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Antonio Montalban
United States
เข้าร่วมเมื่อ 14 ส.ค. 2020
This channel contains my classes on mathematical logic taught for upper division math students.
La Hipótesis del Continuo
La hipótesis del continuo dice que no hay ningún conjunto cuya cardinalidad esté estrictamente entre la de los números naturales y la de los números reales. Esta charla, parte de una serie sobre los problemas de Hilbert, organizada por la Universidad de la República en Uruguay, contamos lo que se sabe y lo que no sobre esta hipótesis. Contamos un poco sobre el resultado de Gödel quien prueba que no es refutable en ZFC, y el de Cohen, quien desarrolla la técnica de forcing para probar que no es demostrable en ZFC.
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Robuster Scott Rank mini-course --- Day 1/4
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This is the first of four lectures on a 10 hour course on Scott ranks of countable structures geared towards advanced mathematics students with some background on mathematical logic.
Robuster Scott Rank mini-course --- Day 2/4
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Robuster Scott Rank mini-course Day 2/4
Robuster Scott Rank mini-course --- Day 3/4
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Robuster Scott Rank mini-course Day 3/4
Robuster Scott Rank mini-course --- Day 4/4
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Robuster Scott Rank mini-course Day 4/4
Problema 24 de Hilbert -- Simplicidad de demostraciones
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Esta charla es parte del seminario sobre Problemas de Hilbert y del Milenio, organizado en la Universidad de la República, Uruguay. Aunque la pregunta no apareció en la lista, Hilbert fue uno de los impulsores de la creación de una Teoría de Pruebas formales.
46. Logic. Finishing the proof of completeness
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46. Logic. Finishing the proof of completeness
44. Logic. Term Models for maximal consistent sets of formulas
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44. Logic. Term Models for maximal consistent sets of formulas
48. Finishing the proof of equivalent versions of the Axiom of Choice
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48. Finishing the proof of equivalent versions of the Axiom of Choice
45. Logic. Theories that contain term witnesses
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45. Logic. Theories that contain term witnesses
45. Set Theory. The Burali-Forti paradox
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45. Set Theory. The Burali-Forti paradox
44. Set Theory. Comparability of Ordinals
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44. Set Theory. Comparability of Ordinals
38. Logic. Generalization of Constants, change of variables, equality
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38. Logic. Generalization of Constants, change of variables, equality
40. Logic. Maximal Consistent sets of sentences
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40. Logic. Maximal Consistent sets of sentences
36. Logic. The Generalization Metatheorem
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36. Logic. The Generalization Metatheorem
36. Logic. Tautologies in First Order Logic
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36. Logic. Tautologies in First Order Logic
Great video easy to follow
0:32 :( 1:42 :)
At 9:45 , we dont need to take the union with C0 or C1 C2 C3 in any of the following steps, its redundant since in the end when we will take union of C0 C1 C2 we would include all that we had needed, correct me if I am wrong please.
Sir, do you suggest Elliott Mendelson introduction to mathematical logic book for such course?
You are a life saver
Thanks for uploading this Antonio! I have really been enjoying these lectures so far.
I understand the topic Thunk You for this video
On the slide at 13:00, we add a new constant symbol c_phi for every phi. This is infinite constant symbols... but vocabulary must be finite right?
Im actually surprised by how low the number of subscribers and views are, this guy is really a good teacher
How do you know \aleph_0 \leq \kappa in the first place?
So you can define the following,: = A cardinal is an ordinal κ such that κ is not bijective with any ordinal α < κ. How do we even know that this exists? One could start with the cumulative hierarchy, up to omega then iterate, omega + 1 etc but then by the limit we will get omega + omega which is isomorphic to omega. How do we ever reach omega 1, the first infinite cardinal that is not bijective with aleph0 as in your comment? Using the the help set {(n,m)∈ω×ω : 2n+13m+1 ∈X} we can show the existence of this cardinal. It then turns out that the successor of each cardinal is bigger than the last.
Does anyone have a reference for the formalisation of the proof of 2->3?
Can’t the axiom of choice be false. I mean its consequences are pretty unintuitive. And we do live in a discrete not continuous universe
Thinking Why V_omega is a set?
Thanks for the nice intro
Understand the symbols and settings now.
Syntactically implies
logically implies Satisfiable
The language for sentential logic is complete. Thank you, you are my math teacher of math. logic. I know that using "or" and "not" is enough but I don't know why. You explain it very well.
Now, learn the symbols tautologically implies and equivalence
Thank you, I get the idea and I think I can fill in the details later
Thanks you, that’s what I want to know❤
From Xotximilko’s comments From the course website on Math 125 Textbooks: Peter G. Hinman, Fundamentals of Mathematical Logic. Joe Mileti, Mathematical Logic for Mathematicians, Part I. Helbert B Enderton, A mathematical introduction to logic. And for 135 its Enderton's Set Theory .
12:46 To show that x < E(q) < y , we need to show that (i) x is a **proper** subset of E(q) and (ii) E(q) is a ** proper** subset of y. (ii) is true since q does not belong to E(q) while q belongs to y. However, for (i), I cannot understand why x is a **proper** subset of E(q).
I think you are correct, it is possible that x = E(q). Assume this is the case. Since y has no largest element, there exists q', such that q < q' and q' belongs to y. Then we have x < q' < y
@@feigao4793 Thank you very much! I did not expect to get a serious answer. Are you a Berkeley student taking this course? (I am not)
@@dally3825 No problem, I am not a math major, just study math by watching vedios
A sentence is not defined in binary terms by its truth or falsity, it is defined solely by its coherence. Without coherence, or sense, there is no sentence. By "it" I mean a string of letters. If "satisfiable" and "not satisfiable" do not define a set of sentences, what makes sentences a "set"?
8:00 Why aren't we using s bar for the interpretation of the relation anymore?
Working through Modern Mathematical Logic by Mileti on my own. These lectures are a great complement
Thanks; I vaguely remembered this proof from my university class but that was years ago and I couldn't find my old notes. This really helped me remember it.
Thanks
Great work, very nicely explained!
why do you clap 🤔
17:10 If I wanted to use the subset axiom, could I say {{B} × B ∈ P(P(A) × A) : B≠∅} ?
Any detailed proof for the recursion theorem?
th-cam.com/video/SZ_es6DVmJw/w-d-xo.htmlsi=vmufZ2HaF7Bmc3Jo
Thank you so much for sharing these lectures! Professor Montalban, which textbook do you recommend for the Math125 and Math135 materials? I cannot find it online, sadly.
From the course website on Math 125 Textbooks: Peter G. Hinman, Fundamentals of Mathematical Logic. Joe Mileti, Mathematical Logic for Mathematicians, Part I. Helbert B Enderton, A mathematical introduction to logic.
And for 135 its Enderton's Set Theory .
Love it!!!!!!!!!!!
6:39 Why does eq change to supseteq?
Got it: In the first case we want B \ ran(F | seg t) ≠ ϕ but this means that ∃ x \in B \ ran(F | seg t) which means ran(F | seg t) \subseteq B or equivalently ran(F | seg t) supseteq B.
Why can't a set belong to itself in the first place? Will such set lead to any contradictions?
Russell paradox
Doesn't it make more sense to define field(R):=UU R, then we can prove that field(R)=dom(R) U ran(R)? Because otherwise it feels like circular reasoning (we prove field(R)=UU R without having a properly defined field(R)). Of course I'm not doubting the truth of the statement, just the logical progression
we prove the equivalence of the two definitions, so we dont have to worry about this. But I think your Definition is also fine. Sometimes I feel like these fundamental concepts try to appeal to intuition a lot, so the definition have to appear "natural"
Saludos. Tal vez es el „equivalente" al 5⁰ postulado de Eucalides. Ya existe un agercamiento ynmodelo de planteamiento de un constructo geométrico que puede dar una otrra opción de "simplicidad" para una probable teoría de números, cercana a las cortaduras de Dedekind y coherente con Platón, Eudoxo y Charles Aanders Pierce. Due desarrollada desde fines del siglo pasasdo e inicios del presente, con avances en 2008-2010 y su fundamentación fuerte del 2019 a la fecha. Se basa, también como la Geometría de Hilbert, en Lineas y Puntos, siendo la linea "primero" que el punto y amplía el campo a la información y la memoria, elementos fundamentales de la Semiótica. Aborda los problemas derivados de los teoremas de Gödel, teniendo como uno de los fundamentos la Memoria como qualia o cualidad de un modo que implica una dualidad Memoria←→Información y, como en clases y conjuntos. Ojalá les interese iniciar un diálogo al respecto. Desde 2015 a la fecha, incluso una tesis de doctorado en españa comoarte algunos principios con lo postulado desde 2000-2001, y existe desde aprox. el 2015 una escuela en Alemania que usan, en un modelo similar más no equivalente, al modelo AHXIOM. Me encantará poder iniciar un diálogo al respecto. Gracias.
Amazing proof! Thank you very much :)
If you allow the universe to include transfinite levels of power set, then how could the axiom of regularity be possibly conceivable? By constructing V_omega you have built a set of infinite depth.
Every set beyond v_0 contains the empty set since the power set of v_0 is a subset thereof. The intersection of any set with the empty set is the empty set, which satisfies the axiom. Depth is not relevant here.
@@afunnycat7102 But the axiom of regularity entails the non-existence of infinitely descending sequences, and a set of infinite depth would have exactly that.
@@Aesthetycs The key word here is descending. V_omega may be infinite, but by definition all of its elements are finite. For any element you pick the descent through its membership hierarchy to the empty set takes only finitely many steps.
@@afunnycat7102 I think you might have missed my point. The universe is constructed through taking power set iteratively, and each time you take the power set you generate sets one level deeper. Hence with omega level universe you would have obtained set of infinite depth, containing a chain of infinite descent.
@@Aesthetycs Intuitively, you'd think so. But rigorously you can't construct this chain. You start with V_omega and the next step in the descent necessarily has a finite index, meaning the chain terminates in finitely many steps.
The Russel Paradox argument for the universe not being a set is unsound, since there are set theories avoiding such paradox. The valid way to prove it is through the power set cardinality argument.
Thank you.
What is the difference between “structure” “model” “interpretation” and “semantics” in first order logic and propositional logic?!
What is the difference between “structure” “model” “interpretation” and “semantics” in first order logic and propositional logic?!
What is the difference between “structure” “model” “interpretation” and “semantics” in first order logic and propositional logic?!
KIND SIR, WHAT IS THE difference between a “model” and an “interpretation” and “semantics”?
There are no difference.
Defining for all using for all seems circular, same for exists...Wouldn't it be more precise to define them considering the formula a function of arity n, where n is the number of free vars, that goes to {true, false}, then for all is true if the function image is {true}... similar approach for exists...
I believe the difference is that red symbols are in the language we are interested in and the black symbols are in the metalanguage that we use to reason about the language, so those for all's and there exists's are actually distinct
How to prove that the assignment at the end to all the variables still satisfy every finite subset in gamma
After reading online, you can justify this by noticing that a finite subset of formulas can only include finitely many variables, which means that the assignment to the later variables doesn't matter since it is not even present in the formula
Formally, after we construct v, then for every finite subset of formula, you can find n so that all variables are among the first n variables. Then since there is a assignment v' compatible with v_n satisfying all finite subset of formula in gamma, this assignment has the same assignment of variables as v for the first n variables and hence v will satisfy the finite subset as well since the finite subset only use first n variables and is satisfied by v'
But isn't this superfluous due to the fact that we built up the truth value assignment recursively?
@@tesafilm8447The issue is kind of minor. But it is mainly because I was trying to think through the details as I was not so familiar with this kind of logic. So after the construction, you get an assignment of all variables. This is not the same as any finite assignment you get. So you can't just say this assignment also satisfy the property immediately. The only thing you know is that, for any finite assignment there is some compatible assignment with no guarantee that the assignment you just got is that compatible assignment
@@tesafilm8447however since formula are finite, this is indeed the case here. Because all formula in gamma is already satisfied in a finite prefix because all the variables are already assigned
Hey love your channel. May I ask a couple questions: Hey so here are the “soft” questions I have compiled. If anything is unclear just let me know! 1) Does naive set theory require attaching a logic to it to “work” or does logic require set theory to “work”? I am having trouble understanding the true nature of their relationship and they seem really connected during this first pass through some TH-cam videos. 2) With just naive set theory - no first order logic - can we make truth valuations? Can we even do anything at all in set theory without logic? 3) why is “first order logic” “fully axiomatizable”, but “independence-friendly first order logic” and “second order logic” isn’t? 4) Does this mean we can’t trust “independence-friendly first order set theory” and “second order logic” to always make true statements? If not, what consequences does it have if a logic isn’t fully axiomatizable? Thanks so much!
Hey i can try answering the first question. So when I was learning logic in university, my professors always said that we have an undeniable advantage in learning set theory if we knew even a little bit of logic. Eventually you have to pick up logic to learn even some of the most basic forms of set theory but the opposite is not true like you can get away with intermediate logic without touching on any set theory, its only when you climb the ladder a bit more that you've to worry. But I seriously think that one should pick up logic before learning any philosophical style math - since it is theoretical to quite the large extent, it is important we know how to apply logic so we do not loose track.
@@hokageari1746 this montelban guy is such an asshole. Why put up these videos if you aren’t gonna answer questions! He can’t really think us self-learners can grasp all of this independent!
@@hokageari1746 this montelban guy is very selfish for not answering anybody’s questions.
at 3:50 , on screen, how is “the set of all natural numbers below 10” equal to { x in N l x is prime } ?
It might have been a little late to answer this question, but it says „the set of all natural numbers such that x is a prime“