That idea of transition costs from being sighted to being blind vs. being born blind was really interesting. I hadn't thought of that before. It would be a terrible thing for me to lose my hearing or my vision. However, I do suspect that it would still be a detriment to me to have been born blind or deaf. I love music and I can't see my life as enriched as it is now if I had never been able to appreciate and make music. But at any rate, I'm not altogether sure that people without disabilities are less reliable than those *with* disabilities specifically because we've been able to experience life without these disabilities, so it seems like we're equally qualified to say that life without a disability is preferable to a life with a disability. Plus, why couldn't it also be the case that those with disabilities are unreliable in this discussion because they could be overcompensating and telling themselves that life is better than it really is because they have to live with this disability? I'm not saying this actually is what happens, just that I think it's a valid response to that argument. In fact, it seems like the person best suited to say whether or not something is a disability is someone who's lived both with and without the disability. At any rate, while I do agree that life with a disability would prevent me from being able to flourish fully as a human being, in no way does that show that people with disabilities are worthless. If anything, we have a greater obligation to help those with disabilities because of those disabilities and we all belong to the community of man. We ought to be helping disabled people, not advocating for killing them because we, personally, would not want to live a life like that.
Interestingly, this is one ways in which Barnes differs from other defenders of the social model: She grants that there are some bad things about having a disability (independent of social structures). Her example is the experience of listening to music -- it does seem like a bad thing to lack the capacity for that experience. But she compares it to the badness that's associated with being embodied in lots of other ways. *Her* example -- not one I intend to advance or endorse here -- is that lacking the ability to carry and birth children is a similar kind of bad thing, at least for some people. So being biologically male -- lacking the natural capacity to carry and birth children -- is a kind of negative of being embodied in that way. Yet, we don't think that biologically male bodies are "worse off" than biologically female bodies -- there are just pros and cons of being embodied in different ways. So having the capacity to listen to music is great, but the difference between the bodies of those who can hear music and those that cannot is not a *bad* difference -- it's a mere difference. (Something like that -- I'm putting the view pretty roughly, I think.) She might also say that lacking the ability to hear might be bad *for you* given your testimony here. But that is different than it being *bad* simpliciter. Regarding testimony, the literature on testimony (epistemic and hermeneutical justice/injustice) is substantial (and growing). The objection you raise is tied closely to "adaptive preferences," I think -- the idea that a "bad" situation might lead a person to revise their preferences to "make the most" of the situation. (The idea is not that this is done knowingly or consciously, I don't think.) Barnes, for example, refers to a story where a fox sees grapes high up in a tree and wants to eat them. But upon realizing there's no way to get them, decides it's better this way -- "grapes are too sour" anyway. It's an article that I haven't read entirely yet (on my to-do list): www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40658392.pdf (I'm sharing the link simply if you'd like to read the article/responses -- I don't intend it as a kind of answer to your objection here.)
If you would ever like to talk to me about my disabilities, epilepsy, autism, and learning disability I am open to explaining how I see all three of my disabilities as positive.
I do think that Natural Law gives a good definition of disability that accounts for all the things that are put on that list. The medical field used to take a more Aristotelian approach to medicine until the 20th century, maybe late 19th century where they shifted from an Aristotelian understanding of medicine to a more utilitarian understanding. Under utilitarianism, it's difficult to understand how things should be seen as disabled.
I am really interested in looking at those kinds of accounts of disability -- There are certainly many more variations of the accounts I consider in this video. Barnes, for example, provides a good response to the view that disability is an absence of a particular feature or function, but (from what I can tell) does not address accounts that suggest disability is (or involves) a lack of some feature or function that the subject *ought to have* (given the type of thing it is). So there's definitely a lot more to be said.
@@bioethicsondemand6258 It would have to be said either everyone or no one is disabled. Genes protect people from some diseases, but those very same genes make them susceptible to other diseases. CCR5 is an example, remove CCR5 and the person becomes immune to HIV, but significantly more susceptible to West Nile disease. All mutations that persist enhance the adaptability of the population as a whole, sustain genetic stability, and accelerate the pace of evolution says Evelyn Fox Keller. So if we destroyed the mutations, we would lose adaptability, lose genetic stability, and accelerate the pace to human extinction. Another thing worth noting, disabled people’s bodies serve functions a non-disabled person’s body can’t. Like it can be said ADHDers and autistics are less susceptible to fall for conspiracy theories by having less dopamine while non-disabled people fall for them all the time, Adaptive Conspiricism.
That idea of transition costs from being sighted to being blind vs. being born blind was really interesting. I hadn't thought of that before. It would be a terrible thing for me to lose my hearing or my vision. However, I do suspect that it would still be a detriment to me to have been born blind or deaf. I love music and I can't see my life as enriched as it is now if I had never been able to appreciate and make music. But at any rate, I'm not altogether sure that people without disabilities are less reliable than those *with* disabilities specifically because we've been able to experience life without these disabilities, so it seems like we're equally qualified to say that life without a disability is preferable to a life with a disability. Plus, why couldn't it also be the case that those with disabilities are unreliable in this discussion because they could be overcompensating and telling themselves that life is better than it really is because they have to live with this disability? I'm not saying this actually is what happens, just that I think it's a valid response to that argument. In fact, it seems like the person best suited to say whether or not something is a disability is someone who's lived both with and without the disability.
At any rate, while I do agree that life with a disability would prevent me from being able to flourish fully as a human being, in no way does that show that people with disabilities are worthless. If anything, we have a greater obligation to help those with disabilities because of those disabilities and we all belong to the community of man. We ought to be helping disabled people, not advocating for killing them because we, personally, would not want to live a life like that.
Interestingly, this is one ways in which Barnes differs from other defenders of the social model: She grants that there are some bad things about having a disability (independent of social structures). Her example is the experience of listening to music -- it does seem like a bad thing to lack the capacity for that experience. But she compares it to the badness that's associated with being embodied in lots of other ways. *Her* example -- not one I intend to advance or endorse here -- is that lacking the ability to carry and birth children is a similar kind of bad thing, at least for some people. So being biologically male -- lacking the natural capacity to carry and birth children -- is a kind of negative of being embodied in that way. Yet, we don't think that biologically male bodies are "worse off" than biologically female bodies -- there are just pros and cons of being embodied in different ways. So having the capacity to listen to music is great, but the difference between the bodies of those who can hear music and those that cannot is not a *bad* difference -- it's a mere difference. (Something like that -- I'm putting the view pretty roughly, I think.)
She might also say that lacking the ability to hear might be bad *for you* given your testimony here. But that is different than it being *bad* simpliciter.
Regarding testimony, the literature on testimony (epistemic and hermeneutical justice/injustice) is substantial (and growing). The objection you raise is tied closely to "adaptive preferences," I think -- the idea that a "bad" situation might lead a person to revise their preferences to "make the most" of the situation. (The idea is not that this is done knowingly or consciously, I don't think.) Barnes, for example, refers to a story where a fox sees grapes high up in a tree and wants to eat them. But upon realizing there's no way to get them, decides it's better this way -- "grapes are too sour" anyway. It's an article that I haven't read entirely yet (on my to-do list): www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40658392.pdf (I'm sharing the link simply if you'd like to read the article/responses -- I don't intend it as a kind of answer to your objection here.)
If you would ever like to talk to me about my disabilities, epilepsy, autism, and learning disability I am open to explaining how I see all three of my disabilities as positive.
I do think that Natural Law gives a good definition of disability that accounts for all the things that are put on that list. The medical field used to take a more Aristotelian approach to medicine until the 20th century, maybe late 19th century where they shifted from an Aristotelian understanding of medicine to a more utilitarian understanding. Under utilitarianism, it's difficult to understand how things should be seen as disabled.
I am really interested in looking at those kinds of accounts of disability -- There are certainly many more variations of the accounts I consider in this video. Barnes, for example, provides a good response to the view that disability is an absence of a particular feature or function, but (from what I can tell) does not address accounts that suggest disability is (or involves) a lack of some feature or function that the subject *ought to have* (given the type of thing it is). So there's definitely a lot more to be said.
@@bioethicsondemand6258
It would have to be said either everyone or no one is disabled. Genes protect people from some diseases, but those very same genes make them susceptible to other diseases. CCR5 is an example, remove CCR5 and the person becomes immune to HIV, but significantly more susceptible to West Nile disease. All mutations that persist enhance the adaptability of the population as a whole, sustain genetic stability, and accelerate the pace of evolution says Evelyn Fox Keller. So if we destroyed the mutations, we would lose adaptability, lose genetic stability, and accelerate the pace to human extinction.
Another thing worth noting, disabled people’s bodies serve functions a non-disabled person’s body can’t. Like it can be said ADHDers and autistics are less susceptible to fall for conspiracy theories by having less dopamine while non-disabled people fall for them all the time, Adaptive Conspiricism.