this data loss earlier today - I was hoping for your take on it. Extraordinary that the CVR and ADR are not supported by the back up battery on this type. Thanks Juan, as ever. 👍
The 737 *is* a 1970s vintage design, after all. It's been 'upgraded' way, way beyond the original design, but let's be real, it's not a system that is critical for plane function.
@@VehrecI worked on 1965 and 1966 built C-130’s that were designed in the 1950’s. Our CVR and FDR were added in the 1980’s and were powered from the Essential battery bus, which only required the battery to be on, which is always the first and last switch actuated. Not being powered directly from the battery our the last bus powered is absolutely ridiculous.
We had a similar incident of 'total electrical power loss' just 2 days ago here in UK. It was an ATR72-500 which lost all electrical power immediately after takeoff. Luckily the crew managed an immediate return for a safe landing with no injuries or loss of life. The aircraft was evacuated on the runway and then towed away to a maintenance stand. The British AAIB were notified and are investigating.
It's crazy (in a good way) to see many pilots in here. It makes a real difference to comments sections on most other channels - smart people having civilised discussions. It's good to learn from you all and watch you question things as professionals.
Walking through diagrams and documentation and explaining what they mean is so helpful. It shows how complicated even seamingly simple thins can be and why investigations can take so long.
The 737 engine fire/engine severe damage or separation checklist is composed of 5 items. The second item states to close the thrust lever of the affected engine. For those who are claiming the good engine was shutdown, this step of the emergency checklist would show up on CDR, since the engine start lever cut off action (effectively shutting down the engine) would only be executed on the next step of the checklist. So, CDR would record the thrust lever of a good engine being closed just before the end of data recording.
I figured this too, must have been sudden, catastrophic ENG and GEN failure on both sides... otherwise the investigator would be telling more than just the missing data.
Surely then too a birdstrike would still show a slight engine performance degradation on CDR before losing total data too? It can't be instantaneous surely? They will at least have data on one engines performance surely......
@ they sure do but probably not enough to come up with a meaningful explanation for now so they only mentioned missing data to buy themselves some more time (understandable but ugh
No matter what made that aircraft to land without gear, most if not all people on bord would have had a chance to survive, if there was not have been that solid concrete structur at the end of the runway. Remember, they had landed safely, they were just sliding on the runway. They landed not on the optimal spot of that runway but still, the structure of the aircraft was ok when they were on the ground. It was the impact to that concrete structure that caused the damage and the fire
I think in this case that solid structure actually reduced the number of deaths. That plane was still going very fast and probably would've slid right out of the airport and into buildings, potentially killing many people on the ground as well as all on board.
@brandyballoon only two out of 181 survived. 179 were killed. From what I have seen it is very unlikely that in the small piece of land that is in line with the runway will ever live more than 30 persons and by the time the aircraft reaches the houses (actually there is only one) the speed would have decreased significantly. But that is all theory, the people are dead. I feel sorry for their loved ones.
This seems like a solid piece of information that might lead to evidence of a rare and untrainable failure chain. This is a relief to hear. "Pilot's panicking" is always on the list of possibilities and obviously might have played a part. And there is no judgement here. Very few of us ever get truly tested. And possibly none in this particular way. They may have done the absolute best that was possible, given what they knew and suspected. And even if they didn't, only fools have firm, negative views on such things.
On an earlier blancolirio video, someone who self-identified as a former commercial pilot in Korea said that they are all trained to go around on a single engine failure. No idea if it's true, but it would explain things.
The bird strike triggered the decision to abort the landing, which would normally give the pilots time to determine the damage and go through checklists. Immediately after they initiated the go around, they lost power (or thought they did, or caused the power loss by shutting off the wrong engine), initiating the quick emergency landing.
If the pilots avoided birds during approach then that was an unstable approach which initiated them to go around. It doesn't matter as It's at the pilots discretion to go around or to continue the approach as either decision was appropriate.
To be honest I'd expect turning off the wrong engine would still be visible on the FDR and recorded on the CVR. The moment you turn off the engine I'd assume the generator will still be providing power until it slows down to the point where it can't keep up with the demand. So if the engine was OK at the moment of turning it off, it should still be recorded, because at the time of turning it off the CVR/FDR system still should have had power if the engine and generator were OK..
Through meticulous investigation, the team should be able to figure out what happened. The crash usually preserves the settings, control valve positions, etc. They will check both engines thoroughly and will be able to determine why the left one was not running. Will just take time to get there. Remember in S. Korea, this is also a criminal investigation.
I hope everyone realizes how wrong it is to assume the crew immediately did the WRONG thing and not assume the crew did an amazing job to get the plane on a nice belly landing under extremely unusual conditions involving multiple system failures and explosions. (read octupus restaurant owner's interview in NYT)
@@esenel92 The generator will stay online until N2 goes below 55-ish, then go offline. Demand has nothing to do with it, merely rotational speed sufficient to maintain 400Hz AC.
The regulations here in Canada were modified a few years ago to require a dedicated Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS) to power the CVR and the cockpit area microphone for at least 10 minutes whenever normal aircraft CVR power sources are interrupted. Many aircraft (including 737s) are currently being modified to meet this regulation.
It's also possible that they didn't even have a functional APU. Per the MMEL, a functional APU is not necessary on the 737 (except for ETOPS) as long as the engine generators are functional. *UPDATE*: As it turns out, the accident aircaft suffered a tailstrike during a takeoff in 2021, and resulted in the airline being fined 2.2 billion won for safety violations. If the APU was not functional, this accident may explain why; the tailstrike may have damaged or destroyed the APU. Jeju considered it a minor incident and didn’t even add it to the accident records, so if the APU was damaged, they may well have either neglected to repair/swap it out, or the repair job may have been inadequate. Now, while it is possible they shut down the wrong engine, there is also a very good possiblity that they suffered multiple bird strikes. The person who filmed the right engine compressor stall stated that he was indoors, heard a loud metallic bang and ran outside just in time to film the incident with the right engine. It's quite possible that the initial sound he heard that made him go outside was a bird strike on the left engine, which would have likely also suffered a compressor stall like we saw on the right engine. The left engine may have failed much earlier than the right, or they may have shut it down to prevent smoke from entering the cockpit. Now the question is, why did they lose electrical power when the right engine was still seen to be functional as we saw with the video of the landing from the plane's front right side? My theory is that the strike on the right engine may have damaged and disabled the generator, so that it's no longer supplying power, but the engine is still at least partially functioning (but for all we know, it may have been in the process of failing). I believe another possibility is that something (perhaps multiple compressor stalls) may have caused the generator to trip and shut off. Now with two dead generators and a nonfunctional APU, the plane is in complete electrical failure. That means no landing gear (there's still the system behind the copilot's seat), no flaps (they may have forgotten about the Alternate Flaps system) and no power for the FDR & CVR. And if you're in full electrical failure, you'll want to land ASAP. If the generator just tripped, I believe they could reset it, but there would have beeen too much going on and little time to think up possibilities. Likewise, it's possible they had a functional APU, but no time to turn it on either. Final note, newer planes have a backup battery for at least the CVR, but this was an older 15-year old plane and it doesn't look like it had said battery, so it may have had an exemption if it was ordered *before* the mandate, even if it was produced *after* the mandate.
If so, then why abort their original landing? They would have had little or no power to execute a missed approach, right? Lined up and good to land and they don’t? Pull up gear & retract flaps (or not fully extend them when critically needed.)? All to turn around and attempt a tailwind landing? Without gear & power? I don’t get this explanation.
It’s a good observation that legally in many cases an APU needn't be operative for flight (save for some extended operations over open water on twin-engined jets).
@@dudeonbike800 You're right, and that one has been bothering me as well. I have heard some theories that may be plausible. One possibility is that they may have started the go-around before the bird strikes. It has been suggested that they either saw the birds or were reacting to the ATC warning, and began a go-around to try to avoid the birds (while neglecting to call out the go-around until after the strike) and tragically ended up ingesting some anyway. Another depends on when they suffered the electrical failure. If the right generator was not immediately disabled, or if it tripped only after surges, then it’s possible that after they lost the left engine but saw that they still had thrust on the right, they decided to go-around in the hopes of not suffering a strike on the right engine (failing to realize that it had already taken significant damage). During the go-around, the right generator may have finally failed or tripped and they lost electrical power. All of this may have even occured in under a minute. If they underestimated the damage to the right engine, it’s possible that they may have intended to try to diagnose the problem (maybe burn some fuel as well) but after the right generator failed during the go-around, they decided to land immediately, instead of completing the go-around which would have seen them lining back up with 19. Now of course this does leave the fact that if you’re already lined up after the inital bird strike, then the best thing to do is to just proceed with landing right away. That leads to the final possibility, which is, regardless of the timing of any of the events, the go-around may simply have been a spur of the moment “panic reaction”. They suffered one or more bird strikes and began performing the go-around without thinking it through.
They can tell from the blades if the engine/engines were working. It wouldn't be the first time a pilot turned off the wrong engine. Thanks for the info on the power sources, I had been looking for that. I thought they were required to be on separate power sources.
@@exist7309What other method is there than the CRM and following checklists we already have, the engine fire handles already light up for the correct engines?
@@exist7309 they do have systems for that, that's the whole point of CRM, trouble shooting methods like PIOSEE, challenge-and-respond checklists, simulator training, etc! I don't know what happened here but I actually doubt that it was just an "oops, wrong engine!" situation. That's quite rare afaik. I can think of only two cases that i know of, some 737 from British Midlands and some ATR-72 from... Taïwan I think?
@ James Nichols thanks for your message. I’m not a pilot but I am an electronics engineer so I’m concerned about the human interface design issues. I’m suggesting there needs to be some new method. If one set of throttles is lit and the other not I could not tell which to shut down. Personally from a control system perspective if I had enough information to know which engine was performing in spec I would rather see some protection that requires the pilot to acknowledge and override before shutting down the last good engine, for example.
The NTSB wasn’t surprised. If you’re using the movie as a reference, it’s mostly garbage. By the way, they moved up the APU on the checklist. The checklist wasn’t designed for loss of both engines at low altitude
This is one heck of a mystery at this point. If one generator fails, the bus tie relays close to drive both systems with one generator. If both engines fail, the battery or apu generator is all that is left. It seems unlikely that a B737 could make it around the traffic pattern with both engines failed or shut down especially touching down mid field at 190 knots. This one will take a while to figure out and there will be much speculation.
I wonder why the failure of both engine generators doesn't trigger an autostart of the ATU. That'd be quicker and one less thing for the pilots to recall.
Yep! 2216 had to have at least partial thrust on one engine most of the time after the bird strike(s)/compressor stall(s).. The 737-800 has a glide ratio of about 12:1 both engines out clean. From under 1000' AGL at 144 kts. on final approach, there's no way the plane could accelerate to +-190 kts. then fly about 8 miles including a 180 degree turn in the pattern prior to a midfield landing on Rwy 19. The math just doesn't work out without at least some thrust.
The pilots had the wit to ask to return rather than continue the go-round and completed the "impossible" turn successfully. A desire to reach the runway would be an adequate explanation for the choice of a hot and clean approach. The only question is whether the failure to deploy landing gear was a choice, an oversight or an unavoidable consequence of the bird strike.
From the ground video, it appears that touchdown was with only 1500 ft of runway remaining, vs mid-field. > much speculation < Gear left up because pilot thought that belly landing intrinsically provides more decel (which is wrong). Gear left up because pilot had reason to believe brakes wouldn't work. Given the existence of brake accumulators, that unlikely thinking unless antiskid availability was in question for some reason.
With flaps up, minimum flaps up manoeuvring speed is around 190 knots, depending on weight. Any lower than that, you're close to stalling the aircraft. After the go-around, they cleaned up the aircraft, so had to accelerate to minimum flaps up manoeuvring speed, which would have been near 190 knots.
The date and terms of the type certificate is what matters. Previous designs don't have to suddenly conform to new rules, unless that's specifically called out.
dustsmoke, did they rule in 2008 that starting in 2010, all new planes need to have CVR and FDR have independent power circuit? I thought it is normal to make new rules this way, so that people have some time to comply. If you surprised everybody and make new rules take effected immediately you announced it, you cause a big mess because people have zero time to get ready to comply.
Juan, CVR & DFDR operation is not flight critical…which would need to be a qualification to be powered by the standby AC system. RIPS (remote independent power supply) is what takes care of powering those devices on those airplanes equipped.
Don't forget. The first impact with the birds occurred at a very low altitude 500ft (near the ground) and probably they missed the landing path, so they made go-around to reconfigure the landing, but go-around also failed.
if they find feathers in the second engine then i think it happend right before the mayday goaround callout and took out everything before they realized. not just 1 bird, but basically bird bird shot
@@zachansen8293 Yes, starboard/right/#2 had the compressor stalls seen in the video. When it was recovered, many blades were missing, and the remaining blades were badly damaged. #1 blades looked basically okay.
Blancolirio Irv here… I’m a recently retired B737-800 Heavy MX Check Rep for medium sized carrier in the Midwest…. It’s my understanding(maybe I’m not 100% accurate here) that the DFDR and CVR are both powered from the unswitched “hot” battery (main battery) bus and that both the DFDR and CVR would be powered “to the ground” should the main AC and standby AC power be lost. That means if you lose all AC power the hot battery bus runs Capts PFD and other essential engine instruments. Load shedding would have occurred automatically and the Buses would attempt to reconnect connect automatically… We do an Electrical Standby System task card every 72 hours to ensure standby power is working correctly. Thanks for excellent info, Juan
Thanks Juan for the update, my go-to source for the most recent news and breakdown of aviation events. "Good" news is forensic examination of the engines will tell us if one or both of the engines failed due to a bird strike, and if either of them were producing power on impact. Just finished my recurrent today and (coincidentally????) practiced engine failure on final. We should always remember that having briefed the scenario before hand and having read the Flight Crew Training Manual description of this maneuver before a practice session in the box, is definitely not the same thing as reacting in real time to an unforseen emergency. But it certainly raises awareness and preparedness. Training records will also tell us if the crew had been trained on and when they last practiced this scenario. EDIT to add: The positioning of the Fuel Control Switches for the engines may also be very telling.
@garyspeed8961 they will find enough evidence in the wreckage. Even an impact with a solid concrete wall will look differently if the emgine fan blades are not moving vs when they are rotating at high speed.
The last four minutes is important but the minutes before and after the bird strike is critical. I trust NTSB will figure out the cause as long as that part of the data is available.
Wow, no wonder why there was so much chaos in the cockpit. This passenger jet was dead in the air. Going back a step how does a bird strike completely disable a 737 electricals.
I have come to be suspicious of the bird strike theory. This is certainly what the pilots believed, but that may only be because the thought was put in their heads by the control tower seconds before. Whatever it was, it caused a major electrical problem to all systems. This just seems way more than a single bird strike would cause. But I am just wildly speculating.
@@christianlibertarian5488 I wonder if several birds were ingested, leading to multiple engine spool downs and one complete failure? Not to dismiss the possibility of an underlying electrical issue or worse yet, procedural error during the recovery phase. A shame we'll never fully know due to the deficient backup arrangement for the recorders.
Seems like the only valid possibilities are a bird struck the other engine so that both engines were gone, or the pilots accidentally shut off the good engine thinking they were shutting off the damaged engine.
I think it is likely that both engines hit birds. First #1, which led people on ground to look up and turn their cameras on, just in time for #2 to get in trouble.
Exactly. Dual engine failure after they called a go-around from the first failure. All AC power gone and already too high for the original approach. Yet the video seems to show one engine still operating. It's astonishing if the recorders on the NG have no battery backup.
@@theharper1 Battery backup on the recorders is a customer option. The aircraft was originally purchased by Ryanair, famous for skimping on everything.
There is NO evidence that either device failed. The most likely reason for both devices ceasing to operate at the same time is a failure of the *external* power supply.
Lovely Boeing engineering, as usual. Fail-safe simply is not in this case. We're still using 1970s era magnetic tape on a loop, that requires constant external power to run. The FDR should be solid state and have its own battery. We're talking about literally the size and computing power of an iPod Mini (and well over 500 hours of recording time as well - and just encase it in a brick of material to protect it. Instead we get this odd mix of bleeding edge and stone age tech in airplanes.
@@plektosgaming There are only two flight recorders damaged in aviation history, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 and United Flight 93, Jeju Air 7C2216 being the third. You either believe in mathematics probability or the “news”.
@@Johnson-g5q The issue is silly things like them constantly being over-written or having vastly limited data/not transmitting in real time or having a multi-day memory to spot repeated faults and so on. They are admittedly very robust, but by now the data recorders should be the very last thing to fail on a plane, not (apparently) one of the first.
The model that works for now would be: One engine lost on approach Initiate go round with one engine Lose second engine during go round process Drop plane onto runway with little or no thrust....seemed one engine had some thrust
Surely there would be something prior to the blackout that indicates what happened? If the FDR shows a loss of power on one side (thrust and/or electrical) then it is not unreasonable to assume a wrong-engine shutdown. Unless the crew were totally silent, I also expect the CVR to contain a snippet of something immediately preceding the blackout. Let's say the wrong engine is shutdown, there will be sufficient time from fuel cutoff actuation to power loss for the CVR/FDR to record it, as the engine won't shutdown and trip off the generator instantly. Let's hope there are no shenanigans with the FDR/CVR.
I'd really like to hear Stig's take on what exactly it would take to instantly knock out that many critical systems.. from an engine failure. Even a double engine failure in a one-failed, wrong one shut down scenario. I get that there was no time to run through the checklist(s), but still thats a lot of layers of swiss cheese to soar through in 4 minutes
Turns out that, along with ADS-B data loss, both CVR and FDR quit at the same time. Since they are on separate buses, it suggests to me that they had cascading electrical failures as a result of an engine failure. It cannot be due to shutting down the wrong engine because they would not shut down the engine so soon (i.e. immediatley within seconds after striking birds). It would be at least one minute because first, they did a go-around; if an engine quit, you have the initial startle factor, then controlling the airplane during assymetric thrust, then more seconds figuring out what's wrong (even if you didn't do that right), then reaching out to turn off the fuel control switch. Even then, there are no memory items in case of a flame out as QRH is pulled out. And even if it was severe damage or compressor stall (Engine Limit Surge or Stall memory items) , the PF would begin the drill, starting with the autothrottle arm switch, then retarding the thrust lever on the evidently bad engine and perhaps recovering it, and no pilot would want to shut down an engine when partial power was available. That takes time, whereas the buses IMO started failing way before any crew action could have caused them to screw up. After a flame out, if any one of the 2 Bus Tie Breakers failed to close, then that's when your problems start because AC Transfer Buse on the failed engine side remains off line. If the right engine quit, and one of the BTB fails to close, then the RH AC Transfer Bus is off line, then you can't lower the flaps through the Alternate Flap system. There could have been a BUS fault also, tripping the other AC Transfer BUS off line at the same time. The good side can be recovered, but it takes time with the QRH. With perhaps a 2 engine bird strike, it may have pushed the PIC to head to the nearest threshold ASAP, given that many of the cockpit screens would to be blank or blank temporarily, with perhaps a looming double engine failure. But who knows. It's going take a lot of investigating for finding related failures. It's easy to blame "Pilot Error" when nothing is evident. These 2 weren't newbies and I give them, at this point, the benefit of the doubt.
Well said. Right now (2025-01-12 06:20 GMT) there is NO evidence which tells us why engine #1 was not operating on the second approach. The hypothesis that both engines suffered damage/failure via bird strike is plausible, and so is the hypothesis that the crew panicked and shut down a working engine. I for one will not (indeed CANNOT) draw any conclusions without further detailed evidence, and I deplore all those fools who have rushed to blame the crew, in some cases simply because they were not white Caucasians and therefore not made of the right stuff. There are eye witness reports that the plane failed to climb properly during the go-round attempt; that would explain why the return for an opposite landing became both essential and very urgent.
@@hb1338 Another content creator showed a picture of a puff coming out of the left engine that was not as prominent as the right engine, but still there.
@@hb1338 Agreed. Plus, you don't get your type rating out of a Cracker Jack box (I'm old enough to remember those). They, like any other Boeing pilot in any well regulated country, had to qualify, not only initially, but every 6 months thereafter in the simulator (or AQP), practice these emergency manoeuvres to a satisfactory level. Boeing has everything figured out (well, almost everything) and they don't want you to think..... Identify what's going on, call the right procedure or checklist, and just carry it out and apply Crew Resources Management ('who's flying the airplane' and anyone can screw up, is how I sum it up).
A lot of accidents happen because something abnormal happens and the pilots don’t react correctly. If it was the wrong engine being shut off, that’s also not unprecedented
One switch selection to start the APU (which should be an instinctive reaction to the loss of both generators) which will take - at worst - a minute to come online..
@@lenger1234On flybywire aircraft I can understand programming in the APU to start automatically and I even think it happens on some models after Hudson if I am not mistaken. However on the 737 it would probably come with too many problems or unwanted side effects..
As an "average business traveler" I am shocked to read that there is no dedicated battery for the "Black Boxes". We learn about how these boxes are placed in compartments in the plane that will protect the boxes as much as possible. And now we hear that they are not operated on battery power...
As a retired controls engineer, one that deals with the mechanical, electrical AND electronic, I frequently see a lot of younger , non EE engineers (and MANY laypersons) think that electricity, in all its black magic wonder, is always 'there'. People in this generation even, think that electricity comes from a plug on the wall. Also as a retired USAF Avionics/engines technician on F-111 Fighter Bombers, among others, we lived by expecting 'battle damage' on the airplane, i.e. robust backups for everything going out, so we can get the jet AND Pilots, home, even in peacetime. We had Bus Ties out the ying yang. Looks like an engineering group somewhere, figured they could just 'plug it in anywhere'.
So, what we know for sure is that we still don't know what happened in the last four minutes. Without the FDR or CVR data or a survivor who knows what happened, or a video we can guess from, we'll never really know. Keep the updates coming, Juan.
@@jamescollier3 Indeed, they once reconstructed a large section of TWA Flight 800 from many tiny pieces just to figure out what happened. Too soon to call whether such old-style feats of investigative reconstruction couldn't shine a light on this one, too.
It will at least make the investigation much more difficult and uncertain, if they will be able fot figure out what happened in this cockpit during the crucial period of time.
Just like I mentioned in the last video on this tragedy. Go back and watch were the #2 engine puffs and rewind a tad and zoom in on engine #1 and watch at the slowest speed you can. Around the same time #2 makes its very pronounced puff from the bird strike #1 does as well. It is just not as pronounced as the other one because most of it happens just inside the exhaust area. But the white puff is there. Very similar to a flameout I have seen turbines on the ground do before. Its almost certain that he ingested a bird or birds and possibly more than #2 did. If it flamed out or was damaged enough from the bird ingestion to shut down, that would possible explain the loss of power to those units. It would also explain the lack of heat blur from #1 as it comes in to touch down.
Hard to perform a go-around with both engines out. I don't think both engines were lost. Also, the gear was raised during the last 4 minutes. Hydraulics were working. I think they likely lost their composure and made some serious errors. Unless there was a fire. Then you need to land quickly. But there is no evidence of that.
@@PostwarPurist The operator's manual requires an *immediate* decision (continue/go-round) after power loss on finals. It is entirely possible to call for a go-round and then immediately discover that it is not possible - this would make the crew's action in requesting a return for an opposite landing a piece of good airmanship, which was followed by a successful execution of an "impossible" turn.
Not on standby bus. This tells us once more that no engine power was available. That's the most likely reason for the rushed unconfigured landing attempt in the first place. But maybe the recorders still can tell us what happened before and hopefully this can help to explain the chain of events. The damaged engine shutdown process requires a discussion in the cockpit. Maybe this discussion is present on the CVR.
You do have to wonder who might benefit from the obfuscation of that data. I can think of at least 4 major parties, the general public not being among them.
So what about the RIPS (recorder independent power supply) for the CVR? If that aircraft is up-to-date, the CVR has its own dedicated battery, even with all power loss with no batteries no engines and no APU the CVR is able to record for 10 more minutes with the RIPS. Also looking at the FDR and the wiring diagrams, there is a DC power source because there is a dedicated circuit breaker for it as well behind the captain EDIT/update: the DC circuit breaker is a control circuit to power a relay to allow AC power to supply the FDR.
@@marcweston2156 that’s why i mentioned. If the aircraft was up to date..pretty much all of our planes in our fleet have the RIPS, even the ones built before 2009. But as I look through the wiring there is a 28vdc power source going to the FDR and a ground. So it should have been getting power. I’m still double checking on that with some Boeing engineers colleagues.
For the CVR, the dc circuit breaker just powers the coil of the CVR power control relay coil. If the coil is energised, AC power is supplied to the CVR. Both CVR CBs are behind the left seat. The DFDR I haven't figured out yet, but also uses two circuit breakers. AC power seems to be required for the Data Acquisition Unit and the DFDR.
@@StigAviationthe functionality was reported to have been applied to aircraft manufactured since 2010. However, we found that the aircraft was first delivered by Ryanair in 2009 and was not retroactively applied to aircraft manufactured before 2010.
This is becoming more and more mysterious with the best plausible explanation being an almighty panic on the flight deck. Most agree that even with a two-engine shut-down on approach an extended glide to the original runway would have been more successful than the go-around turned out . One recalls the BA 777 at Heathrow whose engines failed at a similar point in the approach.
Postscript. Observers saw the flaps down as the JeJu Air jet passed overhead on final approach. This was when at least one birdstrike was observed. The jet then passed out of sight. There might have been another strike in the other engine if it had flown into a flock of birds. In the case of the BA777 at Heathrow the engines suddenly failed late on final approach. The crew extended the glide by raising the flaps and gingerly coaxing the plane over the fence. Probably it was close to stalling. It hit the ground hard, collapsed a main gear and slid to one side on the grass just short of the tarmac. Speed was by that time minimal. Everyone survived. The 'what ifs' in the JeJu Air case are legion. The consensus view is that if both engines had failed for whatever reason - birdstrike, wrong engine shutdown - a configuration to best glide distance might have saved the plane and its passengers. One must always consider, however, that a landing short would have impacted the same ILS structure that the plane actually did from the reciprocal direction. The aggregate elements of this tragedy add up to the truly diabolical.
Juan - The two employees seated in the extreme rear of the aircraft survived. If the plane lost all power prior to landing on the runway without landing gear or flaps, would the surviving crew members seated in the back have been able to notice or determine if there was power in the cabin-such as lights or other systems-during this extreme emergency? I understand that the crew members do not remember the moment of impact, but if there was a lack of power inside the airplane as it touched down and glided, they may, over time, be able to help investigators determine what systems were functioning in their part of the plane. Additionally, they might recall whether they could hear the engines. I’ am no expert - only a passenger on planes , but I have several friends who are flight attendants for Alaska Airlines and fly on these planes daily. Understandably, everyone is feeling uneasy right now.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but the theory that the pilots shut down the left engine accidentally could be disproved if there is no conversation in the cockpit regarding shutting down an engine during the last seconds of the recording. Surely shutting down an engine would have been discussed. Thus pointing more toward multiple engine failure rather than pilot error?
How would they keep flying on R engine with thrust reverser deployed? Also engine roar was heard as it coasted down RWY 19, Then Left engine was heard spooling down in wreckage after impact. So they had power throughout.
@@Tazjet100 No. The No 2 thrust reverser was armed and then deployed just before touchdown and throttled-up, but at low power. The No1 engine was not running.
This is about as useful as a NASCAR car with an extra 10 gallons of emergency fuel, in a little red can, right next to the driver, which can’t be put into the main fuel tank without stopping the car and getting out.
To me it seems a rather obvious design flaw in the black box not to be able still record active available data if its own bus power would somehow become damaged or lost, especially in situations of partial power loss to the aircraft. Im really surprised it does not have its own backup battery and OR’d power from the other available busses.
Battery backup to recorders mandated in 2010. Aircraft built in 2009. No engine power and APU not running led to loss of data transmission and flight recording, also inability to deploy flaps and gear. Plausible scenario?
@@martinross5521 That it had to be mandated is absurd and we all know it. Boeing clearly built the original system in a non-fail-safe manner, despite it being required TO be fail-safe. Then retconned the whole thing by offering it as an "upgrade". To put this into perspective, this is basically how your lawnmower works - the thing works as long as the engine is running as it has a small generator onboard but no battery. You car, since 1960 ( Chrysler ), has had an alternator and all electrical systems operating off of the battery. The engine only charges said battery. For almost 50 years before this plane was built they have had the technology and yet here we are still with planes that lose power and their minds if the engines have problems. Having an engine go out should be "oh, the engine is out - generator 1 is offline" - and nothing changes with the entire rest of the plane. 100% of the systems work and nothing at all goes dead - just you have a battery reserve issue to deal with. Versus oops - half or our systems are on backup and half are disabled - hope the other engine keeps running...
This aircraft was designed in the 90's and manufactured in 2012, it's up to the owner (or the operator) to upgrade their equipment or modernize it in the 2020's only if approved by the FAA (or in this case the Korean Aviation Office "KOCA"). I bet there are thousands of similar airplanes that are still operating without a recorder backup power source.
APU might not have been operative. I have flown on a number of flights without a working APU. It's not required on a lots of flights. So need to check if it was working when they left.
Really? On a 737 it would take a "Huffer cart" to get the engines started without an APU, I cant see any airlines risking that.. and plus the APU gives the cabin creature comforts when they land and the engines are off.. IDK dude
Capt Sully turned on the APU immediately after hitting birds in NY. That gave them enough power for CVR & FDR. That comes from experience, not the checklist. The JeJu air pilots did the BEST they could and if it wasn't for that structure at the end of the runway, all of them would be alive. Zero doubt. Should pilots be trained to turn on the APU earlier in the checklist process?
I cant even imagine how is it even possible that critical system like this stops working when you shut down both engines... I mean at least some 15-30 minutes backup power source should be there to power it even if engines are shut down and apu is not running.
The FDR is not a critical flight system. Stuff on the battery busses are safety of flight basic things. One side of flight instruments, fire systems, systems needed so they plane can stay in the air and be flown. That's why the newer reg that FDR/CDR have their own backup battery separate from the plane's main batteries.
The recorder should document up to the loss of the second engine, which if manually shut down will have the beginning of that shutdown. We should know what started the problems from the recorders but we won't know what happened trying to manage it.
@jackmorris1068 That is the one we saw with the compressor stalls. The engine was turning but it has to achieve a certain power level before it can run the whole aircraft. Hydraulics are a bit different in that it could generate a helpful amount of pressure to assist just by the fact it was turning. The point remains we will know what happened up to the exact point power was lost. There are many questions those recorders WILL answer.
I wouldn't begrudge this flight any last joule of energy that could have increased survival odds - so good call Boeing IMO. Figuring out what happened falls on the investigators and manufacturers. But now I'm wondering about alternate sources of information - would a subset of folks have had their phones recording throughout such a terrible event - and would any memory cards be recoverable? If so could these have captured left and right side engine noise from which frequency and power could be calculated, maybe vibration levels as well, sounds of flap and gear extension/retraction, GPS location and wind speed, cabin lighting and any announcements made or comments about strange AC smells? Would this be enough to put together a rough picture of the plane's changing energy state in the last 4 mins?
Yes passengers texted about the birds being seen jammed in the control surfaces. They all had their phones out , typical koreans. Lots of data available from those phones.
Thanks @marcweston2156 - if birdstrikes severely damaged one engine to the point where it was behaving quite erratically and the other engine was inadvertently powered-down, in your experience would some level of engine monitoring and recording have continued and survived the impact? I imagine that would be very useful data if so.
My manual says CVR powered by "Switched Hot Battery Bus- As installed" so I believe the later NG models were in fact powered by the battery, if manufactured AFTER the date that it was required by the FAA. This aircraft was manufactured before that date. Hopefully the console is recoverable and will possibly show the position of the start switches.
I did a little more calculations: if this airplane uniformly accelerated from 144 to 200 knots in four minutes, it flew a whopping distance of 21 kilometers! (If it accelerated faster, distance could have only been greater!)Therefore, a graphic shown at the beggining of Blancolirios' clip is very wrong, or let's say - at least not in scale! Quite out-of-scale. However, the ADS-B data point that an aircraft's ADS-B transmitter seized at about 9,3 km from runway treshold, which does match the aircraft height on normal glidepath. This point is above the sea, therefore the first video (of engine surging) was taken later on, maybe one minute or more after the strike. This means that the aircraft had landing gear lowered and flaps extended for some time after the bird strike. 21 kilometer distance could have only been made if an airplane veered for let's say, three kilometers, then made a U-turn of 3 km in diameter and then attempted to land...
777 Capt… when I heard that Flight data and CVR were not available for the last four minutes I really couldn’t believe it! I imagined that the flight data recorder would be on the hot battery bus … to preserve the data. Why on earth would it not be? 😬
People are commenting about a cover up and pilot error(s) but since the investigators in Seoul only had access to the CVR and the FDR was send to the NTSB i guess it is possible to recreate the exact time both stopped working. If this is a sudden stop at the same time and this was at the moment of the birdstrike it might indicate a very unexpected and catastrophic event happened with the plane and/or in the cockpit. Also, i cannot see the pilots switching of electrical power from whatever system at the exact moment of the birdstrike. There would have been at least a couple of seconds recorded after the birdstrike on both devices .... Lets hope there will be a solid final report without question marks .....
I'm a former Army, catering division of the tank sea mechanic from the parachute division. from the earlier 80's. also once went on a helicopter. . i also liked this video. Thank you Juan! @jimmckinnon7148 why??? what are your proud of? what is anything good or helpful or redeeming about you once went ona boat?? and why bring it up here?? isn't there a mental health forum for PSTarDs ??
My 2 cents worth has to do with maintenance. What if the last person who hooked up the fire switch panel reversed the fire switch cannon plugs. I know it is possible on the 727 because when I picked up a 727 from a contract Maintenace heavy check during preflight when I pulled the number 2 engine fire handle the Number 3 engine generator light came on. I dropped the panel and reversed the canon plugs and all returned to normal. If the crew pulled the correct engine fire switch and the other engine shut down, they became a glider. If this is still true, the FAA needs to require that the wire harness and canon plug be color coded, Green on green and yellow on yellow and that Boeing put different style plugs on the left and right fire switches and still with color coding on all new 737s.
If the proper system checks are done after maintenance is completed then a switched connector fault would be picked up. When you have halfwit maintenance techs doing the work expect failures.
You dont colour code connectors because some people are colour blind. You key every plug/socket differently so you simply cannot plug them in the wrong place. Pretty simple to do.
If there is an overload on the electrical system, or if a protection system like a circuit breaker trips in response to an issue, both buses could be temporarily or permanently disabled as a safety precaution. The electrical system on the 737-800 includes bus tie switches that connect and manage the distribution of power between Bus A and Bus B. A failure in the bus tie system, or a malfunction in the bus tie switches, could prevent power from being routed to either bus. In some cases, the flight crew can manually control the bus tie switches through the Electrical Panel in the cockpit. This allows them to isolate or connect buses as necessary to preserve power for essential systems. Not knowing the layout of this aircraft, maybe a pilot could explain where on the upper panel these bus tie switches are?
I am wondering if the FDR shows decrease in thrust lever angle on #1 before losing power, as that would be very telling of misidentifying a faulty engine. Unless they just pull the fuel cutoff right away.
Even then I would have thought it would catch the fuel valve being closed before the engine winds down and power is lost.....unless the IDG's failed before engine shutdown
This tragic incident raises some critical questions, especially with the discovery that the black boxes stopped recording just four minutes before the crash. It’s interesting to think about what the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) might have captured prior to that point-engine performance, control inputs, and system warnings. If the pilots inadvertently shut down the wrong engine, the FDR could hold clues, such as the specific control commands made. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) could also provide vital context. Were the pilots discussing which engine to shut down? Were there any signs of confusion or miscommunication in the cockpit? This would be especially important if they were under pressure to make split-second decisions after the reported bird strike. If a wrong engine shutdown did occur, it highlights the importance of clear protocols and situational awareness in such emergencies. Bird strikes are complex to handle, but proper identification of the affected engine is critical before taking action. I hope investigators can retrieve enough from the available data to shed light on the pilots’ decisions and actions. It’s a tragic reminder of how even small errors in high-pressure situations can lead to devastating consequences.
Hopefully a forensic examination of the engine wreckage in particular will throw some more light on this accident but in any event I would suggest that the final recommendations will be along the lines 1. Do not place a solid barrier close to the end of a runway 2. Install EMAS arresting material at the end of every runway 3. In the event of a major engine malfunction on final approach consider continuing to the runway if at all possible 4. Provide independent backup power to the FDR and CVR and retrofit if necessary (so that regular viewers of accident investigation videos won't be 'disappointed').
Especially #3, man! I know hindsight is 20/20 but man I wonder why they didnt just continue the approach? You can tell a lot about engine state at time of the crash by analyzing the fan blades, core, bearings, etc. Aviation Mishap Investigators are so impressive!
Semi-random question: what precisely is powered by the auxiliary drive gearbox on the 737's engines? I wonder if the effects of a freak hit on said gearbox assembly could plausibly include losing both hydraulic pressure and electrical, while the engine (briefly at least) continues to provide thrust. (...or rather, one system of each.)
As an airport worker, i still cannot fathom why they would have a concrete structure across the run off area holding up the ILS antennae. Everything in that area should be frangible (easily breakable without much damage to the aircraft) including the perimeter fence. I suspect that without the concrete structure, some if not all would have survived. So sad.
I doubt there would have been a high survival rate even without the wall. Even a drainage culvert would have destroyed that plane. It had a huge amount of momentum off the end of that runway.
To keep the plane within the airport property. That barrier did stop the plane from leaving the property of the airport. Nobody complained about that barrier before.
@@jamesm568 yes they had…..it had been flagged up several times previously….from memory, from another video, it was on the list of things to be upgraded/rectified…
How strange and disappointing that they don’t have that data. Thanks for the update Juan, I hope they can discover enough to give us some idea. Why the pilots didn’t decided to make the landing they did will forever a mystery
I believe the current CFR requires aircraft manufactured after April 2010 to be fitted with RIPS option for CVR. The accident aircraft was delivered approximately one year prior to that. I believe FDR is intentionally left out from the battery bus as it would NOT be able to receive meaningful data from all sensors onboard. Total AC failure = heavy electrical shedding. Powering sensors and registering data to FDR is their least concern.
@@AerobatBrian No you are incorrect. RIPS is designed for power supplying CVR in case of catastrophic AC power failure. CFR 121.359 through CFR 25.1457 mandates CVR to carry independent power supply for any transport category ac manufactured after April 2010. CFR 25.1459 concerning FDR does not mention anything about independent power source even to this date.
As always Juan, thanks for the detailed and objective insight. I’ve noticed that when high-profile accidents prompt a flurry of fast content, I don’t even watch it now. Instead, I wait for your take, which I trust a lot more. Cheers.
So it looks like both engines got taken out. I think we should still be able to infer with the data up to the second engine going out whether it was an accidental shutdown or another bird strike.
I am an AVS/ELEC. Instructor and I teach All the Challenger and CRJ aircraft series and under FAA rules the CVR must record for 10Mins after the lost of the aircraft power using a recorder independent power supply (RIPS) that sits between the CVR tray and the CVR LRU. FAA rule FAR 25.1457. SB 605-23-006 Rev. 1 (Oct/2015). We have to find out if that airline is under this FAA requirement.
Well it operates in South Korea, it doesn’t fly to USA and the airline and aircraft are registered in South Korea…..so I’m going to say it probably isn’t.
If that engine was running erratically ( it appears it had compressor stalls per the earlier video ) then the generator may have tripped -- it turned itself off to prevent damage , It can be reset in the cockpit, but they didn't appear to have too much time to run through the checklists.
Well, there are a few things that might prevent that from working, but you raise a good point. In a normal situation one running engine would power basically everything. Failures or pilot error could prevent that.
They were still going plenty fast enough for the engines to be windmilling. They still make a lot of noise even windmilling. Judging it by sound is inconclusive. The investigators should be able to determine if the engines were producing power by examination.
Are sure the critical bird strikes occurred before they decided to go around? Is it possible they had two bird strikes, and the second one didn't occur after they had pulled up?
It is unclear whether they were even on approach anymore. The fluctuations in altitude *before* the power loss could indicate they’d already started the go-around before they hit the birds. We don’t know right now and it’ll require a lot of forensic work (and thus time) to get us answers.
They may have seen a flock of birds in their way during their approach and decided to go around. If this is what happened then the bird strikes most likely happened after the go around was initiated. This could explain why the aircraft was in a clean configuration ( gear and flaps up )
@@lyleparadise2764 This is what I think as well and this jives with the video showing the bird strike/compressor stall as the gear is up in that video.
Yes, but many airlines make it a matter of company policy that their pilots do a go-round in the event of any problems on final approach. Even in the world of commercial aviation, you can be fired for choosing the the safest option.
According to the timeline diagram, the go around was initiated about 3 minutes before touchdown and about 4 minutes before the end of the flight. So if the loss of power to the CVR and FDR was the result of the crew shutting down the wrong engine, that would suggest that the crew went through the shutdown procedure at the same time they were beginning the go around, an unlikely occurrence.
One of the absolutes in all my jet training was not to even think about the engine shutdown memory items until you were at a safe altitude. This flight never got to a safe altitude after they started the go-around.
How convenient. So in this narrative they shut down both engines on initial approach before even attempting a go around. Well their story is not adding up. Stinks!
@@user-pf5xq3lq8i By far the most plausible explanation, which seems to be supported by video evidence, is dual engine failure/loss of power due to hitting a flock of birds. There appear to be people who are deliberately trying to invent scenarios which involve a ridiculous degree of crew negligence.
@@hb1338Duel engine and total electrical failure on final approach and at least partly configured for landing yet you opt to go around rather than getting the aircraft on the ground. If that doesn't point to ridiculous crew negligence I don't know what does.
@@I_Evo there wasn't a dual engine failure don't know where people are getting this from you can literally hear the engine still running on the video when it crashes
Non pilot here. The plane had been pretty much in continual use for the previous couple of days, with very minimal down time. Wonder what was listed as inoperable in the MEL (Minimum equipment list). And if items were on the MEL that meant it should not have been flying. Wonder if the APU was listed as inop on the MEL?
Sorry what? “If items were on MEL that meant it should not have been flying”?? That’s the exact purpose of the MEL - to allow the airplane to operate without certain specific systems operative. The airline industry would die if no MEL was allowed, so what are you saying?
@@IanWallace-z4n most probably mis-worded. If they flew when the plane should have been grounded. I assume the list of inop items is uploaded after each stop, and that the only copy was not on the plane.
Very frustrating situation as we need to figure out what happened so that lessons can be learned. So far, the main lesson is that the recorders should have independent power systems, but that's already something that newer aircraft have.
I’m no FDR/CVR expert. But it’s obvious to me that if the systems normally monitored by FDR/CVR are no longer powered then there’s nothing to record. They are digital records, not analog. Ergo, an electronic exchange needs to occur between the microphone on the flight deck or the deflection sensor on a flight control. The 737 can revert to full mechanical flight control without electrics. Therefore battery backup of the FDR/CVR is redundant. Just my $0.02.
The cockpit area mic is directly connected to and powered through the cvr system. Had they installed the RIPS option then they would have had that at least.
you have to consider the CVR and FDR as two VERY different entities and neither share anything as far as data. The CVR is an easy one and is wired to an area microphone on the flight deck and the crews headset mic. The CVR powers those microphones and is armed by different things, some aircraft it is engines at idle power for 5 min, or > 5 psi oil pressure or others whenever there is electrical power on the aircraft per part 121. The FDR's record around 1500 parameters and those components and sensors need to be powered to send data to those FDR channels - it just is not feasible to do. If they had the CVR data via battery backup this video would be a totally different subject
I wonder if a FRAPU fried on the engine that took the hit causing both gens to trip.... it aligns frequency and phase between both engine drive generators... I've seen them drop both busses.
There should be fuses installed to prevent such a scenario, as there is always a chance of this unit to fail, whatever the reason (unrelated to bird strikes). The highest likehood to me seems a lightning strike.
@@hb1338 You missed my point - I said that there should be some kind of fuses installed into every electronic device onboard an aircraft to protect the rest of electrical equipment from failing due to one failed unit, whatever foreseeable failure it might get. It's called good engineering and it's fairly simple to implement it.
Seems to me this was a go-around gone terribly wrong. They retracted the gear and flaps which is normal for go around. Then suddenly turn 180 to return to runway. I think they shut down the operating engine by mistake
There are eye witness reports of a failure to climb in the go-round, which would make a return for an opposite landing the only available option. There is NO evidence which tells how and why engine #1 stopped operating.
In a case like this, there is no benefit to shutting down an engine when you know you have to land ASAP. Not shutting down an engine has zero effect on performance, except if it's still running. So I don't know why everybody's so fixated on that. Even if the fire bell is ringing, you're not going to waste time in that situation when you think you're going to lose both engines when the runway is just minutes away. This isn't a prop plane, where you do have to shut it down so you can feather it. You don't feather turbofans.
If they had shut down the operating engine (I presume you mean #1) by mistake, instead of shutting down the supposedly damaged #2 engine, then how come #2 seemed to be operating and the thrust reversal was clearly deployed when it was speeding down the runway on its belly?
@@istudios225 First, what would be the urgency in shutting down a failed engine? There's no difference in performance whether you leave it alone or secure it. Second, what makes you think that that the left engine was not damaged also and quit on its own accord? New video shows that the left engine also ingested a bird because a puff came out of the tailpipe near the time the right engine did the same thing, although it was less visible. All the landing video shows is that the right hand hydraulic system was operating because the right engine was driving the right engine driven hydraulic pump and the pilot pulled the right thrust reverser lever on landing. If the left thrust reverser was still stowed, it means either that it was not deployed manually, or that there was no hydraulic pressure to deploy the reverser because engine driven pump was not working because the engine was not producting thrust or because there was no electrical power to power the left electric hydraulic pump because the left AC Transfer bus was unpowered. Remember that, the ADS-B/transponder failed nearly at the same time as the CVR and FDR, which suggests that there were cascading electrical failures affecting different buses. OTOH, it may be because someone pulled the left hand engine fire switch, thereby inactivating the left hydraulic system, in which case they would have shut down the engine, but not necessarily in error since it appears now that it did ingest a bird. That's why investigations take so long as aircraft, even pieces of junk like the 737 (did fly it long ago) remain fairly complex.
1/13 UPDATED CVR/FDR Video Chris Brady: th-cam.com/video/1TKoCI9kVtc/w-d-xo.html
Hey Juan from Syd about the near miss Qantas 737-A380 the flight number was QF426 sunday morn here incident time 10.18am maybe you can find it on flightradar24 i cant text you from AUS 🤷♂️
Chris Brady deals here only with the CVR and FDR, both of which appear to have stopped working at a time coincidental with everything else failing. Still yet a mystery. On touchdown, expertly carried out indicating well-trained crew, the bird-struck engine appears to be delivering thrust while the other engine is delivering none. A mystery again. Did the crew shut down the wrong engine as happened at Kegworth, UK in 1989, also a B737? After shutting down the wrong engine while initiating the go around did panic set in? Off to the right you can see the tantalising safety of a long runway and here on downwind you have lost power to both engines, the bird-struck engine only weakly performing. What do you do? The crew appear to have hauled the craft round immediately relying on muscle memory in place of checklists, and what might have ended heroically instead ended in tragedy.
As an outsider to the world of aviation, it just seems crazy to me that systems designed to record what happened during emergencies fail during emergencies.
You would think they would make it foolproof. No accessible circuit breakers, (In the case of suicides, or just wanting to shut off the system for nefarious reasons) multible battery backups etc. While their at it, make it impossible to disconnect the plane ID system.
The ICAO proposed to have battery backup incorporated into the recorders, that's still pending approval.
The recorders are AC powered, so either engine would power them, as would the APU. But, it can take up to a minute to spool up the APU - while scrambling with all four arms to get the aircraft configured and sort of stabilized for a no thrust landing.
All while one really needed six arms and another ten minutes of controlled flight... :/
"We're from the government and here to help you." Whether you like it or not.
Bureaus are all overwhelmed with their own attempts at micromanaging everything, so important revisions to regulations such as this get missed (Combined with the childish bureaucrat mentality that revising is some terrible confession of fault. Related to why the normally only add more regs to the pile.).
i agree, many engines these days are already sending data to manufacturers incase they are developing issues, so why not all aircraft data, as mentioned above, they already and mostly have internet connection
@@eddiek204 i never understood why location beacons or ID locators GPS could be either switched off or indeed available to be removed, also cockpit voice recorders etc - surely these devices can all be located in the tail section, which in 9 out of 10 cases survives a crash
I'm a retired B777 captain. If we can have internet connectivity on planes, we can stream CVR/FDR in real time to the ground. F1 cars have a ridiculous amount of data. Why can't we? We shouldn't have to wait for accident data. It's time to get streaming with battery backup. You have a big audience footprint, Juan. Make it happen!
F-1 cars cost more than that airplane. And it was a very old airplane.
Exactly is a no brainer in my opinion
Why can’t we? ALPA/APA…😎
@@kinikinrdeven old 737-800’s start at 25-30 million. Your TOP of the line f-1 car is about 16 million so I have no idea where you got that info.
@@kinikinrd it takes a USB stick and a split into an antenna. The age of the aircraft isn't an excuse for not having live data coming from every commercial aircraft.
This situation is starting to feel like a "we're not going to know" situation.
Chaebol is at it again.
With solid state electronics, it's about as easy to make an indestructible black box as it is to do the egg drop in Middle School. Yeah it's going to take a little effort, but if you try it all, it should be foolproof.
You don't need some crazy reel to reel, SD cards would work.
Someone knows. They just aren’t releasing information
@@ShaunHensley The only two people who could know at this point were at the front of that 737.
and one day it will become conspiracy
From The 737 Handbook - “It points to loss of AC power which was never recovered. CVR is powered by DC BUS 2 (needs AC power to get powered). FDR is powered by AC TRANSFER BUS 1. Finally ADS-B data transmitted by Transponder is also missing. Transponders are powered by AC TRANSFER BUS 1 and 2 respectively.
AC power is required to power the electric motor driven pumps (EMDPs) which supply HYD pressure for normal gear and flap extension. Without the HYD and AC power,flaps cannot be extended and gear can only be lowered through manual gear extension.
Starting the APU and putting it on the busses isn't part of the Loss of Thrust on Both Engines memory items, but is a crucial step in regaining control over the systems (gear,flaps, trim among others). I hope to see this step moved to the memory items part in the future.”
Although wasn’t the R/H TR deployed on landing shown in the video footage? I could be wrong but I think those can only be deployed hydraulically
@@mrbincaboo Could have been damaged to the point that it looked open in the footage.
Was no Sullenbergers in the controls... (who flicked APU switch first thing despite it being one of the last things on QRH)
Your not fully correct. The flaps can be lowered electrically and the RH engine was running so they should have both electrical and hyd power.
@@mrbincaboo Reversers will work off the standby hyd system as well as the rudder.
You have data just before the power loss. It occured when the second engine/generator failed. So it can still be determined why the first one failed. If first one failed due to damage, and second one was ok in the data until data was lost, this would indicate towards crew error.
I agree.
Exactly
or subsequent engine failure due to the birdstrike. Either way the FDR will tell the story
Also, when a crew is running a procedure to shut down an engine, every step is called out aloud and will be on the the CVR right up to the point they move the switch.
Very good logic
I flew both the 737 and the A320 and usually started the APU if bird activity was reported, especially after Sully’s wild ride. I have always felt that was a major factor in his successful water landing.
I wonder... Is is something you would always had freedom of doing, or after that event some airlines allowed that despite obviously more time on APU?
@@mikesnowable This should be required
@@cola98765Asian carriers, particularly in Korea aren't exactly known to be encouraging of "outside of the box" thinking
i wonder if my company would get mad at me for starting this technique, probably
@ In this case there was bird warning issued, so at a minimum that special case should require extra measures.
as a retired airline captain of 42 years, when ever there was a loss of power either engine or electrical i was trained to reach up and start apu without having someone or some checklist tell me to . on airbus its push button and when available it comes on line . the b 737 is more switches than airbus but would still be an immediate step to help situation. its always training and experience!
@@josephaltieri1017 to be fair on the 737ng you need to start the apu, and then after a minute or so flip the switch to draw power from it. So I could see that second step getting missed. The Airbus (and newer Boeings) put the power on the bus once avail.
I completely agree though that getting the APu on in an emergency is a good idea. That said if they were down two engines I could see why they didn't have much time to mess with it.
@@RichFreeman would a minute be a long time under these circumstances?
AGREE 100%
I do it on every PC after an eng fail or any significant SYS malfunction.
No need for a checklist to tell me to start the APU.
It's going ON providing it's working that day.
absolutely, get the APU started RIGHT NOW
Who or what says that the crew did NOT do this ?
It's kind of surprising to me to hear that a plane equipped with flight data recorders don't have a backup to battery.
Yeah that's something I thought would have been obvious to have. Just beggars belief.
It's just incredibly stupid
Agree, who designed this system, doesn't make sense at all.
@@bernieschiff5919 build a box that withstand the violent crash of a jet airliner, even be submerged deep undersea, with the express purpose to find out what happened....And not even a 30min battery backup??? (the amount of time of recording)??? sheesh.
Did the recording system fail or did the components stop transmitting data? My guess is it’s the latter
Imagine how the crash investigator's hearts sank when they found out that the 4 minutes is missing. Exponentially more tedious.
What about all the families? Now they don’t get quick and definitive closure. They will get a report that takes years and will say this and that occurred but we can’t state the why.
I would think they were relieved that any information was obtainable at all. Imagine how difficult it must be when the airframe is a "total loss".
Indeed, exactly. It´s a worst-case-scenario for an air-accident-investigation.
It's frightening
dude thinks about this and doesnt speak of the families of the victims...what a clowm
Hi Juan, there is a really good (safety) case for having the APU running, for T/O & departure, and for the approach. Of course the airlines will never buy into this, because of the fuel cost. I used to leave the APU running for zero-vis departures, and for low-vis approaches, in particular, RNP approaches into mountainous terrain, when going right down to low minima. On the 737, it was there to select the generator on; on the A320, if running, the APU would pick up the un-powered bus, automatically. It might be “ belt and braces” but increases one’s safety margins, and less distraction in the worst case. Just some thoughts. Cheers, John. NZ🇳🇿 (retired) 😁
I agree, there is a lot of corporate bus drivers that will run the apu's in flight if the aircraft doesn't have an ADG ( RAT)
Absolutely 100 percent. The cost would seem to be minimal if it saves lives, but business is more concerned about money than people.
For non-aviators here, does running the APU increase the fuel consumption? I just got confused when you said that corporations will never allow that.
@@justvid366yes it will definitely consume fuel to run but minimally since it won't be seeing any electrical load since the engine generators will be handling that.
@@MikeTheSeeker1961 That was my first instinct as well. But the bean counters account for even the smallest cost. Because in operations you have so many starts and landings in one company that a seemingly tiny fuel consumption of an APU will add up to a sizeable amount of costs in no time.
I'm a retired 737 pilot and aviation accident investigator. The 737 flies and lands fine with one engine and electrical failure down to battery power in VMC conditions like they had in Korea. The question is, of course, why did the pilots decide to land immediately with gear and flaps up at an non-survivable landing speed on a relatively short runway? Normally you would tell the tower on the Captain's radio (FO radio would be out) you were going to hold VFR (fly in circles) to run checklists and have the tower roll the emergency vehicles. You'd run the engine failure checklist, electrical failure checklist, brief the single-engine approach, lower flaps to 15, lower the gear and run the emergency extension checklist if needed, then land with flaps 15 (standard single-engine flap setting).
In the crash video you can hear an engine running and the right thrust reverser seemed to deploy on landing so it appears at least one engine was operating at touchdown. If that ends up being true, then this is my best guess at what happened. Possibly the combination of losing an engine, transitioning to a single-engine go-around, having smoke in the cockpit from the bird ingestion, and almost complete loss of electrical power caused the pilot to make a series of fatal decisions to get the plane on the ground too quickly.
I think its starting to show a combination of mechanical problems and mistakes made by the pilots. I don't understand why they didn't do a second go around and if the landing gear didn't deploy, why they didn't attempt to deploy it manually. Their are so many factors to consider in this case. As Juan says, all the holes in the cheese lined up.
I'd back it up farther in the events chain.
Why did they elect TOGA on strike during landing. Even with power loss, seconds from landing, the brakes would've worked to stop the aircraft safely.
I am honestly thinking it was a startle response driven error that set the entire chain of events into a hot mess.
I'm also suspecting that they had one immediate power loss in one engine, damage that eventually caused the other engine to fail as well, but initially allowed degraded thrust and loss of AC power hampering critical functions, coupled with a no time, no power and resulting in no ideas that could help in the awful mess they found themselves in.
Telling was the not going around, but going reciprocal. Also suggestive was the damage from photos I saw of the fans, #1 having only collapsed fan components at the bottom, suggesting it wasn't even windmilling on impact, #2 showing damage consistent with a damaged fan still rotating, although due to the limited area showing damage, likely windmilling on impact and obviously missing elements.
It's a tragic end for a workhorse of an aircraft, crew and passengers.
Looks like a bird strike severely damaged the right engine and the pilots shut down the functioning engine@cruzin6123
"why did the pilots decide to land immediately with gear and flaps up?" My biggest 'huh?' moment too. As a non-expert who's solo'd a few times in a Cessna 152, "no flaps and gears up" seems like the pilots forgot about Step 1 For A Good Landing in their haste to complete various tasks.
Right engine was seen with compressor stall possibly due to birds. Left engine appeared shutdown. Mis-identified?
Makes me appreciate what Sully did almost immediately: startup the APU.
Starting the APU in that situation is great pilot instinct, in spite of the fact the Airbus A320s has a Ram Air Turbine (RAT), which the Boeing 737s do not have.
And it was an Airbus with a RAT (should never lose power). Powering up the APU was simply prudent airmanship from an experienced Captain. Looks to me like there's another critical problem with the 737. AGAIN !
its crazy thats not the first thing that needs to happen, im no engineer nor pilot, just my thoughts too after what Sully did
Going by the checklist, he may have never gotten to that item. This is where thinking outside the box (something discouraged by some cultures) can be a real assist.
There are just too many monkey controls, settings, and manual steps in the cockpit. The APU should auto start in the event of either engine loss of bleed air or electrical power.
At the airline I work for, except for the early model 737-800, the recorder independent power supply provides power to the cockpit voice recorder for 10 minutes after aircraft power is interrupted by either normal shutdown or by any other loss of power.
Yeah, from what I've found in forums it seems like an option airlines can buy. I know airlines vary a lot in terms of how much optional safety gear they buy.
I was shocked to find out this was optional here. Our helicopters also have a RIPS for the cvr/fdr and they're nearly 15 years old.
@@RichFreeman The original owner of the aircraft was Ryanair, an airline which has never spent a brass farthing more than it absolutely has to.
@@hb1338 Excellent point!
I am shocked(not really) that this system on the aircraft was not designed better. I keep asking myself; Who designs a system that allows smoke in the cockpit if the right engine is damaged? Being an engineer, I am baffled by these system designs and that there were optional safety features that should have NEVER been optional.
My clock radio had a backup 9 volt battery 40 years ago.
seems like boeing sloppy design & cutting corners didnt just start in the last few years
I am not a conspiracy theorist, but if the CVR and FDR are disabled when both engines fail, then in my opinion that was a deliberate action by Boeing designers. It is outrageous that such a design was accepted by the FAA and this aircraft was approved for worldwide use.
I heard about this data loss earlier today - I was hoping for your take on it. Extraordinary that the CVR and ADR are not supported by the back up battery on this type. Thanks Juan, as ever. 👍
yeah, I saw it but no confirmation until Juan speaks.
They could have a totally separate backup battery very close to them that immediately kicks in on power loss.
The 737 *is* a 1970s vintage design, after all. It's been 'upgraded' way, way beyond the original design, but let's be real, it's not a system that is critical for plane function.
@@VehrecI worked on 1965 and 1966 built C-130’s that were designed in the 1950’s. Our CVR and FDR were added in the 1980’s and were powered from the Essential battery bus, which only required the battery to be on, which is always the first and last switch actuated. Not being powered directly from the battery our the last bus powered is absolutely ridiculous.
Backup batteries and accelerometers for when flight data computers go off line.
We had a similar incident of 'total electrical power loss' just 2 days ago here in UK. It was an ATR72-500 which lost all electrical power immediately after takeoff. Luckily the crew managed an immediate return for a safe landing with no injuries or loss of life. The aircraft was evacuated on the runway and then towed away to a maintenance stand. The British AAIB were notified and are investigating.
It's crazy (in a good way) to see many pilots in here. It makes a real difference to comments sections on most other channels - smart people having civilised discussions.
It's good to learn from you all and watch you question things as professionals.
Walking through diagrams and documentation and explaining what they mean is so helpful. It shows how complicated even seamingly simple thins can be and why investigations can take so long.
The 737 engine fire/engine severe damage or separation checklist is composed of 5 items. The second item states to close the thrust lever of the affected engine. For those who are claiming the good engine was shutdown, this step of the emergency checklist would show up on CDR, since the engine start lever cut off action (effectively shutting down the engine) would only be executed on the next step of the checklist. So, CDR would record the thrust lever of a good engine being closed just before the end of data recording.
Great point.
I figured this too, must have been sudden, catastrophic ENG and GEN failure on both sides... otherwise the investigator would be telling more than just the missing data.
Surely then too a birdstrike would still show a slight engine performance degradation on CDR before losing total data too? It can't be instantaneous surely? They will at least have data on one engines performance surely......
@ they sure do but probably not enough to come up with a meaningful explanation for now so they only mentioned missing data to buy themselves some more time (understandable but ugh
No matter what made that aircraft to land without gear, most if not all people on bord would have had a chance to survive, if there was not have been that solid concrete structur at the end of the runway. Remember, they had landed safely, they were just sliding on the runway.
They landed not on the optimal spot of that runway but still, the structure of the aircraft was ok when they were on the ground. It was the impact to that concrete structure that caused the damage and the fire
항공기가 콘크리트 벽에 닿아 폭발하지만 않았다면
여객기가 여러 파편으로 분리되는 한이 있더라도, 적어도 2명보다는 많은 사람이 생존할 수 있었을 것입니다!
I think in this case that solid structure actually reduced the number of deaths. That plane was still going very fast and probably would've slid right out of the airport and into buildings, potentially killing many people on the ground as well as all on board.
@brandyballoon only two out of 181 survived. 179 were killed. From what I have seen it is very unlikely that in the small piece of land that is in line with the runway will ever live more than 30 persons and by the time the aircraft reaches the houses (actually there is only one) the speed would have decreased significantly.
But that is all theory, the people are dead. I feel sorry for their loved ones.
This seems like a solid piece of information that might lead to evidence of a rare and untrainable failure chain. This is a relief to hear. "Pilot's panicking" is always on the list of possibilities and obviously might have played a part. And there is no judgement here. Very few of us ever get truly tested. And possibly none in this particular way. They may have done the absolute best that was possible, given what they knew and suspected. And even if they didn't, only fools have firm, negative views on such things.
When information is insufficient, the cynical have negative views, the naive have positive views. Which one are you?
The intelligent have insightful views. And his view is.
What baffles me is why a go-around was needed at all. Why not just land when you're all configured already? Maybe I'm missing something here?
I'm thinking startle effect just kicked in and the brain defaulted to go-around. Do we know at what altitude the GA was initiated?
I'm beginning to think that they started a normal 2 engine Go-Around THEN hit the birds.....we NEED that DATA!
On an earlier blancolirio video, someone who self-identified as a former commercial pilot in Korea said that they are all trained to go around on a single engine failure. No idea if it's true, but it would explain things.
The bird strike triggered the decision to abort the landing, which would normally give the pilots time to determine the damage and go through checklists. Immediately after they initiated the go around, they lost power (or thought they did, or caused the power loss by shutting off the wrong engine), initiating the quick emergency landing.
If the pilots avoided birds during approach then that was an unstable approach which initiated them to go around. It doesn't matter as It's at the pilots discretion to go around or to continue the approach as either decision was appropriate.
To be honest I'd expect turning off the wrong engine would still be visible on the FDR and recorded on the CVR. The moment you turn off the engine I'd assume the generator will still be providing power until it slows down to the point where it can't keep up with the demand. So if the engine was OK at the moment of turning it off, it should still be recorded, because at the time of turning it off the CVR/FDR system still should have had power if the engine and generator were OK..
exactly what i was thinking
Through meticulous investigation, the team should be able to figure out what happened. The crash usually preserves the settings, control valve positions, etc. They will check both engines thoroughly and will be able to determine why the left one was not running. Will just take time to get there. Remember in S. Korea, this is also a criminal investigation.
That’s what the E-11 crash showed-R ENG SHUTDOWN posted on EICAS, then a brief flash of L ENG FLAMEOUT (in red) posted and then nothing
I hope everyone realizes how wrong it is to assume the crew immediately did the WRONG thing and not assume the crew did an amazing job to get the plane on a nice belly landing under extremely unusual conditions involving multiple system failures and explosions. (read octupus restaurant owner's interview in NYT)
@@esenel92 The generator will stay online until N2 goes below 55-ish, then go offline. Demand has nothing to do with it, merely rotational speed sufficient to maintain 400Hz AC.
The regulations here in Canada were modified a few years ago to require a dedicated Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS) to power the CVR and the cockpit area microphone for at least 10 minutes whenever normal aircraft CVR power sources are interrupted.
Many aircraft (including 737s) are currently being modified to meet this regulation.
It's also possible that they didn't even have a functional APU. Per the MMEL, a functional APU is not necessary on the 737 (except for ETOPS) as long as the engine generators are functional.
*UPDATE*: As it turns out, the accident aircaft suffered a tailstrike during a takeoff in 2021, and resulted in the airline being fined 2.2 billion won for safety violations. If the APU was not functional, this accident may explain why; the tailstrike may have damaged or destroyed the APU. Jeju considered it a minor incident and didn’t even add it to the accident records, so if the APU was damaged, they may well have either neglected to repair/swap it out, or the repair job may have been inadequate.
Now, while it is possible they shut down the wrong engine, there is also a very good possiblity that they suffered multiple bird strikes. The person who filmed the right engine compressor stall stated that he was indoors, heard a loud metallic bang and ran outside just in time to film the incident with the right engine. It's quite possible that the initial sound he heard that made him go outside was a bird strike on the left engine, which would have likely also suffered a compressor stall like we saw on the right engine. The left engine may have failed much earlier than the right, or they may have shut it down to prevent smoke from entering the cockpit.
Now the question is, why did they lose electrical power when the right engine was still seen to be functional as we saw with the video of the landing from the plane's front right side? My theory is that the strike on the right engine may have damaged and disabled the generator, so that it's no longer supplying power, but the engine is still at least partially functioning (but for all we know, it may have been in the process of failing). I believe another possibility is that something (perhaps multiple compressor stalls) may have caused the generator to trip and shut off. Now with two dead generators and a nonfunctional APU, the plane is in complete electrical failure. That means no landing gear (there's still the system behind the copilot's seat), no flaps (they may have forgotten about the Alternate Flaps system) and no power for the FDR & CVR. And if you're in full electrical failure, you'll want to land ASAP.
If the generator just tripped, I believe they could reset it, but there would have beeen too much going on and little time to think up possibilities. Likewise, it's possible they had a functional APU, but no time to turn it on either. Final note, newer planes have a backup battery for at least the CVR, but this was an older 15-year old plane and it doesn't look like it had said battery, so it may have had an exemption if it was ordered *before* the mandate, even if it was produced *after* the mandate.
If so, then why abort their original landing? They would have had little or no power to execute a missed approach, right?
Lined up and good to land and they don’t?
Pull up gear & retract flaps (or not fully extend them when critically needed.)?
All to turn around and attempt a tailwind landing?
Without gear & power?
I don’t get this explanation.
It’s a good observation that legally in many cases an APU needn't be operative for flight (save for some extended operations over open water on twin-engined jets).
@@dudeonbike800 You're right, and that one has been bothering me as well. I have heard some theories that may be plausible.
One possibility is that they may have started the go-around before the bird strikes. It has been suggested that they either saw the birds or were reacting to the ATC warning, and began a go-around to try to avoid the birds (while neglecting to call out the go-around until after the strike) and tragically ended up ingesting some anyway.
Another depends on when they suffered the electrical failure. If the right generator was not immediately disabled, or if it tripped only after surges, then it’s possible that after they lost the left engine but saw that they still had thrust on the right, they decided to go-around in the hopes of not suffering a strike on the right engine (failing to realize that it had already taken significant damage). During the go-around, the right generator may have finally failed or tripped and they lost electrical power. All of this may have even occured in under a minute.
If they underestimated the damage to the right engine, it’s possible that they may have intended to try to diagnose the problem (maybe burn some fuel as well) but after the right generator failed during the go-around, they decided to land immediately, instead of completing the go-around which would have seen them lining back up with 19.
Now of course this does leave the fact that if you’re already lined up after the inital bird strike, then the best thing to do is to just proceed with landing right away.
That leads to the final possibility, which is, regardless of the timing of any of the events, the go-around may simply have been a spur of the moment “panic reaction”. They suffered one or more bird strikes and began performing the go-around without thinking it through.
this is what I said a few hours eariler in the comment thread and I was ridiculed.
They can tell from the blades if the engine/engines were working. It wouldn't be the first time a pilot turned off the wrong engine. Thanks for the info on the power sources, I had been looking for that. I thought they were required to be on separate power sources.
If there's evidence of birds in both engines then it doesn't matter which engine they cut off now.
We need a method to prevent pilots from shutting down the wrong engine in error. Or at least reducing the chances they will.
@@exist7309What other method is there than the CRM and following checklists we already have, the engine fire handles already light up for the correct engines?
@@exist7309 they do have systems for that, that's the whole point of CRM, trouble shooting methods like PIOSEE, challenge-and-respond checklists, simulator training, etc! I don't know what happened here but I actually doubt that it was just an "oops, wrong engine!" situation. That's quite rare afaik. I can think of only two cases that i know of, some 737 from British Midlands and some ATR-72 from... Taïwan I think?
@ James Nichols thanks for your message. I’m not a pilot but I am an electronics engineer so I’m concerned about the human interface design issues. I’m suggesting there needs to be some new method. If one set of throttles is lit and the other not I could not tell which to shut down. Personally from a control system perspective if I had enough information to know which engine was performing in spec I would rather see some protection that requires the pilot to acknowledge and override before shutting down the last good engine, for example.
Then the NTSB was surprised that the Hudson crew first action was “APU on”. Sully knew why.
The NTSB wasn’t surprised. If you’re using the movie as a reference, it’s mostly garbage.
By the way, they moved up the APU on the checklist.
The checklist wasn’t designed for loss of both engines at low altitude
Kinda sad how the only procedure for a double engine failure at low altitude is 'don't crash into a school'
@@Daimo83 _"Kinda sad how the only procedure for a double engine failure at low altitude is 'don't crash into a school'"_
Or river boat.
Or a Nunnery
It's an A320. Different craft, different altitude and speed.
This is one heck of a mystery at this point. If one generator fails, the bus tie relays close to drive both systems with one generator. If both engines fail, the battery or apu generator is all that is left. It seems unlikely that a B737 could make it around the traffic pattern with both engines failed or shut down especially touching down mid field at 190 knots. This one will take a while to figure out and there will be much speculation.
I wonder why the failure of both engine generators doesn't trigger an autostart of the ATU. That'd be quicker and one less thing for the pilots to recall.
Yep! 2216 had to have at least partial thrust on one engine most of the time after the bird strike(s)/compressor stall(s).. The 737-800 has a glide ratio of about 12:1 both engines out clean. From under 1000' AGL at 144 kts. on final approach, there's no way the plane could accelerate to +-190 kts. then fly about 8 miles including a 180 degree turn in the pattern prior to a midfield landing on Rwy 19. The math just doesn't work out without at least some thrust.
The pilots had the wit to ask to return rather than continue the go-round and completed the "impossible" turn successfully. A desire to reach the runway would be an adequate explanation for the choice of a hot and clean approach. The only question is whether the failure to deploy landing gear was a choice, an oversight or an unavoidable consequence of the bird strike.
From the ground video, it appears that touchdown was with only 1500 ft of runway remaining, vs mid-field.
> much speculation <
Gear left up because pilot thought that belly landing intrinsically provides more decel (which is wrong).
Gear left up because pilot had reason to believe brakes wouldn't work. Given the existence of brake accumulators, that unlikely thinking unless antiskid availability was in question for some reason.
With flaps up, minimum flaps up manoeuvring speed is around 190 knots, depending on weight. Any lower than that, you're close to stalling the aircraft. After the go-around, they cleaned up the aircraft, so had to accelerate to minimum flaps up manoeuvring speed, which would have been near 190 knots.
Thank you Juan and thanks to the folks on Patreon.
Thanks
FAA ruled in 2008 that CVR and FDR have an independent power circuit. The 737-800 here HL8088 was built in 2009.
The date and terms of the type certificate is what matters. Previous designs don't have to suddenly conform to new rules, unless that's specifically called out.
The independent battery is a customer option, as per FAA regulations.
dustsmoke, did they rule in 2008 that starting in 2010, all new planes need to have CVR and FDR have independent power circuit? I thought it is normal to make new rules this way, so that people have some time to comply. If you surprised everybody and make new rules take effected immediately you announced it, you cause a big mess because people have zero time to get ready to comply.
You have a halo on your face at 0:55 mark. Good job, Juan.
Wow, what a relief, a YT channel and comments at professional level...Thank you, what a find!👍
Juan, CVR & DFDR operation is not flight critical…which would need to be a qualification to be powered by the standby AC system. RIPS (remote independent power supply) is what takes care of powering those devices on those airplanes equipped.
Don't forget. The first impact with the birds occurred at a very low altitude 500ft (near the ground) and probably they missed the landing path, so they made go-around to reconfigure the landing, but go-around also failed.
Thanks!
The blades on the left engine appeared mostly intact when they lifted it up to recover it. So perhaps it was not running at impact?
looks like it to me....
was the starboard side the one with the bird strike?
@@zachansen8293 It was the one seen compressor stalling, so probably.
if they find feathers in the second engine then i think it happend right before the mayday goaround callout and took out everything before they realized. not just 1 bird, but basically bird bird shot
@@zachansen8293 Yes, starboard/right/#2 had the compressor stalls seen in the video. When it was recovered, many blades were missing, and the remaining blades were badly damaged. #1 blades looked basically okay.
Blancolirio
Irv here… I’m a recently retired B737-800 Heavy MX Check Rep for medium sized carrier in the Midwest….
It’s my understanding(maybe I’m not 100% accurate here) that the DFDR and CVR are both powered from the unswitched “hot” battery (main battery) bus and that both the DFDR and CVR would be powered “to the ground” should the main AC and standby AC power be lost.
That means if you lose all AC power the hot battery bus runs Capts PFD and other essential engine instruments.
Load shedding would have occurred automatically and the Buses would attempt to reconnect connect automatically…
We do an Electrical Standby System task card every 72 hours to ensure standby power is working correctly.
Thanks for excellent info, Juan
Sun country ??
Standby power yes - but the CVR is powered by RIPS in 2010 and later models. no backup for earlier ones.
@
I stand corrected…I was going off my somewhat feeble memory and did not have any schematics with me.
Thanks,
Irv
Thanks Juan for the update, my go-to source for the most recent news and breakdown of aviation events.
"Good" news is forensic examination of the engines will tell us if one or both of the engines failed due to a bird strike, and if either of them were producing power on impact. Just finished my recurrent today and (coincidentally????) practiced engine failure on final. We should always remember that having briefed the scenario before hand and having read the Flight Crew Training Manual description of this maneuver before a practice session in the box, is definitely not the same thing as reacting in real time to an unforseen emergency. But it certainly raises awareness and preparedness. Training records will also tell us if the crew had been trained on and when they last practiced this scenario.
EDIT to add: The positioning of the Fuel Control Switches for the engines may also be very telling.
considering both engines also hit a solid berm wall at 100+ knots I will be impressed if they can extract that detail from them
@garyspeed8961 the way the fan and compressor blades get deformed is different in powered vs un powered condition at impact.
@@frank_av8tor I doubt the engines hit anything, though they may have been affected by the fire.
@garyspeed8961 they will find enough evidence in the wreckage. Even an impact with a solid concrete wall will look differently if the emgine fan blades are not moving vs when they are rotating at high speed.
Hope the thrust levers in cockpit could survived and provide some crucial information
The last four minutes is important but the minutes before and after the bird strike is critical. I trust NTSB will figure out the cause as long as that part of the data is available.
if the timeline we have currently is accurate, the last four minutes is exactly when the bird strike happened
@@cassinipanini don't assume there was only one bird strike. The number of birds there, it could have happened a second time.
@@danielch6662 that's a fair point.
Here you get the facts, always blancolirio, been waiting for this update. Thanks Juan!
Wow, no wonder why there was so much chaos in the cockpit. This passenger jet was dead in the air. Going back a step how does a bird strike completely disable a 737 electricals.
My thoughts exactly
I have come to be suspicious of the bird strike theory. This is certainly what the pilots believed, but that may only be because the thought was put in their heads by the control tower seconds before. Whatever it was, it caused a major electrical problem to all systems. This just seems way more than a single bird strike would cause.
But I am just wildly speculating.
@@christianlibertarian5488 I wonder if several birds were ingested, leading to multiple engine spool downs and one complete failure? Not to dismiss the possibility of an underlying electrical issue or worse yet, procedural error during the recovery phase. A shame we'll never fully know due to the deficient backup arrangement for the recorders.
I think the most realistic answer is: it doesn't lol
Seems like the only valid possibilities are a bird struck the other engine so that both engines were gone, or the pilots accidentally shut off the good engine thinking they were shutting off the damaged engine.
I think it is likely that both engines hit birds. First #1, which led people on ground to look up and turn their cameras on, just in time for #2 to get in trouble.
Exactly. Dual engine failure after they called a go-around from the first failure. All AC power gone and already too high for the original approach. Yet the video seems to show one engine still operating. It's astonishing if the recorders on the NG have no battery backup.
look at the pictures of the 2 engines as a crane lifted them from the site. One has NO fan blade damage. ....
@@theharper1 Battery backup on the recorders is a customer option. The aircraft was originally purchased by Ryanair, famous for skimping on everything.
@@robertfreeburg3566#2 likely was at least partially recovered. Those engines are really tough and are difficult to get them to quit completely.
@hb1338 it shouldn't be permitted to be an option. 🙄😥
As a non pilot I'm shocked that the FDR and CVR could fail in this manner.
There is NO evidence that either device failed. The most likely reason for both devices ceasing to operate at the same time is a failure of the *external* power supply.
@@hb1338 Which part of "fail in this manner" did you not get?
Lovely Boeing engineering, as usual. Fail-safe simply is not in this case. We're still using 1970s era magnetic tape on a loop, that requires constant external power to run. The FDR should be solid state and have its own battery. We're talking about literally the size and computing power of an iPod Mini (and well over 500 hours of recording time as well - and just encase it in a brick of material to protect it. Instead we get this odd mix of bleeding edge and stone age tech in airplanes.
@@plektosgaming There are only two flight recorders damaged in aviation history, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 and United Flight 93, Jeju Air 7C2216 being the third. You either believe in mathematics probability or the “news”.
@@Johnson-g5q The issue is silly things like them constantly being over-written or having vastly limited data/not transmitting in real time or having a multi-day memory to spot repeated faults and so on. They are admittedly very robust, but by now the data recorders should be the very last thing to fail on a plane, not (apparently) one of the first.
The model that works for now would be:
One engine lost on approach
Initiate go round with one engine
Lose second engine during go round process
Drop plane onto runway with little or no thrust....seemed one engine had some thrust
Surely there would be something prior to the blackout that indicates what happened? If the FDR shows a loss of power on one side (thrust and/or electrical) then it is not unreasonable to assume a wrong-engine shutdown. Unless the crew were totally silent, I also expect the CVR to contain a snippet of something immediately preceding the blackout.
Let's say the wrong engine is shutdown, there will be sufficient time from fuel cutoff actuation to power loss for the CVR/FDR to record it, as the engine won't shutdown and trip off the generator instantly.
Let's hope there are no shenanigans with the FDR/CVR.
I'd really like to hear Stig's take on what exactly it would take to instantly knock out that many critical systems.. from an engine failure. Even a double engine failure in a one-failed, wrong one shut down scenario. I get that there was no time to run through the checklist(s), but still thats a lot of layers of swiss cheese to soar through in 4 minutes
Turns out that, along with ADS-B data loss, both CVR and FDR quit at the same time. Since they are on separate buses, it suggests to me that they had cascading electrical failures as a result of an engine failure. It cannot be due to shutting down the wrong engine because they would not shut down the engine so soon (i.e. immediatley within seconds after striking birds). It would be at least one minute because first, they did a go-around; if an engine quit, you have the initial startle factor, then controlling the airplane during assymetric thrust, then more seconds figuring out what's wrong (even if you didn't do that right), then reaching out to turn off the fuel control switch. Even then, there are no memory items in case of a flame out as QRH is pulled out. And even if it was severe damage or compressor stall (Engine Limit Surge or Stall memory items) , the PF would begin the drill, starting with the autothrottle arm switch, then retarding the thrust lever on the evidently bad engine and perhaps recovering it, and no pilot would want to shut down an engine when partial power was available. That takes time, whereas the buses IMO started failing way before any crew action could have caused them to screw up. After a flame out, if any one of the 2 Bus Tie Breakers failed to close, then that's when your problems start because AC Transfer Buse on the failed engine side remains off line. If the right engine quit, and one of the BTB fails to close, then the RH AC Transfer Bus is off line, then you can't lower the flaps through the Alternate Flap system. There could have been a BUS fault also, tripping the other AC Transfer BUS off line at the same time. The good side can be recovered, but it takes time with the QRH. With perhaps a 2 engine bird strike, it may have pushed the PIC to head to the nearest threshold ASAP, given that many of the cockpit screens would to be blank or blank temporarily, with perhaps a looming double engine failure. But who knows. It's going take a lot of investigating for finding related failures. It's easy to blame "Pilot Error" when nothing is evident. These 2 weren't newbies and I give them, at this point, the benefit of the doubt.
Many good points!
Well said. Right now (2025-01-12 06:20 GMT) there is NO evidence which tells us why engine #1 was not operating on the second approach. The hypothesis that both engines suffered damage/failure via bird strike is plausible, and so is the hypothesis that the crew panicked and shut down a working engine. I for one will not (indeed CANNOT) draw any conclusions without further detailed evidence, and I deplore all those fools who have rushed to blame the crew, in some cases simply because they were not white Caucasians and therefore not made of the right stuff.
There are eye witness reports that the plane failed to climb properly during the go-round attempt; that would explain why the return for an opposite landing became both essential and very urgent.
@@hb1338 Another content creator showed a picture of a puff coming out of the left engine that was not as prominent as the right engine, but still there.
@@hb1338 Agreed. Plus, you don't get your type rating out of a Cracker Jack box (I'm old enough to remember those). They, like any other Boeing pilot in any well regulated country, had to qualify, not only initially, but every 6 months thereafter in the simulator (or AQP), practice these emergency manoeuvres to a satisfactory level. Boeing has everything figured out (well, almost everything) and they don't want you to think..... Identify what's going on, call the right procedure or checklist, and just carry it out and apply Crew Resources Management ('who's flying the airplane' and anyone can screw up, is how I sum it up).
ADS-B data stopped at 8.58am, CVR/FDR stopped at 8.59am. pilot acknowledged tower at 9.01am on VHF. So when was power cut?
Things are just getting stranger and stranger.
and things are starting to seem sus to me.
Not really. A massive power failure (for whatever reason) provides a plausible explanation for some of the unlikely things hat did and did not happen.
A lot of accidents happen because something abnormal happens and the pilots don’t react correctly.
If it was the wrong engine being shut off, that’s also not unprecedented
Only for conspiracy theorists.
@@neilkurzman4907 If the wrong engine was shut off, how were they able to fly for 3+ minutes? Everything is very strange.
One switch selection to start the APU (which should be an instinctive reaction to the loss of both generators) which will take - at worst - a minute to come online..
Better yet, why can't it start automatically
@@lenger1234 problem is, it's a plane from when our grandparents were not even married
120 seconds minimum on the 737 - the APU is not made available until it has been running in a stable manner for some time.
@@lenger1234On flybywire aircraft I can understand programming in the APU to start automatically and I even think it happens on some models after Hudson if I am not mistaken. However on the 737 it would probably come with too many problems or unwanted side effects..
@@lenger1234 or just start it as part of the final approach checklist a few miles out like some of the corporate drivers do
As an "average business traveler" I am shocked to read that there is no dedicated battery for the "Black Boxes". We learn about how these boxes are placed in compartments in the plane that will protect the boxes as much as possible. And now we hear that they are not operated on battery power...
As a retired controls engineer, one that deals with the mechanical, electrical AND electronic, I frequently see a lot of younger , non EE engineers (and MANY laypersons) think that electricity, in all its black magic wonder, is always 'there'. People in this generation even, think that electricity comes from a plug on the wall. Also as a retired USAF Avionics/engines technician on F-111 Fighter Bombers, among others, we lived by expecting 'battle damage' on the airplane, i.e. robust backups for everything going out, so we can get the jet AND Pilots, home, even in peacetime. We had Bus Ties out the ying yang. Looks like an engineering group somewhere, figured they could just 'plug it in anywhere'.
So, what we know for sure is that we still don't know what happened in the last four minutes. Without the FDR or CVR data or a survivor who knows what happened, or a video we can guess from, we'll never really know. Keep the updates coming, Juan.
they will look at the engines
@@jamescollier3 Indeed, they once reconstructed a large section of TWA Flight 800 from many tiny pieces just to figure out what happened. Too soon to call whether such old-style feats of investigative reconstruction couldn't shine a light on this one, too.
It will at least make the investigation much more difficult and uncertain, if they will be able fot figure out what happened in this cockpit during the crucial period of time.
Just like I mentioned in the last video on this tragedy.
Go back and watch were the #2 engine puffs and rewind a tad and zoom in on engine #1 and watch at the slowest speed you can. Around the same time #2 makes its very pronounced puff from the bird strike #1 does as well. It is just not as pronounced as the other one because most of it happens just inside the exhaust area. But the white puff is there. Very similar to a flameout I have seen turbines on the ground do before. Its almost certain that he ingested a bird or birds and possibly more than #2 did. If it flamed out or was damaged enough from the bird ingestion to shut down, that would possible explain the loss of power to those units. It would also explain the lack of heat blur from #1 as it comes in to touch down.
Still, even with 0 engines operating they still would have power to set up for a landing.
Hard to perform a go-around with both engines out. I don't think both engines were lost. Also, the gear was raised during the last 4 minutes. Hydraulics were working. I think they likely lost their composure and made some serious errors. Unless there was a fire. Then you need to land quickly. But there is no evidence of that.
737 can't glide far away at approach speed with both engine out, yet alone go around.
@@ianrobertson3419 The video shows a perfectly executed landing.
@@PostwarPurist The operator's manual requires an *immediate* decision (continue/go-round) after power loss on finals. It is entirely possible to call for a go-round and then immediately discover that it is not possible - this would make the crew's action in requesting a return for an opposite landing a piece of good airmanship, which was followed by a successful execution of an "impossible" turn.
Not on standby bus.
This tells us once more that no engine power was available. That's the most likely reason for the rushed unconfigured landing attempt in the first place.
But maybe the recorders still can tell us what happened before and hopefully this can help to explain the chain of events. The damaged engine shutdown process requires a discussion in the cockpit. Maybe this discussion is present on the CVR.
I've been waiting for you to cover this news. Thanks Juan. The ONLY source I really trust!
This gets more and more strange. Awful tragedy no matter how it happened. This will make things so much harder to learn exactly what happened.
as someone else said, all the cockpit voice of what they are deciding to do right before it shuts off should be indicative of what caused it.
Indeed.
@@commerce-usa
Exactly why I thought it might happen.
Without the data, all those people died for nothing 😢
You do have to wonder who might benefit from the obfuscation of that data. I can think of at least 4 major parties, the general public not being among them.
If you look at pictures of the engines being recovered, the upper part of the left engine shows no rotational fan blade distortions.
So what about the RIPS (recorder independent power supply) for the CVR? If that aircraft is up-to-date, the CVR has its own dedicated battery, even with all power loss with no batteries no engines and no APU the CVR is able to record for 10 more minutes with the RIPS. Also looking at the FDR and the wiring diagrams, there is a DC power source because there is a dedicated circuit breaker for it as well behind the captain
EDIT/update: the DC circuit breaker is a control circuit to power a relay to allow AC power to supply the FDR.
RIPS is optional. The initial owner of the aircraft was Ryanair, famous for skimping on everything it can. Somehow, I doubt that RIPS was fitted.
RIPS was only mandated in 2010....I believe this was a 2009 model.
@@marcweston2156 that’s why i mentioned. If the aircraft was up to date..pretty much all of our planes in our fleet have the RIPS, even the ones built before 2009. But as I look through the wiring there is a 28vdc power source going to the FDR and a ground. So it should have been getting power. I’m still double checking on that with some Boeing engineers colleagues.
For the CVR, the dc circuit breaker just powers the coil of the CVR power control relay coil. If the coil is energised, AC power is supplied to the CVR. Both CVR CBs are behind the left seat. The DFDR I haven't figured out yet, but also uses two circuit breakers. AC power seems to be required for the Data Acquisition Unit and the DFDR.
@@StigAviationthe functionality was reported to have been applied to aircraft manufactured since 2010. However, we found that the aircraft was first delivered by Ryanair in 2009 and was not retroactively applied to aircraft manufactured before 2010.
This is becoming more and more mysterious with the best plausible explanation being an almighty panic on the flight deck. Most agree that even with a two-engine shut-down on approach an extended glide to the original runway would have been more successful than the go-around turned out . One recalls the BA 777 at Heathrow whose engines failed at a similar point in the approach.
Postscript. Observers saw the flaps down as the JeJu Air jet passed overhead on final approach. This was when at least one birdstrike was observed. The jet then passed out of sight. There might have been another strike in the other engine if it had flown into a flock of birds. In the case of the BA777 at Heathrow the engines suddenly failed late on final approach. The crew extended the glide by raising the flaps and gingerly coaxing the plane over the fence. Probably it was close to stalling. It hit the ground hard, collapsed a main gear and slid to one side on the grass just short of the tarmac. Speed was by that time minimal. Everyone survived.
The 'what ifs' in the JeJu Air case are legion. The consensus view is that if both engines had failed for whatever reason - birdstrike, wrong engine shutdown - a configuration to best glide distance might have saved the plane and its passengers. One must always consider, however, that a landing short would have impacted the same ILS structure that the plane actually did from the reciprocal direction. The aggregate elements of this tragedy add up to the truly diabolical.
Juan - The two employees seated in the extreme rear of the aircraft survived. If the plane lost all power prior to landing on the runway without landing gear or flaps, would the surviving crew members seated in the back have been able to notice or determine if there was power in the cabin-such as lights or other systems-during this extreme emergency?
I understand that the crew members do not remember the moment of impact, but if there was a lack of power inside the airplane as it touched down and glided, they may, over time, be able to help investigators determine what systems were functioning in their part of the plane. Additionally, they might recall whether they could hear the engines.
I’ am no expert - only a passenger on planes , but I have several friends who are flight attendants for Alaska Airlines and fly on these planes daily. Understandably, everyone is feeling uneasy right now.
It is highly unlikely that any useful information will be provided by the surviving cabin crew.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but the theory that the pilots shut down the left engine accidentally could be disproved if there is no conversation in the cockpit regarding shutting down an engine during the last seconds of the recording. Surely shutting down an engine would have been discussed. Thus pointing more toward multiple engine failure rather than pilot error?
How would they keep flying on R engine with thrust reverser deployed? Also engine roar was heard as it coasted down RWY 19, Then Left engine was heard spooling down in wreckage after impact. So they had power throughout.
@@Tazjet100 No. The No 2 thrust reverser was armed and then deployed just before touchdown and throttled-up, but at low power. The No1 engine was not running.
that is really strange the blackboxes wouldn't have battery power also connected to their power input. Not as strange as that berm.
All chat about that berm wiped, all chat about no flaps and gear wiped.
How convenient.
Hm... Strange... I thought it is powered by battery... Thanks for update!
Me too!
It boggles the mind. Hi @pilotblogdenys, I just watched your update on Ukraine, came here, and here you are 😆
That's what I thought, these would run on battery backup, I can only guess, who designed this system?
This is about as useful as a NASCAR car with an extra 10 gallons of emergency fuel, in a little red can, right next to the driver, which can’t be put into the main fuel tank without stopping the car and getting out.
@@bernieschiff5919Who designed this system? Boeing. 'Nuff said.
To me it seems a rather obvious design flaw in the black box not to be able still record active available data if its own bus power would somehow become damaged or lost, especially in situations of partial power loss to the aircraft. Im really surprised it does not have its own backup battery and OR’d power from the other available busses.
Backup battery system for FDR/CVR is a customer option. It was not fitted to this aircraft.
Battery backup to recorders mandated in 2010. Aircraft built in 2009. No engine power and APU not running led to loss of data transmission and flight recording, also inability to deploy flaps and gear. Plausible scenario?
@@martinross5521 That it had to be mandated is absurd and we all know it. Boeing clearly built the original system in a non-fail-safe manner, despite it being required TO be fail-safe. Then retconned the whole thing by offering it as an "upgrade". To put this into perspective, this is basically how your lawnmower works - the thing works as long as the engine is running as it has a small generator onboard but no battery. You car, since 1960 ( Chrysler ), has had an alternator and all electrical systems operating off of the battery. The engine only charges said battery. For almost 50 years before this plane was built they have had the technology and yet here we are still with planes that lose power and their minds if the engines have problems.
Having an engine go out should be "oh, the engine is out - generator 1 is offline" - and nothing changes with the entire rest of the plane. 100% of the systems work and nothing at all goes dead - just you have a battery reserve issue to deal with. Versus oops - half or our systems are on backup and half are disabled - hope the other engine keeps running...
This aircraft was designed in the 90's and manufactured in 2012, it's up to the owner (or the operator) to upgrade their equipment or modernize it in the 2020's only if approved by the FAA (or in this case the Korean Aviation Office "KOCA"). I bet there are thousands of similar airplanes that are still operating without a recorder backup power source.
Actually it was manufactured in 2009 and first operated by Ryanair from leasing company.
APU might not have been operative. I have flown on a number of flights without a working APU. It's not required on a lots of flights. So need to check if it was working when they left.
Really? On a 737 it would take a "Huffer cart" to get the engines started without an APU, I cant see any airlines risking that.. and plus the APU gives the cabin creature comforts when they land and the engines are off.. IDK dude
@@drewpknutz1410Inoperative APU allowed on MEL, common practice
@@drewpknutz1410I flew on a flight a week ago on United that did not have working APU and they used the huffer cart.
@@drewpknutz1410happens all the time.
@@AB-kd9mk Haha, no, a commercial flight with an inop APU doesnt "Happen all the time"..LOL..
Capt Sully turned on the APU immediately after hitting birds in NY. That gave them enough power for CVR & FDR. That comes from experience, not the checklist.
The JeJu air pilots did the BEST they could and if it wasn't for that structure at the end of the runway, all of them would be alive. Zero doubt.
Should pilots be trained to turn on the APU earlier in the checklist process?
The Airbus had a rat, so there was power and time to start the APU.
All the 737-800 had was cold batteries.
As is often the case in aviation accidents... sounds like one of those 'perfect storm' scenarios, where multiple odd things happen at the same time.
I cant even imagine how is it even possible that critical system like this stops working when you shut down both engines... I mean at least some 15-30 minutes backup power source should be there to power it even if engines are shut down and apu is not running.
The 737 is a design of the 1960s and has still grandfather permit to lack certain Systems. E.g. the Crew warning System.
@@flightlinevr6302A good reason for a little retrofit.
@@flightlinevr6302 the problem wasn't the 737 he got it on the ground, the problem was the design of that airport
@@cardboardboxificationas fast as it was going at the berm it would have gone another half mile or more.
The FDR is not a critical flight system. Stuff on the battery busses are safety of flight basic things. One side of flight instruments, fire systems, systems needed so they plane can stay in the air and be flown. That's why the newer reg that FDR/CDR have their own backup battery separate from the plane's main batteries.
The recorder should document up to the loss of the second engine, which if manually shut down will have the beginning of that shutdown. We should know what started the problems from the recorders but we won't know what happened trying to manage it.
It wasn't shut down you can literally hear it on the video don't know why no one is talking about that
@jackmorris1068 That is the one we saw with the compressor stalls. The engine was turning but it has to achieve a certain power level before it can run the whole aircraft. Hydraulics are a bit different in that it could generate a helpful amount of pressure to assist just by the fact it was turning.
The point remains we will know what happened up to the exact point power was lost. There are many questions those recorders WILL answer.
I wouldn't begrudge this flight any last joule of energy that could have increased survival odds - so good call Boeing IMO. Figuring out what happened falls on the investigators and manufacturers. But now I'm wondering about alternate sources of information - would a subset of folks have had their phones recording throughout such a terrible event - and would any memory cards be recoverable? If so could these have captured left and right side engine noise from which frequency and power could be calculated, maybe vibration levels as well, sounds of flap and gear extension/retraction, GPS location and wind speed, cabin lighting and any announcements made or comments about strange AC smells? Would this be enough to put together a rough picture of the plane's changing energy state in the last 4 mins?
I'm sure people had their phones out and recording.
Yes passengers texted about the birds being seen jammed in the control surfaces.
They all had their phones out , typical koreans. Lots of data available from those phones.
Engine EECs record certain data that can be etracted.
Thanks @marcweston2156 - if birdstrikes severely damaged one engine to the point where it was behaving quite erratically and the other engine was inadvertently powered-down, in your experience would some level of engine monitoring and recording have continued and survived the impact? I imagine that would be very useful data if so.
My manual says CVR powered by "Switched Hot Battery Bus- As installed" so I believe the later NG models were in fact powered by the battery, if manufactured AFTER the date that it was required by the FAA. This aircraft was manufactured before that date. Hopefully the console is recoverable and will possibly show the position of the start switches.
Which model 737 Gino?
@@blancolirio -700/800 (NG)
I did a little more calculations: if this airplane uniformly accelerated from 144 to 200 knots in four minutes, it flew a whopping distance of 21 kilometers! (If it accelerated faster, distance could have only been greater!)Therefore, a graphic shown at the beggining of Blancolirios' clip is very wrong, or let's say - at least not in scale! Quite out-of-scale.
However, the ADS-B data point that an aircraft's ADS-B transmitter seized at about 9,3 km from runway treshold, which does match the aircraft height on normal glidepath. This point is above the sea, therefore the first video (of engine surging) was taken later on, maybe one minute or more after the strike. This means that the aircraft had landing gear lowered and flaps extended for some time after the bird strike.
21 kilometer distance could have only been made if an airplane veered for let's say, three kilometers, then made a U-turn of 3 km in diameter and then attempted to land...
It's not an acrobatic plane. Airliners can only turn so fast. IINM, 2-1/2 to 3 minutes is the minimum required to complete a 180-deg turn.
777 Capt… when I heard that Flight data and CVR were not available for the last four minutes I really couldn’t believe it!
I imagined that the flight data recorder would be on the hot battery bus … to preserve the data. Why on earth would it not be? 😬
It's sus isn't mate. Cmon, you have the expertise. Spill the beans.
People are commenting about a cover up and pilot error(s) but since the investigators in Seoul only had access to the CVR and the FDR was send to the NTSB i guess it is possible to recreate the exact time both stopped working.
If this is a sudden stop at the same time and this was at the moment of the birdstrike it might indicate a very unexpected and catastrophic event happened with the plane and/or in the cockpit.
Also, i cannot see the pilots switching of electrical power from whatever system at the exact moment of the birdstrike.
There would have been at least a couple of seconds recorded after the birdstrike on both devices ....
Lets hope there will be a solid final report without question marks .....
I'm a former Navy jet mechanic from the early 70's. USS Kitty Hawk sailor here. I learn so much from Juan. Thanks!
I'm a former Army, catering division of the tank sea mechanic from the parachute division. from the earlier 80's. also once went on a helicopter. . i also liked this video. Thank you Juan! @jimmckinnon7148 why??? what are your proud of? what is anything good or helpful or redeeming about you once went ona boat?? and why bring it up here?? isn't there a mental health forum for PSTarDs ??
My 2 cents worth has to do with maintenance. What if the last person who hooked up the fire switch panel reversed the fire switch cannon plugs. I know it is possible on the 727 because when I picked up a 727 from a contract Maintenace heavy check during preflight when I pulled the number 2 engine fire handle the Number 3 engine generator light came on. I dropped the panel and reversed the canon plugs and all returned to normal. If the crew pulled the correct engine fire switch and the other engine shut down, they became a glider. If this is still true, the FAA needs to require that the wire harness and canon plug be color coded, Green on green and yellow on yellow and that Boeing put different style plugs on the left and right fire switches and still with color coding on all new 737s.
Did you report this incident issue in the proper way or just save it for a TH-cam comment?
If the proper system checks are done after maintenance is completed then a switched connector fault would be picked up. When you have halfwit maintenance techs doing the work expect failures.
You dont colour code connectors because some people are colour blind. You key every plug/socket differently so you simply cannot plug them in the wrong place. Pretty simple to do.
This is the original Murphy's Law.
@@paulprice5466 The pin index safety system is for compressed gas cylinders and folks still manage to screw that up.
If there is an overload on the electrical system, or if a protection system like a circuit breaker trips in response to an issue, both buses could be temporarily or permanently disabled as a safety precaution.
The electrical system on the 737-800 includes bus tie switches that connect and manage the distribution of power between Bus A and Bus B. A failure in the bus tie system, or a malfunction in the bus tie switches, could prevent power from being routed to either bus.
In some cases, the flight crew can manually control the bus tie switches through the Electrical Panel in the cockpit. This allows them to isolate or connect buses as necessary to preserve power for essential systems.
Not knowing the layout of this aircraft, maybe a pilot could explain where on the upper panel these bus tie switches are?
I am wondering if the FDR shows decrease in thrust lever angle on #1 before losing power, as that would be very telling of misidentifying a faulty engine.
Unless they just pull the fuel cutoff right away.
Even then I would have thought it would catch the fuel valve being closed before the engine winds down and power is lost.....unless the IDG's failed before engine shutdown
This tragic incident raises some critical questions, especially with the discovery that the black boxes stopped recording just four minutes before the crash. It’s interesting to think about what the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) might have captured prior to that point-engine performance, control inputs, and system warnings. If the pilots inadvertently shut down the wrong engine, the FDR could hold clues, such as the specific control commands made.
The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) could also provide vital context. Were the pilots discussing which engine to shut down? Were there any signs of confusion or miscommunication in the cockpit? This would be especially important if they were under pressure to make split-second decisions after the reported bird strike.
If a wrong engine shutdown did occur, it highlights the importance of clear protocols and situational awareness in such emergencies. Bird strikes are complex to handle, but proper identification of the affected engine is critical before taking action.
I hope investigators can retrieve enough from the available data to shed light on the pilots’ decisions and actions. It’s a tragic reminder of how even small errors in high-pressure situations can lead to devastating consequences.
Hopefully a forensic examination of the engine wreckage in particular will throw some more light on this accident but in any event I would suggest that the final recommendations will be along the lines 1. Do not place a solid barrier close to the end of a runway 2. Install EMAS arresting material at the end of every runway 3. In the event of a major engine malfunction on final approach consider continuing to the runway if at all possible 4. Provide independent backup power to the FDR and CVR and retrofit if necessary (so that regular viewers of accident investigation videos won't be 'disappointed').
10 minute lithium battery should be included internal to both recorders that defaults to operation if the external power to the recorders fails ?
Especially #3, man! I know hindsight is 20/20 but man I wonder why they didnt just continue the approach?
You can tell a lot about engine state at time of the crash by analyzing the fan blades, core, bearings, etc. Aviation Mishap Investigators are so impressive!
Those are all already procedures, they just weren't followed.
@@davidpowell3347 What's there to record? They shut off all the power. Even if the recorder was running there was nothing to send it data.
@@davidpowell3347 internal? So it has a chance to combust the memory storage?
Semi-random question: what precisely is powered by the auxiliary drive gearbox on the 737's engines?
I wonder if the effects of a freak hit on said gearbox assembly could plausibly include losing both hydraulic pressure and electrical, while the engine (briefly at least) continues to provide thrust.
(...or rather, one system of each.)
As an airport worker, i still cannot fathom why they would have a concrete structure across the run off area holding up the ILS antennae. Everything in that area should be frangible (easily breakable without much damage to the aircraft) including the perimeter fence. I suspect that without the concrete structure, some if not all would have survived. So sad.
I doubt there would have been a high survival rate even without the wall.
Even a drainage culvert would have destroyed that plane.
It had a huge amount of momentum off the end of that runway.
Something to do with typhoon going yearly through the area.
Agree, overruns should be safe.
To keep the plane within the airport property. That barrier did stop the plane from leaving the property of the airport. Nobody complained about that barrier before.
@@jamesm568 yes they had…..it had been flagged up several times previously….from memory, from another video, it was on the list of things to be upgraded/rectified…
How strange and disappointing that they don’t have that data. Thanks for the update Juan, I hope they can discover enough to give us some idea. Why the pilots didn’t decided to make the landing they did will forever a mystery
I believe the current CFR requires aircraft manufactured after April 2010 to be fitted with RIPS option for CVR. The accident aircraft was delivered approximately one year prior to that. I believe FDR is intentionally left out from the battery bus as it would NOT be able to receive meaningful data from all sensors onboard. Total AC failure = heavy electrical shedding. Powering sensors and registering data to FDR is their least concern.
@@AerobatBrian No you are incorrect. RIPS is designed for power supplying CVR in case of catastrophic AC power failure. CFR 121.359 through CFR 25.1457 mandates CVR to carry independent power supply for any transport category ac manufactured after April 2010. CFR 25.1459 concerning FDR does not mention anything about independent power source even to this date.
As always Juan, thanks for the detailed and objective insight. I’ve noticed that when high-profile accidents prompt a flurry of fast content, I don’t even watch it now. Instead, I wait for your take, which I trust a lot more. Cheers.
So it looks like both engines got taken out. I think we should still be able to infer with the data up to the second engine going out whether it was an accidental shutdown or another bird strike.
Thank you Juan, and keep working.
I am an AVS/ELEC. Instructor and I teach All the Challenger and CRJ aircraft series and under FAA rules the CVR must record for 10Mins after the lost of the aircraft power using a recorder independent power supply (RIPS) that sits between the CVR tray and the CVR LRU. FAA rule FAR 25.1457. SB 605-23-006 Rev. 1 (Oct/2015). We have to find out if that airline is under this FAA requirement.
Well it operates in South Korea, it doesn’t fly to USA and the airline and aircraft are registered in South Korea…..so I’m going to say it probably isn’t.
but we can see an engine running on landing... doesn't that mean the generator in that would be running and providing power to the cvr and fdr?
If that engine was running erratically ( it appears it had compressor stalls per the earlier video ) then the generator may have tripped -- it turned itself off to prevent damage , It can be reset in the cockpit, but they didn't appear to have too much time to run through the checklists.
Well, there are a few things that might prevent that from working, but you raise a good point. In a normal situation one running engine would power basically everything. Failures or pilot error could prevent that.
They were still going plenty fast enough for the engines to be windmilling. They still make a lot of noise even windmilling. Judging it by sound is inconclusive. The investigators should be able to determine if the engines were producing power by examination.
@@RichFreeman "running" covers a wide variety of situations.
@@lyleparadise2764 even at idle power the IDG would still be working.
They were set up on approach. All they had to do was maintain GS and put it down on the runway. Juan already mentioned this.
Are sure the critical bird strikes occurred before they decided to go around? Is it possible they had two bird strikes, and the second one didn't occur after they had pulled up?
It is unclear whether they were even on approach anymore. The fluctuations in altitude *before* the power loss could indicate they’d already started the go-around before they hit the birds. We don’t know right now and it’ll require a lot of forensic work (and thus time) to get us answers.
They may have seen a flock of birds in their way during their approach and decided to go around. If this is what happened then the bird strikes most likely happened after the go around was initiated. This could explain why the aircraft was in a clean configuration ( gear and flaps up )
@@lyleparadise2764 This is what I think as well and this jives with the video showing the bird strike/compressor stall as the gear is up in that video.
Yes, but many airlines make it a matter of company policy that their pilots do a go-round in the event of any problems on final approach. Even in the world of commercial aviation, you can be fired for choosing the the safest option.
Looks like another written in blood requirement. Hope this spurs a AD to have backup power on the CVR and FDR.
According to the timeline diagram, the go around was initiated about 3 minutes before touchdown and about 4 minutes before the end of the flight. So if the loss of power to the CVR and FDR was the result of the crew shutting down the wrong engine, that would suggest that the crew went through the shutdown procedure at the same time they were beginning the go around, an unlikely occurrence.
One of the absolutes in all my jet training was not to even think about the engine shutdown memory items until you were at a safe altitude. This flight never got to a safe altitude after they started the go-around.
How convenient. So in this narrative they shut down both engines on initial approach before even attempting a go around. Well their story is not adding up. Stinks!
@@user-pf5xq3lq8i By far the most plausible explanation, which seems to be supported by video evidence, is dual engine failure/loss of power due to hitting a flock of birds. There appear to be people who are deliberately trying to invent scenarios which involve a ridiculous degree of crew negligence.
@@hb1338Duel engine and total electrical failure on final approach and at least partly configured for landing yet you opt to go around rather than getting the aircraft on the ground. If that doesn't point to ridiculous crew negligence I don't know what does.
@@I_Evo there wasn't a dual engine failure don't know where people are getting this from you can literally hear the engine still running on the video when it crashes
Non pilot here. The plane had been pretty much in continual use for the previous couple of days, with very minimal down time. Wonder what was listed as inoperable in the MEL (Minimum equipment list). And if items were on the MEL that meant it should not have been flying. Wonder if the APU was listed as inop on the MEL?
I reckon you might be right, there was some mention of a diversion the previous day. Might have been electrical.
@@MollyWi the earlier diversion was due to a medical emergency of a passenger.
@ the diversion was supposedly medical, but would have impacted the tight schedules in place.
Sorry what?
“If items were on MEL that meant it should not have been flying”??
That’s the exact purpose of the MEL - to allow the airplane to operate without certain specific systems operative.
The airline industry would die if no MEL was allowed, so what are you saying?
@@IanWallace-z4n most probably mis-worded. If they flew when the plane should have been grounded. I assume the list of inop items is uploaded after each stop, and that the only copy was not on the plane.
Very frustrating situation as we need to figure out what happened so that lessons can be learned. So far, the main lesson is that the recorders should have independent power systems, but that's already something that newer aircraft have.
I’m no FDR/CVR expert. But it’s obvious to me that if the systems normally monitored by FDR/CVR are no longer powered then there’s nothing to record. They are digital records, not analog. Ergo, an electronic exchange needs to occur between the microphone on the flight deck or the deflection sensor on a flight control. The 737 can revert to full mechanical flight control without electrics. Therefore battery backup of the FDR/CVR is redundant. Just my $0.02.
The cockpit area mic is directly connected to and powered through the cvr system. Had they installed the RIPS option then they would have had that at least.
The battery backup allows the data recorder and the voice recorder to record the loss of power to all the other systems.
you have to consider the CVR and FDR as two VERY different entities and neither share anything as far as data.
The CVR is an easy one and is wired to an area microphone on the flight deck and the crews headset mic. The CVR powers those microphones and is armed by different things, some aircraft it is engines at idle power for 5 min, or > 5 psi oil pressure or others whenever there is electrical power on the aircraft per part 121.
The FDR's record around 1500 parameters and those components and sensors need to be powered to send data to those FDR channels - it just is not feasible to do. If they had the CVR data via battery backup this video would be a totally different subject
I wonder if a FRAPU fried on the engine that took the hit causing both gens to trip.... it aligns frequency and phase between both engine drive generators... I've seen them drop both busses.
There should be fuses installed to prevent such a scenario, as there is always a chance of this unit to fail, whatever the reason (unrelated to bird strikes). The highest likehood to me seems a lightning strike.
@bsimic29 never seen one in it before...
@@bsimic29 In this case, there was no lightning, but there were birds.
@@hb1338 You missed my point - I said that there should be some kind of fuses installed into every electronic device onboard an aircraft to protect the rest of electrical equipment from failing due to one failed unit, whatever foreseeable failure it might get. It's called good engineering and it's fairly simple to implement it.
Thank you for the latest Juan. I have been waiting for the latest word and you got it out ASAP. Kudos.
Seems to me this was a go-around gone terribly wrong. They retracted the gear and flaps which is normal for go around. Then suddenly turn 180 to return to runway. I think they shut down the operating engine by mistake
There are eye witness reports of a failure to climb in the go-round, which would make a return for an opposite landing the only available option. There is NO evidence which tells how and why engine #1 stopped operating.
In a case like this, there is no benefit to shutting down an engine when you know you have to land ASAP. Not shutting down an engine has zero effect on performance, except if it's still running. So I don't know why everybody's so fixated on that. Even if the fire bell is ringing, you're not going to waste time in that situation when you think you're going to lose both engines when the runway is just minutes away. This isn't a prop plane, where you do have to shut it down so you can feather it. You don't feather turbofans.
If they had shut down the operating engine (I presume you mean #1) by mistake, instead of shutting down the supposedly damaged #2 engine, then how come #2 seemed to be operating and the thrust reversal was clearly deployed when it was speeding down the runway on its belly?
@@istudios225 First, what would be the urgency in shutting down a failed engine? There's no difference in performance whether you leave it alone or secure it. Second, what makes you think that that the left engine was not damaged also and quit on its own accord? New video shows that the left engine also ingested a bird because a puff came out of the tailpipe near the time the right engine did the same thing, although it was less visible. All the landing video shows is that the right hand hydraulic system was operating because the right engine was driving the right engine driven hydraulic pump and the pilot pulled the right thrust reverser lever on landing. If the left thrust reverser was still stowed, it means either that it was not deployed manually, or that there was no hydraulic pressure to deploy the reverser because engine driven pump was not working because the engine was not producting thrust or because there was no electrical power to power the left electric hydraulic pump because the left AC Transfer bus was unpowered. Remember that, the ADS-B/transponder failed nearly at the same time as the CVR and FDR, which suggests that there were cascading electrical failures affecting different buses. OTOH, it may be because someone pulled the left hand engine fire switch, thereby inactivating the left hydraulic system, in which case they would have shut down the engine, but not necessarily in error since it appears now that it did ingest a bird. That's why investigations take so long as aircraft, even pieces of junk like the 737 (did fly it long ago) remain fairly complex.
on landing engine noise was clearly noticeable. total system failure resulting in loss of control i think.