วีดีโอ

What evidence is there that 2021 event in Washington was instigated by Russia? First time hearing that.

Man, everything said before 11:40 was mislabelled. Every example used was not subversion at all but the "tools" of subversion i.e., misinformation, disinformation, propaganda - and their influence on the principles of social identity theory, and in/out-group differentiation theory. At 11:40 it is spot on though, "undermining cohesion" is the exact outcome desired from an effective subversion campaign. Further, stop using Jan 6th as an example of subversion (as you define it), the people who demonstrated on Jan 6th, were not disputing the authority of the government, nor were they attempting to undermine it, they were simply demonstrating against what they felt was an unlawful outcome of the election. They still believed in the principles of the Constitution, just not the manner in which the other party won the election. Your premise "weaponization of a narrative" is an excellent example for Jan 6th though. The media redefined the narrative post-event, repeated it constantly for 3 years now, and now even researchers such as yourself have been conditioned (via your schema of the event) to believe something else occurred on that day - other than what actually did. That said, that's not subversion, that's classical disinformation strategy - which is a tool of subversion.

BLITZKRIEG, ignorant !!!... This IS a German Word...

Great talk!

Berlin and Washington were responses to subversion and cases in which subversion has failed, which occurred prior to the events you mentioned. I don't think you can justify a response to clear cases of governmental subversion of their own people as subversion itself.

promo sm

Thank you for this presentation. Why are Q&A skipped?

USA is still leading the tech industry but with the time the competition between the 2 Giants (US and China) will be more intense.

Thank goodness the Egyptians did overthrow the Ihkwan government. Can you imagine leaving that terror group in charge of Egypt? You’d have a major theater war in the Levant with Israel, and probably in the Horn with Ethiopia.

The Post Truth Era. There’s a reason the 1% are building underground bunkers and creating an infrastructure to leave. The Post Truth world will be run by authoritarians who can clean up the mess and control the narrative.

Recent articles by Paul Scharre on the topics discussed: warontherocks.com/2023/04/ais-inhuman-advantage/ www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/ai-america-can-win-race

Vladislav Surkov. Could Russia have established a level of control over British media and government due to how unaware our security services seem to be of these effects and how information is kept from the public in the UK.

𝓅𝓇𝑜𝓂𝑜𝓈𝓂

Great talk, excited to read this book

Professor Arquilla's insight, lifetime of study and commitment to national defense is an absolute blessing to Americans. He has the deep respect of myself and many others. DOL!

Timestamps! 9:16 Panel 6 | European Cybersecurity: Redefining Sovereignty 11:55 Sarah Backman - Risk vs. threat-based cybersecurity: the case of the EU 30:34 Cosmina Moghior - European Digital Sovereignty: An Analysis of Authority Delegation 47:51 Tobias Liebetrau - A genealogy of EU cyber security governance: Redefining the role of the single market 1:01:15 Dennis Broeders, Fabio Cristiano & Monica Kaminska - In search of digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy: normative power Europe to the test of its geopolitical ambitions 3:09:45 Panel 7 | The Covid Pandemic: Lessons and Challenges for Cyber Stability 3:11:35 Pedro Henrique Ramos - A "New" Digital Divide in Times of Crisis: The Open Internet During the COVID-19 Pandemic 3:26:16 Gareth Mott and Jason Nurse - Can lessons be learnt from the governance of the coronavirus pandemic to help preparations for future cyber crises? 3:44:20 Miftahul Ulum - Religious based Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Cyber Norm; their take on the disinfodemic during the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia 4:03:51 JD Work - Understanding cyber operations against pandemic response by authoritarian states 5:41:07 Keynote by Herb Lin: "Some Unanswered Questions in the Development of Norms Regarding Cyber-Enabled Disinformation: A Provocation" 6:50:05 Closing Remarks and Best Paper Prize by Dennis Broeders

Timestamps! 12:39 Panel 3 - Emerging Cyber Orders: Nations, Regions and Peripheries 16:26 Courtney Fung - China’s Use of Rhetorical Adaptation in Development of a Global Cyber Order: a case study of the norm of the protection of the public core of the internet 32:39 Bernardo Beiriz - Cybernorms and cyber peripheries - can the process of creating cybernorms be one of inequality production? 47:49 Nnenna Ifeanyi-Ajufo - Cyber Governance in Africa: A Crossroads of Sovereignty, Politics and Cooperation 1:04:50 Cristina Del-Real & Antonio Díaz-Fernández - The future of the governance of cybersecurity in Spain: A Delphi forecasting study 1:27:13 Q&A for Panel 3 3:09:43 Panel 4 - Virtual Crises: Managing Breakdowns 3:12:21 André Barrinha & Arindrajit Basu - Imagining crises: cyber-diplomacy and the lessons from outer space 3:31:24 Mariëlle Wijermars & Tanya Lokot - An ideal in crisis: Critiquing the global politics of internet freedom rankings 3:19:10 Louise Marie Hurel - Breakdowns, Incidents and the Continuity of Crises: An infrastructure approach to the governance of cybersecurity 4:11:44 Q&A for Panel 4 5:14:05 Panel 5 - Cyber Arms Control: Incentives and Challenges 5:16:46 Max Smeets - Explaining the Diffusion of Military Cyber Organizations 5:35:55 Lennart Maschmeyer - The Political Economy of Cyber Knowledge Provision 5:51:08 Taylor Grossman - Offensive Cyber Operations & the Market Incentives for Contracting 6:07:56 Q&A for Panel 5 7:10:45 Keynote Jon Lindsay: "Anarchy within Order: The Political Logic of Deception"

Timestamps! 6:09 Opening by Dennis Broeders 27:55 Keynote Frédérick Douzet: "The Shrinking of Cyberspace: a Blind Spot of Cyber Policy" 2:01:36 Panel 1 | International Law & Cyberspace: New Conundrums 2:06:16 Maroi Kouka - Rethinking the underlying gray zones in the international law applicable to cyber-operations: a data-driven approach 2:20:52 Jack Kenny - State cyber operations, hackbacks and the right of hot pursuit in international law 2:36:15 Ferry Oorsprong - Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Clarifying and Assessing When Cyber-Attacks Trigger the Netherlands’ Right of Self-Defence 2:52:29 Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius - Disinformation-as-a-service: the legal landscape of dark PR 3:07:37 Q&A for Panel 1 4:59:06 Panel 2 | Great Power Perspectives: Sovereignty, Norms and Attribution 5:02:06 Mischa Hansel - Great Power Narratives on the Crisis of Cyber Norm Building: Understanding Legitimization Strategies and Dilemmas 5:19:18 Riccardo Nanni - A Quest for Digital Sovereignty in Internet Governance? Observing the Role of Chinese Stakeholders in ICANN 5:38:29 Oleg Shakirov - Decoding Russia’s Quasi-Attribution of Cyber Attacks 6:02:43 Heajune Lee - Public Attribution as Subject and Source of Cyber Norms 6:17:27 Q&A for Panel 2

Excellent conference. Bookmarking to watch again 6:10 Opening and Welcome by Dennis Broeders 28:00 Keynote by Frédérick Douzet: "The Shrinking of Cyberspace: a Blind Spot of Cyber Policy" 1:10:20 Q&A 2:01:40 Panel 1 | International Law and Cyberspace: New Conundrums (moderator: François Delerue) 2:06:15 "Rethinking the underlying gray zones in the international law applicable to cyber-operations: a data-driven approach", by Maroi Kouka:

Sec Gen of ITU Mr Utsumi is a person who took sovereignty or exclusive right of Internet from US. Internet space is different from high sea which Grotius argued. At least Internet was invented and bling to US government and NGO. Pre-history is important for International Law.

I just wanted to add the *edited (by me)* transcripts of the Q&A part. I put (***) sign where I couldn't catch what speakers say.

*Q6:* _If state sovereignty doesn't apply to cyberspace because it was to be a global commons then how can States react to cyber operations that are held against them below the threshold of force because normally we would say sovereignty is violated. If it's a global commons then you take that away, then how can a state legitimately within international law react to such abuse? How does it fit onto each other if it's a global commons?_ A6: That's a problem for the international lawyers not for me. What they have discovered every time they delve into it is that this cyber operation really doesn't meet the threshold of an act of force. And so you can't say that it's a violation of their sovereignty. It is just some kind of influence or some kind of under the threshold activity so they need to tell us how sovereignty applies to that. And typically they can't. I would say that let's suppose that I do a cyber operation that completely corrupts the electoral machinery of the Netherlands and I determine the winner of the parliamentary elections, that is a clear violation of sovereignty of the Netherlands. Not of cyberspace you have to assert sovereignty over cyberspace to tell that you have a right to protect the integrity of your fundamental political processes that's kind of a confused notion, so there are things that actually do affect your sovereignty and they could be executed through cyber means, but you're not trying to assert sovereignty over cyberspace or a piece of cyberspace, you're simply defending your sovereignty.

*Q5:* _There are proposals like Zion that abandon BGP supported gateway protocol for routing, and instead create deterministic routing and trust zones basiically interfering in this deep layer of the internet to create a trusted zone for traffic. Are you familiar with this proposal? (Mueller: I am not the name of Zion. I mean there has been a debate about deterministic routing in connection with the so-called new IP by Huawei and there have been various discussions of that but I am not familiar with this particular proposal.) Okay, maybe broaden the point out, do you know of any proposals out there that would touch on these deeper layers of the internet in terms of creating different zones that are out there that are actually viable in the medium term?_ *A5:* Well the most interesting recent developments in internet standards have to do with encrypting parts of it and increasing the security of it. So there are some attempts to solve the security problems of BGP sec is probably a disaster that will never go anywhere but our PKI is basically authenticating the address block announcements in routing which is an important form of added security. More interesting is the DNS over HTTPS and TLS 1.3. We see here encrypted standards and that is expanding to new elements of the internet. Not only does DNS over HTTPS sort of shelter or protect the DNS queries but it also bypasses or has a potential to bypass if you wanted to the DNS resolution of the internet service provider. So some people are concerned about the impact on market structure. In fact, we have an IGF workshop on this tomorrow where we'll be talking about the changes in market control or market concentration caused or not caused by DNS over a DOH as we call. But it's been interesting to see when you introduce these security technologies you disrupt power relations as well not in the way that some human rights advocates have been saying, Oh you can hardwire human rights into the protocol, no, that doesn't happen. What happens, for example, TLS 1.3 is now being rejected by Russia and China in certain ways and there's a debate about its adaptation and adoption even within the private industry because it makes internal network traffic non-transparent and some companies think that undermines their security. But what does happen is the control points might shift in the implementation. So it might be suddenly that your internal network has less control over what's going on, less visibility into what's going on and that means the users have more freedom. Or with DOH it means that the control point is shifted from the ISP to the browser manufacturer and the browsers have more access to data than the ISPs.

*Q4:* _Why are the restrictions on Huawei comparable to the US oil mega on Japan. The underlying question here is, does China shoulder any responsibility for the way its technology and platforms are perceived, (***) that is so different from how they are perceived._ _Another of them is about the other side of the story, more the information warfare side of it. China doesn’t seem turning liberal when it comes to free speech. So how do we deal with these kinds of realities where we have authoritarian regimes who are both technologically able and very politically keen on restricting cyberspace as a space for free speech? If that is a given basically for the foreseeable future, how should that impact our own reaction in this sphere basically?_ *A4:* The second question is very interesting and good one having to do with this lack of reciprocity that I talked about earlier. I will save that for later but on the Japanese embargo, I don't know it seems pretty obvious to me that we embargo the Japanese were arising empire that was becoming aggressive and militaristic, and the United States had kind of dominance of oil and gas markets and we decided knowing by the way that this would probably draw us into the war which some people wanted, to cut them off from oil supplies. That's exactly what we're doing with chips. Even though China at the present time is as bad as it is domestically, it is not invading other countries and doesn't have quite the same imperialistic profile as Japan in the 1930s. The other question is a very profound one and I think like I say that's why the future of liberal democracy really depends on finding the right approach to global governance of information and communications and normal forms of territorial governance. I think you don't have to believe that China is miraculously going to turn into democratic liberals if they engage with us. I mean I wrote a book about China in the information age in 1996, and it was clear to me then that what they were doing was exploiting market forces while retaining communist party dictatorship or one-party State. And this was very clear that they had no intention if there were any doubts you know Tiananmen square settled them in terms of how they were going about this development process. So the question, however, is If you go to China today and if you went there, when I started going in the early 90s or in the 80s, you see that economic development does create interdependencies with the Western world that does constrain their behaviour in important ways. And so even though you're not going to liberate the weakers, you are not going to suddenly turn them into the Netherlands, their continued engagement through trade and commerce and transportation is extremely important in moderating and gradually evolving their system of governance. And do not underestimate the ability of the Chinese people to sort of stand up for their rights eventually. I think that will happen. It just as they become wealthier and they will become a little more demanding of what they expect from their government.

*Q3:* _The argument seems to rest on the view of cyberspace of the network that lies beyond territory. It is detached from the real world basically albeit connected at nodes etc. And therefore it's incompatible with sovereignty but he's saying okay but the digital world and the real world are becoming more enmeshed through ubiquitous commuting, smartphones etc. So more and more the internet or cyberspace is creeping into all the nooks and crannies of our day-to-day life. So would we not be better served with an approach toward cyberspace that sees it as part of the world rather than distinct from it. I think this is sort of coming from from the really early conceptions of cyberspace as a new free space devoid of sovereignty so the Perry Barlow kind of notions. But because it's becoming so enmeshed with daily lives, shouldn't we have a different kind of conception of what cyberspace is?_ *A3:* No, I don't think so. I don't think my conception of cyberspace is a Barlow-esque statement that it's a realm of the mind that is somehow detached from the rest of the world. I don't think that's the case at all. I mean you could say that is detached from the world in a physical sense but I mean it is part of the world and so much of what we do depends on satellites, beaming information up and down between the world but we don't try to govern it based on territorial notions. And so what we have is a software-defined space. Yes, you can obtain leverage over what happens in cyberspace to some extent by controlling pieces of equipment in your territory although that is limited because once they're connected they are constantly interacting with devices in no time and simultaneously they are interacting with devices that are all over the world and in outer space and on the oceans So the fact that some of these services, let's take something very intimate and physical that is to say let's say health information and health services in hospitals. So, obviously, there's a very physical and territorial aspect to being treated medically but who cares if the information comes from your county or your state or even your nation as long as it's properly protected and handled. That what matters is the nature of the access to and treatment and processing of the data rather than its territoriality. If we can develop major medical advances by shipping information around all over the place all the time, why not.

*Q2:* _Okay, maybe adding on that, you've talked sort of about sovereignty historically as being a very malleable concept. It sort of fits the powerful basically. Would you suggest reinventing or redefining sovereignty as a concept specifically for cyberspace or apply the existing concept as it is? So in other words, what kind of room to manoeuvre is there to apply a concept that is very foundational even in a mummy form if you like, for international lawyers and diplomats to look at the world? Is there a way to make it malleable so that States to a certain extent can have their cake and eat it to have this substructure in place and then still have some form of sovereignty that they would like?_ *A2:* No, I think that's exactly what I'm saying we shouldn't do. This idea whether it's the Tallinn Manual or similar efforts to define sovereignty in cyberspace, it’s just no. Let's understand that they are conceptually, politically and technically mutually exclusive concepts with the global cyberspace and I don't understand why this is such a problem. We surrender sovereignty over the high seas, we surrender sovereignty over outer space, we have de facto sovereignty over cyberspace, I mean it grew independently of States and within the ecosystem created by a liberalized trading order. But no, I don't want to give States any ability to cling to the idea that the traditional notion of sovereignty can be salvaged as it applies to cyberspace. The point is sovereignty as it evolved, I described it not as just totally a power grab but as economies of scale and governance. So, think of the weights and standards that were created by the consolidation of authority over France for example. It facilitated markets, it facilitated coordination. And think of the expansion of State territory that came with the rise of railroads and the consolidation of Germany into a large nation-state instead of a bunch of fragmented principalities. That's all parts of that process could be brutal but on the other hand, it made a lot of sense. But it makes no sense to try to apply those concepts of territorial boundaries which can, in fact, be a peaceful thing if you're saying okay now we know where your authority ends and mine begins and we're not going to fight over that anymore because I have a border here and I have sovereignty on this side and you have it on that side, you can't do that in cyberspace, it is too interdependent and interacting.

*Q1:* _You say okay we need to recognize the internet as a global commons and in your speech you gave some examples of that happening before. You refer to the high seas, you refer to outer space. If we take the high seas, for example, talking about that in terms of debates started in the 16th century and we had a treaty in 1965, historically for humankind or for States to be more accurate, to relinquish something as being a global common takes some time. And if you look at outer space and you look at the high seas, they are infrastructural and they do not really carry content the way the internet does. So your last point about the emergent problem of content and content control not just for authoritarian States but also increasingly for western States, we’ll probably not make it easier to get to the global commons. So how would you say a trajectory like that look or how would you make that idea more palatable to States who have all these worries on their minds which will block their view on why this is or is not a good idea?_ *A1:* Well, authoritarian States are always going to want to erect barriers to communication. So the only way to overcome that is for their people to gradually struggle with them and extract or decentralize or undermine their authoritarian power. And for the liberal democracies, I think we need to do some thinking about the actual threat. Let me back up and say, what does it mean to have a transnational public sphere and what are the contradictions and problems associated with being open and having a free information environment while at the same time your authoritarian rivals do not. I think that's a very interesting problem and we need to think about it. But I can see a legitimate role for cyber defence in terms of actively identifying coordinated inauthentic activity by nation States for flagging it and making us aware of it and in some cases you know disabling it if it is indeed disruptive and doing things that are undermining rational public discourse. So I think we've gone a little bit too far however in which we are looking to platform content moderation to erase from existence all forms of social deviance, all forms of bad behaviour, all bad ideas, all racist language, and this is just crazy. Sometimes we need to see these things for one thing. If you're talking about some small QAnon type group of conspiracy theorists, I would rather have them openly visible operating on a platform than suppressing them and telling them to go hide out in every deeper holes where they cannot be seen and cannot be held accountable for what they do.