Thank-you so so much Victor for your exquisite readings. They are most enjoyable and elucidating, akin to blowing on the embers of life - A lighthouse beacon for a sailor drifting in the tempest of life. Is it conceivable to approach Wittgenstein’s writings with an ouroboros, circular, self-examining and nurturing tendency ? Unable to unshackle the self from the reality of its own language. No prospect of total objectivity and an inclination to solipsism with mankind caged within his own manifested prison of reality. Why is mankind so intent with tenacious relish to cast his anchor of fear into the abyss of absurdity, yearning to find some abrasive tension and comfort on the rippled seabed of time. Then winching it back aboard . Alas, only to find that, what he had already cast. Is it possible to take a leap into absurdity from a point of absurdity…….?
to picture rain and not raining - see rain at a location where it is raining one side of a road up to the lane markings and one the other other half or the road it is not raining - so to imaging it raining and not raining is entirely possible at the same time is the size of the location is sufficient to include both states of raining and not raining - it is only impossible at the same universal time and same universal location. this then raises a set of questions about boundary locations in general
extremely helpful and clear introduction to the TLP. Thank you very much! If you were to speculate: What is your guess concerning the "ontological status"/being of Wittgensteins "simple objects". Personally, I believe that the axiomatic, ideal, non-empirical objects of theoretical physics (e.g. the uniformly moving mass point of Newtonian physics), which are a priori projected onto what presents itself to our senses, are closest to what Wittgenstein had in mind. The romanian philosopher Ilie Parvu wrote a brilliant essay on this specific interpretation: The Structural Theory of the Tractatus Have a great day!
I was thinking about 0-chapters in the book and was looking into Russell's dichotomy of knowlegde - on the one hand about sensory knowledge (subjective knowledge - personal knowledge) and on the other hand about knowledge based on description (objective knowledge - shared knowledge - which is (in the end) based on subjective experience). It is possible that when W makes 0 - statements (2.0, 3.0 ....) he deals with a pure subjective point of view as Russel defines it.
This answers pretty well my concerns from the previous video, if you remember, when I questioned whether Wittgenstein saw names as clusters of properties or as referring to existing things. 3.24 is a pretty clear departure from any descriptive theory (and Frege). I'm starting to see how pictures, thought and language are tightly intertwined in the Tractatus, and need names referring to simple things as a form of atoms. I love in 3.141 when he compares the Satz to a musical theme - there needs to be a form of "grammar" for notes to form a melody, you can't just hammer a bunch of notes, just like logic, language and thought need a logical grammar. I can see how this points forward to modern propositional logic, if I understand him right that is. By the way, is Andor any good? I need something to occupy my free time other than having Kant and Wittgenstein use my brain as a boxing ball... And reading philosophy is often very much a single player game. But I appreciate your videos as company!
To picture oneself flying by flapping one's hands necessarily entails the picture either ommitting or changing the state of affairs in the real world, such as gravity and weight. It is not possible to picture without such departure from reality, so it is not really a thought of this world. It is no less impossible to think than simultainious raining and not raining. It's just a more complicated example.
In 3.001 Wittgenstein talks about the thinkability of a state of affairs...how can he be so sure about something being thinkable when he wasn't even able to explain what it was?!?
I wonder if comparing the possibility of thinking of simultaneously raining and not raining, and flapping ones arm and flying are categorically different? The rain example is conceptual, as in you can't have an object be black and white simultaneously, while the second is empirical, ie ones arms doesn't have enough power to cause one to fly. If one had that power, one could fly. But there is no argument to allow the possibility of simultaneous rain and no rain, or simultaneous black and white object . Thus I can agree with witt that it is logically impossible for the rain case to be, and logically (but not empirically) possible for the flying case to be.
Thanks for your response. Yes, that really hit me when u mentioned that Wittgenstein stipulated that all possibility for him is logical, eg is possible to picture someone flapping their hands and flying, even though it is empirically impossible. Wittgenstein dropped a half a peg in my eyes with that comment. Also, I'd like to add that maybe there is possibly a logical inconsistency in Wittgenstein's stipulation, and that is that yes we can picture a human flapping hands and flying, but wouldn't that be illogical, ie conceptual nonsense, ie if someone could fly by flapping hands, or someone could lift the Eiffel tower, then that organism would not be human..?
Hi, I'm a bit confused I have two questions: 1. What is the relation between logic and language, is logic some kinde state of affair and language is some kinde state of affair and both are linked together like chain, like you said about oxygen atoms how they link? 2. Is Wittgensteins trying to say that there is no such thing as a prior truths? Ty!
23:32 (Premise 3.1431) is it okay to talk of ‘Spatial Objects’ and call them chairs books etc? For didn’t we come to conclude before, when talking of your Nietzsche Bust that it is not possible to use it as an example and name an atomic object. Or is this just a miss interpretation of the language game used when saying ‘Object’ in this particular premise? OR is it that we can name and speak of spatial objects but not logical objects? Thus the Nietzsche bust is a spatial not a logical object and was used incorrectly as a logical object before you corrected yourself later in the video?
Ok then is "a cat" a simple object or a composite of let's say it's parents DNA or chemical components that make up it's tissues? What are the objects that can not be reduced to their parts? Are we talking about physics or something else? Does the topic of the conversation play a role. For example for a casual conversation on non biology "a cat" is a simple name and at a veterinarian's conference "a cat" is a compound object?
To me it seems kinda odd that Wittgenstein put forward this completely made up thing, “simple objects”. If they are a logical necessity for language’s meaning then the fact that (as far as we can observe) no simple objects nor names for simple objects exist would have to lead you to rethink your theory instead of just insisting that they must exist out of necessity.
Victor, please keep going - your discussion of the Tractatus is wonderful. Can't wait for the rest!
I've been very busy, but I'll certainly get back to these videos!
Very excited for someday getting through chapter 4.
Thank-you so so much Victor for your exquisite readings. They are most enjoyable and elucidating, akin to blowing on the embers of life - A lighthouse beacon for a sailor drifting in the tempest of life.
Is it conceivable to approach Wittgenstein’s writings with an ouroboros, circular, self-examining and nurturing tendency ?
Unable to unshackle the self from the reality of its own language. No prospect of total objectivity and an inclination to solipsism with mankind caged within his own manifested prison of reality.
Why is mankind so intent with tenacious relish to cast his anchor of fear into the abyss of absurdity, yearning to find some abrasive tension and comfort on the rippled seabed of time. Then winching it back aboard . Alas, only to find that, what he had already cast.
Is it possible to take a leap into absurdity from a point of absurdity…….?
What happened?? I'm loving these videos!
Thank you for the clarifying commentary, much needed for the Tractatus. Looking forward to the remaining videos.
to picture rain and not raining - see rain at a location where it is raining one side of a road up to the lane markings and one the other other half or the road it is not raining - so to imaging it raining and not raining is entirely possible at the same time is the size of the location is sufficient to include both states of raining and not raining - it is only impossible at the same universal time and same universal location. this then raises a set of questions about boundary locations in general
extremely helpful and clear introduction to the TLP. Thank you very much! If you were to speculate: What is your guess concerning the "ontological status"/being of Wittgensteins "simple objects". Personally, I believe that the axiomatic, ideal, non-empirical objects of theoretical physics (e.g. the uniformly moving mass point of Newtonian physics), which are a priori projected onto what presents itself to our senses, are closest to what Wittgenstein had in mind. The romanian philosopher Ilie Parvu wrote a brilliant essay on this specific interpretation: The Structural Theory of the Tractatus
Have a great day!
Thank you very much
Looking forward to the next chapter :)
Victor, Dank u wel for the wonderful videos. They have helped me tremendously! I'm eagerly awaiting the next video
I was thinking about 0-chapters in the book and was looking into Russell's dichotomy of knowlegde - on the one hand about sensory knowledge (subjective knowledge - personal knowledge) and on the other hand about knowledge based on description (objective knowledge - shared knowledge - which is (in the end) based on subjective experience). It is possible that when W makes 0 - statements (2.0, 3.0 ....) he deals with a pure subjective point of view as Russel defines it.
Quite superb.
This answers pretty well my concerns from the previous video, if you remember, when I questioned whether Wittgenstein saw names as clusters of properties or as referring to existing things. 3.24 is a pretty clear departure from any descriptive theory (and Frege). I'm starting to see how pictures, thought and language are tightly intertwined in the Tractatus, and need names referring to simple things as a form of atoms. I love in 3.141 when he compares the Satz to a musical theme - there needs to be a form of "grammar" for notes to form a melody, you can't just hammer a bunch of notes, just like logic, language and thought need a logical grammar. I can see how this points forward to modern propositional logic, if I understand him right that is.
By the way, is Andor any good? I need something to occupy my free time other than having Kant and Wittgenstein use my brain as a boxing ball... And reading philosophy is often very much a single player game. But I appreciate your videos as company!
Thank you so much
Professor, when will you be making a new video?
when is the rest coming (: !!?
when will the next one come out?
To picture oneself flying by flapping one's hands necessarily entails the picture either ommitting or changing the state of affairs in the real world, such as gravity and weight. It is not possible to picture without such departure from reality, so it is not really a thought of this world. It is no less impossible to think than simultainious raining and not raining. It's just a more complicated example.
In 3.001 Wittgenstein talks about the thinkability of a state of affairs...how can he be so sure about something being thinkable when he wasn't even able to explain what it was?!?
I wonder if comparing the possibility of thinking of simultaneously raining and not raining, and flapping ones arm and flying are categorically different? The rain example is conceptual, as in you can't have an object be black and white simultaneously, while the second is empirical, ie ones arms doesn't have enough power to cause one to fly. If one had that power, one could fly. But there is no argument to allow the possibility of simultaneous rain and no rain, or simultaneous black and white object .
Thus I can agree with witt that it is logically impossible for the rain case to be, and logically (but not empirically) possible for the flying case to be.
That makes a lot of sense. Wittgenstein's idea that all modality is logical is quite extreme and not very popular!
Thanks for your response. Yes, that really hit me when u mentioned that Wittgenstein stipulated that all possibility for him is logical, eg is possible to picture someone flapping their hands and flying, even though it is empirically impossible. Wittgenstein dropped a half a peg in my eyes with that comment. Also, I'd like to add that maybe there is possibly a logical inconsistency in Wittgenstein's stipulation, and that is that yes we can picture a human flapping hands and flying, but wouldn't that be illogical, ie conceptual nonsense, ie if someone could fly by flapping hands, or someone could lift the Eiffel tower, then that organism would not be human..?
Yes, and by the way, thanks much for your Tractatus series. Very clear, greatly helped my understanding. Looking forward to additional vids .
Hi, I'm a bit confused I have two questions:
1. What is the relation between logic and language, is logic some kinde state of affair and language is some kinde state of affair and both are linked together like chain, like you said about oxygen atoms how they link?
2. Is Wittgensteins trying to say that there is no such thing as a prior truths?
Ty!
23:32 (Premise 3.1431) is it okay to talk of ‘Spatial Objects’ and call them chairs books etc? For didn’t we come to conclude before, when talking of your Nietzsche Bust that it is not possible to use it as an example and name an atomic object. Or is this just a miss interpretation of the language game used when saying ‘Object’ in this particular premise?
OR is it that we can name and speak of spatial objects but not logical objects? Thus the Nietzsche bust is a spatial not a logical object and was used incorrectly as a logical object before you corrected yourself later in the video?
Ok then is "a cat" a simple object or a composite of let's say it's parents DNA or chemical components that make up it's tissues?
What are the objects that can not be reduced to their parts? Are we talking about physics or something else?
Does the topic of the conversation play a role. For example for a casual conversation on non biology "a cat" is a simple name and at a veterinarian's conference "a cat" is a compound object?
To me it seems kinda odd that Wittgenstein put forward this completely made up thing, “simple objects”. If they are a logical necessity for language’s meaning then the fact that (as far as we can observe) no simple objects nor names for simple objects exist would have to lead you to rethink your theory instead of just insisting that they must exist out of necessity.