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great video! thank you!

Ağzınıza sağlık :)

Thank you for your video. It really helped me to better understand the iteration method in infinite games. Greetings from Germany.

Thank you, really helpful and motivating video to get me into the mood of solving seemingly arbitrary static imperfect info games. This gives some much needed context, to the otherwise stale method-focused material on the topic out there.

Thank you very much ! I find very helpful your videos

thx so much the visual of the fixed point theorem really helped

How can you mathematically evaluate the symmetry in step 4?

Hello, why haven't you differentiated between delta1 and delta2? While it doesn't make a difference for 2 rounds, shouldn't it matter 3rd round onwards? Or are you assuming both players to be equally patient? Thanks for the informative video.

What happens to the marginal cost of firm 1 = 10. Why didnt we use it?

Thank you so much! Greetings from Germany

lovely explanation, thank you!

Hello, a small question, I am following your videos and the complete course. I wanted to ask you, what book do you recommend for the rest of the subject? For example, the game theory part, mixed strategies, dynamic games, etc. Thank you so much

Hello, what book do you recommend that includes exercises like the one in the video?

Helped clarify the concept of Bayesian update in Game theory! I was hung up at how it works! 3 minutes DONE! Thanks.

This is true gold. Thanks so much!

Thank you for considering a new playlist for Game Theory. Your lectures are crisp and informative, helps me a lot to grasp the fundamental concepts.

There's a market with n = 4 oligopolistic firms. The industry-wide output of is Q = 60 metric kilotons and a market price of (when expressed per metric kiloton) p = 30 mio. €. The marginal cost parameters are c1=6, c2=7, c3=8 and c4=9 (total cost per firm: ci * qi). The firms in this market can be best thought of as choosing outputs (not prices). Assume that the inverse market demand function can be described by the following functional form: Price = A - bQ. How can we find the NE if we have two unknown? Being A and b if we have the input of A = 30 + 60b?

that's a very intuitive explanation, thanks for the dedication!

thanks

Thank you! There is many people on here talking about how to read empirics, but you are the first person I found discussing how to approach theory in econ

thanks a lot professor. it was so helpfull

Thank you!

Hello, thank you very much for the video! I read some papers and they were talking about this game not having pure strategy NE but mix strategy NE. Could you please explain at the end why did you say that there is no MSNE. Thank you very much

what textbook have you used in the video, if any?

Great!

Hi Naomi! Could you please provide the source from which you are picking that concrete form of the utility function? I am working in group tasks seen as PGGs and this form of the utility function is particularly convenient. Thanks!

Thank you for the video! I do have a (relatively) related question: I know the threshold public good game (with binary effort) by Palfrey and Rosenthal, but I don't know if anyone has done any work on the arbitrary effort. May I know if this reminds you of any particular papers?

situation is two firms compete in same market and situation are, suppose; (1) (current condition of market) firm A has 60% market share and firm B has 20 % under the competition policy (2) Firm A has 40% and Firm B also has 40% (3) Firm A has 30 % and Firm B has 60 market share. So how we proof it Nash equilibrium through game theory ? Please help me in this matter. Thank You Professor

Thank you for your explanation professor

shouldn't be 130-q1-q2?

Great job

What if for the ultimatum game (one round) the payoff of reject were 0,5, 0,5?

Thankyou so much ma’am for explaining each n every thing thoroughly 🙏

this video really helped me out, thank you, Naomi!

thank you prof

Very helpful and clear thanks a lot!

Thank you so much for this video!

mam your lectures are amazing it would be great if you could upload other lectures of game theory too

Wait I thought first-price auctions weren't incentive compatible (4:43)

I think there is a mistake at (0:57): it says "valuations are uniform on [0,1]" but the example v's go up to 6. Also, do you know what would the situation look like if the distribution was discrete? Thanks

You've explained it perfectly, all your Game Theory videos are really helpful, Thank you!

you didnt mention games of chance and games of skill. only games of strategy

That's a curious choice of terminology, where is it from? I've only ever heard the term "normal-form game" used synonymously to strategic-form i.e. games represented by functions from a set of strategy profiles to payoffs (sometimes denoted as a matrix).

this is helping me understand game theory better

Very professional teaching! Thank you Prof. Utgoff.

Really helpful

thanks

thanks so much madam this is really awesome and helpful.

amazing explanation

I m also student of game theory and working on some new results of fixed point in game theory