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Thanks for that profound comment, Xavier. Those are interesting links to the Sacrament of Marriage: both the necessity for freedom and (in Catholic thought, at least; if freely chosen) irrevocability. I still think that, in the context of Fr. De Young's talk, reincarnation isn't the 'Charybdis,' because it isn't the opposite to the 'Scylla' of gnosticism-Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return of all things is, because it preserves everything just as it is.

That's a great quotation even though it is wordy. Eric Weinstein talks a lot about what he calls portals. The idea is that there is a period of transition an growth that is difficult and in some sense violent, especially if you refuse to pass through willingly. He uses the Exodus as an example. I find that idea useful hear. Death is, as far as we can see, our greatest portal. It connects also with Jesus words "For whoever would save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake will find it." I appreciate your thoughts.

That's a beautiful quote; I don't think there's anything in it I'd disagree with. What's the chapter/page number, by the way? I do think exploring the question of what happens after we die is important, however. The existence and nature of an afterlife can have tremendous practical effects in this life, positive or negative. In relation to the specific subject I'm wrestling with: the belief in a life after death devoid of suffering and violence is important because it grounds an ethic (the Christian ethic) in which suffering and violence are ultimately evil (note the 'ultimately'). The Nietzschean contention is that this has tremendously negative practical effects, over time, because it is misaligned with the basic nature of life and reality. Even if we forego an analytic exploration of the afterlife, we're still left with the question of values. I would say the exploration of the question of eternal life can illuminate the the question of values-of how to act in and relate to this life. My current hunch is that the Christian belief in life after death is an abstraction of certain elements of this life, which can't actually be separated from the complex, temporal, temporary, morally ambivalent whole which is this life. Likewise, Christian values... Thus it may be valuable to indulge in some left-brained critical analysis (as McGilchrist does) of a left-brained abstracted view precisely in order to put it back in its proper right-brained place.

@@sirasksalot8282 I think there are problems identifying the individual subject with our individual sense of self; in this I am in sympathy with Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. And because of this, I think I can agree with you that we should treat death as our greatest portal, though without believing in an individual afterlife. It is perhaps the life (or Life, or 'God') that lives through 'me' that grows through my individual life and death.

@@gpxavier Thank you! Just to refer you to the correct page number: I have the e-book version, but this should probably be clear enough: Vol. II / Part III "THE UNFORESEEN NATURE OF REALITY" - Chapter 28 of _The Matter with Things_ "The Sense of the Sacred," (pp. 1193-1304) under "WHY IT MATTERS" (specifically the last two pages of the subsection "Religion or spirituality: a matter of societal flourishing?") right before the final subsection of the chapter (on "EVIL") Footnotes 341-344 are relevant for this quote.

Nietzsche is certainly selective for power and against 'the weak and the botched'. I think he wrestles with and overcomes the poisonous emotional force of that on a personal level (or at least, goes some way toward this) in Zarathustra: on the deepest level he affirms all that is weak and botched, inasmuch as they exist and are part of the whole picture of life. Yet he still expresses these strong sentiments in later writing. I think we have to see this particular selectivity as reflecting his view of life itself: life affirms all that is while, at exactly the same time, it ruthlessly selects-and precisely on the basis of power, energy, efficiency, fitness, etc. Because life's nature selects based on power, while at the same time affirming all that is-so does the individual Nietzsche. It's not an arbitrary view or preference, but grounded in the nature of things. Likewise, if the nature of life or reality is self-sacrificial love... so with Christ and the individual Christian.

It's a good question. The truest but perhaps least helpful answer is: no, because I don't currently affirm anything eternally, because I'm not a convinced Nietzschean and haven't yet tried in any really deep way to live that worldview. But to inhabit it for a moment, at least in imagination: the answer has to be yes. There is horror there, sure-perhaps enough to drive one mad, if one really dwells on it. Likewise, I know that there are forms of affliction I could directly suffer that would effectively destroy me, just as there are uncountable things that could happen to destroy me physically. But if the only alternative is eternal nonbeing, the universe never arising-do you choose that instead? If to say say yes to existence is to say yes to all that is possible, those are the options we have (or refusing to choose). I would take some solace in the fact that literal eternal return is no longer cosmologically viable. Lives as 4D objects in spacetime is perhaps the best way of expressing the same idea in current physics, but it's subtly different in the sense that these lives aren't really occurring again and again, they just are, they happen 'once' and then they 'end'-from 'within' that life everything happens once and then ends, even though objectively they remain, if you will, timelessly real. Finally, we must be careful to distinguish the kind of affirmation we can apply to existence itself from the kinds of affirmation we can apply within existence (or particular domains of existence). Affirming everything need not be to morally affirm it. I think that one can morally deny something at the same time that, on a deeper level, one affirms it as a possible manifestation of being.

@@gpxavier Thank you! Clear. Now I believe we are moving closer to understanding each other. Your last two sentences articulate what I tried to convey previously (also using the DBH quotations), and I believe that's more or less the potentially Christian way of looking at ultimate reality, i.e. _"Affirming everything need not be to morally affirm it. I think that one can morally deny something at the same time that, on a deeper level, one affirms it as a possible manifestation of being."_ - Where we differ is that you think that on a deeper level Christianity does not affirm it, I take it? Something to discuss.

@@gpxavier I love what you said about living the worldview. I think that is a key to this conversation. These are more than just ideas; they are meant to be lived and that is really the only way to test them. I really appreciate that Nietzsche from what I understand of him really experienced his ideas and lived with them in some sense. I wanted to say that but I also have a question and consideration. You said you take solace in knowing the eternal return is not possible, and that you do not currently affirm anything eternally. What do you think about the idea existentially, though? Is one moment or perhaps a few moments in your life enough to justify whatever has or ever could happen to you? In my case I find the question challenging, and enlightening. If it is something that I can say yes to without having experienced it, then I find myself agreeing with Nietzsche. There are things in my life that I would not trade anything for, even with the uncertainty of the future. Ironically, it is why I could sing Gods praise for ten thousand years. There are moments in my life like Nietzsche described that make eternal life worth living.

@@arono9304 Thanks for that, Aron-I suspect we really do agree far more than we seem to disagree 🙂 To your question, though: yes, it seems that way to me.

@@sirasksalot8282 Thanks for sharing that, Rex. I think on the existential level the thought of eternal return is incredibly powerful and helpful. It's a challenge to see your life in a different light (if you're resentful, for instance) and a challenge to relate to it and act in it in a way you could genuinely affirm eternally-though without introducing all the problems of eternal duration (after all, it is the finite, definite, delimited life that returns again and again). I think the sense that 'this moment justifies all the others' is just a starting point-ideally, life is a whole and must be affirmed as a whole. One can move from that perspective to seeing all the other moments, even the more banal or 'bad' as having both a unique and interconnected worth, rather than just being necessary prerequisites for the good moments. Of course, there may be moments and lives (let's assume, for sake of argument, through no fault of one's own) so horrible that an actual human being could never affirm them for eternity. I don't think the thought of eternal return is some foolproof means of existential salvation. Rather than leading me to reject being, though, this gives me a sense of trembling awe while deepening my gratitude. So much is beyond my control; what is in my control I will seize and use for the utmost good. What you say resonates with me. I'll concede that in moments of vast joy, love, vitality, and gratitude-in these moments one feels like one could live forever, could sing God's praises forever.

I'll bet you stop listening on all kinds of impulses.

@@geoffr4018 so in otherwords you irrationally hate men?

I think you're spot-on: every monotheistic or monist theology is going to need to harmonize with duality somehow, considering how integral the latter is to human experience. The crucial point would be just how this is done and the relative weight given to each.

The bible says to not worship false idols, thus excluding any other deity then the hebrew god considering it's not mentioned what other real gods are unless we consider gods like Asherah and the other hebrew gods.

thats logic and you're on to something as opposed to the Egyptians who were monotheistic. wouldn't happen to be related to theogony by any chance would it?

@@gaypigeon5365 Could you please provide a reference for the term you use, "not worhip false idols". Thanks. Because that's not the words used in the 10 commandments, so I'm guessing it's elsewhere?

@@ADEpoch exodus 20:4-5 and 20:23, deuteronomy 4:15-19, 1 john 5:21, romans 1:25 and exodus 32

@@gaypigeon5365 As expected, most of those do not mention "false" idols. The only one that pertains to what you say is in fact Romans 1:25. Written by a time where monotheism had well and truly been adopted by the Jews (around the Hasmonean period). I sugegst a study of Deuteronomy 32:8-9 and Psalm 82. But use a combination of the DSS and MT to see the details, not an English translation.

Thanks Rex-it was truly a blessing for me as well, and more than compensated for any suffering/difficulty from disagreement! To chip in regarding your questions: 1. I feel like Jordan Hall and Nietzsche are in agreement, based on what I've heard from them; the question would be whether Jordan Hall and Christianity are. I think we've definitely gone some way to showing how they could be. 2. Based on my understanding of Christianity, I think the proposed reconciliation is consistent with it. There are inherent limitations to our being creatures rather than God. The question would be how far those limitations extend: whether just to our not being infinite, or to chaos and suffering/difficulty as well. We know from our experience of living that there are forms of unpleasantness we readily embrace because they are entwined with greater flourishing. To call them 'unpleasantness' or 'suffering' may even be misleading (and this perhaps goes to your objection to the term) because they are so entwined that the overall experience is positive; we might only be able to separate them out as aspects in a somewhat artificial way. Exercising, doing fulfilling but effortful work, helping someone we deeply love. If Christianity affirms creation, it is consistent with it that these things should be preserved when creation is perfected: they are inherent to being creatures, not just to being fallen creatures. One may take a negative attitude to them; but then one might take a negative attitude to ontological finitude itself, as Satan resented being a mere creature rather than infinite and supreme. One doesn't have to; one may instead allow them to be the blessing that they are. All this without affirming gratuitous and evil suffering that isn't inherent to creaturely limitation but merely a result of the Fall. I think this is a promising and potentially compelling vision. My questions for you would be: 1. What exactly is the Fall? How can we make sense of it, when there appears to have been no such event that we can detect in the history of humanity or the universe, and the history of life on earth and of the universe predates human life by billions of years? If it is metaphorical, how are we to understand it, considering that in this proposal fallenness has a direct bearing on the nature of life and the universe? 2. How exactly can we distinguish between suffering which is beneficial and inherent to creaturely being, and that which is gratuitous and evil? What criteria do we have to guide us? In the present day, there are people who propose genetically engineering predation out of wild animals, neurologically removing the possibility of pain from humans, eliminating human aging and death. There are also people who seek to minimize distress to others to such a degree that they arguably impair their development of responsibility and strength and confuse their sense for truth.

To the second question, since I’m not theologically equipped to address the first: I don’t think you can draw a neat, clear delineation between suffering that is useful and suffering that is gratuitous. Suffering is inherently experiential and individual-it doesn’t exist outside of the organisms it affects. So it’s up to each individual person to decide for themselves what their suffering means to them, whether it seems minor or incalculable to an “objective” lens. I come from the perspective that suffering can be a path to meaning and purpose, even or especially when unavoidable, through the taking on of that suffering and choosing in the existentialist or Stoic sense how to respond emotionally, mentally, and physically. If Viktor Frankl can survive four different death camps during the Holocaust and write about the beauty and meaning he experienced in that time, it seems both facile and unnatural to ascribe “good” or “bad” categorization to it. I feel like it’s much more grey. To quote Frankl, “What is to give light must endure burning.” By the same token, I think there should be a distinction between evil and suffering. Yes, we should try to reduce malefic acts with intent to harm, especially innocents. That is entirely separate from trying to rid ourselves of natural processes like grief, aging, loss, and death. If suffering is inherently of the experience of finite creatures created in the image of the infinite, we make ourselves less human by avoiding it-and can we actually? I think it’s important to cultivate a mindset of acceptance of what is and approach it gracefully rather than living in fear of suffering. I think it’s natural to want to reduce it, because a person with any grounding in morality doesn’t like to see others suffer, but there are places and times where it’s not only proper, but necessary. Especially grief, because that grief is natural growth and the response to a loss of something significant and loved. I think there’s a quote of Kübler-Ross’s worth remembering: "The reality is that you will grieve forever. You will not 'get over' the loss of a loved one; you will learn to live with it. You will heal and you will rebuild yourself around the loss you have suffered. You will be whole again but, you will never be the same. Nor should you be the same, nor would you want to." - Elizabeth Kubler-Ross and John Kessler Apologies for being long winded. Hopefully that’s intelligible.

Thank you for sharing your thoughts! They're profound, and I mostly agree with them. If I were a fully believing, fully practicing Christian, this would be the approach I would take. You referred to the key difference with the Nietzschean view regarding what comes before or after. (I take it this is an allusion to Eden and the General Resurrection?) My question to you would be: what if this 'before' and 'after' are just projections of longings that only make sense relative to the dynamics of life as it actually is now (i.e. life with suffering)? When we suffer or exert ourselves too much for too long, we want peace and rest; we exert ourselves at all because we wish for greater happiness. But when we have rested, we gladly plunge back into the strife of living; when we have achieved what we thought would make us happy, we suffer again as we yearn for something still greater. So what if we had ONLY peace and happiness? Is that even conceivable? Is it even something we would WANT? The Nietzschean proposal is something like this: what if life itself, with all its strife and suffering, is the thing itself-the truly valuable thing, the thing that GIVES value to states of Edenic peace and glorious resurrection, which are really just ever-repeated moments WITHIN it and cannot be conceived as encompassing it (as though they could exist on their own terms or be extended forever)? Please reach out if you'd like to talk further! My email is my username at protonmail.com 🙂

_"This dissertation examines a hitherto neglected aspect of the problem of nihilism. Beginning with Nietzsche''s insight that nihilism is the product of what he considers Christianity''s misinterpretation of suffering, I consider the importance of suffering in Nietzsche''s philosophy and reconstruct his contrast between his own, life-affirming perspective and Christianity''s nihilistic, life-negating one. In this, I have two basic projects. The first is to offer a re-interpretation of Nietzsche, based on his published works, particularly those from his final two productive years (1887 and 1888). In the works Zur Genealogie der Moral, Gotzen-Dammerung, Ecce Homo, and Der Antichrist, Nietzsche offers his own, life-affirming perspective on suffering, amor fati ("love of fate"), his "Dionysian" perspective. In Nietzsche''s own account in Ecce Homo, the conflict between his philosophy and Christianity is decisive. I try to take that account seriously, and to show how this contrast between "Dionysus and the Crucified," between two opposing perspectives on human suffering, is the central theme of his philosophy. My second project is to respond to Nietzsche''s criticisms of Christianity. I try to do this, while at the same time showing what kind of religious critic he is, and what kind of resource he can be for understanding Christianity. Nietzsche is adept at highlighting how a certain strand of the Christian tradition can lead to nihilism. Nietzsche''s criticisms reveal a tension inherent in the Christian tradition, a tension between negating the world (because of the suffering it contains) and denying the reality of suffering (because of faith in a redemptive God). Nietzsche equates Christianity with the first extreme, the nihilistic rejection of the world. This is largely what he means by the "Crucified," that the death of god on the cross means the rejection of this world. Although I disagree that this is the "essence" of Christianity, Nietzsche''s attacks clarify the danger of nihilism that lies at one extreme of the Christian tradition. I briefly review certain claims by Augustine and Leibniz to show how, at its best, Christianity maintains the tension between these extremes, and affirms this world while acknowledging the reality of suffering."_

From the little I know of Nietzche-particularly, the common view of him as one of the great philosophical atheists-, it seems to me that he denies the possibility of a higher kind of life. Since Christianity is based on the purpose of God becoming man "so that they may have life, and to have it in abundance," the bracketing of any life that's not strictly understood as this biological life (this life we share with other animals and plants), will necessarily lead to a skewed criticism.

​@@xaviervelascosuarez It depends on what is meant by "higher" life. Nietzsche often alluded to "higher individuals" ("Höhere Menschen"). Nietzsche also thought that, while we _are_ in an important sense biological animals, we are interesting animals due to our capacity for valuations, among other important aspects. I'm not sure I'm fully grasping your point other than that, would you mind expanding? My thinking is not theologically oriented.

@@arono9304 You are right. I'm starting from the assumption that the vision of a humanity devoid of its transcendent dimension is a limited and impoverished one. I trust that, as long as this transcendent dimension is a reality, you would also agree with this assumption. Christianity relies conclusively on it, so it makes no sense to criticize it while assuming human insignificance at the level where it emphatically maintains the fullness of meaning can only be found. You must first prove that there's no higher life that humans can aspire to beyond the biological, a life that transcends both space and time-all space and time, and not just the individual's. Otherwise, you'd be criticizing a tennis player with the standards that can only be applied to football. In other words, Christianity-and most, if not all religions, for that matter-only makes sense if its claims to an eternal life that fulfills all of humanity's seemingly infinite longings for joy, truth, love and beauty are indubitably established. Once these claims are debunked, only then all and any critics can be justified. Of course, at that point, all criticism becomes pointless-and so the criticism of any religion, for that matter.

@@xaviervelascosuarez I see, thank you for clarifying. I partly agree and partly do not. I do not agree in the sense that I believe we should apply the principle of parsimony / Occam's razor - sometimes the kind of approach that you suggest above motivates disagreement and confusion where there does not have to be any. For instance, you will lose many potential conversation partners _directly_ through such an approach who will be alienated by its jargon, and then I'm not even considering its potential falsity (which Occam's razor aimed to combat). I do, however, agree in the sense that I believe conscious experience is primary, and our conscious experience informs us of modes of existence that easily challenge the general picture of reductive materialists. Rejecting this would, again, be problematic from the perspective of applying the principle of parsimony. In other words, I'm likely sympathetic to many of your conclusions but I do not always share the means to arrive at them. Thank you for laying out your approach so clearly.

Consider also: _"Dostoiewsky who, incidentally, was the only psychologist from whom I had anything to learn: he belongs to the happiest windfalls of my life"_ (TI, §45) - What did he learn? Nietzsche was clearly conflicted: _"I value him as the most valuable psychological material I know - I am, in a strange way, grateful to him, however much he goes against my basest instincts."_ (Letter to Georg Brandes) Consider finally: _"Jesus: Dostoyevsky - I know only one psychologist who has lived in a world where Christianity is possible, where a Christ can arise at any moment… That is Dostoyevsky. He guessed Christ"_ You may have come across these passages before (e.g in my writing) - but I think this part should not be dismissed when considering Nietzsche still held this view after the Dionysus vs. The Crucified passage you keep referring to.

I personally think several stories in the bible don't condemn suffering as such (e.g. Job, which - again - Nietzsche thought _affirmed_ life), but meaningless suffering. Nietzsche even held that this is the case for Christians (though he is undoubtedly more positive about pagans and attic Greeks in this regard: _"What actually arouses indignation over suffering is not the suffering itself, but the senselessness of suffering: but neither for the Christian, who saw in suffering a whole, hidden machinery of salvation, nor for naïve man in ancient times, who saw all suffering in relation to spectators or to instigators of suffering, was there any such senseless suffering."_ (GM II.§7) Nietzsche mostly takes the utilitarian philosophers to task (and Epicurean hedonists) for wanting to get rid of suffering, _not_ the Christians

@@arono9304 While I appreciate allusiveness in general, it can get in the way of debate when debate is necessary. It seems to me there's a particular view of Christianity you're defending, but so far I haven't been able to grasp what it is. What exactly is your vision of a life-affirming Christianity, and how does it evade the problem that I (and Nietzsche) have put? How does the belief in an eternal blissful afterlife devoid of suffering NOT condemn suffering as such? Or are you proposing a Christianity without belief in an afterlife? Even in the last quote above: the "hidden machinery of salvation" suggests the very meaning of Christian suffering is as a means to ultimately escape suffering. In a way, this is an even stronger condemnation of suffering: its only value is as a way to its own removal. This accords with what Xavier said about suffering being meaningless without the advent of Christ. Likewise, as per JMF's thesis abstract, if Christianity is a tension between negating the world because of its suffering and denying the reality of the suffering (through faith in redemption)-again, I don't see how either of those extremes evade denigration of the actual world. The Nietzschean position (probably impossible for any person but coherent nonetheless) being something like: affirming the world AND the reality of its suffering.

Is your position that the essence of Christianity (or what Christianity ought to be if it truly followed Christ) is what Nietzsche outlines in sections 32-35 of The Antichrist (purified of any contempt)? Christ as perfectly 'innocent'-in the sense of both blameless and childlike (Myshkin-idiotic). The utterly inward-oriented, knowing no rules or dogmas, united with the 'God' who is utmost inward reality and bliss. The utterly practical, in the sense that this way of living is everything, doctrine nothing. The utterly present-focused, as the experience of union with the inner One is present and timeless, and death and any 'life after death' infinitely less real than it. The utterly beyond (because utterly 'before') revenge or ressentiment... On that last point, that would create a nice symmetry with Dionysus: Christ and Dionysus are both immune from ressentiment, though in different ways: Christ 'below' or 'before' it (not even comprehending it); Dionysus above it, (at least inasmuch as he coincides with Zarathustra) having gone through it. Or maybe: Dionysus immersed in and fully affirming the world; Christ immersed in and fully affirming the reality upon which it is based...?

A side note on that, too: the similarity of Nietzsche's description of Christ to Eastern enlightenment is striking (and no doubt intentional, given the references to Samkhya and Lao Tzu). Hinduism has more resources for dealing with these two ideals, I think... while it doesn't exactly make Dionysus (full affirmation of the manifest world) the chief ideal, it does have Shiva-the god who dances-and the world is God's lila (divine play). But the chief ideal is something like Christ as Nietzsche describes him (perhaps also epitomized by Shiva in his other aspect: the yogi/ascetic). But it doesn't have any vision of the manifest world being 'perfected' or 'redeemed'-limitation and suffering are intrinsic to it; if they weren't there it wouldn't be the world, but Brahman himself. One could therefore immerse in and affirm the world OR immerse in and affirm its basis (or perhaps both?). But I feel like the logic of Christianity (the actual, historical system) muddies and nullifies this by holding out the vision of a perfected world: one is therefore prevented from affirming the world as it is AND affirming its divine basis oblivious to it (as Nietzsche suggests Christ did).

Thanks, Xavier! I'll email you 🙂

Thanks for your thoughts. I had a similar experience with Nietzsche when I was much younger. Now coming back to him after (at least somewhat) overcoming that immature egoism and developing some virtue, I see his thought in a much deeper and richer way. I think it's important to recognize Nietzsche himself was mature and virtuous when he developed his thought; so we should be wary of the less mature interpretations.

I'd suggest that, if anything, you used a partial understanding of Nietzsche to rationalise a nihilistic turn in your life.

Again I’m much keener to take nietzsche at his word. I do not think a bridge can be built between his “virtuous” and “mature” thought and reality. I think he really did despise the Christian path. I think he really did misunderstand the spiritual reality of things, in a very bad way. I suppose I’m happy that he points to Kierkegaard, who for him was probably a bridge figure, but to me was honest with the fear problem and who sought answers in a truly profound way. Again, I can’t beat back the Nietzcheans, especially on the internet, but I’m grateful you let me share my thoughts.

Will to Power is essentially a compilation of excerpts from his notebooks - as I understand it, it's contentious because of the selection and arrangement, but Nietzsche did write those notes. This particular one accords very well with his own published work, so I don't think there's any reason to disregard it.

Thanks Erica! I can totally respect that approach to faith 🙂 I think what you said about will to power having no rest is less of a problem if you consider it as joy rather than hunger (stemming from abundance rather than lack). Does God's will to power in creation need any rest?

@@gpxavier yes I think you’re right. Violent joy lol there is always that necessary tension that creates growth and change. It’s kind of synonymous with the life force or God itself . . . maybe?

@@erica_mSoFla I would tend to agree with that... I think there's a hidden theism in Nietzsche 😉

​@@gpxavier "Does God's will to power in creation need any rest?" Yes! On the 7th day!😂

Thank you, Aron! Do you mean the video on Lucifer? I'll check it out 😀

Just watched it - a beautiful video! I'm wondering exactly how you see it fit into the puzzle?

​@@gpxavier​ Sorry for the late response G.P.! - There is something about the way in which Christianity arguably already integrates far more than what people usually argue it exclusively stands in stark opposition to. This is I think Pageau's point connected to Lucifer, and we can similarly discuss the extent to which that applies to Dionysus

Saying that is just opinion-based, off of what you already assume is the case, which is begging the question. Even if Christianity was "escapist", that wouldn't falsify it as a worldview.

​@@JordanX767worldviews proper aren't based upon a universal rational standard and so can only be 'falsified' under their own terms

@@F--BSeems right.

Thank you-that means a lot! May his memory be a blessing 🙂

Interesting! Can you say a bit more about this?

I think this is a promising approach. The question would be how these two orientations can be made to work together (or in productive opposition) rather than getting in the way of each other. Can one serve two masters? (or is that the wrong way to frame it?)